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Abstract 
 
 
 
This dissertation aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of two separate, yet 
interrelated subjects; ASEAN and constructivist scholarship in the study of it. The 
particular focus is on ASEAN’s performance, its actorness, within the confines of the 
first pillar of the ASEAN Community, the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). 
This takes place against the backdrop of a great number of academic analyses 
informed by constructivist research parameters and characterised by a remarkable 
optimism regarding ASEAN’s agency in matters of security in the International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific. 
Specifically, this thesis questions the constructivist bias in perspectives on ASEAN’s 
autonomous agency on the regional security canvas and intends to analyse ASEAN’s 
tangible impact on and contribution to regional security against this optimistic 
analytical background. It inquires as to ASEAN’s security actorness in the Asia-Pacific 
region and will try to reconcile empirical results and constructivist assessments. To 
that end, this research has devised a simple “demand and supply model” by which 
constructivist “demand” put forward is analysed and measured against the “supply” 
of ASEAN regional security actorness. The demand-supply balance is assessed with 
the help of three case studies of some of the most pressing security threats and 
issues facing Southeast Asia today. 
This thesis finds that constructivist influenced perspectives are characterised by 
similar analytical weaknesses and just like the association itself, unduly credit ASEAN 
with remarkable ability to influence Asian security. Following a thorough assessment 
of both academic literature and ASEAN’s tangible performance, this thesis comes to 
the conclusion that although ASEAN does play an important role in regional security, 
its degree of actorness misses optimistic expectations as well as ASEAN’s own 
ambitions spectacularly. While acknowledging both the merits of ASEAN as an 
organisation and constructivist contributions, based on solid empirical evidence this 
research intends to induce a sense of realism back into the study of Southeast Asian 
security. Finally it shall be argued that the analytical framework of institutional 
realism is most appropriate to discuss ASEAN. 
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Frequent Abbreviations 
 
 
 
AC15 ASEAN Community; launched in 2015 
 
ADMM 
(ADMM+) 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting                                                           
(incl. Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia, and U.S.) 
AEC ASEAN Economic Community 
 
AHRD ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
 
AICHR ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
AMMTC ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime 
 
AMS 
(ASEAN10) 
(o-AMS) 
ASEAN Member State(s) (all                              
ten current members) (the                               
five founding AMS; incl. Brunei after 1984) 
APSC ASEAN Political-Security Community 
 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
 
ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
ASEAN-ISIS ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
ASEC ASEAN Secretariat 
ASG ASEAN Secretary General 
 
CLMV (states) The “new” AMS Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam 
CoC Code of Conduct in the South China Sea 
DoC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
 
EAMMTC Emergency ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Concerning Irregular Movement of Persons 
in Southeast Asia Region 
 
EAS East Asia Summit 
 
EPG ASEAN Eminent Persons Group 
 
HLTF High Level Task Force (to draft the ASEAN Charter) 
 
HPA Hanoi Plan of Action 
 
HRM Human Rights Mechanism 
 
HRW Human Rights Watch 
 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
 
IMAMM Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN 
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NTS Non-traditional security 
 
PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration 
 
SCS South China Sea 
 
SOMTC Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime 
 
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
 
UN 
UNCLOS 
UNHCR 
UNSC 
United Nations                                                   
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
United Nations Human Rights Commissioner for Refugees, UN Human Rights Agency 
United Nations Security Council 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Background and Significance of this Study 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is certainly one of the finest 
case studies in regionalism. Owing to its extraordinarily heterogeneous membership, 
it is one of the most remarkable cooperative organisations in world history. ASEAN 
comprises a region larger than the European Union (EU) in both population and area 
and consists of currently ten sovereign nation states ranging from secular to strictly 
religious and authoritarian to democratic. The socio-economic development gap 
between the richest and poorest ASEAN Member State (AMS) is remarkable.1 
It comes at no surprise then that plenty of academics have ploughed this research 
field tirelessly. Ideally, this would mean a thorough understanding of ASEAN, 
bringing conclusive results both theoretically sound and innovative, buttressed by 
thorough empirical analyses. There would be policy relevant research. However, at 
first glance, there appears to be a conflict between both ASEAN and academic 
rhetoric and reality on the ground. ASEAN’s own self-perception and predominantly 
optimistic academic analyses are prima facie at odds with empirical observations in 
the region. Whereas the organisation ASEAN can be forgiven for its self- 
aggrandisement instead of critical self-reflection, academic analyses should be 
theoretically sound and innovative, supported by  empirical evidence and candid 
evaluation. And yet, although they ideally ought to be pursuing different goals and 
remain on different analytical levels, the academic and ASEAN’s self-appraisal are 
strikingly similar in their optimism and outlook. Both credit ASEAN with a  high 
degree of autonomous agency in both the gritty business of day-to-day regional 
politics and in its ability to achieve its often very aspiring long term goals. 
Ever since ASEAN’s inception, much ink has been spilled by both observers and 
ASEAN itself on the association’s norms, processes, values and an allegedly shared 
Southeast Asian identity, buttressing this ostensible community of nation states. The 
 
 
 
1 
Chapter 2 will provide more detail on ASEAN’s heterogeneity. 
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2003 Bali Concord II by which ASEAN for the first time articulated its ambition to 
embark on a formal, long term regional integration project, the ASEAN Community 
(AC15), inaugurated in 2015, has given greater impetus to such notions. In this 
endeavour, ASEAN has formulated plenty of ambitious principles, goals, and visions 
as well as roles for its institutions in order to meet those. By doing so, the association 
has set high targets for itself, which is at the same time courageous and perilous. 
ASEAN’s community rhetoric coincides with an ever increasing dominance of 
noticeable constructivist inclinations in ASEAN studies. The normative basis ASEAN 
has set in its integration endeavour corresponds well with constructivist analytical 
frameworks in International Relations (IR). Such inclined observers may see some of 
their paradigms confirmed in Southeast Asia by what they see as a set of individual 
states, bonded by a common regional identity based on a set of collectively shared 
norms and  producing a  community  of nations.  Indeed, it  appears  that an  ever- 
increasing group of scholars in East- and Southeast Asian IR take ASEAN’s self- 
appraisal at face value and see their constructivist informed analytical frameworks 
and research variables as confirmed, often without explicitly stating as much. 
This school widely accepts that AMS have ostensibly embarked on a joint effort of 
regional integration based on a shared understanding of norms, values, and common 
goals. Apparently, Southeast Asia is home to a sound alternative model to EU-style 
regionalism more suitable to Asia’s socio-cultural and historical context, a budding 
security community of shared values, and a more or less united regional actor.2 
Praise however does not stop at intramural cooperation and agency. Plenty of 
experts are not too shy to emphasise and reiterate ASEAN’s ability to influence, in 
some cases even dictate the terms of wider East Asian relations.3 
By any stretch of the imagination, sweeping claims are made by both academics and 
ASEAN. In sum, those claims allege a high degree of agency and a significant role of 
ASEAN,  which  I  contend  is  characterised  by  two  elements;  (1)  the  tangible 
 
 
 
2 
Acharya (2014); Haacke (2003); Kupchan (2010); Bellamy (2010); more critical but also positive 
Collins (2014). 
3 
Eaton/Stubbs (2006); Sukma (2010); Ba (2006; 2009); Kang (2007); and for a more critical view Goh 
(2011; 2014). 
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dominance of constructivist reasoning, echoing ASEAN’s self-perception and (2) a 
conspicuous lack of empirical support. Against the backdrop of the 2015 launch of 
AC15, a great number of contemporary security threats in Southeast Asia with 
questionable ASEAN involvement and lastly, a predominant constructivist orthodoxy 
in the analysis of ASEAN and Southeast Asian security, 4 this thesis is dedicated to 
precisely the conflict between rhetoric and action, or as I shall term it here, between 
ASEAN “demand and supply”. 
This thesis is at its very core both a critical appraisal of ASEAN’s security 
performance, ASEAN’s actorness quality in the first official pillar of AC15, the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community (APSC) and an equally critical appraisal of 
aforementioned academic analyses. Those I argue are informed by constructivist 
parameters to an extent that by now, a new sub-theory has emerged and 
established itself in the field. Henceforth, I shall categorise and term this new sub- 
theory as “Asia-constructivism”. This new “breed” of Asia-constructivists has come 
to dominate the academic debate surrounding ASEAN security. 
 
1.2. Argument, Methodology and Approach 
 
The remainder of this introductory chapter shall now introduce, explain, and justify 
the selected research approach and introduce some critical concepts and research 
strategies. The puzzle that motivated my research and eventual writing of this thesis 
is the conflict between the “demand” by thus termed Asia-constructivists as well as 
by ASEAN itself and the “supply” the latter delivers. There are plenty of conspicuous 
conundrums prima facie suggesting that serious empirical case study results may be 
at odds with those optimistic perspectives on ASEAN agency, shared norms and 
values, identity and community. Cautious monitoring of regional relations raises the 
suspicion that ASEAN's principles, promoted by both perspectives, are more rhetoric 
than practice. This thesis focuses on conundrums arising from traditional and non- 
traditional  security  threats  to  ASEAN.  Appreciating  that  regional  relations  are 
 
 
 
 
4 See Khoo (2004): 45. 
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manifold, consisting of more than one policy field, a security focus has been selected 
for two reasons. First, security has ever since its inauguration post-Konfrontasi been 
ASEAN’s raison d’être and not coincidently is the APSC the first pillar of AC15. 
Second, it also represents the main concern in Asia-constructivist literature. 
Economics for instance is often entirely disregarded by Asia-constructivists. This is 
most curious as the economic pillar is perhaps the most recognised and widely 
publicised pillar and has certainly received great attention in different sectors of 
society. 5 Notwithstanding some noteworthy exceptions, 6 the socio-cultural 
integration of ASEAN does not receive much attention either, which is in itself 
striking as constructivist notions are closely embedded in sociological and cultural 
contexts. Hence, security threats are cogent cases and Southeast Asia certainly is a 
region where such challenges are aplenty. Ensuring a continuation of relative peace 
will be the central challenge for all stakeholders in Southeast Asia. 
What this Thesis is not 
 
Before mapping out how this thesis attempts to perform the above task, a few words 
about what it does not do. In spite of a thick theoretical element, the aim of this 
thesis is not to pitch one IR theory against another. It is not simplistic hypothesis 
testing for the sake of theory falsification. It is rather an attempt to spur 
modification of existing theory based on empirical observations.7 It tries to be con- 
not destructive. The goal is not to discard Asia-constructivism per se, but to highlight 
the potential need – and indeed the opportunity currently at hand – to broaden the 
theoretical horizon. A future revised framework may well incorporate constructivist 
elements that may have some valuable aspects to add to holistic analyses in IR in 
general, but may need to be qualified by certain realist elements. Therefore, it is not 
primarily a question of whether Asia-constructivism has greater or lesser explanatory 
value than competing perspectives. Instead, it is an inquiry into the nature of the 
perceptible gap between theoretical expectations and rhetoric and empiricism. It is 
 
 
 
5 
Dosch (2013; 2015; 2015b) for a great analysis of ASEAN’s economic integration. 
6 
Collins (2013; 2014). 
7 
Mearsheimer/Walt (2013) have recently argued that theory falsification via empirical data collection 
has taken over contemporary IR for the worse. According to them, more consideration ought to be 
given to generating new and/or refining existing theory. 
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neither to discard theory, nor to produce a new one, but to lay the groundwork by 
finding out if ASEAN is or can live up to its own and academic ambitions and what 
this could mean for future research in the field. Moreover, although parts of this 
thesis highlight the linguistic harmony between Asia-constructivism and ASEAN 
rhetoric, it does not address the source of this harmonisation, while appreciating the 
work that has been done elsewhere on this. Indeed, the question whether ASEAN 
adopted rhetoric and Asia-constructivism jumped on the conceptual bandwagon, or 
vice versa as some have suggested, is reminiscent of the “chicken and egg” causality 
dilemma. 8 Instead, this study shows and accepts a rhetorical and conceptual 
commonality as it stands and proceeds from there with the inquiry as to the 
demand-supply gap. Fourthly, although the occasional reference to European 
integration will be made, this thesis is not an act of comparative regionalism. 
Naturally, being the largest, most significant, and most integrated case of 
institutionalised regionalism, the EU can serve as a valuable reference point. Yet, 
such references will not be more than brief annotations and shall be made only if 
doing so directly aids understanding of the matter at hand. 
This thesis believes to have devised a unique analytical model in order to approach 
the study variable (SV) of ASEAN’s security actorness. 
Approach – Research Question 
 
Within a case study framework of three empirical cases, this thesis will analyse 
ASEAN’s role, its actorness, in regional security. Ultimately, it inquires as to the 
degree of ASEAN’s relevance in meeting security requirements of the APSC, the 
 
 
 
8 
As the reoccurring theme of this thesis, it will be demonstrated that Asia-constructivists often cite 
ASEAN declaratory language as evidence for constructivist hypotheses. At the same time, there is 
strong evidence of normatively biased academic influence on the drafting process. Some have 
suggested ASEAN devises language and engages in rhetorical promises in order to gain international 
recognition, while neo-realists ASEAN critics such as Jones/Smith (2007) deem the influence of 
academic networks on the political process in Southeast Asia as particularly high and deeply 
institutionalised and argue that in particular track 2 forums influence policy making in ASEAN. Simon 
(2010) has argued similarly, though less critically. Indeed, Asia-constructivists [Caballero-Anthony 
(2005)] also acknowledge the deep political impact of scholarship on ASEAN, in a strikingly 
institutionalised track 2 structure in the region. Others have argued that the success of the European 
Union served to some extent as a model, not necessarily to be copied, but to be leaned against. 
Hence, ASEAN rhetoric and tangible institutionalisation follows a European model of community and 
normative integration, Jetschke (2009), Jetschke/Murray (2015). 
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“supply”, against the backdrop of optimistic, indeed ambitious “demand”. I therefore 
propose the following principal research question: 
How great is ASEAN’s role in arbitrating, mitigating, and managing matters of 
regional security in the light of the high expectations it is subjected to? 
In order to investigate this puzzle, I offer a research project based on juxtaposing the 
two fundamental components of “demand” and “supply” as this thesis’ principle 
structural framework. 
Demand 
 
First, I will conduct a categorisation and in-depth analysis of what I have already 
termed Asia-constructivists. I intend to dissect this “new orthodoxy” of 
constructivism influenced regional scholarship and shall demonstrate both the 
traditional constructivist roots of those dominant perspectives on ASEAN and just 
how closely related they are to ASEAN’s own self-appraisal. I posit that Asia- 
constructivists often presuppose the presence of shared norms and values, the 
independent variable (IV), facilitating  the intervening variable (IntV)  of a  shared 
identity, generating a number of dependent variables (DV) such as a high degree of 
ASEAN agency, autonomy, and community. Those three components make up what I 
 
 
will refer to as ASEAN’s “actorness”. ASEAN itself has given impetus and in a plethora 
of documents, treaties, and declarations raised the “demand bar” significantly. All 
the way from its inception in 1967 to the latest document this thesis can take into 
account, Vision 2025, published in 2015, have clearly mapped out the route for 
ASEAN to become not just a tightly integrated security community with shared goals 
and identity, but also to play a lead role in the wider regional security architecture. 
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This dual body of academic literature and political rhetoric makes up what I shall 
refer to as the “demand side”. 
Supply 
 
A heavy load of expectations has been put on ASEAN’s shoulders. The juxtaposed 
second structural pillar of supply is the logical follow up question to the demand 
pillar; whether or not ASEAN is sufficiently capable, willing, and delivering. From this 
starting point, I attempt to assess the supply side with the help of three detailed case 
studies located within regional security. All three studies examine post-ASEAN 
Charter (2007/8) security events and threats and thus, all take place under the 
condition of a codified legal institutional framework. Guided by its own case specific 
research question, each study shall investigate ASEAN involvement and in their sum, 
shed light on the actual degree of ASEAN overall security actorness. Hence, each 
case study is an appraisal of the individually incomplete parts that make up the 
overall sum of ASEAN security actorness. This assessment will illuminate the degree 
of ASEAN relevance to its members’ security calculations, whether or not existential 
regional security challenges can elicit result-oriented, ASEAN-centred multilateral 
responses and will clarify the effectiveness of intra-ASEAN cooperation in the light of 
the APSC. Secondly, results may have significant ramifications for the analytical 
weight of Asia-constructivism. In their sum, I expect each case study analysis and the 
subsequent final assessment to conclusively answer the principle research question. 
 
 
Main assumptions and Hypotheses 
 
 
2. ASEAN Community rhetoric is similarly optimistic. 
 
 
4. Hence, the optimistic demands are not met. 
 
 
Before I set out to answer the research question, I posit a number of pre-analytical 
hypotheses. 
1. Asia-constructivism’s inherent normative bias obscures empiricism in favour of thick phenomena description 
makes assessments regarding ASEAN’s actorness overly optimistic. 
3. In reality, ASEAN is not a credible security actor and makes no contribution to intra- and extramural Asian 
security. 
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Approach – Case Study Design, Benchmarking, and Data Collection 
 
This aim suggests a bottom-up research approach that in epistemological terms, as 
most qualitative research, utilises both deductive and inductive logic in order to 
reach a conclusion as to this thesis’ study variable of ASEAN’s actorness. Consistent 
with inductive reasoning, the argument is triggered by initial observations. On the 
most rudimentary level, one can assess a theory by asking whether or not empirical 
evidence suggests confirmation or infirmation of the theory.9 Once the scrutinised 
theory’s variables, hypotheses, and expectations have been laid out, one can infer 
what  observations  a  case  study  should  produce  if  the  theory  is  valid  and  what 
observations if it false. In other words, the influence of the IVs on the DVs should be 
traceable and observable. Therefore, once Asia-constructivist and ASEAN’s own 
expectations and predictions, the demand, have been laid out, I intend to formulate 
several qualitative benchmarks and subordinate key performance indicators (KPIs) in 
order to provide a verifiable and coherent instrument to measure whether or not 
ASEAN supply meets demand. This subtraction of particular expectations and 
predictions from ASEAN itself and Asia-constructivist informed analyses in order to 
devise benchmarks on the demand side is a deductive process, though. Hence, an 
initial deductive logic informs a largely inductive research process. 
Once the supply side data, ASEAN action, has been gathered in each case study, the 
aim is to try to reconcile demand and supply and assess whether or not ASEAN 
meets benchmarks, measured in KPIs. Eventually, the knowledge thus acquired shall 
be used to draw conclusions on both ASEAN’s realistic actorness and Asia- 
constructivist theory. This thesis’ approach should not be confused with approaches 
such as grounded theory, for the basic point of departure is not the lack of theory as 
such but rather the apparent dissonance between rhetoric, dominant theory and 
preliminary empirical observation as well as lack of reliable empirical data to 
evaluate existing hypotheses and ASEAN’s own ambitions. The inductive process of 
gathering high-quality data and subsequent analysis within a case study framework 
may uncover previously unidentified antecedent conditions, such as predominance 
 
 
 
9 
Van Evra (1997) for weak vs. strong theory testing in political science. 
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of narrowly defined national interest or bilateral security alliances prevailing over 
ASEAN-led multilateralism. If so, this may possibly suggest modification of theory, 
such as the need to add conditioning variables (CV), in order to account for 
antecedent conditions not recognised previously. The supply-demand dichotomy as 
structure, supplemented by the analytical framework of qualitative benchmarking 
enables an effective appraisal of both dominant theory and ASEAN as an 
organisation. This serves to induce a potentially required dose of pragmatism into 
Southeast Asian studies, the absence of which prompted this research question in 
the first place. 
 
 
 
 
 
Making the Case for Benchmarking 
 
Naturally the question is how the SV, ASEAN supply, its security performance, can be 
measured against the demand side. I offer a qualitative benchmarking model as the 
major analytical tool. I have already raised the argument that the APSC is the most 
significant of the three AC15 pillars. At the very least, they should be seen as of 
horizontal, not vertical hierarchy. Yet, receiving most attention is the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) pillar and the progress – or lack thereof – in the single 
market or movement of labour and such vital issues. Perhaps the reason for this 
greater attention is that the AEC is the only of the three pillars for which clear 
benchmarks  exist.  The  official  AEC  scorecard  allows  for  fairly  straightforward, 
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quantitative progress tracking.10 Unfortunately, no such scorecard exists for the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) and thus, this thesis must take the 
liberty of devising its own benchmarks. Naturally, in the field of security, quantitative 
benchmarking is not sufficient, while qualitative benchmarking may be less objective 
or verifiable as is possible in the AEC. Labour movement, reduction of trade barriers, 
etc. are  quantitatively measurable  variables, but  pro- or  regress in political  and 
security integration and actorness must to a large extent rely on qualitative research 
and reasoning. Nonetheless, any appraisal of ASEAN, whether it has lived-up to or 
failed ambitions and expectations requires certain yardsticks, or benchmarks against 
which it  can be  tested and  judged. In  order to  achieve the  greatest achievable 
objective quality in my benchmarking approach, I claim to have devised benchmarks 
according to three principles. First, each benchmark originates from no other source 
than Asia-constructivist assertions and ASEAN declarations, treaties, roadmaps, and 
ASEAN’s fundamental legal body, the Charter. The benchmark’s origins are therefore 
traceable, objective, and of greatest possible universality. Second, therefore, 
benchmarks are not subject to confirmation bias and thirdly, each benchmark I have 
applied case specifically is also of broader validity within an ASEAN security context. 
Whether benchmarks are met or not shall be determined by the degree to which 
ASEAN performance has satisfied specific key performance indicators  (KPIs). 
Benchmarks can be met, partially met, largely failed, and failed. 
Although applied to the specific test cases, each benchmark refers to broader 
concepts such as centrality, norm diffusion, or Southeast Asian identity and is thus 
applicable to other security related test cases within the APSC. Case study 3 for 
instance has set the benchmark of intramural norm diffusion, a key concept in Asia- 
constructivist analyses, and applied key performance indicators (KPIs) specific to the 
case of the Rohingya refugees and human rights. The demand derives from sources 
such as the APSC blueprint and the Charter as well as Asia-constructivist literature 
not necessarily directly related to the Rohingya in Myanmar. It is therefore possible 
to apply the same benchmark to different cases. So could for instance the ability of 
 
 
 
10 
Although Dosch (2015): 93ff has highlighted the problems of limited reliability of the AEC scorecard 
mechanism. 
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ASEAN to ignite and facilitate norm diffusion, derived from the same sources, be 
tested by looking at Indonesian efforts to introduce and spread democratisation 
across Southeast Asia. One could for instance consider Indonesia’s role as the 
democratic norm entrepreneur, ASEAN as the facilitating forum, and non-democratic 
AMS as the norm recipients. The benchmarks are thus of more universal validity. 
Indeed, I propose that this approach in general could gain foothold as an analytical 
framework across a range of areas in the wider field of political science. 
 
Cases 1. SCS  2.  Thailand-Cambodia 3. Rohingya 
Benchm Cohesiveness; Convening Power; Dependable expectations of peaceful In tramural norm diffusion; 
arks Competence Power change; Identity; Conflict mediation Governance capacity 
Sample Ability to act as a unit; Ability to Absence of violence; Consideration of Penetration of norm- 
KPIs socialise; Great power investment regional good; ASEAN ability to entrepreneurs; ASEAN ability to 
into ASEAN provide good offices af fect norm adherence 
General Applicability of Benchmarks – sample alternative test cases 
Cohesiveness Convening 
Power 
Competence 
Power 
Dependab 
le 
expectati 
ons of 
peaceful 
change 
Identity Conflict 
mediation 
Intramural 
norm 
diffusion 
Governance 
capacity 
Negotiations Convene Socialise Intramura Rhetoric in SCS Democratisati Haze 
on free-trade major power extramural l arms- Malaysia- disputes on phenomeno 
agreements in AEC related actors into race Singapore among  n 
such as the forums ASEAN trade  relations, AMS   
EU-ASEAN  norms and  e.g. in Lee claimants   
FTA  preference,  and    
  e.g. in TPP  Mahathir    
  negotiations  years    
 
 
In sum, I propose approaching the research question by deriving general benchmarks 
from the two sources that 
make up the demand side 
of concern here, ASEAN’s 
own rhetoric and self- 
appraisal and Asia- 
constructivists       analyses. 
Each  case  study  will  commence  with  a  case  specific  review  of  relevant  ASEAN 
documents, declarations, and statements across the entire range of the APSC and 
Meeting Benchmarks 
1. Met 2. Partially met 3. Largely failed 4. Not met 
Met critical 
KPIs 
Met some KPIs 
while missing 
others 
Failed critical KPIs Failed critical 
but some minor KPIs 
achievements 
observable 
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even beyond. This will be followed by a similar review of relevant Asia-constructivist 
literature. This demand side summary allows us subsequently to derive a set of 
critical case specific benchmarks against which ASEAN’s performance can be 
assessed. In order to declare those benchmarks met or failed, each is furnished with 
a sub-set of KPIs. For instance, Asia-constructivists assertions of ASEAN’s institutional 
and procedural frameworks allowing it to create intersubjective understandings of 
acceptable norms of behaviour and socialise actors into acceptance should be 
observable in regional security practice. Norm adherence can be tested by empirical 
analysis of state conduct in regional relations. Once benchmarks and KPIs have been 
devised, set, and their validity accurately justified, empirical observation of case 
specific ASEAN action, involvement and success or otherwise will take place. 
Empirical results shall then be reconciled with specified KPIs for each individual 
benchmark. This allows for a workable, accurate, and scientifically sound framework 
of analysis. 
 
 
The Cases 
 
 
Case Characterisation, Concern and Inquiry 
 
 
2. Thai-Cambodian 
border conflict 2008 - 
2011 
- Territorial dispute; traditional security; intramural. 
- Is ASEAN a (security) community? 
- ASEAN as a security community; with shared identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. ASEAN and China in the South China Sea – ASEAN Central or Sidelined? 
 
The  empirical  discussion  will  commence  with  a  look  at  the  concept  of  ASEAN 
centrality. Centrality is key to ASEAN’s engagement with the wider East Asian region 
1. ASEAN and China. - Territorial/jurisdictional disputes; traditional security; extramural. 
Territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea 
- ASEAN centrality, really central or sidelined in the wider East Asian security? 
- ASEAN cohesiveness; its convening-; and its competence power. 
3. 2015 Rohingya 
refugee crisis 
- Irregular migration; non-traditional security; intramural. 
- Is ASEAN capable of spreading and enforcing norms in order to realise its values 
and principles? 
- Institutional effectiveness, commitment to principles and norms. 
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and the association continuous to insist on centrality being the fulcrum of its 
external engagement. It is also one of the fundamental building blocks of the APSC 
and correspondingly, a predominant element in Asia-constructivist analyses. 
Effectively, centrality is the key to ASEAN’s external security actorness. This specific 
case is without comparable alternative. Centrality in wider East Asian affairs is 
manifold and includes the economic and other realms, but in strict security terms, as 
is our concern, there is no conceivable, contemporary alternative to the troubles 
ASEAN faces in its relations with China over the South China Sea (SCS). 
Contemporary security relations and dynamics unfolding between a number of AMS 
and China in the SCS are as complex and tense as they are revealing. With the help of 
a detailed analysis of events and actions by China, AMS, and ASEAN, this study 
substantially aids exploration of ASEAN actorness in an approach towards the overall 
research question of this thesis. It explores the degree of ASEAN ability to remain 
united and affect change in the face of an extramural security threat. We will find 
out whether China has embraced ASEAN as the centre of regional security 
architecture, the extent to which ASEAN can be cohesive as a prerequisite to the 
ability to pacify and socialise an external, more powerful actor. 
This takes place under the guidance of the following case specific research question: 
 
Can the notion of ASEAN centrality in the wider regional security architecture 
be substantiated and upheld in practice? 
This case study greatly enhances our understanding and allows an assessment of 
common or individual responses to what is a common security threat. No serious 
assessment of ASEAN’s security actorness can justifiably exclude the maritime 
domain. The SCS disputes can safely be assumed to be of great interests to the 
majority of AMS and by extension ASEAN itself. Threats and interests are often 
prone to subjective perception. Territorial integrity however, can be regarded as a 
general interest of all sovereign nation states and their people and are thus, 
independent from many interfering variables such as regime type or short-term 
policies. Selecting a territorial issue is therefore likely to insolate the research 
variables. At the very least, all ASEAN’s littoral states intend to maintain control of 
their EEZs, their fisheries, and hydrocarbon resources exploitation. Rizal Sukma et.al. 
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have argued that the maritime space is absolutely pivotal to most Asian states’ 
revenue and tensions have risen significantly over recent years owing to a greater 
competition for resources and increasing concerns over continuous flow of energy 
imports.11 As a result, if not constraint by multilateral bargains, states could be 
tempted to regard the SCS as an arena of zero-sum politics and resort to unilateral 
self-help in order to protect key interests, risking a potential security dilemma. At the 
2015 Shangri-La Dialogue Malaysia's Minister for Defence Hussein claimed that the 
SCS conflict could ‘escalate into one of the deadliest conflicts of our time’.12 This may 
have been said for effect, but even without subscribing to Hussein’s dramatic 
assessment the SCS does present one of the most serious security threats in the 
Asia-Pacific in general. Additionally, territorial and resource claims and interests are 
usually clearly and publicly articulated as most claimants have an interest to settle 
matters of such importance either by international arbitration, public diplomacy, or 
military means, none of which takes place covertly. Sources are therefore plentiful 
which significantly assists research. 
Competition in the SCS, whether combative or cooperative, will continue to feature 
prominently in the region's security discourse for years to come. It is indicative of the 
region’s emerging great power’s (China) future foreign policy intent, apparently 
increasing both its military capabilities and its territorial assertiveness. But more 
critical here, indicative of ASEAN’s ability to be in the “driver’s seat” of East Asian 
security. 
2. The “SC” in the APSC – The Thai-Cambodian Conflict and the ASEAN Security 
Community. 
This second case study will turn attention inside. It shall assess the substance of the 
so called ASEAN security community. Asia-constructivists have widely looked at 
ASEAN’s evolution towards a sound security community, based on a shared 
Southeast Asia identity. ASEAN has also declared itself as such. In fact, the ASEAN 
 
 
 
11  
Sukma et.al. (2015). 
12 
Channel News Asia (30 May 2015): South China Sea could be ‘deadliest conflict of our time’: 
Malaysia defence chief. 
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Political-Security Community is neither coincidentally named, nor coincidently the 
first pillar of AC15. Intramural security is and has always been ASEAN’s very raison 
d’être. This case study therefore asks whether ASEAN has security and whether it is a 
community. To that end, I offer the following case specific research question: 
Does  the  APSC  sufficiently  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  security  community 
concept to warrant the name APSC? 
Several cases could have justifiably been chosen to approach this question and 
analyse the substance of the ASEAN security community. There is for instance the 
increasing militarisation, perhaps arms racing, 13 or the perpetual antagonism 
between Malaysia and Singapore. However, the first one could be criticised on the 
basis of causality, the second has been done many times before and it would indeed, 
as Khoo has pointed out, be “stacking the deck” against the ASEAN security 
community due to the long and very particular Malaysia-Singapore relationship.14 
The list goes on but all things considered, the Thai-Cambodia conflict is a valuable 
and justifiable case study. First, although the least contemporary case considered in 
this thesis, the 2008 - 2011 conflict is still very much up to date and occurred both 
post-Charter and at a time when community building was well underway. Second, 
because of confirmed military engagement between two AMS, including several 
battle related deaths and displacements, it can justifiably be considered a matter of 
concern for the APSC. This case study will aid our understanding of ASEAN’s security 
actorness greatly by addressing the two critical question of whether ASEAN has 
security, or is indeed a community. By doing so, it represents a great test of ASEAN’s 
credibility to be the vanguard of intramural peace and stability, the institutional 
facilitator of the Southeast Asian security community. It challenges the very 
quintessence of the APSC, indeed ASEAN’s raison d’être of being a no-war 
community. ASEAN performance in this case will greatly aid our understanding of the 
association’s security relevance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13  
Bitzinger (2007; 2010). 
14 
Khoo (2015): 188. 
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3. The Rohingya Refugee Crisis – Norm Diffusion and Effective Governance. 
 
The third and final case study will tackle an intramural non-traditional security (NTS) 
threat. A in that extent unprecedented NTS threat arose for ASEAN in 2015 in form 
of a refugee crisis concerning the Rohingya Muslim minority predominantly 
originating in Rakhine State, Myanmar. As far as NTS is concerned, there are a 
number of alternatives that could have been chosen, such as the haze phenomenon, 
but I consider the Rohingya refugee crisis is of particularly high analytical value. First 
and foremost, it cannot reasonably be called an exclusively domestic, Burmese affair 
for at least three additional AMS (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) are directly affected 
as the intended destination countries. The plight of the Rohingya is a transnational 
matter and will continue to pose a threat to countries other than Myanmar alone. 
While the cause of the exodus may be domestic, its impact is not. Secondly, this 
crisis particularly stands out in its severity of human suffering, not comparable to the 
haze problem or most transnational crime. ASEAN has definitively emphasised the 
importance of human rights as well as NTS in general and also located it firmly within 
the jurisdiction of the APSC. In particular in Asia human rights are a contested 
concept, but no matter what definition of human rights is applied or what exactly 
counts as a human right, the suffering of the Rohingya cannot justifiably be 
excluded. Hence, in addition to the substantial normative dimension, ASEAN’s 
quality as a norm diffusion forum, this issue is a great test for ASEAN’s ability to 
affect positive outcomes in matters of regional NTS in line with its own principles. In 
particular due to the substantial global attention paid to the Rohingya refugee crisis, 
it also presents a unique chance for ASEAN to prove its relevance. 
I propose that we seek an answer to the following case specific research question 
 
Have human rights norms been diffused and internalised across ASEAN and 
translated into sufficient governance capacity for ASEAN to act meaningfully in 
events of human rights crises? 
Data-Collection 
 
Overall, this research is based predominantly on collection and interpretation of 
qualitative data, gathered by extensive primary and secondary research. Though 
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beginning in 2014, the bulk of primary research, including archival work, elite 
interviews, and conference participation, was conducted between November 2015 – 
February 2016 in Singapore, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta. Extensive 
secondary research included academic literature and suitable media outlets. Due to 
limitations of feasibility, this research cannot account for developments or 
publications after May 2016. 
Research input on the demand side originates from two main sources, traditional 
constructivist and Asia-constructivist literature and second, official and semi-official 
ASEAN publications. For the former I set out by extensively reviewing existing 
general constructivist and ASEAN specific literature, in particular as it relates to 
security and subsequently, devised the category of Asia-constructivism. Selected 
literature that could be classified as both relating to ASEAN security and relying and 
expanding on traditional constructivism was added to that category and scrutinised 
for research variables and main arguments. ASEAN publications on the other hand is 
a body of information consisting of all sources that can justifiably be regarded as 
representative of the organisations’ elites perspectives, officially sanctioned 
statements relating to various ASEAN meetings as well as legal treaties and regimes, 
such as the Charter or the TAC. However, wherever appropriate, semi-official 
statements made by ASEAN elites relating to the APSC in the media, academic 
journals, and personal interviews may be referenced. In their sum, those two input 
sources make up the demand side and were used to set the benchmarks for the case 
studies. 
On the supply side, the empirical case studies, this research gathered data with the 
help of quantitative tools (e.g. gathering military statistics, refugee movement etc.) 
but relied predominantly on qualitative tools in a triangulation of four distinct input 
sources. First, extensive survey of media publications from inside and outside the 
region and across the entire political spectrum covering events around the particular 
case studies provided a great general overview. Second, secondary research was also 
conducted with the help of academic publications, surveys and polls. The literature 
situation in all three cases is fairly solid. Much has been written on the SCS disputes 
and all claims have been thoroughly mapped and detailed. The Rohingya crisis is well 
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documented by both ASEAN (in particular the meetings and special summits) and a 
great number of international NGOs and organisations (HRW, Amnesty, UNHCR) and 
more specialised local ones (Fortify Rights, Forum-Asia, etc.). The issue of the Thai- 
Cambodian border conflict posed the greatest challenge in terms of resource 
availability. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, research was impeded by low 
governmental transparency. However, in particular thanks to interviews and off-the- 
record conversations in Bangkok and Singapore, I have been able to gather sufficient 
information. Moreover, since Cambodia began to internationalise its conflict with 
Thailand more information has become available. On the other hand, this topic 
remains the most under researched of the three case studies and is thus, particularly 
well suited to contribute to both a unique argument and the general study of 
Southeast Asian IR. 
In particular case study 1 and 2 consulted quantitative data relating to military 
statistics, mostly obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) as well as 
governmental websites and specialised military publishing houses such as Jane’s 
Information Group. All of this was substantiated by a total of 24 elite interviews, off- 
the-record conversations, and numerous conference attendances, mostly in 
Southeast Asia, but also in Washington D.C. and London. Those were conducted with 
various experts, diplomats from a number of both ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries, 
Supreme Court judges, and current and past policymakers. Fortunately, I could gain 
access to an elite network and had access to a great number of academics and 
academic publication in the region, facilitating personal interviews, secondary 
research, as well as participation in various conferences and workshops in Southeast 
Asia, mostly at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. Fourthly, during field research in 
Southeast Asia, I was able to conduct extensive archival research and access original 
ASEAN documents. 
Conclusion, Contribution, and an Appreciation of Critical Input 
 
With the help of those three case studies, this thesis hopes to uncover evidence that 
enables a fair, critical assessment of its SV. The demand and supply dichotomy will 
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allow a fair appraisal of ASEAN’s security actorness, its attitude, role, and ability to 
influence regional security within its area of jurisdiction and thus, shed light on the 
substance of the APSC. At the same time, the optimistic perspectives on ASEAN, 
dominating both ASEAN’s own as well as Asia-constructivist discourse, can be 
evaluated. 
This thesis detects a great disparity between empirical case study results and 
expectations, between demand and supply. I arrive at the conclusion that ASEAN 
does indeed have a role to play in regional security, yet, supply does not even come 
close to meeting the demand side. The APSC is not only AC15’s first pillar, but also 
the one where it is most visible that disunion rather than solidarity, national self- 
interest rather than the common regional good, often at the expense of value 
commitments, determines policy choices. Or as Robert Kaplan puts it ‘[w]hile the 
language at Asian summits will be soft, the deployment of warships […] will be 
hard.’15 In other words, in its current form, the APSC is a rhetorical success but a 
security political basket case. Yet, ASEAN is not superfluous in regional security and 
Southeast Asia would indeed be less secure without ASEAN. I shall argue that ASEAN 
cannot in the foreseeable future enhance its security actorness via institutional 
reform, such as introducing supranational elements. Instead, I suggest not increasing 
the supply potential by structural institutional change in ASEAN, but by lowering the 
bar on the demand side. ASEAN supplies useful, indeed necessary avenues for 
regional dialogue and cooperation. Albeit missing the demand spectacularly, 
ASEAN’s strengths rest in its function as the region’s confidence builder, its 
ideational yardstick as well as its convening power, manifest in its ability to convene 
relevant intra- and extramural actors and facilitate dialogue and confidence building 
that would be absent otherwise. Most importantly, ASEAN is a useful intramural elite 
networking facility. ASEAN is a compass to navigate the intricacies of regional 
relations. There is merit in process. 
I further contend that the widespread, sometimes implicit acceptance of both 
ASEAN’s actorness – drawing its strength from factors such as regional identity – and 
 
 
 
15 
Kaplan (2014): 16. 
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thus, intra- and extramural security significance is both highly unrealistic and 
inauspicious to the study of IR in the Asia-Pacific. Although by no means a unitary 
approach, Asia-constructivist analyses often evince similar weaknesses, seemingly 
prioritising ideology over empirical analysis and often utilise dead-end arguments 
whereby alternative approaches are universally declared obsolete or helplessly 
Eurocentric. They often get caught up in epistemological debates without sound 
analyses of praxis. Albeit making rather sweeping claims, studies are often based on 
questionable independent variables, such as collectively shared norms, rely on 
selective evidence, eschew serious hypotheses testing, and often echo ASEAN 
rhetoric. 
The value added of this thesis is therefore both practical and theoretical. It is born 
out of protest over the unsatisfactory explanatory value of ideologically predisposed 
theory and motivated by an apparent contradiction of ASEAN’s self-perception, 
mainstream literature, and observations of the political status quo. Trying to fill this 
gap, this research’s contribution to Southeast Asian IR hopes to be twofold. One is 
theoretical, i.e. a categorisation of what I have termed Asia-constructivism and a 
subsequent assessment of this school of thought’s merits and limitations. The other 
contribution is empirical, i.e. ASEAN’s agency in specific matters of regional security 
from which general conclusions for the APSC are drawn. Hitherto, contemporary 
literature lacks detailed, up-to-date evidence of specific security threats against the 
backdrop of a critical appraisal of ASEAN based security regionalism. This thesis will 
therefore deconstruct Asia-constructivists’ main assumptions and by doing so, pose 
the hitherto most comprehensive and most systematic challenge to constructivist 
biased analyses of ASEAN security. This challenge is based on solid and up-to-date 
empirical evidence. 
On the theoretical level, critics may ask why a strongly supported theory in 
Southeast Asian IR would be a problem. Asia-constructivists at least keep the debate 
alive. If only realist perspectives were to be applied, any analysis of ASEAN’s 
actorness would be a foregone conclusion. But a consequence may be a qualification 
or modification of dominant theory and its framing variables. Although some authors 
have taken issue with the robustness of constructivist theory as applied to Asia 
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before, 16 criticism remains mainly on a theoretical level, equally disregarding 
contemporary, empirical political practice in the region. At the same time, while 
Asia-constructivists have made attempts to empirically verify their assumptions,17 
they apply selective evidence from dated cases, strongly suggesting ideological 
predisposition. This study is able to prove that the reasons for the near academic 
consensus are to be found in inadequate reasoning and unduly selective evidence, 
and ideological predisposition. A modification of theory is necessary and capable of 
significantly advancing ASEAN studies. Plenty of further theoretical research ought to 
modify  and  reconcile  Asia-constructivism,  perhaps  even  produce  new  theory. 
Research ought to begin with a thin description of ASEAN, based on solid testable 
evidence not ideological predisposition. 
Criticism of this specific research design is likely to be epistemological. The greatest 
attack on my approach I expect to be made in form of critique of my major analytical 
tool of qualitative benchmarking. The question how the SV of ASEAN supply can be 
measured against the demand side is indeed justified, but has been answered above. 
Criticism may also concentrate on the efficacy of case studies and on the pitfalls of 
inductive logic. For instance, how can this research circumvent the perils of 
oversimplification and –generalisation? It may be guilty of overgeneralisation if 
conclusions drawn from the study of security challenges only are assumed to be of 
universal relevance for ASEAN. What about the economics or socio-cultural value of 
ASEAN? Yet, this thesis specifically analyses the security pillar of the AC15 project, 
not least because the value of the economic pillar has been analysed sufficiently 
elsewhere.18 Nor do I claim universal applicability of my findings across all pillars. 
Critics may then raise objection to the arguably narrow focus on security and thus, 
touch rather sensitive issues of national sovereignty, which is of particular 
importance in post-colonial Southeast Asia where governments and their publics 
often evince a strong sense of nationalism. In other words, I may be guilty of a 
confirmation bias, even “stacking the deck” against ASEAN. However, tough cases 
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Tan (2006); Khoo (2004). 
17  
Acharya (2014); Ba (2010); Caballero-Anthony (2005). 
18 
Dosch (2013; 2015). 
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are the best test of claims made only by Asia-constructivists and ASEAN itself. Those 
proclamations of ASEAN relevance claim to be of universal validity and specifically 
include sensitive matters of security. Security is also the predominant and unifying 
subject of inquiry of Asia-constructivists. Additionally, the pursuit of regional 
resilience and security has always been the driver of ASEAN integration and 
alongside sovereignty, continues to be both the greatest obstacle and facilitator of 
regional initiative at the same time. Again, the APSC is not by coincidence the 
fundamental and indeed first pillar of AC15. Thus, security must be subject of inquiry 
in this thesis. 
I also appreciate that case studies in political science will rarely be as precise as in 
natural science for example. The issue, however, is not the weakness of case studies, 
but the nature of the discipline itself, often depending on qualitative analysis of 
complex, non-static and often and erratic data, and capricious events. In order to 
mitigate the risk of undue generalisation, the number of cases has been extended to 
three, including both traditional and non-traditional security challenges across the 
widest possible range of issues. 
Convinced falsificationists may argue that should my data analysis show Asia- 
constructivist reasoning to be inadequate, the theory becomes obsolete and I must 
propose new theory. However, this absolutism is as dogmatic parochial as the 
ideological predisposition of constructivist scholars, prompting my research question 
in the first place. I suggest that infirming and entire theory as a result of failed 
hypotheses testing may be too radical. Instead, the inductive process as suggested 
may identify previously unknown antecedent conditions, eliciting further future 
research efforts to reframe rather than discard theory in order to appropriately 
account  for  the  failed  tests. 19 This  thesis  may  provide  the  impetus  and  lay  the 
groundwork. 
 
Critics may also ask whether it is at all important whether security issues are 
resolved by virtue of a collective ASEAN approach or bilateral hedging strategies, 
involving internal balancing mechanisms and external security guarantees. Why does 
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it matter if ASEAN and Asia-constructivists can or cannot live up to their rhetoric? 
After all, ASEAN has existed for nearly four decades and all AMS are arguably better 
off now then they were in the 1960s. The answer is that it matters a lot as plenty of 
harm can arise from unchallenged optimistic consensus. In particular in a region 
were a distinction between academia and policy making is oftentimes blurred. 
Should optimistic accounts of ASEAN’s actorness turn out to be unwarranted and 
should it emerge that ASEAN’s role in the regional security theatre is minimal or non- 
existent, ASEAN may have to undergo a serious restructuring process in order to live 
up to its promises. Thus, this research might have clear policy implications. 
The quest to construct AC15 has become a great distraction for ASEAN in the face of 
manifold, serious challenges in the Asia-Pacific. For instance, in the light of the U.S. 
rebalancing to Asia and an ever more assertive Chinese government, stability in the 
Asia-Pacific is far from certain. In 2013 the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command 
Admiral Locklear explained the regional significance in few, but accurate words 
The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the most militarized area in the world, containing seven 
of the world's ten largest standing militaries, the world's largest and most 
sophisticated navies, and five of the world's declared nuclear nations. This area 
also contains five of the United States' seven treaty allies, the three largest 
economies in the world […] It has nine of the world's ten largest ports and the 
busiest sea lanes in the world.20 
ASEAN has an incredible potential and significant role to play in East Asia. However, 
if ASEAN and academics continue to declare ASEAN a universal success ignoring its 
real impact on the security canvas, an illusion may retard potentially necessary 
reforms. A weak ASEAN faces the danger of being ignored by both its own members 
and major powers amid a restructuring of the East- and Southeast Asian regional 
security architecture. ASEAN risks becoming increasingly polarised and marginalised 
in a regional theatre characterised by great power rivalry.21 Institutional set-up and 
processes might have to be amended in order to enhance or establish meaningful 
actorness and ultimately, maintain ASEAN’s relevance. Simultaneously, such analysis 
allows insights into policy preferences and considerations of AMS and whether or 
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not individual foreign and security strategies can be components of a larger, 
cohesive regional strategy that might be termed an ASEAN approach. 
Both of this thesis’ pillars aid the understanding of the IR of Asia significantly in their 
own right as well as in their sum. Sound theoretical criticism is supplemented by 
institutional analysis of ASEAN-based security regionalism. What are the implications 
for Asia-constructivism, the ASEAN community and its centrality, and most of all 
ASEAN’s very raison d’être are questions that will be answered. 
 
1.3. Structure 
 
This first chapter will close with a clarification of some potentially imprecise but 
frequently referred to concepts, such as actorness, and explain Southeast and East 
Asia specific practicalities, such as organisation of regional security. Chapter 2 offers 
a brief introduction to ASEAN, its historic development, institutional set-up, 
particular processes, and its community building project. Chapter 3 represents a 
comprehensive in-depth review and analysis of constructivism influenced 
perspectives on ASEAN. This allows the categorisation and proper clarification of the 
aforementioned sub-theory of Asia-constructivism. Wherever appropriate, this is 
supplemented with references to the association’s own rhetoric. This literature 
review will produce three critical outcomes: (1) introduction of the main theoretical 
components necessary to appreciate what I have termed the demand side; (2) 
demonstration of the influence of traditional constructivism on ASEAN studies, 
allowing for the categorisation of Asia-constructivism; and (3) demonstration of 
similarity in conclusions on ASEAN’s actorness of ASEAN itself and Asia-constructivist 
analyses. 
Chapter 4.1 – 4.3 are the empirical components of this thesis and include the three 
case studies. Each will introduce the demand and supply side and try to reconcile 
both at the end. Conclusions shall be drawn subsequently, coming in form of chapter 
5. This final assessment will draw on case study results and assess the overall degree 
of ASEAN actorness. Here, the association’s shortcomings will be critically 
highlighted, so will ASEAN’s undoubtedly existing strengths and contributions to 
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regional security. This chapter will also show the ramifications of this critical 
appraisal of ASEAN in regional security for Asia-constructivism. Chapter 6 then ought 
to be understood not as a conclusion as much as some final remarks on what ASEAN 
actually is and will also suggest further possible research. 
 
1.4. Critical Terms and Concepts 
 
The intersubjective appreciation and understanding of terms and concepts is one of 
the most fundamental preconditions for academic analyses, as ambiguous 
application may cause a misinterpretation of the arguments brought forward. The 
responsibility to create such understanding rests with the author. Below, I intend to 
do this responsibility some justice, but more concepts specifically relating to Asia- 
constructivist thought are introduced in Chapter 3. 
ASEAN 
 
Recognising that ASEAN is a regional organisation and thus a bureaucratic body, this 
thesis occasionally uses ASEAN and Southeast Asia interchangeably. In comparison to 
the global average of international organisations, ASEAN is relatively 
comprehensively integrated and occasional interchangeable reference does not do 
academic precision injustice. When we talk about ASEAN, we refer to the sum of the 
ten AMS of Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam (ASEAN10). Most definitions of 
the Asian sub-region that is Southeast Asia accept that there is only one country that 
is part of geographical Southeast Asia but not ASEAN, namely Timor-Leste, whose 
membership is being negotiated and accession is most likely not more than a matter 
of time. 
Regionalism 
 
When referring to regionalism, what is meant here is first and foremost a framework 
for the study and indeed practice of political, economic, and often socio-cultural 
integration by several sovereign nation states within a given region, Southeast Asia 
in this case. Although some have suggested that in the context of post-Cold War 
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globalisation, 22 geographical factors matter less than factors such as human 
practices,23 specific political contexts,24 or international organisations,25 this thesis 
accepts geography as the centre of regionalism. Although the term has been 
contested ever since early regionalism studies of the 1950s, Joseph Nye’s now 
infamous, rather broad definition has withstood the test of time. Nye defines a 
region ‘as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a 
degree of mutual interdependence.’ He argues regionalism ‘[i]n the descriptive sense 
is the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions; and in 
the doctrinal sense, the advocacy of such formations.’ Most noteworthy is Nye’s 
emphasis on political decisions made by relevant regional actors for the relevance of 
regions in international politics.26 Defined as such, geography, interdependence, and 
cooperation among political elites in nations states are the major parameters of 
regionalism. 
This thesis therefore treats the state and its elites as the reference point and actor, 
and institutionalised modes of regional cooperation as the facilitator of regionalism. 
This corresponds closest with an institutional realist understanding of regionalism as 
interaction and the result of states seeking to mostly advance their national interest, 
which may or may not be corresponding with the interests of other regional actors, 
but does not ignore the value of institutions per se. A constructivist reading on the 
other hand emphasises the transformative power of interaction with regards to a 
redefinition of the national interest through common socialisation dynamics and 
emergence of common identities. In either case though, regionalism refers to 
interaction of some kind in order to advance and pursue certain goals. This 
interaction takes place within varying degrees of formal integration in form of 
institutions and regimes on the basis of documents such as charters, laws, mottos, 
and declarations. But also less formal and even ad-hoc contacts between regional 
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actors in form of bi-, multi-, or minilateral meetings with the purpose of coordinating 
regional relations in some way. 
Widening the concept beyond geographically bound functionalism – as the “new 
regionalists” have done27 – is useful and sometimes necessary, but doing so also 
carries the risk of rendering the term all but irrelevant. Can for instance the 
Commonwealth, displaying shared history, some interdependence and great multi- 
level exchange be termed a case of regionalism? For the purpose of this thesis, 
Indonesia’s Hasan Habib delivers a suitably narrow definition, stating 
Regionalism is the expression of regional consciousness that develops from a 
sense of identity among states situated in geographical proximity which 
motivates them to mutually cooperate in one or another mode to attain 
common goals, satisfy common needs, or to solve political, military, economic, 
and other practical problems.28 
 
Here, regionalism can effortlessly be applied to the cooperation among and 
integration of Southeast Asian states as institutionalised in ASEAN as well as to the 
various ASEAN-plus arrangements that include extra-ASEAN states with a significant 
Asian presence, such as China, the U.S. etc. In addition to the pursuit of common 
goals, which rationalises cooperation, Habib highlights a sense of identity. This is a 
critical term and ought to be treated with due caution. Many constructivists have 
controversially treated identity as an independent or intervening variable or a 
constant determinant.29 In order to avoid confusion with the concept of identity in 
constructivist literature, a theory independent concept of identity could term it as 
“character”. A region’s character is what demarcates one form of regionalism from 
another. There can be hardly any disagreement over the different character of 
European (EU), Asian (ASEAN), African (AU), or Arabic (Arab League) regionalism. 
Hence,  although  there  may  be  disagreement  over  the  nature  or  the  source  of 
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regionalism,30 the pure existence of a particular regional character can be universally 
agreed upon. Regional coherence and ultimately the independent agency of an 
organisation’s institutions is closely linked to its character, determining the degree 
and progress of regional integration. 
Lastly, what is meant by regional integration is essentially the establishment and 
continuation of patterns of interaction among states that may forfeit or maintain 
varying degrees of national sovereignty. In this light, integration is a process, but also 
a perpetuation of this process. Perpetuation does not necessarily imply ‘creating an 
ever closer union’ as European treaties prescribe.31 Perpetuation of the process 
should  also  be  understood  as  maintenance  of  a  sufficient  level  of  regional 
integration and cooperative structures once achieved. Two very traditional 
definitions of regionalist pioneers clarify this point. Ernst Haas defined regional 
integration as 
the process whereby political actors in several distinct national setting as 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new 
center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing 
national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed over 
the pre-existing ones.32 
 
 
Haas’ emphasis on the transfer of loyalty and an end result of a new entity sees 
regional integration, once started as an inevitable process towards an eventually 
completed post-sovereign new entity. His definition therefore implies the necessity 
of at least some degree of supranational authority over individual units; over 
previously sovereign nation states. This definition of integration as a process can be 
qualified and moderated by Karl Deutsch’s definition of regional integration as a 
‘relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly 
produce  system  properties  which  they  would  separately  lack.’ 33  Here,  Deutsch 
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concentrates not so much on the unionising process of integration but on the 
institutional outcome of relationship and cooperation among units. Regional 
integration is thus also a situation that allows for greater capabilities resulting from 
pooling resources. Both definitions are beneficial in their own right, but also 
complement one another. Hence, this thesis understands regional integration as 
both a process and a situation. 
Actorness 
 
Certainly most crucial to this thesis is the question of what constitutes its very study 
variable of actorness. As already argued above, actorness results from the sum of 
Asia-constructivists variables, summed up in agency, autonomy, and community. 
Regardless of one’s assessment of the capabilities of international/regional 
institutions, latest with the establishment of organisations with a certain degree of 
autonomy such as the EU, it no longer suffices to exclusively regard national 
governments as the only viable actors in IR. Depending on the theoretical 
perspective, regional organisations and institutions can have greater or lesser 
significance, but entirely disregarding those may lead to self-imposed analytical 
limitation. For example, even if one was to consider European institutions as not 
more than a forum for individual governments to advance national self-interest, 
latest with the Lisbon Treaty, those EU institutions do have a life of their own and a 
voice in their own right, although one may disagree on the significance and 
independence of that voice. Thus, determining the degree of actorness of a more or 
less independent actor – state or non-state – aides understanding international 
politics. Having said this, it is perhaps surprising just how little attention has been 
paid to definitions of the tangible ability, willingness, and motives of actors to act, or 
their actorness. Not surprisingly, most accounts of organisational actorness refer to 
the EU. 
When IR theories and analysts talk about the behaviour of states, individuals, 
networks, institutions and more, what is typically meant is less the constitution of 
the body itself but the impact it has on its surrounding. A constructivist reading 
would suggest that an organisation’s actorness results from a shared understanding 
of values, principles and norms, leading to a certain degree of unity and the ability to 
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act, to meaningfully affect change. From a rationalist perspective, being active and 
deliberate in ones action is not sufficient, but any assessment ought to be outcome 
oriented. From here, one gets a better idea about what independent actorness could 
be. In most rudimentary terms, actorness is the degree of any given actor’s capacity 
to initiate change of structure and itself. If structure is the environment within which 
an actor is embedded, then actorness is the capacity of this actor to make this 
structure work for himself, or, depending on ones theoretical starting point, the 
extent to which this actor can shape and influence the environment. Gunnar 
Sjoestedt differentiates between strong and weak international actors in relation to 
others in the international system.34 According to him, actorness is ‘the capacity to 
behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international 
system’.35 Mathew Doidge delivers a useful definition when he writes that actorness 
is 
the ability to act in a purposive fashion in the pursuit of external goals and 
interests, informed by a region’s identity. It is a function, therefore, of the 
ability to formulate coherent policies and the possession of the performance 
instruments necessary to operationalize those policies.36 
Actorness then certainly includes the ability to initiate and affect change of itself and 
its surroundings. But there is more to it when relating to regional organisations. 
Doidge’s identification of a process of moving from regional presence to regional 
actorness further aids understanding.37 Presence is the impact of a region on its 
external environment, the outcome of its very basic existence. The mere existence of 
a region may have certain relevance in the world even without actively engaging in 
any meaningful action. For instance, regional organisation may model themselves in 
the European image without Brussels pro-actively contributing or even intending to 
contribute in any way. Presence therefore includes some implicit low-level agency of 
a regional organisation. Yet, meaningful actorness materialises only by 
demonstrating the will and the capacity to turn from merely being present to being 
an active shaper of ones environment. Doidge names three essential characteristics 
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of regional actorness. (1) action triggers - the goals and interests of a particular 
entity; (2) policy processes - the ability to reach decisions relating to the action 
trigger; (3) performance structures – structural conditions and resources necessary 
to act once a decision has been reached. Or as Bretherton and Vogler put it, an actor 
should be able to ‘identify policy priorities and formulate coherent policies’.38 Both 
presence and actorness impact on a region’s surrounding, yet in profoundly different 
ways. Whereas the former is a passive, possibly unintended impact, the latter is the 
active formulation and operationalisation of policy. Actorness therefore includes the 
ability of a unit to exercise agency,39 more precisely, the capacity of an actor to 
mobilise resources in order to affect change. Thus defined, possessing a high level of 
collective actorness implies a degree of autonomy from its external environment,40 a 
need for an appropriately high level of independence; the collective must be 
distinguishable from its constituent parts.41 Jupille and Caporaso have added that 
actorness derives from autonomy defined as institutional independence and 
cohesion. 42 I suggest that cohesion is the extent to which policies and bilateral 
relations between individual actors agree with each other and preferences and 
processes are transnationally synchronised. At the same time, cohesion derives from 
a vertical coherence between the organisation and its members. Independence and 
cohesion must be based on a certain degree of reliable unity. An organisation must 
be able to operate in its own right, relatively independent from capricious activity 
and intentions of sub-actors such as individual nation states or interfering outsiders. 
On the basis of internal agreement and unity it must be capable of formulating and 
articulating coherent goals and policies. Finally, determination and articulation of 
such goals and policies must be substantiated in practice by implementation of 
policy measures in order to meet thus articulated ends. An organisation possessing 
actorness must therefore be more than the merely the sum of its components. It 
should possess some independent ability to formulate, articulate, and operationalise 
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a common purpose. Although this thesis strongly questions the utility of identity 
variables, a certain degree of common understanding, or common appreciation of its 
character aids an organisation’s capacity to act collectively in a meaningful manner 
on the basis of a shared interest; i.e. the ability to formulate and operationalise 
coherent policies. Hence, actorness is best understood as the sum of individual 
constituents such as community, autonomy, and agency, measured in terms of 
cohesion, impact, effectiveness, external recognition and others. Robust regional 
institutionalisation and rules-based decision structures are, though not necessary, 
desirable and well-established, formal, reliable, and non-arbitrary modes of 
interaction are conducive to actorness. 
Community 
 
Essential to the research question is conceptionalising community. For a theoretical 
starting point I suggest sociologist Ferdinand Toennies who juxtaposed Gemeinschaft 
(community) and Gesellschaft (society).43 The difference lays in both the perception 
of the collective by the individual unit and the reason for collectivising in the first 
place. In Toennies’ view, communities are forged and held together by an intrinsic 
identification of the individual unit with the collective. Members are bound by a 
shared interpretation and understanding of norms and values facilitating a sense of 
togetherness, a community feeling. Although Toennies sees the immediate family as 
the root of the collective and regards frequent personal interaction on the basis of 
traditional social norms and trust as necessary, he specifically allows for an extension 
of his community concept to include wider social collectives. Society on the other 
hand is a de-personalised, rationally constructed cooperative. Rational, self- 
interested individuals organise as a formal, rules-based collective in anticipation of 
efficiency, economic, and security gains. Being part of a Gesellschaft is therefore 
conducive to the individuals’ own long-term interests and integration motivated by 
such considerations. This dichotomy resonates well with two of Max Weber’s four 
types of social interaction. Wertrationales Handeln (value-rational action) is guided 
by intrinsic orientation on the basic values of a community. Zweckrationales Handeln 
 
 
 
43  
Toennies (1887, edited 2001). 
40 
 
 
(instrumental action) on the other hand is not informed by values, but pursued in 
terms of constant cost-benefit calculations as rational individual behaviour; echoing 
the homo economicus acting within the bounds of society. More recent work on 
communities often builds on those sociological foundations. MacMillan and Chavies 
for instance also defined community in terms of belonging. Members mattered to 
one another and to the group beyond their efficiency value and the need of the 
individual member will be met via collective commitment to be united and 
together.44 
When applied to international cooperation, it ought to be noted that society in this 
understanding differs significantly from understanding informed by the English 
School tradition in International Relations. English School theorists such as Hedley 
Bull conceive a society of states as the basis of inter-state cooperation and the 
international society as the central theme of the English School.45 The international 
society have jointly and cooperatively established a shared understanding of a 
certain set of values, rules, and commonly shared interests, resulting mutually 
recognised institutions. 46 Despite an appreciation of the basic condition of 
international anarchy, states may agree to restrict themselves within rules-based 
institutions, as they have recognised their common interest in maintaining an 
ordering principle. The English School therefore seeks an eclectic third way 
somewhere in between realist and constructivist notions of international 
cooperation. Its understanding of society is, although less idealistic, more akin to the 
aforementioned concept of Gemeinschaft, or community. This has informed the IR of 
Asia and ASEAN studies a great deal and reappears in most accounts of Southeast 
Asian relations. 
Adler and Barnett prefer to apply the early sociological Gemeinschaft definitions to 
the international arena and define a community with the help of three essential 
characteristics.47 First, members share “identity, values, and meanings” as the basis 
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of community, providing members with an intersubjective understanding of specific 
norms, values, and suitable behaviour integral to the collective organisation of 
nation states. Second, members need to have many-sided, direct relations and 
“frequent interactions in numerous settings”. Perhaps this is the most obvious 
impediment to the community concept’s application to IR. How could all member 
states’ citizens, or even the smaller circle of elites possibly frequently and directly 
interact with one another? Some Asia-constructivists have tried to manoeuvre this 
obstacle by seeing transnational communities as “imagined communities”. 48 
Imagined does not equal illusory, but ought to be understood as a feeling of being 
directly connected by a shared understanding of and identification with their shared 
community without the need for direct personal encounters. Finally, “reciprocity” 
appreciates a degree of long-term interest, even altruism derived from a shared 
sense of obligation and reciprocal responsibility as the bond between individual 
members. Reciprocity is possibly best understood in terms of convergent definitions 
of the common good among all participating nation states. The individual interests of 
a state, such as security and prosperity for ones’ nation and people, ought to mirror 
the common – in this case regional – interest. The individual and collective good and 
interests are correspondent. Logically, this leads to the conclusion that supporting 
other members and the collective as whole is equivalent to furthering ones’ own 
interest. Yet, far from being self-interested value-rational action, this mutual, 
reciprocal support originates in both altruism and a shared identity. The distinction 
between “the self” and “the other” becomes blurred over time. In sum, a community 
is thus characterised by a subjective, imagined, and reciprocal sense of belonging 
together; a “we-feeling”.49 
Security and ASEAN Centrality 
 
An understanding of what is widely called ASEAN centrality and how this relates to 
the concept of security is also critical to this thesis. 
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In absence of a universal definition, security is a controversially debated term in IR.50 
Complicating matters is that most would certainly agree that establishing and 
safeguarding security is the top-priority of international cooperation and the 
archetypal responsibility of all international actors, may those be nation states or 
non-state actors. As most concepts, the understanding of security depends on the 
theoretical starting point. Compare for instance Lippmann’s assertion that ‘a nation 
has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, 
and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war’51 to Samuel Makinda’s definition 
of security as ‘the preservation of the norms, rules, institutions and values of society’ 
which must be protected from ‘military and non-military threats’.52 Estrella Solidum 
equally emphasises norms and values, does however, move away from the focus on 
threats per se. Solidum instead concentrates on security as the satisfaction of values, 
arguing that security ‘consists of the feeling that accompanies actual, perceived, or 
sustained satisfaction of values and/or reasonable and stable expectation of their 
realization.’53 A nation state’s values rather than its survival become the main 
parameters of its core interest of security. 
Traditionally, in the realist reading security has been discussed in terms of territory 
and threats. The nation state is the quintessential actor and, threatened by extra- 
national actors by military means, its survival is the most rudimental component of 
having security. Accordingly, threats can be alleviated by increasing power and 
defence capabilities of the state by enhancing military and economic power, 
engaging in pre-emptive military action, building and enhancing alliances etc. Some 
institutional realists also account for the possibility of some form of limited, rational 
oriented institutional integration and confidence-building measures (CBMs) among a 
group of competing states. Above definitions carry a more or less overt theoretical 
connotation and prescribe a theoretical perspective.54   As security studies evolved, 
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non-traditional security (NTS) threats were added and widened the understanding of 
what constitutes security and thus, what poses a threat. NTS can be broadly 
categorised as all non-state challenges to survival and well being of the state and its 
people. NTS threats include internal threats in form of inter alia subversion by 
extremist  groups,  migration,  economic  hardship,  human  rights  abuses,  famines, 
pandemics, environmental disasters, all of which pose a direct threat to the welfare 
of state and people.55 The traditional realist view is broadened in two ways. First, 
security is no longer seen as being state-centric. Secondly, the welfare of society as a 
whole and the security of the individual is included. Latest in the wake the of the 
Cold War, the security discourse expanded from the nation state as the principle 
object of security and the understanding of security in exclusively military terms. The 
emerging notion of human security included food-, economic-, political-, and 
increasingly environmental challenges. 56 Despite justified warnings that the concept 
of human security is too vague to serve as a sound analytical framework,57 there is 
now all but universal consensus that exclusively state-centric, military security is no 
longer sufficient in order to account for global stability. 
Buzan et.al. highlight the problem that security is by no means an objective 
measurement. Quite the opposite, securitisation of issues often follows normative- 
ideological elite preferences and therefore, almost any issue can be securitised. 
Definitions can be endless and the their ideological origins almost polar-opposite.58 
In particular Makinda’s and Solidum’s definitions are prone to the problem of diverse 
issue securitisation. Norms and values of society can be subject to fluctuating and 
even capricious reinterpretations, depending on elite preferences and even 
Lippman’s assertion of a state’s ‘legitimate interest’ is contingent upon potentially 
inconsistent elitist understanding. In this light, this thesis does not subscribe to any 
theoretical definition of security or positivist or post-positivist understanding of how 
it ought to be measured. This is not decisive here. Indeed, defining security with a 
theoretical bias distracts from the attempted analysis of Asia-constructivism’s value 
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added to Asian regionalism. This thesis does however decisively include NTS threats 
and treats non- and traditional security as non-hierarchical. Non-traditional security 
threats are real and their impact directly felt and most states and people are 
regularly confronted by one or more NTS threats of varying intensity. Thus, we must 
take into account various sources and directions of threats and appreciate a holistic 
security perspective. More often than not, NTS challenges often defy a purely 
national resolution, for more often than not, NTS challenges are trans-national in 
nature (e.g. migration, refugees, ecological issues, economic crises etc.).  Hence, 
while the degree of their importance and effectiveness is going to be subject of 
debate, international organisations are not superfluous in security. At the same time, 
traditional security remains as important as it has always been and NTS 
supplements, not replaces traditional notions. For the purpose of this thesis it 
suffices to deem security as whatever the relevant actors believe it consists of. This 
varies from one case study to the other and even within the same case study, 
depending on the issue at hand. Indonesia for instance, grappling with domestic 
insurgencies, may have a very different perspective on security from Singapore, 
being concerned with geostrategic situation regarding the Malacca Strait and other 
vital sea-lanes and having virtually no strategically usable hinterland. Similarly, the 
Philippines may regard maritime security as more important than say a landlocked 
country such as Laos does. 
How Security is Operationalised in Southeast Asia 
 
One also needs to get an idea of how security is kept functional, or is operationalised 
in the region. Apart from a largely self-sufficient China and the unique case of North 
Korea, there are three pivotal pillars supporting the East Asian security architecture. 
First and foremost, there is the United States-led largely bilateral “hub-and-spokes” 
system. Washington is the principal regional security guarantor, the hub of a 
complex arrangement of mostly bilateral security relationships (spokes). In this 
arrangement the Pentagon is primarily responsible for the greater security of the 
region. Its allies and partners contribute within their often limited means. In East 
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Asia,59 this is operationalised via a complex web of formal alliances with traditional 
allies including Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand as well as informal, often 
intentionally ambiguous agreements and security guarantees, in particular but not 
exclusively with partners where ambiguity serves a wider strategic goal, such as 
Taiwan. This is supplemented by several treaties, short of formal alliances, 
supporting U.S. efforts by granting access to military bases, offering logistic support, 
conducting joint exercises etc. In recent years, U.S. defence policymakers have 
increasingly come to appreciate the importance of strategic partnerships short of 
formal alliances (Indonesia, Vietnam etc.). There has been a particular surge in such 
arrangements under the Obama administration as part of a strategy for navigating a 
more complex security situation in Asia.60 
Since President Obama assumed office in 2009, he extended his predecessor’s 
narrow security focus on the Middle East and South Asia and began to “rebalance” 
American strategic interests by concentrating on East Asia. By 2020, 60% of the U.S. 
Navy will be deployed in the Pacific and the military hardware deployed is hoped to 
permit U.S. forces to effectively by-pass Chinese area-denial and deterrence 
capabilities. Although the so-called pivot to Asia, or rebalance, is not ostensibly 
directed at containing the PRC, it provides Southeast Asia with more options facing a 
more assertive PRC in the SCS. 61 The new U.S. strategy includes diplomatic, 
economic, and security elements, in particular in Southeast Asia. It is however the 
security component and U.S. military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific that AMS’ 
leaders consider as the centrepiece of the pivot. 
Secondly, there are significant bilateral cooperative networks among individual East- 
and Southeast Asian countries such as closer Philippine-Vietnam relations, in 
particular in reaction to the SCS threat originating in China. There are also more or 
less close military-to-military contacts and joint exercises among most AMS. Lastly, 
and most crucially to this thesis, the final pillar of East Asian security is based on 
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ASEAN’s centrality, the notion that ASEAN is and ought to be the fulcrum of regional 
order. 
Centrality 
 
Centrality is the broader notion that Southeast Asia and ASEAN is the centre of wider 
East Asian relations in general and in the regional security architecture in the Asia- 
Pacific in particular. Take for instance the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia 
Summit (EAS), or other forums including various ASEAN+ formats. Those are often 
East Asia-wide, some even wider, but all are ASEAN-based. The origins of that indeed 
privileged position dates back to ASEAN’s founding when it had to deal with larger 
powers that were converging in East- and Southeast Asia during the Cold War and 
earlier. Native actors and their regional organisation did and still do not wish to be 
marginalised by the struggle for influence and dominance among more powerful 
actors. At the same time, ASEAN represented a useful interlocutor and mediating 
channel for those greater, competing powers to conduct their relations. ASEAN 
appreciated this privilege and intended to be in the “driver’s seat”, as it is often 
called, of regional security multilateralism. From the very beginning, ASEAN believed 
it had to assume and must always remain in this driver’s seat of Asian regionalism, its 
institutions, forums, regimes etc.62 Even more ambitious, ASEAN aims to be not only 
reacting to great power activity in the region but also to pro-actively harness and 
even shape that activity. In other words, the concept of centrality attempts to keep 
AMS and ASEAN relevant against the odds of unequal power in the Asia-Pacific.63 By 
virtue of by being the “honest broker” in an Asia where institutions, treaties, and 
regimes created by one of the bigger powers would lack legitimacy in a context of 
mutual big power mistrust, ASEAN assumes this role essentially by default. Centrality 
therefore originates from Southeast Asia’s careful management of and navigation 
between great powers competing for influence in a region that has too often found 
itself to be a playground for great power competition. Here, ASEAN found a path to 
promote cooperation and trust without all too obvious alignment. In particular in the 
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Acharya (2014): 266 for a good explanation. 
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Goh (2014) for the taming unequal power. 
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post Cold War era, ASEAN became the most ardent actor in regional multilateralism, 
leading to the founding of the ARF, EAS, and ratification of peace regimes such as the 
TAC. To this day, ASEAN expects to continue to be the centre of much of the regional 
architecture that is evolving around it. In the security architecture, centrality is 
mostly is institutionalised in ASEAN associated elements of track-1 multilateral, 
regional security cooperation, such as the ARF or ASEAN+3, ADMM+, as well as 
extensive track-2 network and even non-ASEAN, pan-Asian, track-1, -2 and 
increasingly -1.5 forums, such as the Shangri-La Dialogue. Concealed in this concept 
is a gigantic challenge for a collective of small, comparatively weak (measured in 
terms of material capabilities) nation states. Centrality implies that an association of 
weak nation states can play an over proportionally powerful role in the wider 
regional security architecture. Considering the asymmetric might of other regional 
actors such as the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and others, one would 
not think AMS could maintain a position of regional security management on their 
terms. The pressure resulting from this implication shall be topic of the first case 
study. 
AMS regard all pillars of regional security operationalisation as mutually reinforcing. 
Yet, this thesis works on the assumption that the security quality of the first pillar, 
U.S. managed security, is the most critical of all and this remains what most East 
Asian states, bar North Korea and China, greatly rely on.64 The contemporary main 
focus of regional multilateralism is less militarily and more on CBMs and conflict 
avoidance. Although preventive diplomacy is the declared goal, 65 the region is 
arguably very far from having achieved a sufficient level of mutual trust as to make 
preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution reliable. Unlike in Europe, the strong 
emphasis on sovereignty in Southeast Asia is powerfully coupled with an equally 
strong sense of both national identity and interest. The lack of accepted and 
established common security structures and insitutions such as NATO in combination 
with a heterogeneous, complex web of security interests, alliances, and military 
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This presumption is the result of interviews and conversations with policy makers, diplomats, and 
experts in Southeast Asia. 
65  
www.aseanregionalforum.asean.org for the ARF objectives. 
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capabilities  and  strategies  produces  rather  unstable,  unreliable,  and  potentially 
conflictual security dynamics in the region. 
 
 
2. What is ASEAN? 
 
 
 
This chapter is an introduction of the major subject of this thesis, ASEAN itself. It will 
attempt a brief historical, institutional, and political overview and intends to allude 
to ASEAN’s noteworthy heterogeneity and distinctively non-supranational 
organisational and ideological character. Since ASEAN is an organisation of 
magnificent size and active in somewhere close to 1000 annual meeting and forums 
encompassing track-1, -1.5, -2, -3, the focus must inevitably be narrowed and be of 
direct relevance to this thesis. 
 
2.1. Its Members 
 
No observer would deny that 
ASEAN is a remarkable 
organisation and  arguably  the 
world’s second most successful 
project of regional integration; 
with the first place  belonging 
to the European Union (EU). EU 
comparisons however are only 
of limited value. Not only is the 
EU  an  organisation  in  one  of 
the world’s wealthiest regions and highly advanced in any measureable aspect from 
socio-cultural development, politics to economics and technology. It is also 
characterised by a comparatively strong cohesiveness, resulting as much from 
Brussels’ institutional resilience as it is a consequence of Europe’s homogeneity. EU 
members are liberal democracies with, though not identical, comparatively similar 
societal make-up, demography, and socio-economic circumstances. Some may be 
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reluctant to accept this point of European cohesiveness, but in comparison, Europe’s 
homogeneity permits a strong organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1.a; Source: ASEANstats (2015), www.asean.org. 
ASEAN on the other 
hand is characterised 
by        almost        polar 
opposite 
characteristics. And 
yet, having been 
around for almost five 
decades, it has been 
relatively successful 
within its means. 
Following  earlier 
unsuccessful attempts 
or short-lived 
realisations of regional confederations or defence organisations such as Southeast 
Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) or Maphilindo, ASEAN was founded on August 8, 
1967 with the ratification of the ASEAN Declaration (also Bangkok Declaration) by 
the foreign ministers of the original five founding member states (o-AMS) Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. For reasons such as non-completed 
independence or on-going civil war, subsequent ASEAN membership expansion had 
to wait for several decades. The present day ASEAN10 were gradually completed 
with the admission of Brunei Darussalam in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and 
Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. ASEAN’s main legal body, the 2007 ASEAN 
Charter,  does  provide  for  further  membership  expansion  without  any  specific 
economic or political pre-accession criteria as long as the applicant is a sovereign 
nation state located within the geographical boundaries of Southeast Asia.66 This is 
distinctively different from EU standards by which the Copenhagen Criteria intend to 
maintain a relative political, economic, and socio-cultural homogeneity. Effectively, 
 
 
 
 
66 
ASEAN Charter (2007), available: www.asean.org, accessed 06/06/2016: Art 6. 
Key ASEAN Indicators 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total land area 4,435,674 4,435,617 4,435,618 4,435,618 
(sq.km)     
Total population 
(1000) 
598,926 606,856 614,741 622,250 
GDP ($USmillion) 2,210,915 2,343,196 2,409,216 2,573,589 
GDP growth (%) 4.9 6.0 5.3 4.7 
GDP per cap. ($US) 3,691 3,861 3,919 4,136 
Export ($USmillion) 1,242,199 1,254,581 1,271,128 1,292,634 
Import ($USmillion) 1,146,245 1,221,847 1,240,388 1,236,284 
FDI inflow 95,838 115,453 117,687 136,181 
($USmillion)     
Visitor arrivals (1000) 81,229 89,225 101,055 105,083 
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Table 2.1.b; Source: World Bank, www.worldbank.org; International Monetary Fund (2013), www.imf.org. 
 
this provision means that present-day ASEAN is virtually completed with the 
exception of Timor-Leste.67 Already, the current ASEAN10 cover a region larger than 
the EU in both population and area. 
Perhaps most striking at first sight is that Southeast Asia is, unlike other regions, 
 
 
AMS Capital Government Popul. (est.) GDP GDP Major ethnic Main religion Life 
  Type (official)  ($USb per.c. groups  expectanc 
    n) (US$)   y – global 
        rank 
 
Brunei Bandar Constitutional 422,675 17.43 38,563 Malay 65.7%, Muslim 78.8%, 77 – 50
th
 
 Seri Islamic    Chinese 10.3%, Christian 8.7%,  
 Begaw Monarchy    other 24% Buddhist 7.8%  
 an (Indep. 1984)       
 
Cambodia Phnom multiparty, 15,458,332 16.9 1,007 Khmer 90%, Buddhist 96.9%, 73 – 104th 
 Penh constitutional    Vietnamese 5%, Muslim 1.9%,  
  monarchy    Chinese 1% Christian 0.4%  
  (Indep. 1953)       
 
Indonesia Jakarta Republic, 253,609,643 856.1 3,475 Javanese 40.1%, Muslim 87.2%, 71 – 116th 
  presidential    Sundanese 15.5%, Christian 7%,  
  (Indep.    Malay 3.7% R.Catholic 2.9%,  
  declared 1945)     Hindu 1.7%  
 
Laos PDR Vientia Socialist, single 6,803,699 11.71 1,660 Lao 55%, Buddhist 67%, 66 – 142nd 
 ne party (Indep.    Khmou 11%, Christian 1.5%,  
  1949)    Hmong 8% other 31.5%  
 
Malaysia Kuala Constitutional 30,073,353 336.9 10,538 Malay 50.1%, Muslim 61.3%, 74 – 95th 
 Lumpur Monarchy,    Chinese 22.6%, Buddhist 19.8%,  
  federal    Indigenous 11.8%, Christian 9.2%,  
  parliamentary    Indian 6.7% Hindu 6.3%  
  (Indep. 1957)       
 
Myanmar Nay Pyi Republic, 55,746,253 65.29 1,200 Burman 68%, Buddhist 89%, 66 – 143rd 
 Taw presidential (in    Shan 9%, Christian 4%,  
  transition),    Karen 7%, Muslim 4%  
  (Indep. 1948)    Rakhine 5%,   
 
Philippines Manila Republic, 107,668,231 289.7 2,765 Tagalog 28.1%, Catholic 82.9%, 69 – 128th 
  presidential    Cebuano 13.1%, Muslim 5%  
  (Indep. 1946)    Ilocano 9%,   
      other 49.8%   
 
Singapore Singap Republic, 5,567,301 307.1 55,182 Chinese 74.2%, Buddhist 33.9%, 83 – 4
th
 
 ore parliamentary    Malay 13.3%, Christian 18.1%  
  (Indep. 1965)    Indian 9.2% Muslim 14.3%,  
 Taoist 11.3%,  
Catholic 7.1%,  
Hindu 5.2%  
 
Thailand Bangko Constitutional 67,741,401 380.5 5,779 Thai 95.9%, Buddhist 93.6%, 75 – 77th 
 k Monarchy    Burmese 2%, Muslim 4.9%,  
      other 1.3% Christian 1.2%  
 
Vietnam Hanoi Socialist, single 93,421,835 187.8 1,910 Kinh 85.7%, None 80.8%, 76 – 65th 
  party (Indep.    Tay 1.9%, Buddhist 9.3%,  
  1945)    Thai 1.8% Catholic 6.7%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
And at some point in the future perhaps West Papua should it ever gain independence from 
Indonesia and, depending on geographical interpretation, Papua New Guinea. 
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geographically fragmented and in a geographical sense arguably not a natural region. 
It is comprised of large and small mainland and maritime states, split by plenty of 
waterways and most dominantly, the South China Sea (SCS). Not entirely unrelated 
to both the lack of membership criteria and the geographical differences is the 
second striking ASEAN characteristic; its heterogeneity. Table 2.1.b visualises that 
ASEAN member states (AMS) cover almost all political and administrative systems of 
governance   known   to   political   science,   ranging   from   total   monarchies   and 
authoritarian, to semi-democratic and democratic parliamentary or presidential 
systems. 68 A simplified political characterisation could for instance recognise 
Indonesia as one of the few more or less functioning and consolidated democracies 
in East Asia. Since the student demonstrations in the late 1990s ebbed off, Jakarta 
holds regular popular elections and non-violent political change takes place, 
although caveats such as strong clientelistic patronage-politics must be added. On 
the other end of the political spectrum are countries such as the absolute monarchy 
Brunei, or Vietnam, which, despite successful semi-capitalist economic reforms 
politically remains a socialist one-party state. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 
remains solidly authoritarian and secondary political association and dissident 
behaviour is not tolerated and strongly circumscribed. Somewhere in between sits 
the city-state Singapore. Possibly best characterised as a semi-democracy in which 
the People’s Action Party (PAP) is governing uninterruptedly since independence, 
albeit being subject to regular elections. The PAP traditionally relies on a form of 
electoral authoritarianism combining concentration of power among a few elites and 
limits on expression, media coverage, political assembly, and often draconian laws 
against any activity that may upset domestic stability. Also interesting to note is the 
great deal of influence the military and military elites traditionally exercise in some 
AMS, such as Myanmar or Thailand. As of yet, it remains unclear what medium- and 
long-term implications Myanmar’s recent opening and the 2015 elections will have. 
Thus far, it remains – even if no longer junta ruled – a country where the military 
establishment enjoys great political privileges, resulting in certainly undemocratic 
 
 
 
 
68 
Peou (2014) for a discussion of theory and political system asymmetry in Southeast Asia. 
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political influence. Thailand, unique in that it is the only AMS without a history of 
direct colonial administration, used to enjoy a great wealth of capable and 
comparatively liberal political leaders. Unfortunately, latest since 2001 Thailand is in 
a prolonged state of varying degrees of political instability and popular unrest and 
remains highly military coup-prone, the latest of which took place in 2014. The 
country has since regained some stability but is governed by an unpredictable 
military junta in absolute control of all institutions and branches of government. 
Albeit promising a return to civil administration at some point, the undisputed 
leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha continues to put off this point towards an 
unspecified future. Unlike countries such as Singapore or Indonesia currently 
characterised by comparatively reliable political stability, Thailand is likely to be 
politically very volatile, on the brink of renewed turmoil and subject to capricious 
events for many years to come.69 
Table 2.1.b also shows that AMS have a great wealth of ethnic and religious diversity, 
ranging from secular to Islamic, Buddhist, or Christian. Some countries, such as 
Thailand or Vietnam are ethnically fairly homogenous while others, such as the 
Philippines are diverse. Most mainland AMS tend to have one principal 
ethnic/religious population group and numerous minority groups. Maritime states 
on the other hand are often characterised by a large number of ethnicities, 
sometimes without one constituting an absolute majority. In Vietnam, the Kinh 
people make up almost 86% of the Vietnamese population at large, of which again 
some 81% do not subscribe to any particular religion. In contrast, the Javanese are 
by far the largest ethnic group in predominately Muslim Indonesia, but constitute 
only some 41% of the population, with a great number of minority groups mostly 
occupying islands other than Java. Since Singapore was expelled from the Federation 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
A political expert at a research institute in Bangkok has suggested to this author that this situation is 
likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Even if elections were going to be held soon, the new 2016 
constitution, in the drafting process at the time of writing and Thailand’s 20
th 
constitution since 1932, 
does not provide for a democratic, civilian system of government up to western standards. It rather 
organises institutions and laws in order to maintain ultima ratio elite authority over the political and 
legal process in the foreseeable future; Interview, February 2016, German-Southeast Asian Centre of 
Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Bangkok. 
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of Malaya in 1965, it became the only Southeast Asian state with a majority ethnic 
Chinese population. 
The socio-economic development gap is equally striking. The per capita gross- 
domestic product (GDP) ratio between the largest and smallest national GDP per 
capita across ASEAN was trending around 1:61 in 2010 and is still at an estimated 
1:54. In comparison, the EU ratio is roughly 1:14. The 2014 United Nations Human 
Development Index lists Singapore in the top ten of developed nations, higher than 
Denmark, but ranks Indonesia as the world’s 108th. Cambodia and Laos are even as 
low as 136th  and 139th  respectively.70 Tiny Singapore is by far the most developed 
industrial economy in Southeast Asia and leverages on its international reputation as 
a major global financial and transhipment centre. Singapore’s ambitious and skilful, 
but controversial long-time leader, the late Lee Kuan Yew 71 managed to turn 
Singapore from a poor, underdeveloped and hopelessly overburdened city that 
never wished to be independent into one of the world’s most developed and 
wealthiest nations. Nowadays, Singapore’s per capita income tops the U.S.’ and 
boasts a political, economic, and bureaucratic capacity and infrastructure 
unparalleled in Southeast Asia. Singapore’s success is due to a relatively stable, 
highly skilled and educated multi-ethnic society, largely at peace with each other. 
Given its ethnic diversity and early-days history of racial troubles, this is remarkable 
and not least due to draconian laws and law enforcement, Lee Kuan Yew’s political 
skills and legacy, and Singapore’s self-perception as a capitalist meritocracy. On the 
other end of the spectrum are countries such as the 2016 ASEAN Chair Laos. A 
single-party state with an authoritarian government, unopposed in over four 
decades, Laos is among the poorest countries in East Asia. Bureaucratic state 
capacity is a further dividing factor. Across most AMS, corruption is endemic. 
Transparency International for example lists Myanmar and Cambodia in the top-20 
of the most corrupt countries on earth. At the same time, Singapore’s tough anti- 
corruption laws have been successful and won the government international acclaim 
 
 
 
 
70 
UN HDI (2014): Human Development Index 2014, available: www.hdr.undp.org, accessed: 
01/08/2015. 
71 
Lee died in 2015. Singapore’s current Prime Minister is his son Lee Hsien Loong. 
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as the global number 7, with the lowest degree of public-sector corruption in all of 
Asia; less corrupt than most European countries, including Germany and the 
Netherlands.72 An unfortunate commonality across ASEAN is that Freedom House 
deems no member as “free” in terms of political and civil liberties. Six AMS (Vietnam, 
Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei) are considered “not free” with the 
remaining four (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore) “partly free”. 
Noteworthy and not without significance to this thesis is also that the current ASEAN 
Chair Laos is the least free of all the ASEAN10.73 
 
2.2. Brief Historical Background 
 
Apart from being rich in natural resources, Southeast Asia encompasses pivotal sea- 
lanes linking East Asia with the Indian Ocean towards the Bay of Bengal, further on 
to the Middle East, Africa and Europe. As a historical consequence, Southeast Asia 
played a significant role in colonial, World War II, and Cold War history and has often 
been the centre stage of past and present conflicts, power balance dynamics, and 
turf wars. To this day, Southeast Asia remains of immense geostrategic significance 
and constitutes one of the most crucial regions for the future of great power 
relationships. Undoubtedly, all AMS have certainly had penetrating, sometimes even 
tragic and traumatic experiences with outside interference. In this light not 
altogether surprisingly, nationalism has always been one of the defining features of 
Southeast Asian history, society, and politics. 
More surprising is that in this light the founding document of ASEAN, the 1967 
Bangkok Declaration, declares ASEAN’s primary ambition as 
to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of 
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a 
prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations.74 
 
 
 
 
72 
Transparency International (2014): Corruption Perception Index 2014, available: 
www.transparency.org,  accessed:  28/08/15. 
73 
Freedom House (2015): Freedom in the world in 2015 available: www.freedomhouse.org, accessed: 
20/02/2015. 
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Bangkok Declaration (1967); available: www.asean.org, accessed: 06/06/2015. 
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If it was not for Southeast Asian history of conflict and war, one could interpret this 
statement  of  purpose  as  an  attempt  to  facilitate  economic  and  socio-cultural 
exchange and 
not much else. 
Yet, against the 
backdrop of 
events unfolding 
in Asia in the 
1960s and 70s, it 
was  security 
that had always 
been  upmost  in 
the mind of 
AMS’  leaders. 75 
The  intensifying 
and spreading 
war in Vietnam, 
post-Cultural 
Revolution re- 
emergence of 
now communist 
China, and in 
anticipation of a 
power vacuum 
the great 
powers were likely to leave behind in the wake of the 1969 Nixon Doctrine and 
British intention to militarily vacate the world “East of Suez”, the major non- 
communist states of Southeast Asia sought stability and security first and foremost. 
Though important of course, economic principles were given only rhetorical pre- 
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Leifer (1989). 
ASEAN Milestones; Treaties and Major Steps 
August 1967 Bangkok Declaration – Founding at height of Vietnam War 
February 1976 First ASEAN Summit convenes in Bali, Indonesia 
 
Treat of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) – Cooperation and regional 
management guidelines; ASEAN Concord (Bali I) 
January 1984 First membership expansion: Brunei 
January 1992 ASEAN Free-Trade Agreement (AFTA) 
July 1994 Inaugural meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
July 1995 Second membership expansion: Vietnam 
July 1997 Third membership expansion: Laos and Myanmar 
December 1997 First meeting ASEAN+3 
 
First ASEAN-China Summit 
April 1999 Fourth and most recent membership expansion: Cambodia 
May 2000 Launch of the currency swap agreement Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 
response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
November 2002 ASEAN-China sign non-binding Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea (DOC) 
November 2002 China-ASEAN free trade area agreed 
October 2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali II) – Accord on the establishment of 
AC15 
December 2005 First East Asia Summit, originally comprising of ASEAN+6 
November 2007 ASEAN Charter adopted 
December 2015 ASEAN Community inaugurated 
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eminence over security. Two of the founding states (Thailand and Philippines) were 
allied to the U.S. and communist and non-aligned suspicions regarding the new 
association were supposed to be kept at a minimum.76 Lee Kuan Yew confirms as 
much in his memoirs. Lee recalls that at a time of great uncertainty in the face of the 
Vietnam War and communist insurgencies across the region, the founding of ASEAN 
was a result of the unspoken objective to gain strength and stability for security 
through   Southeast   Asian   solidarity.   Threatened   by   a   common   enemy,   the 
“communist threat”, the five founding ASEAN states (o-AMS) found a way to unite 
under the ASEAN umbrella in order to fill a potential power and security vacuum.77 
Coincidently, the simultaneous collapse of the nationalist Sukarno government 
establishing a new domestic and foreign policy order in Indonesia, allowed for a 
rapprochement between former adversaries in Southeast Asia. Michael Leifer argued 
that Indonesia as the largest state had always maintained that Jakarta ought to 
occupy a leadership role. This Indonesian notion of ‘regional entitlement’ as Leifer 
called it78 was certainly not shared by its neighbours. Post-Konfrontasi Indonesia 
however, signalled increasing willingness to cooperate with the region and served 
Sukarno successor Suharto’s goal of portraying Indonesia as a constructive, cordial 
neighbour interested in reconciliation.79 According to Lee Kuan Yew Indonesia under 
Suharto stopped acting like a regional hegemon and only because of this, 
reconciliation and reengagement was made possible. Suharto’s cooperative foreign 
policy allowed other Southeast Asian leaders to accept the largest and most 
powerful of the o-AMS to be the “first among equals”.80 
However, diverse security interests were discernible from the outset. Shaun Narine 
for instance found that most Southeast Asian leaders primarily sought to minimise 
military interference by outside actors against the backdrop of the region’s 
experiences with European colonialism as well as with imperial Japan.81 Yet, Lee 
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Lee (2011): Chapter 20. 
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Smith (2004): 419. 
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Kuan Yew vividly recalls his all but desperate efforts to convince the British to 
maintain a military presence in the region for as long as possible despite the East of 
Suez decision. He claims to have gone to great length in trying to convince both the 
Wilson and Heath governments to give explicit security guarantees and maintain the 
greatest military might possible in Singapore.82 At the same time, at a meeting in KL 
in 1971, AMS finalised the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) formulating the intent ‘to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the 
recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers’ and that 
Southeast Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of 
cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer 
relationship.83 Leifer saw ZOPFAN essentially as a Malaysia initiated response to the 
U.S. – China rapprochement and the former’s impending withdrawal from Vietnam, 
which would significantly alter the geostrategic situation in Southeast Asia.84 Ralf 
Emmers views this obvious conflict of security interest as a division of perception 
between Indonesia and the rest of the o-AMS as to what Southeast Asia and ASEAN 
should and can be. In the end, Jakarta failed to realise its vision of an exclusively 
Southeast Asian-led security order, free from extramural interference, and Suharto 
somewhat  succumbed  to  the  interests  of  mostly  Singapore,  Thailand,  and  the 
Philippines wanting to continue to rely on and press for outside security 
guarantees.85 Although ZOPFAN did not have any immediate discernible effect and 
was perhaps intentionally characterised by vague assumptions of the role of outside 
powers. As the first official agreement pursuing some limited regional security 
cooperation with a joint goal, ZOPFAN was highly symbolic nonetheless. At first sight, 
this seems to make for a strong neo-realist case whose proponents tend to claim 
that  commonly  perceived  threats  are  integral  to  tying  sovereign  states  into 
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Lee (2011), in particular chapter 2 and 4. 
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Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (1971), available: www.asean.org, accessed: 
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institutions which then subsequently evolve or perish with the development of the 
respective common threat.86 
But there was more to regional integration from the outset. Economic and domestic 
political factors were inseparable from stability and security and this connection took 
a rather curious form In Southeast Asia. The Indonesian notion of ketahanan 
nasional or “national resilience”, was seen as pivotal in the context of experiences 
with great regional disorder. The concept holds that if the nation state is robust, 
administered by a strong government and buoyed by a sound socio-economic 
situation and a strong sense of nationalism and national belonging, it is better 
equipped to deal with outside threats. If Southeast Asia were to consist of resilient 
but friendly nation states, ASEAN would be strong in logical consequence.87 At the 
1972 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik 
argued that national resilience would 
enhance the capabilities and abilities of each member country and its people in 
all fields of national endeavor, in order to withstand and to overcome all kinds 
of outside interference and adverse influences, harmful to its sound and 
harmonious development.88 
Thailand’s Thanat Khoman added that national resilience ought to be developed in 
the spirit of regional solidarity, cooperation and loyalty which would allow the region 
to cope with internal and external threats to their common interests.89 In line with 
their general nationalist principles, AMS’ leaders embraced ketahanan nasional, 
linked it to the regional context and made “regional resilience”, based on “national 
resilience” a lasting guiding principle of further ASEAN integration. The achievement 
of national development and simultaneous regional cooperation would create a 
robust region capable of preventing external powers from undue interference in 
Southeast Asia. In turn, greater regional security cooperation and friendly relations 
within a framework of limited institutionalised regionalism at minimal interference 
would  reduce  domestic  uncertainty  and  allow  for  this  apparently  indispensable 
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national development. Implicitly, this would also be conducive to regime survival and 
robust domestic governance, at all times inapprehensive of outside interference. The 
concept of regional resilience not only highlighted that regional coordination was 
desirable. It also led to a henceforth inextricable link in the mind of AMS’ elites 
between domestic socio-economic development, robust national government free 
from external interference, and overall regional security. Regional  and domestic 
stability came to be regarded as two sides of the same coin. In other words, national 
and regional resilience are mutually reinforcing and constitutive of each other. 
Facing an increasing communist consolidation in Indochina following the fall of 
Saigon, this common understanding of security and resilience led to the first ever 
ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976.90 Here, fearing for their still fragile regional resilience, 
ASEAN leaders took first crucial steps towards greater institutionalisation. As one 
observer highlighted at the time, ‘the communist victory injected an altogether more 
compelling sense of urgency into the activities of ASEAN.’91 Results included the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the Declaration of ASEAN 
(or simply Bali-) Concord as well as the Agreement on the Establishment of an ASEAN 
Secretariat.92 
As a still operational security agreement, the TAC is of particular importance to this 
thesis. In the spirit of regional resilience, the o-AMS sought to codify intramural 
cooperation to some extent in order to create a strong foundation. To this day, the 
TAC continues to be one of the most important ASEAN documents and is the basis 
for present-day security cooperation.93 Its principles still denote a de facto code of 
conduct for non-violent contemporary regional relations. Its purpose was ‘to 
promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation’ in Southeast Asia and 
signatories defined the principles of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
Koga (2014) for a good historical and analytical account of the process leading ASEAN from ZOPFAN 
to towards the TAC. 
91  
Jorgensen-Dahl, A. (1982): 84. 
92 
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976), (Bali Concord I); Agreement on the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Secretariat (1976), available: www.asean.org, accessed: 07/07/2016. 
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a. Mutual   respect   for   the   independence,   sovereignty,   equality, 
territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; 
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from 
external interference, subversion or coercion; 
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; 
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; 
f. Effective cooperation.94 
It also reinforces the ASEAN resilience dichotomy. Several articles (e.g. Art 11) 
highlight that not only intramural cooperation, but also each AMS’ national domestic 
stability is integral to the main goal of Southeast Asian peace and stability. Likewise, 
the first Bali Concord specifies that 
[t]he stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential 
contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to 
eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening 
national and ASEAN resilience.95 
Although o-AMS leaders felt the need to enhance ASEAN’s institutional substance 
and reliable cooperative mechanisms in the face of what appeared to be seen as a 
common communist domino threat in East Asia, the TAC included the critical 
provision to be ‘open for accession by other States in Southeast Asia.’96 This should 
be read in the context of the communist North Vietnamese victory. In particular 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore were increasingly apprehensive and desperate to 
contain the potential spread of revolutionary communism and it is reasonable to 
argue that this TAC provision was written with the by then more or less consolidated 
Hanoi government in mind.97 ASEAN leaders had realised that the CPV government 
in Hanoi was there to stay and were now hoping for Hanoi’s recognition of their own 
non-violent principles, including the absolute sovereignty and independence of all 
Southeast Asian states. It was the hope that if communism had become a reality, the 
principle of mutual respect and non-interference could become the anchor of a 
regional modus vivendi, not threatened by further communist expansion.98 Hence, a 
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decade after Konfrontasi, ASEAN’s focus had shifted from the challenge in the south 
to the northern challenge in Indochina. 
Vietnam’s subsequent invasion of Cambodia in 1979 seemingly confirmed this 
anxiety and threatened all hopes of a modus vivendi. In particular Suharto sought to 
substantiate regional resilience, to ensure stability and security in Southeast Asia in 
the face of challenges posed by the “communist threat”, without becoming the 
playing field of conflict between outside powers. Effectively, ASEAN for the first time 
sought a Southeast Asian response to a Southeast Asian security threat. The aim was 
to prevent Hanoi from altering the geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia through 
force and to prevent one AMS, Thailand, from having to cope with a communist 
occupied neighbour from where the revolutionary threat could infiltrate ASEAN. 
Accordingly, o-AMS leaders took the lead in supporting Cambodian resistance and 
the ousted exile government of Democratic Kampuchea led by the Khmer Rouge. 
ASEAN tried to galvanise international opposition against Vietnamese aggression and 
was instrumental in preventing the Hanoi backed Cambodian puppet regime of Heng 
Samrin from occupying Cambodia's UN seat. However, with Vietnam’s withdrawal 
from Cambodia in the late 80s, its Doi Moi economic reforms, and the eventual 
collapse of the Soviet Union – and with this the collapse of a large part of the 
“communist threat” – Vietnam became more akin to what leaders of the o-AMS 
thought Southeast Asia ought to be. Vice versa, in the light of the eventually 
unsuccessful attempt to dominate Indochina and an increasingly powerful China, 
Hanoi became more interested in joining ASEAN for its own security interests.99 This 
sea change in Vietnamese politics heralded an era of engagement and an end to 
previous Indochinese-ASEAN suspicions. In 1995 the former pariah state Vietnam 
became the first Indochinese and the first officially socialist state to join ASEAN. 
A further pivotal integration step came in the form of the 2007 ASEAN Charter 
(effective as of 2008). For four decades ASEAN had operated without a formal legal 
framework. Increasing institutionalisation and expansion, AMS realised, required an 
official instrument to provide ASEAN with a firm legal foundation. The Charter should 
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codify regional bureaucratic organisation, institutional targets, but also guiding 
norms, rules, and values. The 2005 Kuala Lumpur Summit appointed the so-called 
ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (EPG), tasked with drawing up first proposals and 
recommendations for a codified legal document that would not only facilitate, but 
regulate  robust  regional  integration.  The  ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers  were  then 
requested to set up a High Level Task Force (HLTF) to draft the Charter, taking into 
account EPG recommendations. This was accomplished at the 39th AMM. The 
Charter became the most significant document, establishing ASEAN as a legal entity 
and mapping its institutional structure, its principles, finances, and key objectives. 
Although those objectives, inter alia achieving and enhancing regional resilience, had 
been set out in plenty of previous documents, they ought to be formalised and 
articulated within a single legal document, hitherto representing the main point of 
reference for intra- and extramural relations. The Charter was signed at the 
Singapore Summit in November 2007 and became a legal reality as of December 
2008. It is certainly remarkable that it took ASEAN some 40 years to ratify its basic 
constitutive legal framework. 
The ASEAN Community 
 
Most critical to this 
thesis is ASEAN’s latest 
significant milestone; 
its regional integration 
project of the ASEAN 
Community (AC15). 
Despite the traditional 
insistence on national 
sovereignty, ever since 
its inception in 1967, ASEAN had continuously reiterated the call for a ‘community of 
Southeast Asian nations’ or later even an ‘ASEAN community’100 without further 
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specifications as to what a possible ASEAN community should be or entail. Following 
the 1997 Asian Financial crisis, ASEAN rhetoric focussed more profoundly on deeper 
regional integration and institutionalisation in both the political and economic 
domain as well as on establishing a leadership role for ASEAN in the wider Asia- 
Pacific region. In 1997, the ASEAN Vision 2020 statement put forward the notion of a 
single community in Southeast Asia, which would be 
a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward- looking, living in peace, stability 
and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in a just, democratic, and 
harmonious environment, dynamic development and ever-closer economic 
integration and in a community of caring societies, conscious of its ties of 
history, aware of its shared cultural heritage and bound by a common regional 
identity.101 
 
 
Community building gained momentum when the primus inter pares Indonesia 
assumed the ASEAN Chair in 2003. As many times before and since, at the 9th ASEAN 
Summit, Jakarta demonstrated its willingness to exercise leadership in propelling 
regional integration and paved the way for the greatest institutional evolution of 
ASEAN, yet. Community calls were now provided with a relatively clear agenda in the 
form of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), which was reaffirmed 
in 2011 with the Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of 
Nations (Bali Concord III). With those documents ASEAN embarked on a hitherto 
uncharacteristic community building project by specifying the institutional and 
ideological framework for deeper regional integration in the form of AC15. At the 
12th ASEAN Summit in 2007 the date for achieving AC15 was ambitiously rescheduled 
from 2020 to 2015. In 2013, ASEAN realised just how tight this schedule was and set 
the specific inauguration date as the very last day of 2015. 
AC15 institutionalises ASEAN’s strategic aspiration for regional stability and security, 
economic prosperity, and closer engagement with civil society. Its institutional 
framework is vaguely reminiscent of the pre-Lisbon Treaty pillar structure of the EU 
and consists of a three-pillar organisational architecture with the ASEAN Political- 
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Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN 
Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The three pillars collectively represent the general 
roadmap for AC15, are concurrent and mutually reinforcing and each is defined by a 
respective blueprint.102 In recent years the concept of ASEAN connectivity has also 
been increasingly emphasised and has become the main focus for improvement 
during the 2016 Laotian Chairmanship. 103 Connectivity refers to the physical, 
institutional, and people-to-people linkages ASEAN deems necessary to achieve the 
objectives of each AC15 pillar. Early community building was supposed to be 
buttressed by the Charter providing greater coherence and coordination. Article 8 
and 9 established four additional ministerial bodies to achieve this coordination. This 
was followed by the Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN 
Community (2009-2015) 104 under Thai chairmanship in 2009, which confirmed 
members’ commitment to implement the tangible, clearly defined goals and targets 
set out by the respective blueprints. 
With 2015 having come and gone and AC15 officially firmly in place, it is somewhat 
surprising that at the 27th Summit in Malaysia, ASEAN published ASEAN 2025: 
Forging Ahead Together. The High Level Task Force set up in February 2015 was 
given less than one year to draw up this document, comprising of the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration, the new ASEAN Community Vision 2025 as well as three updated 
blueprints for each pillar.105 Article 3 of Vision 2025 declares how pleased ASEAN 
leaders are with the progress they have made since 2009 as far as implementation of 
the blueprints is concerned. Now, it was time for a further milestone. It appears that 
ASEAN itself is not 100% certain whether this newest roadmap for the coming 
decade is supposed to embark on the consolidation of a community already in place 
as Article 4 of Vision 2025 suggests, or as the ASEAN website explains, charts the 
path for continued, but unfinished community building.106 In either case, the new 
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ASEAN 2025 documents are an affirmation of ASEAN’s ambition to continue along 
the community path. 
Of particular importance to this thesis is of course the security pillar APSC. 
Reminiscent of  the resilience  dichotomy, APSC  is built  on the presumption  that 
sustainable development of the ASEAN10 in all areas requires a stable and secure 
political environment in the region based on cooperation, political solidarity, and the 
mutual interests of a  prosperous Southeast Asia; in  other words, mutually 
reinforcing national and regional resilience. Initial proposals to transform ASEAN into 
a security community met some resistance as it touched some of ASEAN’s 
fundamental norms. Jakarta had for some time advocated ideas such as democracy 
building, human rights, and peace-keeping by and within ASEAN. But this would 
require ASEAN to both rethink the strict norm of non-interference and to establish 
new institutions in order to implement new tasks.107 During the 12th Summit in 2007, 
ASEAN acknowledged the need to respond to the increasing number of security 
challenges with deeper integration and furnished the APSC in 2009 with the first 
APSC Blueprint, articulating 143 action lines. The APSC Blueprint intends to promote 
security and stability by bringing ‘ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a 
higher plane’ and ensuring that ‘the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in 
peace with one another and with the world at large’. APSC’s three key characteristics 
are (a) a rules-based community of shared values and norms; (b) a cohesive, 
peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive 
security; and (c) a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated 
and interdependent world.108 
 
2.3. ASEAN Organisation and Institutional Structure 
 
With those milestones in mind, the following shall introduce the organisational 
particularities of ASEAN regionalism. Focus is on what makes ASEAN distinct from 
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other organisations and what is important to this thesis. We begin with the very DNA 
of ASEAN that is the procedural basis of the “ASEAN way”. 
Conceptualising the ASEAN Way 
 
Implicit in all constitutive ASEAN documents to date as well as in the day-to-day 
practice and conventions of all regional collaboration is what has become known as 
the ASEAN way. Though the precise meaning of the ASEAN way often escapes 
outsiders, this mode of interaction remains the quintessential and defining 
characteristic of institutionalised Southeast Asian regionalism. The ASEAN way 
encompasses a set of behavioural standards, principles, and norms that are the basis 
of all of ASEAN’s procedural routine.109 Juergen Haacke explains that the ASEAN way 
consists of six underlying core-norms of sovereign equality, non-interference, the 
non-resort to the threat or use of force, quiet diplomacy, the non-involvement of 
ASEAN in the resolution of bilateral disputes and mutual respect.110 Arguably, the 
ASEAN way is best understood as the realisation of a set of underpinning principles 
in the day-to-day routine of ASEAN politics. Principles such as non-interference in 
internal affairs of sovereign states, mutual respect for territorial integrity etc., form 
the basis of a mutual appreciation by all AMS of the intergovernmental, Westphalian 
architecture of Southeast Asian regionalism. Those principles are realised via 
adherence to the practical elements of the ASEAN way, i.e. processes of consultation 
and consensus building, a non-confrontational, “face-saving” bargaining style and a 
high degree of informality in the interactional habitus of ASEAN elites. Or as others 
have alternatively termed it “legal-rational” and “socio-cultural norms.” 111 The 
former are those universal norms such as non-interference and peaceful conflict 
resolution,  shared  not  only  across  ASEAN  but  also  by  plenty  of  regional  and 
international organisations, institutions, and regimes. Those legal-rational norms 
constitute the principles. The realisation however, is dependent on region-specific 
socio-cultural norms. Modes of interaction are therefore culturally relative and in 
the Southeast Asian case dominated by strong consensus seeking and informality. 
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Indeed, much of ASEAN decision making is reminiscent of the old Javanese practice 
of informal consensus building (musyawarah) and friendly consultation (mufakat).112 
Former ASEAN Secretary General (ASG) Rodolfo Severino explains that ‘ASEAN has 
been cooperating through informal understandings that impose no legally binding 
obligations.’ 113 Decisions are not made by majority choices and subsequently 
imposed, but reached by careful pre-decision consultation among all participants 
under the utmost respect of the equal weight of each member’s position in an 
atmosphere of non-hostile and informal dialogue. However, it is important to note 
the difference between consensus and unanimity. One of the founders of ASEAN 
once explained that in a consensus situation it was not necessary that all AMS are in 
complete agreement until decisions are made. Rather, if no participant’s reputation 
is damaged and if no participant is in any way excluded from current and future 
processes, not unanimous agreement but non-objection was key to ASEAN decision 
making; or in Lee Kuan Yew’s own words, ‘if four agree and one does not object, this 
can still be considered a consensus.’ 114 Consensus seeking means finding an 
agreement on a level of mutual comfort and “face-saving”. In particular in the often 
sensitive arena of security, which is our concern here, handling of intramural 
disagreement and consultation takes place behind closed doors in an opaque, non- 
public way. Even if consensus cannot be reached, ASEAN elites tend to not expose 
the “spoiler” and more often than not refrain from publically mentioning that there 
was any disagreement at all, ensuring a face saving outcome for all. The importance 
of this modus operandi can hardly be overestimated in the ASEAN process and the 
case studies in chapter 4 will frequently encounter what this means in practice. 
ASEAN Bureaucracy and Administration 
 
Michael Leifer once correctly pointed out that ASEAN was created to facilitate 
regional reconciliation. It was, as he neatly put it, ‘established as the institutional 
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fruit of conflict resolution.’115 In one sense, ASEAN’s rationale was comparable to the 
European idea of regionalism. Although economically biased at first, EU integration 
cannot be interpreted without the context of centuries of extensive regional warfare 
prior to 1945. Yet, the comparable conflict resolution rationale of European and 
Southeast Asian regionalism materialised and subsequently developed in profoundly 
different, almost diametrically opposed ways. 116 Just as much as the origin of 
European regionalism was the curbing of nationalism, in  particular German 
nationalism, and its worst outcomes by trying to establish a post-Westphalian order, 
the inception of ASEAN was the result of elite agreement in Southeast Asia that quite 
the opposite ought to be the bedrock of their respective form of regionalism. As 
explained above, national resilience facilitates regional resilience and vice versa in a 
context of a strong sense of post-colonial nationalism. Correspondingly, ASEAN’s 
institutional architecture and its decision making processes are characterised by 
decidedly anti-supranationalism, strict avoidance of sovereignty pooling, and a 
preference for informality. Former ASG Severino stated that 
ASEAN has always been regarded as a group of sovereign nations operating on 
the basis of ad hoc understandings and informal procedures rather than within 
the framework of binding agreements arrived at through formal processes.117 
Accordingly, in organisational terms, Southeast Asian regionalism is largely designed 
to facilitate a cooperative, but Westphalian state system, not to transcend it. It has 
been kept relatively loose and strictly intergovernmental as opposed to 
supranational and contrary to more rules based, bureaucratic procedures of the EU, 
ASEAN was created as an informal network avoiding binding rules and procedures. 
At first, ASEAN was not more than an assembly of AMS’ foreign ministers considering 
where Southeast Asia ought to be going. That assembly was ASEAN’s key institution, 
responsible for both policy formulation and all cooperation among AMS and officially 
became the AMM. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration established a Standing Committee 
and several minor bodies in support of the AMM, as well as National Secretariats in 
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each AMS as the local hubs for all ASEAN matters and responsible for national 
coordination and implementation of regional policies. The first ASEAN Summit in 
1976 in Bali, Indonesia proceeded with deeper institutionalisation by ratifying two 
key documents, the Bali Concord and the Agreement on the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Secretariat.118 The Summit also codified a leading role for the heads of the 
AMS’ governments with the hitherto regular ASEAN Summit. Further institutions, 
such as the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEMM) signifying the interest in 
greater economic policy coordination, were also set-up. 
 
Once the Charter was in effect as of December 2008, ASEAN had taken a significant 
leap towards more formal, rules-based regionalism and, most importantly, signalled 
the intent to clarify and codify its institutional hierarchy and decision making 
processes. The EPG had submitted its recommendations, which, if ratified as they 
stood, would have significantly altered ASEAN’s character. The EPG proposal 
included supranational mechanisms such as majority voting decision making and 
sanctions for non-compliance.119 However, although some recommendations were 
incorporated, the final product brought the traditional nationalist preferences of 
ASEAN leaders to the fore and largely reinforced ASEAN’s intergovernmental and 
elitist structure. 
In spite of Charter Article 1 promulgating AMS’ aspiration to create a ‘people- 
oriented ASEAN’, 120 the association has no meaningful assembly or regional 
parliament representing the people of ASEAN on a regional level. Some institutions 
aim to include civil society organisations (CSO)121 and an ASEAN Inter-parliamentary 
Assembly (AIPA) has been set-up, but their role and influence remains marginal. The 
two most significant functional forums governing ASEAN are the ASEAN Summit as 
the prime overall decision making body and, unofficially, the AMM. Article 7 
preserves the henceforth biannual meeting of the ASEAN Summit as the supreme 
policy-making  body.  Officially  second  in  command  is  supposedly  the  ASEAN 
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Coordinating Council (ACC) comprised of AMS’ foreign ministers and thus, appears to 
take over most of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting’s (AMM) support functions for the 
prime decision making body, the ASEAN Summit. The ACC oversees overall 
implementation and progress of AC15 and coordinates internal cooperation. It 
reports to the Summit and is responsible for the implementation of the latter’s 
decision. AC15 itself consists of three further subordinate councils, one for each 
community pillar; the APSC Council, AEC Council, and ASCC Council (APSCC, AECCC, 
ASCCC). Together, the three councils supervise the sectorial activities of ASEAN – 
over 700 meetings each year – and are responsible for realising their respective pillar 
and implement Summit and ACC decisions. Underneath, each community council has 
several sectorial ministerial bodies. Although the Charter established the AMM only 
as a third-tier institution it certainly remains one of the most important forums for 
both policy discussion and formulation. In 2015 ASEAN underlined the importance of 
the AMM by agreeing to undertake efforts to further enhance its role.122 It also 
oversees most of ASEAN’s core institutions, such as the ASEC and the National 
Secretariats, the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN and the ASEAN 
Foundation. 
Key features on decision making are stipulated in Charter chapter VII which 
revealingly opens with Article 20: 
(1) As a basic principle, decision making in ASEAN shall 
be based on consultation and consensus. 
(2) ) Where consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN 
Summit may decide how a specific decision can be made. 
(3) Nothing in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall 
affect the modes of decision-making as contained in the 
relevant ASEAN legal instruments. 
(4) ) In the case of a serious breach of the Charter or 
non- compliance, the matter shall be referred to the 
ASEAN Summit for decision.123 
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In the light of the above characterisation of ASEAN, it is unsurprising that Article 20 
evidently rejects any form of majority voting mechanism with which individual AMS 
governments could be overruled in a case of disagreement. 
All ASEAN institutions and meetings are officially organised, hosted, and led by the 
annually rotating ASEAN Chair.124 It was Malaysia’s turn in 2015, followed by Laos in 
2016. Rotation is usually based on the alphabetical order of the English names of 
AMS, but exceptions to the schedule have been made. The Chair is responsible for 
ensuring the strength of ASEAN, its resilience by inter alia ensuring steady progress 
of the ASEAN community, its centrality, and effectiveness as well as implementation 
of principles and goals. In practice the Chair performs three major duties. It is the 
spokesperson on behalf of ASEAN; it is its “CEO” by hosting, chairing, and facilitating 
all official meetings, task forces etc.; and it sets the agenda by proposing new 
initiatives and programmes to advance integration and cooperation. However, as 
ASEAN expert Tang Siew Mun points out, the most crucial job is the Chair’s informal 
role as ASEAN consensus builder.125 In the light of the above described ASEAN way 
this job is critical to the ASEAN process and it takes an effective Chair to exhibit 
leadership and diplomatic acumen in order to establish such agreement among a 
heterogeneous ASEAN membership. 
All of the above is supplemented by frequent meetings of the Heads of States as well 
as countless of sectorial ministers, senior officials, and military meetings and 
retreats, both official and unofficial, ad-hoc and scheduled. Taken together, there 
are somewhere close to 1000 ASEAN related meetings every year. Corresponding 
with the ASEAN way, the common characteristic of those forums is their informality 
and intergovernmental nature. Since 1999, prior to some official ASEAN meetings 
ASEAN leaders hold a corresponding “retreat”, e.g. the AMM Retreat, where 
respective minsters gather without official agenda items in order to brainstorm 
important sensitive issues to be discussed – or decidedly not – in the official 
counterpart setting.126 Retreats are seen as a place where ministers can discuss 
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freely, without public attention; in other words, a semi-official pre-agenda gathering 
to gauge the regional mood. This reflects ASEAN’s emphasis on establishing 
consensus and the great caution of AMS that no surprises materialise at official 
meetings. 
In the light of this thesis’ subject matter, the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting 
(ADMM) is also critical. Its importance has steadily increased as the ADMM emerged 
as the primary forum for ASEAN security. Convened in Kuala Lumpur in 2006, the 
ADMM was in effect the first step towards realising the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community by institutionalising defence diplomacy as an important tool in joint 
AMS’ foreign and security goals and policies. It is the result of increasing reliance on 
and appreciation of multilateral forums for security cooperation across ASEAN and 
the main platform to promote trust and confidence through better understanding of 
mutual defence/security perspectives in Southeast Asia. 127 Officially it is tasked with 
(1)  promoting  regional  peace  and  stability  through  dialogue  and  defence  and 
security cooperation; (2) providing strategic guidance for defence and security 
cooperation within ASEAN (and with the subsequent formation of ADMM+ between 
ASEAN and eight dialogue partners also external); (3) promoting mutual trust and 
confidence; and (4) contributing to the establishment of the ASEAN Political Security 
Community (APSC). 
The ASEAN Secretariat 
 
Based in Jakarta, Indonesia the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) is supposed to be the key 
organiser of ASEAN. Set up at the first ever ASEAN Summit in 1976, the Agreement 
on the Establishment of an ASEAN Secretariat provides for the ASEC to streamline 
cooperation. The ASEC is the mission control of Southeast Asian regionalism. From 
Jakarta, the ASEC coordinates ASEAN’s organs and is the hub for all major projects 
and undertakings. It is headed by the ASEAN Secretary General (ASG) – formerly 
known as Secretary General of the ASEC – who is currently selected from all AMS in 
alphabetical order and appointed by the ASEAN Summit for a non-renewable term of 
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five years.128 ASEAN history suggests that the degree of actual power somewhat 
depends on the person holding the office. The ASG can be an influential moral 
institution and to a lesser extent even a political factor. Some ASGs have been more 
powerful than others. Surin Pitsuwan, serving from 2008 – 2012, had for instance 
been recognised as a pro-active ASG. Others before and 
since Surin were less vocal and zealous. 
In theory, the ASEC has the potential to transcend 
intergovernmentalism but in fact epitomises the ASEAN 
approach of national pre-eminence over supranational 
sovereignty. From the outset, the ASEC was provided 
with very modest resources, suggesting that AMS would 
shy away from any substantial support for the secretariat 
and indicative of their objection of any substantial 
supranational authority. Initially, the ASG would be 
appointed for a two year term by the AMM upon 
nomination by an AMS on a rotational basis in 
alphabetical order. It commanded only very limited 
human resources beyond the ASG and every senior 
member of staff was seconded from AMS,129 ensuring 
that   the   ASEC   would   not   develop   any   meaningful 
independent agency. A number of subsequent Protocols Amending the Agreement 
of the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat 130 reformed this institution 
somewhat. Those protocols established the rotating posts of two Deputy Secretary 
Generals (DSG) and added a number of additional senior and junior members of 
staff, such as eventually four Bureau Directors, 15 Assistant Directors, and 15 senior 
officers as well as additional junior staff as deemed necessary. Crucially, from 1992 
onwards, all senior positions apart from the ASG but including the DSGs, were openly 
recruited – although a quota system applied in order to ensure fair representation of 
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all AMS. As of the 1992 amendment, the post of the ASG was given an appearance of 
greater authority by renaming the office “Secretary General of ASEAN” instead of 
“Secretary General of the ASEAN Secretariat” and granting it ministerial rather than 
ambassadorial status. At the same time, it is interesting to note that Article 4 of the 
1992 amendment provided for the by then only one DSG, an office established by 
the 1989 amendment, to be appointed by the ASG himself following an open 
recruitment process. However, AMS retracted from this in 1997, most likely fearing 
both too much political power of the ASG as well as symbolic ramifications. 
Thereafter, the by then two DSG posts were no longer openly recruited and 
appointed by the ASG, but yet again seconded from AMS.131 
Following the events of ASEAN expansion and the Asian financial crisis, the 1997/98 
Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) recommended a 
review of the role, functions and capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat to 
meet the increasing demands of ASEAN and to support the 
implementation of the Hanoi Plan of Action.132 
With the ASEAN Charter the ASEC did indeed regain a slightly stronger position. 
Henceforth, the ASEAN Summit appoints the ASG for a singular five-year term and 
endows the ASEC with a mandate to facilitate and monitor implementation of 
ASEAN’s commitments and agreements and provided more senior staff by doubling 
the number of DSGs to four, two of which seconded from AMS and two openly 
recruited. 
Nonetheless, in spite of those rhetorical commitments and modest efforts to 
strengthen the office of the ASG and the role of the ASEC and thus, deepen 
institutionalisation of ASEAN coordination, both the ASG’s status and the scope for 
independent ASEC action remain highly circumscribed – intentionally of course.133 
Virtually all documents referring to specific tasks, authority, and organisation of the 
ASEC include strong provisions for perpetuating the primacy of national sovereignty 
over     ASEC     authority     and     thus,     reinforce     and     perpetuate     ASEAN’s 
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intergovernmentalist character. Despite having been upgraded to ministerial status 
and given some monitoring and implementing authority, the ASG still has little input 
on actual policy, only operating in accordance with the directives issued by leaders 
and foreign ministers.134 Nor is the ASEC able to enforce any ASEAN agreement or 
even to monitor domestic policies and events in order to ward off potential crises 
without being specifically invited to do so by the respective AMS. 
AMS lack of generosity also continues to inhibit the ASEC to this day. Resources at 
ASEC’s disposal remain in fact so modest that several officials and representatives of 
non-ASEAN political foundations and NGOs have complained about its lack of 
productivity. According to some, the ASEC is largely unable to provide basic 
documents and agendas in a timely fashion and even the most basic correspondence 
takes significant amounts of time due to its very limited capacity in terms of both 
human and material resources.135 Some experts have gone as far as claiming that the 
aversion against an even remotely autonomous body beyond the nation state is so 
deeply entrenched that AMS often purposefully deny any kind of support and even 
pursue preventive measures such as retarding information sharing and posting non- 
qualified staff. 136 Whether this is true or not, the limited ASEC mandate certainly 
ensures that its role is little more than coordinating AMS dignitaries and even a pro- 
active ASG like Surin cannot be more than one voice among many to be heard. 
ASEAN Beyond Track 1 Diplomacy 
 
ASEAN’s minimalist regionalism prioritising informal consensus seeking opens the 
door wide for informal elite contacts and networks. Consequentially, ASEAN has a 
high degree of diplomatic engagement with track-1.5 and -2 forums, dialogues, and 
workshops, arguably obscuring agenda setting and decision making. There is for 
instance a rather opaque interconnectivity between ASEAN policy making processes 
and what is called the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies 
(ASEAN-ISIS);  a  network  of  national  think  tanks  and  policy  institutes  seeking  to 
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engage in agenda setting and other methods of input provision to ASEAN policy 
making. Officially, the ASEAN-ISIS commenced in 1988, but informal meetings date 
back to earlier days. Original institutes in the o-AMS included the Indonesian Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Institute for Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS Malaysia) in Malaysia, the Singapore Institute for 
International Affairs (SIIA), and the Thai Institute for Security and International 
Studies (ISIS Thailand). Subsequent membership expansion added further to the 
network, such as the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in Hanoi.137 They play a 
proactive and influential role in integration processes as well as security and 
economic discourses and policy making. 138 As Mely Caballero-Anthony, herself 
actively involved in those structure, argues, the ASEAN-ISIS is more than an advisory 
body, it initiates policy.139 
Although the ASEAN-ISIS is legally defined as a NGO, the individual institutes of the 
ASEAN-ISIS are closely linked to their respective parent states and rarely rise above 
national interests.140 The distinction between public and private is at best blurred 
and the network has often represented a venue for “off-the-record” diplomacy. It 
has gradually assumed an influential role in regional policy making and has become 
deeply involved in the policy making process of ASEAN.141 A number of significant 
ASEAN projects can be traced back to ASEAN-ISIS drafts, including both the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Free-trade Agreement.142 Moreover, there is 
often an obscure human resource crossover from the ASEAN-ISIS towards both the 
ASEAN and the national political scene and back. Rizal Sukma for instance is one of 
Southeast Asia’s leading scholars and publishes widely. He first became the head of 
the Indonesian CSIS and subsequently the Indonesian ambassador to the United 
Kingdom. Sukma is also one of the closest foreign policy advisors to Indonesian 
President  Joko  Widodo,  often  joining  Widodo’s  official  meetings  with  foreign 
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dignitaries and even writing some of his speeches on foreign affairs.143 Sukma tends 
to be rather critical of ASEAN and advocates a more realist foreign policy, based on 
key Indonesian national interests.144 
Corresponding well with the aforementioned ASEAN way, this informal connection 
provides avenues for policy discussions in sensitive areas were official policy makers 
and individual AMS may have serious reservations. Often, sensitive policies are 
discussed and prepared behind the scenes to be subsequently opened for more 
public debate. ASEAN-ISIS analyses and publications have then often severed as 
scientific legitimisation for subsequent policies. Far from being detrimental to sound 
regionalism, though, Caballero-Anthony for instance believes that a region as diverse 
and burdened with potential conflicts as Southeast Asia, such institutions fill a 
substantial discourse and policy gap that could not be filled by ASEAN policy makers 
in their official capacity.145 The advantages are seen as outweighing their opaque 
nature, for in those settings, issues regarded as too sensitive for governments to 
discuss publically, can be addressed. And yet, the obvious insinuation is that policy 
making in ASEAN ought to be an exclusively elitist affair. The citizenry remain passive 
and unaware of the activities of ASEAN-ISIS.146 Although Caballero-Anthony may be 
right in a narrow sense of vertical hierarchy, the intrinsic form and extent track-1.5 
and -2 has taken in ASEAN policy making obscures processes and accountability. The 
question is whether the individual ASEAN-ISIS components act solely in the interests 
of their respective parent nation states or as more or less independent think tanks 
interested in furthering objective discourse. 
ASEAN Dispute Settlement 
 
In cases of disputes all ASEAN documents suggest bilateral negotiations as the first 
resort but should those channels be exhausted, Article 14 of the TAC provides for an 
ad-hoc conflict resolution body. In theory, this High Council represents the most 
important multilateral dispute settlement mechanism (DSM)  to date. It is  to be 
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comprised of ministerial level representatives as a body to ‘settle disputes through 
regional processes’ whenever situations arise that were ‘likely to disturb regional 
peace and harmony.’147 Yet, although the region is not short on disputes, the High 
Council has not once been summoned, nor have provisions of ASEAN’s mostly 
economic DSM, the 1996 Dispute Settlement Mechanism been invoked to date. 
Considering the High Council’s structural limitations, this is no great surprise and it is 
indeed hard to see how intramural disputes or cases of non-compliance with 
settlement provisions could be dealt with effectively. If no peaceful bilateral solution 
can be found, the High Council ‘shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation 
and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement.’ The 
High Council may for instance offer mediation and good offices, is however entirely 
dependent on the unanimous agreement of all parties to the dispute.148 In other 
words, the High Council is unable to act unless all disputing parties give their 
consent. Chapter VII of the ASEAN Charter reinforced the High Council as ASEAN’s 
default mode of dispute settlement alongside ad-hoc mediation requests by 
disputing parties towards the ASEAN Chair or the ASEC. Should a conflict remain 
unresolved following application of regional DSM provisions, or in case of non- 
compliance by one or more parties, Charter Article 26 and 27 stipulate that as a last 
resort, the matter should be referred upwards to the highest ASEAN organ, the 
ASEAN Summit, for a decision.149 The impotence of the High Council due to the 
ASEAN way of regional cooperation becomes immediately evident. Even if disputing 
parties were ever to agree to have their dispute officially settled by the High Council, 
it is hard to see how this could be in any way effective. Not only is a High Council 
mediation  unlikely  as  this  would  publically  expose  the  disputing  parties,  going 
against AMS’ preference for quiet diplomacy.150 It is also unlikely that after bilateral 
negotiations have been to no avail, disputing parties would be in agreement on the 
measures suggested by the High Council. Hence, the provisions are essentially a 
loop.  In  case  of  continuing  disagreement  or  non-compliances,  no  enforcement 
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mechanism is provided for and conflict resolution ends up at the Summit. Here all 
AMS are present and unanimous decision making applies, inevitably including the 
non-compliant disputing party. Moreover, the actual process by which disputes 
could theoretically be settled by the Summit has yet to be specified.151 
Ineffective dispute settlement is of course no coincidence, but perfectly 
correspondent with and indicative of ASEAN’s quiet diplomacy logic innate to the 
ASEAN way. According to Juergen Haacke, rules are designed to prevent a scenario 
of confrontation. Instead of official settlement, sensitive security issues tend to be 
discussed behind closed doors, e.g. at informal retreats such as the ADMM 
Retreat.152 In this light, it is no surprise that ASEAN DSMs remain entirely theoretical 
and have never been invoked. Thus far, whenever AMS – or extramural signatories 
to the TAC – felt in need of arbitration, parties called on international rather than 
regional settlement bodies. Singapore’s former Attorney General and its 
representative to the Charter High Level Task Force Walter Woon admits that the 
most practical way to dispose of an unresolved dispute would be to have it referred 
to international arbitration.153 Examples include the Thai-Cambodian border conflict, 
subject of this thesis’ second case study, when Cambodia referred the matter to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague instead of relying on regional conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
 
The ASEAN+ Extensions 
 
Also not without significance for this thesis’ aim and purpose are those institutions 
tasked with ASEAN’s external diplomatic representation. In order to ensure 
continuous dialogue and by extension prevent conflict and increase trust and 
confidence across East Asia, while simultaneously safeguarding ASEAN’s bargaining 
position, the early post-Cold War years saw a proliferation of ASEAN-based pan- 
Asian institutions. This proliferation has led to an impressive ASEAN-centred network 
of multilateral forums, treaties, and institutions supposed to engage with one or 
 
 
 
 
151 
Woon (2009): 4. 
152 
See Haacke (2003b): 233. 
153 
Woon (2009): 4f. 
80 
 
 
more non-ASEAN actors. In addition to the various “ASEAN+” forums and dialogues 
with a number of international actors already alluded to above, ASEAN has also 
created additional forums and institutions such as the ARF and the East Asia Summit 
(EAS) and even institutionalised interregional relations with other multilateral 
organisations such as the EU. AMS also host and participate in regular non-ASEAN 
track-1 forums such as the Shangri-La Dialogue. 
ASEAN-led extramural multilateral engagement pursues the primary aim of 
establishing, maintaining, and reinforcing ASEAN’s relevance in wider regional 
security and economic architecture; in other words, strengthening what has been 
introduced as ASEAN centrality. This is supposed to be achieved with the help of 
essentially two simultaneous and mutually reinforcing mechanisms. ASEAN aims to 
extend its own norms and procedures by inviting non-ASEAN actors to join ASEAN- 
centred regimes and treaties such as the TAC, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone (SEANWFZ)154, and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea (DoC). The 
TAC for instance 
originally codified 
peaceful intra-ASEAN 
behaviour  and 
dispute settlement, 
but from the outset 
early ASEAN 
visionaries hoped for 
greater pan-Asian 
applicability  and 
enhancement of their own security and relevance by extending thus codified rules of 
behaviour into the wider Asia-Pacific region.155 Although there was no intention to 
create formal military alliances, the principal objective was to arrange and manage 
contact  with  extramural  participants  and  to  commit  those  to  ASEAN’s  main 
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preference of the renunciation of the use of force and peaceful conflict settlement 
with any ASEAN Member State (AMS) in the context of existing and anticipated 
power asymmetries. By the time the first non-ASEAN countries, China and India, 
signed the TAC in 2003, the principle apprehension had shifted from the former 
communist threat to territorial concerns mostly in the South China Sea, the 
Southeast Asian mainland, and possible future disputes over Indo-Pacific sea lanes. 
Nowadays, the TAC has been extended significantly and parties include inter alia the 
U.S., the EU, Turkey, Brazil, and many others. As ASEAN intended, the TAC has 
become a non-aggression and security cooperation pact between AMS and non- 
ASEAN actors. 
Secondly, ASEAN tries to take the lead in institutionalised multilateralism by being 
the convener, host, and most of all procedural prototype of all relevant forums, 
institutions, and meetings in the Asia-Pacific, inviting participations of the greatest 
possible number of relevant actors. Most, though not all, forums are either decidedly 
security oriented or have a strong security bias, indicative of ASEAN’s intent and 
priorities. Particularly noteworthy are the ARF, ASEAN+3, the EAS, and the ADMM+. 
Set-up in Bangkok in 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for instance includes the 
diverse set of the ASEAN10 and 18 extramural nations, in some cases with mutual 
territorial or other significant disputes. The importance ASEAN attached to the ARF 
was a signal that ASEAN elites were serious about security multilateralism and 
ASEAN centrality. Most realists perceive the ARF and other such forums in balance of 
power terms, with the clear aim to engage both the U.S. and China constructively in 
order to prevent both, but in particular the latter, from achieving regional 
hegemony.156 Constructivists on the other hand see the ARF mostly as a forum to 
spread ASEAN norms.157 
 
One could argue that the ARF is both at the same time and perhaps easier defined in 
terms of what it is not than vice versa. It is no collective alliance with defence 
commitments  such  as  NATO.  Nor  is  it  a  conflict  solving  mechanism.  The  first 
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Chairman's Statement describes ARF objectives as to ‘foster the habit of constructive 
dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and 
concern’ in order to ‘make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence- 
building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.’ 158  It is essentially 
designed as a multilateral venue for security dialogue and confidence building 
measures (CBMs) to facilitate mutual reassurance in Asia and maintain stability. The 
purpose of the ARF is to maintain a balance of power by engaging all relevant actors. 
Engagement however is also supposed to establish predictable patterns of security 
cooperation. Procedurally, and this is where constructivists have a valid point, the 
ARF is ASEAN-led and reminiscent of the ASEAN way. When first concrete steps were 
taken regarding the ARF’s institutional design, many provisions of the first Concept 
Paper for the design of the ARF, submitted by ASEAN, have incrementally been 
adopted. The Concept Paper stipulated that in the ARF, ASEAN procedures ought to 
be embraced and thus, provided ASEAN with a distinct advantage. Many have 
regarded the adoption of ASEAN principles as a great success of ASEAN.159 
It is somewhat symptomatic for all ASEAN processes that the ARF is, after more than 
two decades still stuck in the first of its three planned phases of institutional 
development, CBMs among parties, even though it was agreed in 2001 that such 
confidence building must be followed up with the development of preventive 
diplomacy measures and conflict settlement.160 Hitherto, the next phase has still not 
been reached and doubts increase as to the efficacy of this forum. In recent years, 
the ARF has primarily focused on terrorism, maritime security, and disaster relief and 
other security forums have emerged alongside it.161 
The most recent institutional addition to the regional security architecture and 
perhaps  ARF’s  greatest  challenger  is  the  ASEAN  Defence  Minister  Meeting  Plus 
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(ADMM+), inaugurated in Hanoi in 2010. It brings together the defence ministers of 
the extended EAS membership and given that defence officials run the ADMM+, 
unlike the ARF, which is run by foreign ministers, the notion that the ADMM+ has 
overtaken the ARF in importance in all matters of serious security is spreading and 
not unwarranted. The ADMM has probably become the most significant avenue for 
both intra-ASEAN security cooperation and ASEAN engagement with extramural 
actors. This raises the risk of a potential institutional cross-purpose. Defence officials 
may also have different priorities and approaches than foreign ministers, but engage 
with the same external actors in numerous settings, increasing complexity and 
risking inefficiency. Conversely, it could also be argued that the ADMM in general 
and its +extension are good examples of addressing gaps in multiple layers of 
institutionalised security cooperation by having included such issues as multilateral 
defence cooperation, unaddressed in other forums. 
Further forums such as the ASEAN+3 and the EAS pursue a broader agenda, including 
economic elements such as the currency swap agreement Chiang Mai Initiative. 
Those groupings started with a focus on post-1997 financial crisis recovery but 
gradually expanded to include different policy areas including security. At its 
inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, the multi-agenda forum EAS comprised 
of the ASEAN+3 and India, Australia, and New Zealand. The USA and Russia joined in 
2011. Similar to the ARF, main objectives are CBMs and preventive diplomacy in 
order to increase cooperation and interdependence in the Asia-Pacific by fostering 
dialogue and consultation. As is often the case in ASEAN, aforementioned track-1 
forums are often track-1.5 and -2 supplemented and venues such as the Asia-Pacific 
Roundtable often play a proactive and influential role. Such smaller forums under 
the greater institutional security umbrella often address specific security issues, 
usually in the form of workshops or joint working groups. Some noteworthy 
examples are to be found in the maritime security domain with the Maritime 
Security Expert Working Group (MSEWG) under guidance of ADMM+, the Expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on 
Maritime Security, or the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group (JWG) to Implement the 
DoC. 
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Both those elements, the institutionalisation of ASEAN-conceived norms and 
engagement of externals in ASEAN-prototype forums for cooperation and CBMs, are 
mutually reinforcing mechanisms and intend to facilitate ASEAN’s leadership role, its 
centrality. All vaguely follow ASEAN’s own principles of the ASEAN way and are 
therefore characterised by a “soft” form of institutionalisation on the basis of 
inclusiveness and consensus. 
 
2.4. Some Preliminary Conclusions 
 
Jointly, all of the above makes for a distinctively non-European, soft, or even weak 
institutional framework. While ASEAN does by no means lack bureaucratic bodies, 
ASEAN leaders have not embraced supranationalist features and reject any 
meaningful independent administrative authority beyond the nation state. Ever 
since 1967, AMS elites have prioritised intergovernmental, informal consensus 
seeking, arguably deliberately creating a regional architecture more suited to 
problem avoidance than problem solving. From the outset, nationalist, often 
autocratic AMS wittingly allowed for ASEAN to be just strong enough to facilitate 
inter-elite cooperation in order to maintain regional stability. Simultaneously, 
ASEAN’s founders  and subsequent leaders  ensured  that no  single regional body 
would become strong enough as to assume any autonomous supranational power, 
capable of interfering or even dictating the terms of regionalism independently. 
Almost schizophrenically, ever since ASEAN began moving towards enlargement in 
the late 1980s and all the way through the enlargement process during the 1990s, 
AMS embarked on institutional reforms in order to strengthen the framework of 
regional cooperation, accompanied by constant calls and the eventual inauguration 
of an ASEAN community. Rizal Sukma has called this the quintessential ASEAN 
predicament; how to strengthen regional institutions in the light of the need and 
indeed    desirability    of    regional    cooperation,    without    transforming    into    a 
supranational organisation, loathed by most ASEAN elites?162 
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In theory, the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) and the ASEAN Secretary General (ASG) have 
the potential to transcend strict intergovernmentalism and be the mediator, 
organiser, facilitator and the moral voice of ASEAN for the better. But in fact, 
reforms of the ASEC and the office of the ASG epitomise Sukma’s predicament. Even 
in the context of AC15, the ASEC is kept at a minimum and the ASG is perhaps more 
“Secretary” than “General”. Despite the need for and indeed some minor 
materialisation of institutional reforms, neither benefited significantly from the 
Charter or the community. Rizal Sukma contends that, albeit significant, all those 
institutional changes did not alter the fact that Southeast Asian regionalism remains 
a largely state-driven process. ASEAN still is a regional organisation where progress – 
or the lack thereof – is determined by the political will of AMS rather than by a body 
with supranational implementing agency. 163 Moreover, despite a plethora of 
institutional changes and documents prescribing greater organisational streamlining 
in the light of AC15, the ASEAN hierarchy remains vague.164 For example, what are 
precisely role, functions, and hierarchy of individual ASEAN organs? Is the ACC/AMM 
de jure superior to the three Community Councils or vice versa? Are ASEAN’s DSMs 
desired or superfluous? Is the ARF superior or inferior to the ADMM+? And if the 
latter, is it still needed? 
AMS are confronted with the task of strengthening regional institutions in order to 
work effectively on their behalf and in their interest, without transforming ASEAN 
into a supranational organisation. This predicament produces compromises that 
reflect AMS insistence on state sovereignty and intramural harmony through strict 
consensus. The absence of an institution that transcends intergovernmentalism, the 
absence of binding commitments and procedures, and sanctioning regimes as well as 
the ineffectuality of transparent, rules-based dispute settlement mechanisms among 
AMS effectively retard ASEAN cooperation in times of intramural disagreement. This 
ambiguity is likely to obstruct deeper integration. Perhaps some ASEAN leaders 
deliberately  maintain  this  situation  while  others  are  uncertain  and  prefer,  in 
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accordance with the ASEAN way, to defer such matters into an unspecified future; 
“shelving” as this is commonly called and practiced in ASEAN. 
 
 
3. Perspectives on ASEAN. 
Constructivism and the ASEAN 
Community 
 
 
 
The following is an in-depth analysis of this thesis’ “demand-side” as laid out in the 
introduction. The empirical “supply” analyses in the form of the case studies will 
commence with a “demand” overview, yet, this will be brief and case specific, not 
much more than a reminder of what this chapter 3 has performed. Although readers 
may disagree, understanding and acknowledging the points I raise in this part is 
unconditionally pivotal to appreciating the overall aim, purpose, and argument of 
the thesis. 
As already mentioned, demand derives from two sources; dominant academic 
perspectives on ASEAN influenced by traditional constructivism in International 
Relations (IR) and the linguistically, conceptually, and optimistically strikingly 
interrelated self-appraisal by ASEAN. In the introduction, I have claimed to have 
found a connection between influential ASEAN scholarship and constructivist IR 
theory mostly in corresponding research variables to an extent that I believe justifies 
the classification of a new theoretical category, or sub-theory, of Asia- 
constructivism. I have also claimed that Asia-constructivism is very optimistic about 
ASEAN’s agency, cohesion, and its place in the wider region, just like ASEAN itself. 
Much of contemporary, post-Michael Leifer ASEAN scholarship draws heavily from 
American IR constructivist thought, uses corresponding logic and research variables, 
and verifies often sweeping hypotheses by relying on ASEAN’s very own rhetoric, 
often in lieu of empirical evidence. This chapter’s declared goal is to attempt 
substantiation of my claims with the help of a tripartite analysis of the Asia- 
constructivist perspective on ASEAN by accounting for authors I categorise as 
belonging to this alleged sub-theory, their roots in traditional constructivism in IR, 
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and how this relates to ASEAN’s self-perception. This chapter therefore attempts to 
uncover the theoretical and ideological context of this thesis, the demand ASEAN is 
confronted with. ASEAN itself has given impetus and in a plethora of documents, 
treaties, and declarations raised the “demand bar” significantly. I posit that Asia- 
constructivists presuppose the presence of shared norms and values, the 
independent variable (IV), facilitating  the intervening  variable (IntV)  of a  shared 
identity, resulting in the dependent variable (DP) of a high degree of ASEAN agency, 
autonomy, and community. As argued in the introduction, this makes up ASEAN’s 
actorness. 
Whether one accepts or rejects this thesis’ main argument, this chapter has achieved 
its aim once four things have been conclusively, coherently, and intersubjectively 
communicated to the reader. First, that there is a broad positive academic consensus 
about ASEAN’s degree of actorness, not necessarily in proportion to the sum of its 
members’ individual capacity. One would therefore not prima facie expect nor 
accept this degree of actorness. Second, those optimistic perspectives borrow 
heavily from traditional constructivist research variables and accordingly credit 
factors such as shared norms and values, common identity etc. for the success of the 
ASEAN way of maintaining operational cohesion, supposedly facilitating intra- and 
even extramural peace, stability, and a promising burgeoning regionalism. Third, the 
connection between traditional constructivism and what I henceforth term Asia- 
constructivism is sufficiently deep as to justify both the establishment of a sub- 
category and the classification of this category as constructivist Asian scholarship. 
Although some of thus categorised analysts would deny being constructivists, I 
propose that all are subject to a thick normative bias, basing their claims on 
constructivist analytical parameters. Once again, the purpose is not to settle the 
debate between realism and constructivism. Instead, it is to show that the academic 
debate in Southeast Asian studies is heavily influenced by constructivist parameters 
and to perform a subsequent empirical test of such informed conclusions. Lastly, this 
chapter’s aim is finally achieved if it manages to show how strikingly similar the 
evaluation of ASEAN actorness by itself and Asia-constructivists are. ASEAN leaders 
themselves  can  be  forgiven  for  taking  a  perhaps  untenable  optimism  on  their 
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particular Southeast Asian version of institutionalised regionalism and on their 
association’s capabilities and ambitions. Like all political organisations, ASEAN and its 
leaders rely on sound public relations. Seldom are official political documents, 
declarations, and elite statements a critical self-appraisal. The same cannot be said 
about academic scholarship, though. Without engaging in a positivism debate, 
scholars ideally ought to take a scientific perspective, as objective as possible, 
informed by theoretically sound and innovative epistemological frameworks. Both 
hypotheses and conclusions ought to be verified by thorough and intersubjectively 
appreciable empirical evidence. Not only would this do proper academic standards 
justice, but sound assessments would also be policy relevant. In particular in the case 
of ASEAN where, as mentioned in the previous chapter, policymaking is heavily 
influenced by scholarship. 
I shall argue that constructivism as well as ASEAN’s own rhetoric of a community of 
Southeast Asian nations, a strong regional actor in East Asia, united by a common 
identity and collectively shared norms and values inform an ever-increasing group of 
scholars, who ought to remain on a different analytical level to their subject matter, 
but fail to do so. ASEAN’s own self-perception as a normative community of like- 
minded states with a common fate blends perfectly in with traditional constructivism 
who see their paradigms confirmed by ASEAN rhetoric. Yet, in practice, we have to 
wonder about the substance of the ASEAN Community and whether or not it is left 
wanting. But before one can look at the supply side in the case studies and reconcile 
it with the demand, the demand must be clarified. 
To this end, this chapter will summarise and analyse much of thus categorised 
literature. Commencing with an introduction to the “traditional” school of 
constructivism in IR and its major variables and assumptions, it follows up with an 
overview of Asia-constructivist literature. This overview will be split into several 
elements of ASEAN based regionalism dear to Asia-constructivists and related to the 
overall subject matter of Southeast Asian security.165 The association with traditional 
constructivism  shall  be  demonstrated  as  well  as  the  alleged  echo  with  ASEAN 
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rhetoric. I attempt to prove beyond doubt that each of those elements and 
respective constructivist assumptions denote a different building block of what I call 
Asia-constructivism. Naturally, an overview of scholarship is precisely that, an 
overview. It does not capture all theoretical arguments in their nuanced details. 
While certainly trying to do the greatest possible justice to most noteworthy 
perspectives and elements relating to constructivist literature on ASEAN security and 
constructivist literature in general, space limitations necessitate selectiveness. This 
selection, though, has been assembled in good faith and attempts to reflect the most 
dominant perspectives and assessments. 
 
3.1. Excursion into Traditional Constructivism 
 
Most of the IR community would agree that international politics consists of the 
elements of several agents (states, organisations, institutions etc.) and at least one, 
perhaps numerous structures (military balances, identities, anarchy etc.). Substantial 
disagreement however exists as to what exactly agents and structures are and how 
they interrelate, if indeed at all. In the later 1980s to early 90s, traditional 
constructivism emerged primarily as a critical response to rationalist, mostly realist 
theory. Unlike rationalist rational-choice approaches, constructivism seeks to explain 
behaviour in IR as a result of social interaction rather than in materialist terms. 
Simplified, if classical realists look chiefly at the agent as a point of reference (states, 
human nature etc.) and neo-realists add a structural emphasis (power balances, 
anarchy etc.), other theories add more agents (institutions, businesses etc.) and 
structures (interdependence etc.), then constructivists analyse how and why all 
interact and mutually constitute and re-constitute each other and what consequence 
this has for IR. 
Constructivists argue that a continuous process of interaction between agents and 
structure determines reality. As the title of an influential work by John Ruggie 
suggests, ideational rather than material factors are What makes the world hang 
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together.166 The result of this interaction is an intersubjective understanding among 
numerous agents, who can and do constantly re-negotiate the terms of their 
interaction; the intersubjective meaning of concepts and expectations. In this 
constant bargaining process, the structure within which agents interact is itself 
continuously altered as agents continuously re-negotiate and change their terms of 
interaction. This has three initially obvious consequences. Both structure and agents 
are ostensibly subject to social forces and intersubjectively constructed; neither is 
predetermined. Second, both are non-static and thus theoretically changeable at 
will. Third, forces driving this construction and constant re-construction are not 
material factors such as antagonistic power interpretations but ideational and, 
depending on the specific branch within the wider constructivist school, either 
norms and identities or discourses and language. European IR constructivists tend to 
concentrate more on language and discourse analysis, traditionally influenced by 
European thinkers such as Michel Foucault. Those “post-traditional” constructivists 
tend to rely less on norms as their independent variables, but account for Foucault’s 
trilogy of discourse, knowledge, and power, leading them to assess the impact of 
structure in terms of language and discourse on agents in politics, economics, and 
society. Mostly American educated “traditional” IR constructivists on the other hand 
highlight the structure constituting effects of collective norms, values, and ideas on 
behaviour and habits over which agents negotiate.167 They attempt deductive, causal 
explanations of policy and agent/state behaviour by analysing a structure consisting 
of, and determined by identity, norms, intersubjective interest genesis and habitual 
practices governed by ideational forces. It follows that in constructivist analyses, 
understanding the key elements characterising a structure or meta-structure 
(regional/global environment and other systems of interaction), such as the identity 
of the collective of agents (e.g. community of states), their cooperative norms, and 
their habits of interaction is key to understanding, explaining, and predicting policy 
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behaviour. It is this branch of constructivism Asia-constructivism and therefore this 
thesis primarily relates to. 
On the Structure-Agency Relationship 
 
The structure-agency relationship allows us two distinguish between the rationalist 
realist and liberal schools in IR and traditional constructivism. First, there is no such 
thing as predetermined, exogenously provided structure. Second, constructivists 
define the interaction between those participating agents in sociological rather than 
material terms as rationalists do. In spite of analytically prioritising interaction, it is 
not the individualities or main characteristics of the interacting agents (e.g. states, 
institutions) that are at the core of traditional constructivism. It is rather the 
question as to how the process of interaction among several agents influences, 
alters, and continuously modifies the structure (e.g. international/regional 
environment) within which they interact and – crucially – vice versa. Whilst 
rationalist schools by and large identify for instance the condition of anarchy as a 
constant, innate feature of this structure, constructivists argue that it is rather a 
social construct, based on intersubjective meaning.168 In consequence, the structure 
has no predetermined, static base-characteristic and can be constantly re-negotiated 
among relevant agents. Or as one of the founding fathers of constructivism put it, 
‘people and societies construct, or constitute, each other’.169 
Many constructivists have therefore taken issue with the rationalist understanding of 
inevitably competitive systems of interaction (e.g. inevitable power contest or 
struggle over recourses). The presumption of international anarchy for  instance 
leads in particular neo-realists to believe that international politics is prone to 
security dilemmas. Constructivists would disagree. Alexander Wendt has adeptly 
argued that while the international arena may well be characterised by anarchy, 
competitive interests and identities, and as a result antagonistic interaction among 
agents (states), this is not inevitable consequence of the innate condition of anarchy 
(structure). Instead, a particular routine of unfavourable interaction among agents 
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may be the reason for the adverse an undesirable condition of anarchy. In other 
words, competitive interaction within a condition of anarchy is not only cause, but 
also effect of a chosen form of social interaction among states. 
Following this logic, Wendt then argues that the condition of anarchy is non-static 
and changeable through non-violent, positive social interaction.170 Wendt explains 
[...] on the agency side, what states do to each other affects the social 
structure in which they are embedded, by a logic of reciprocity. If they 
militarize, others will be threatened and arm themselves, creating 
security dilemmas in terms of which they will define egoistic identities 
and interests. But if they engage in policies of reassurance [...] this will 
have a different effect on the structure of shared knowledge, moving it 
toward a security community. The depth of interdependence is a 
factor here, as is the role of revisionist states, whose actions are likely 
to be especially threatening. However, on the structural side, the 
ability of revisionist states to create a war of all against all depends on 
the structure of shared knowledge into which they enter. If past 
interactions have created a structure in which status quo states are 
divided or naive, revisionists will prosper and the system will tend 
toward a Hobbesian world in which power and self-interest rule. In 
contrast, if past interactions have created a structure in which status 
quo states trust and identify with each other, predators are more likely 
to face collective security responses.171 
There is therefore a mutual constitution of structure and agency; a mutual 
constitution and interdependent relationship between the international/regional 
system of exchange (structure) and nation states/institutions etc. (agents). While a 
structure produced and consisting of antagonistic agents is indeed likely to ignite 
security dilemma dynamics, a cordial structure produced and consisting of 
benevolent agents will foster the opposite, a security community. Both revisionist 
and status quo states enter a non-predetermined international arena and alter their 
behaviour accordingly. Hence, according to a constructivist understanding of IR, 
crucial conditions of international politics, such as security threats, are not inevitable 
outcomes of anarchy. Instead states can opt to cooperate and over time establish a 
collective non-violence habitus through cordial interaction. Security can be created, 
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or constructed, through social interactions among status quo states, despite the 
condition of anarchy. 
As far as political science is concerned then, constructivists have been radical on 
rationalists. The quintessential independent variable (IV) of realist thought, 
international anarchy,172 is relegated to being not more than one among many 
possible dependent variables (DVs). Similarly, a DV of particular importance to neo- 
realists, security dilemmas and security threats arsing from balancing and/or power 
maximisation can theoretically be the IV in constructivism; the cause rather than the 
effect of anarchy and competition. Constructivism treats structure as the cause, the 
medium, and the outcome of agent behaviour. In other words, states create 
circumstances rather than being confronted by and having to adjust to them. States 
adjust circumstances instead. 
On Power 
 
Realists generally tend to conceptualise power in terms of coercion with the 
instruments being material in nature. Ideologically they follow Robert Dahl’s well- 
known and most intuitive definition of power that A has power over B if A is able to 
get B to do what B would not do otherwise.173 Power is therefore the ability to 
coerce others to do something they resist doing. Although constructivists have often 
taken issue with this allegedly too narrow perception of power, it would be unfair to 
realists to accept this criticism per se. While it is true that all rationalist theories 
regard mostly military or economic means as the critical instruments to exercise 
power, defined as coercion, early realists such as Hans Morgenthau had already 
accepted broader readings of power. Though still defining power in terms of self- 
interested coercion, Morgenthau accounts for non-material exercise of power, that 
may 
comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man 
over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that 
end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by 
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which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of 
man by man […].174 
Kenneth Waltz contemplated how power can be measured and quantifies it mostly 
in terms of population size and territory, resource availability, military and economic 
capabilities, and political stability and competence.175 Other famous neo-realists 
such as Stephen Walt similarly account for power as coercion in material terms.176 
Constructivist power however follows from assertions of Wendt or Ruggie that 
structure is non-static and changeable. If one accepts this argument, constructivist 
scholarship adds a new, previously unidentified dimension to arguably the most 
central concept of IR. Power can be extended and regarded as the capacity to initiate 
opportune change to the structure itself, which in turn, true to constructivist logic, 
changes the agents interacting within it. 
Such understanding follows from earlier socio-philosophical concepts of power as 
defined by thinkers such as Hannah Arendt. To Arendt, power differs from force, 
violence, and strength and is not a means to merely force a result but a social 
condition. This condition results from an ability of a social group to be cohesive and 
‘act in concert’. It thus ‘belongs to a group and remains in existence only as long as 
the group keeps together.’177 Arendt therefore sees power as the possession of 
influence by a legitimate group of actors by the means of collective persuasion. Ted 
Hopf  has  called  this  the  ‘power  of  practice’,  which  provides  ‘the  capacity  to 
reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors 
alike.’178 In the constructivist view then, power is not coercion. It is the ability to 
create intersubjectivity and to construct, establish, and if necessary re-construct 
meanings and knowledge eventually shared by all. 
This ability to construct reality is facilitated by institutions. If, in crude terms, 
material might is the vehicle for the exercise of realist power, institutions and 
institutionalised norms are the vehicle for the constructivist interpretation of power. 
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Finnemore and Sikkink have defined a norm life cycle from “emergence” to 
“internalisation”. They argue that the agents of this constructivist form of power are 
providers of norms or “norm-entrepreneurs”. Norm-entrepreneurs’ exercise of 
power is successful if they manage to convince a critical mass of “norm-takers” to 
embrace new standards of behaviour and thus redefine appropriateness according 
to their own liking.179 Within institutions, norm-entrepreneurs (agents) spread norms 
and in doing so auspiciously alter the structure by redefining what is appropriate. 
Simultaneously, they can be at the receiving end and absorb norms spread by others. 
Institutions are the arena where norm-takers and entrepreneurs meet and exchange 
ideas.180 Institutions can therefore provide the context for the Wendtian mutual 
constitution of structure and agency. They are one of the critical arenas where agent 
behaviour can be constructed or regulated and where the agent’s identity is re- 
defined. Constructivist power, exercised in institutions construct and re-defines the 
international and regional meta-structure of IR. 181 Institutions as a forum of 
collective action  play  a  decisive role. Realists would find the  most  pivotal 
consequence of that interpretation hard to accept. Since in this view power is 
socially constructed rather than material, states of low material capability can in 
theory have as much power as states commanding great material capabilities, as 
long as they can influence intersubjective meaning. 
On Norms and the Power of Socialisation 
 
Congruently, norm setting is power and established norms are the result of 
successful exercise thereof. No surprise that norms are the reoccurring IV of large 
parts of constructivist literature. It is important to note that in constructivist 
literature, norms are not seen as either existent or absent. Norms always exist, but 
vary in strength and function. Legro defines norms as the ‘collective understandings 
of the proper behaviour of actors.’182 Finnemore and Sikkink agree, postulating that 
there is general agreement in constructivist scholarship that norms are a ‘standard 
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of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.’183 In other words, norms are 
standards of acceptable conduct or behaviour in certain circumstances and are a 
reflection of particular preferences among a set of two or more actors. Ostensibly, 
norms implicitly regulate state behaviour and, over time, continually reconstitute 
state identity. Norms are however distinctive from rules in that the latter are a 
subset of the former. Rules are the codification of obligatory behaviour on the basis 
of norms. A useful functional distinction is made between regulative and constitutive 
norms of behaviour. Peter Katzenstein writes that 
[i]n some situations norms operate life rules that define the identity of an actor, 
thus having “constitutive effects” that specify what actions will cause relevant 
others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations norms operate as 
standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In 
such instances norms have “regulative effects” that specify standards of proper 
behaviour. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or 
regulate) behaviour, or they do both.184 
Regulative norms specify behavioural rules. They regulate what is obligatory or 
forbidden, what agents (states) can or cannot do within an already established and 
recognised framework of interaction (structure). Regulative norms (rules) specify the 
exact parameters of interaction for participating actors with an already existing, 
shared identity. Constitutive norms do not directly prescribe or prohibit a particular 
action. Instead, they define new possible actions or situations. Constitutive norms 
are the social fabric, the interpretation of the greater social framework within which 
regulative norms can emerge and regulate specific behaviour in the first place. 
Constitutive norms give social meaning to the context of interaction and frame the 
parameters of possible policy options. 
Thus defined and applied to International Relations (IR) and the activity of actors 
(e.g. policy choices), it follows that the difference is whether a particular norm is 
prompting states to weigh-up compliance versus non-compliance or whether a norm 
has the ability to limit what choices policy makers even consider possible in the first 
place. At this point, it aids understanding to consider March and Olsen’s conceptual 
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dichotomy of the “logic of appropriateness” and the “logic of consequence”185 that 
are analogous to the constitutive-regulative dichotomy. The logic of an expected 
consequence explains behaviour as a result of rationality, thus elicits a 
straightforward cost-benefit calculation. An actor acts on the basis of a calculation of 
how certain actions will further his interests, knowing that any other actor will 
behave in exactly the same self-regarding manner. This logic resonated more with 
rationalist IR theories. Appropriateness on the other hand defines what behaviour is 
deemed right according to social norms and communal identity. The logic of 
appropriateness implies an actor’s awareness of and interests in a differentiation of 
the “self”, the “other”, and of a sense of social context. Appropriateness is therefore 
defined by the constitutive norms that the social fabric consists of. Constitutive 
norms define what regulative norms can exist and what counts as appropriate 
behaviour. They are progressively internalised and spread through social learning 
and sustained over time through social practices. Congruently, if some courses of 
policy action are intrinsically ruled out by a shared understanding  of 
appropriateness, by the means of constitutive norms, a state has adopted an identity 
shared by the collective. In a Gemeinschaft, or community of nation states, the logic 
of appropriateness becomes the bedrock of intramural foreign and security policy 
choices and provides the predictability and shared identity for constitutive norms to 
emerge. 
This also implies that norms can spread. Indeed it implies desirability to spread 
norms in order to define a shared sense of appropriateness felt by all actors acting 
within the same structure. Norm diffusion in that logic is the possibility of 
socialisation dynamics within the international system. In the IR context, 
socialisation via norm diffusion relates to the process by which states – and other 
agents in the international structure – accept standards of appropriate behaviour of 
the collective. In doing so, those individual agents adopt the characteristics of the 
collective. Via the process of socialisation by a larger group of legitimate agents, 
individual  new  members  adopt  the  group’s  standards  of  behaviour  and  alter 
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preferences, interests, policy behaviour, and ultimately their identity accordingly 
(see below for identity and interests formation). Finnemore and Sikkink have called 
this diffusion “norm cascade” where norm leaders persuade others to become norm 
followers.186 This leads back to constructivist interpretations of power. As material 
might does not matter as much to constructivists as it does to realists, the collective 
may well be a collective of smaller states, socialising a larger, in material terms more 
powerful one, as long as they act in Arendt’s terms “in concert”. In Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s life cycle of norms, the final step is the internalisation of norms by new 
members. ‘At the far end of the norm cascade, norm internalization occurs; norms 
acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public 
debate.’187 In other words, socialisation of the agent (state) within the structure 
(international/regional system) has been successful. 
On Identity and Interest Formation 
 
In this socialisation process constructivists tend to not only concentrate on the 
agent’s behavioural change in accordance with the logic of appropriateness as a 
result of peer-pressure by the collective. More importantly, the agent on the 
receiving end, the norm-taker has supposedly made changes to its very identity and 
interests. According to constructivism, identity defines interest. In this essentially 
Wendtian view, there is no such thing as pre-social or pre-determined interest – as 
realists tend to assume. Instead, interests are constructed and subject to constant 
readjustment depending on the social context, dynamics, and the constantly 
changing identity of interacting agents in relation to both the structure and to each 
other. Agents therefore cannot know their own interests until their place within the 
social environment (structure) has been clarified. Ted Hopf writes that identity will 
tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are. In telling you 
who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or 
preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with 
respect to particular actors. 188 
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In other words, we do not know what we want until we know who we are in relation 
to others; in what ways we are similar and how we differ. Identity is the appreciation 
of the self in relation to others and the environment and is produced and re- 
produced by social interaction. This in turn, as Wendt had already suggested, defines 
interests. Both concepts of identity and interest are therefore extrinsic to the agent. 
Thinking back to constructivist interpretations of the structure-agency relationship, 
interests are thus as non-static as the structure itself and also mutually constitutive 
and constantly re-negotiated. The concept of mutually constitutive identity and 
interest and the collectivisation of identity that shapes all agents’ behaviour is critical 
to constructivism, Asia-constructivism, and therefore this thesis. Wendt had 
exemplified this notion by arguing that a potentially revisionist state entering a 
structure of essentially amiable condition, characterised by habits of positive 
cooperation among status quo states, must and will change its interests according to 
what is deemed appropriate by the status quo orientated and arranged collective 
acting in concert. And vice versa, if this state enters a structure determined by 
enmity and the absence of cordial cooperative norms, it will be forced to define its 
interest in zero-sum terms and pursue its interests regardless of others. 
According to Wendt, there are two essential constraints to interest generating 
identity formation.  Firstly  the  process  of  interest and  identity  formation  is 
‘incremental and slow’ as actors are focussed on tangible gains at the expense of 
substantial reflections as to the process that allowed those gains to materialise. 
Second, identity formation presupposes that actors do not identify negatively with 
one another. Under certain preconditions though, actors are able to self-reflect and 
subsequently redefine their social roles in ways conducive to overcoming those 
inhibitions. Wendt cites the Soviet Union under Gorbachev as an example for the 
positive effects of critical reflection of the self. Wendt argues that in a context of 
new social situations, unmanageable in terms of pre-existing self-conceptions as well 
as an anticipation of the expected rewards of intentional role change being greater 
than its costs, post-Soviet Russian identity change and in logical extension interest 
change occurred. A critical re-evaluation of identity commitments and old ideas and 
a re-definition of the self and the other need to take place. Such rethink, according 
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to Wendt, paves the way for new practices, i.e. initially unilateral initiatives and self- 
binding by one actor in order to convince the other of its cordial intentions. This can 
subsequently institutionalise positive cooperation practices based on new 
identity.189 
Again, structure and agency redefine each other and interests are determined by a 
structure dependent identity, which in itself is non-static. Both are thus subject to 
constant change. Thus, unlike rationalist theories that largely follow rational choice 
interest formation and the logic of consequence based on predetermined interests, 
constructivist theory endogenises interest formation by treating a nation state’s 
interest (agent) in the international arena (structure) as one among many dependent 
variables. 
On Security Communities 
 
Not least because security is the main focus and community one of the defining 
elements of ASEAN actorness, security community literature is pivotal to this thesis. 
Constructivist theory in IR has often been applied to arguably the greatest question 
in IR, how to establish and maintain peace and security. Mindful of the above 
constructivist parameters, it will become evident that although the intellectual 
father of security community literature, Karl Deutsch can not be termed a 
constructivists per se, security community concepts correspond very well with 
constructivist logic on norms, interest formation, and mutual constitution of 
structure-agency. In the language of the security community literature, on the most 
rudimentary level, security communities are a group of states among which war has 
become inconceivable due to an experience of reciprocated trust and non-violent 
cooperation. Forming a security community is a quest for long-term peace and 
requires an analytical framework that accounts for a supremacy of norms, shared 
values, and incremental identity formation. In its final stage, a security community is 
an institutionalisation of the constructivist stronghold of shared ideas, norms and 
values, codifying what constitutes appropriate behaviour. In Toennies’ and Weber’s 
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terms, states may form a Gemeinschaft, based on the value-rational interaction. The 
analogous ontological assumptions of constructivism and the security community 
concept are noticeable. 
No discussion of security community literature can satisfy without Karl Deutsch et 
al.190 who laid the foundations upon which prominent constructivists later built and 
refined the concept.191 Deutsch defined a security community as ‘a group of people, 
which has become integrated’, meaning that a group within a defined territory has 
developed a ‘sense of community and of institutions and practices’. He defined 
integration as a process that creates ‘unifying habits and institutions among 
participating units or groups’. Those groups have developed a sense of community 
when individual members are certain that they ‘have come to an agreement on at 
least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by 
processes of peaceful change’. 192 Successful security community formation is 
achieved when members have dependable expectations of peaceful change, i.e. all 
relations take place in absence of war or the preparations for war.193 Deutsch’s 
definition consists of two essential elements; a legal substantiation (institutions and 
practices) and an intersubjective sense of belonging to a social group (sense of 
community; we-feeling). This is therefore more than a mere modus vivendi found by 
essentially competitive states. In its final consequence, the security community 
argument claims that those who manage to construct such a security community will 
have created not simply a stable mode of interaction, but a stable long-term peace. 
Given the track record of international relations, this is no small claim. Essential for 
this to occur is a change in political attitude and behaviour leading towards a sense 
of community among nation states, a “we-feeling”. 194 According to Deutsch, 
communities can integrate as “amalgamated communities” within which members 
have ceded political sovereignty and merged into one single political unit, practicing 
 
 
 
 
190 
Deutsch et al. (1957); The work of Deutsch and his associates will henceforth be referred to as 
Deutsch’s or the Deutschian concept. 
191  
Adler/Barnett (1998); Wendt (1995); Acharya (2014). 
192 
Deutsch et al. (1957): 5. 
193 
See Deutsch (1961): 98/9. 
194 
Deutsch et.al. (1957): 29. 
102 
 
 
peaceful federalism. Alternatively, and more common, integration can take the form 
of pluralistic communities within which members do remain independent polities, 
but war has become an inconceivable option. Deutsch argued that pluralistic security 
communities were not necessarily achieved by incremental institutionalisation on 
the basis of shared identities and values – although this is arguably a necessary 
condition for amalgamated security communities – but on the basis of increased 
economic, political, and cultural cooperation.195 According to the Deutschian notion, 
increasing multi-functional interaction between nation states creates 
interdependence that fosters a sense of community. This increased practice as well 
as sense of belonging together makes violent conflict among members of this group 
increasingly irrational. The Deutschian interaction is accounted for in terms of 
frequent,  measurable  social  contacts  between  people  and  elites  (e.g.  cultural, 
educational, professional/political) as well as commercial transactions (trade, labour 
migration etc.). What has become known as the “transactionalist approach” regards 
communities as a direct consequence of a dense web of frequent practice of 
interaction and relies upon a high degree of regional interdependence as a necessary 
precondition for Deutsch’s vital dependable expectation of peaceful change. 
The transactionalist approach has inevitably rationalist characteristics and is largely 
quantitative and positivist in nature. The transactionalist model is classified as 
functionalist or, if one considers Deutsch’s insistence on spill-over effects of 
increased transaction, it is even neo-functionalist. 196 Deutsch is therefore not 
normally associated with constructivism per se, in spite of his bias towards social 
interaction and communication ensuing community and identity formation. In fact, 
at the time of Deutsch’s writing, constructivism was not yet an approach associated 
with IR. And yet, one could certainly make the argument that despite his 
methodology and logic, Deutsch’s approach was biased towards what would later 
become known as constructivism in the IR community. In particular his DVs of a “we- 
feeling” and a “sense of community” framed by interaction and interdependence 
suggest  the  element  of  identity  change.  All  of  this  would  become  enduring 
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constructivist variables. In any case, Deutsch’s security community model has had a 
tenacious and enduring impact on latter-day constructivist and Asia-constructivist 
scholarship. 
Emmanuel Adler for instance once wrote that Deutsch was possibly slightly ahead of 
his time. 197 Combining normative Kantian principles with interactive forces of 
globalisation did not bode well during the early Cold War years, vastly dominated by 
realist self-help and balance of power considerations. However, following the demise 
of the Soviet Union, scholars as well as seasoned statesmen searching for a way out 
of violent conflict were possibly more amenable to an IR theory based on norms, 
values, and cooperation. In a context of a normative environment conducive to 
peace and stability, an epistemological development materialised in political 
thought. A newly interested circle of scholars, beginning with people such as Hopf, 
Wendt, Adler and others, explicitly picked up Deutsch’s concept and gave it a more 
distinctively constructivist edge. Instead of relying on Deutschian functionalism, 
scholars partial to the sociological concepts of constructivist and associated 
conceptual frameworks concentrated on typical constructivist strongholds of norms, 
social learning, shared practices, and collective identification in lieu of functionalist 
spill-over effects. Wendt’s arguments in this respect have already been summarised 
and need not be repeated. 
Adler and Barnett’s edited volume198 specifically referred to Deutsch and aimed to 
demonstrate how socialisation and social learning could establish and transmit 
transnational norms and values and would subsequently define the parameters of 
what constitutes appropriate behaviour within a cooperative structure 
(international/regional system). The authors support the basic Deutschian 
assumption and his intervening variable (IntV) of integration decreasing the 
likelihood of war and note that 
violent   conflict   can   be   mitigated   and   even   eliminated   by   the 
development of mutual identification among peoples and not through 
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conventional  practices  such  as  balancing  and  collective  security 
schemes.199 
However, Adler and Barnett also relied on rather different variables. Whereas 
Deutsch emphasised functionalist cooperation fostering integration and ultimately 
reducing violence, Adler and Barnett see normative social forces at work. To them, 
integration is not only institutionalisation of functional cooperation, or transaction, 
but add the institutionalisation of ‘mutual identification, transnational values, 
intersubjective understandings, and shared identities’.200 The authors use their three 
characteristics of community as introduced in chapter 1; shared identity; direct, 
frequent interaction; and reciprocity. The emerging we-feeling nurtures a sense of 
collective responsibility and loyalty among the community.201 Adler defined security 
communities accordingly as being 
socially constructed because shared meanings, constituted by interaction, 
engender collective identities. They are dependent on communication, 
discourse, and interpretation, as well as on material environments.202 
Evidently, post-Cold War constructivists did not challenge the significance of 
Deutschian transaction as such, but instead of emphasising functionalist spill-over 
effects, they supplemented it with constructivist notions of shared meanings and 
social learning. Presuming that socialisation requires a “vehicle”, some 
constructivists added the conditioning variable (CV) of institutional facilities. Amitav 
Acharya for instance highlights the importance of transnational institutions and 
regimes in order to cement an emerging transnational identity via  formal 
integration. Acharya’s CV of institutionalisation and legalisation prompt members to 
increasingly regard their respective futures as interconnected and facilitate the 
process by increasing the belief in a common destiny.203 
Multilateral security cooperation of course is not an exclusive stronghold of 
constructivists and contrasting it to more rationalist theories of “security regimes” 
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increases conceptual understanding. Consider for instance Robert Jervis’ definition 
of a security regime. 
By a security regime I mean [...] those principles, rules, and norms that permit 
nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will 
reciprocate. This concept implies not only norms and expectations that 
facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the 
following of short-run selfinterest.204 
Note the emphasis on belief and reciprocation. States act in good faith and expect 
positive action in return, leading to a long-term positive-sum result. Allan Collins 
writes that a security regime ‘constrains members so that they rarely practice self- 
help, and if they do so they must weigh carefully the opportunity cost of defecting 
and thus disrupting the relationship.’205 Interests are, as Janice Gross-Stein neatly 
puts it ‘neither wholly compatible, nor wholly competitive.’206 Members of a security 
regime therefore do not act on the basis of internalised collective values but on long- 
term cost-benefit calculations. While reserving the right to defect, rational states are 
biased towards making sacrifices in form of rule compliance in anticipation of 
security benefits. In other words, security regime members are part of a Gesellschaft 
that has realised that their respective individual security might be enhanced by some 
degree of collective security and diplomatic interaction on the lowest common 
denominator. They act in Weber’s sense zweckrational and their decision making 
follows March and Olsen’s logic of consequence. The dean of Southeast Asian 
studies, Michael Leifer, meant precisely this when he called ASEAN an ‘embryonic 
security community’.207 Instead of using community in the above defined sense, 
Leifer meant an institutionalisation of a balance of power, defined as not a situation 
but a policy aimed at ‘preventing the establishment of undue dominance by one or 
more states’. Hence, in a context of regional reconciliation, regional policy would 
promote ‘an institutional framework of mutual constraint’.208 
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This form of multilateral security cooperation therefore accommodates rationalist 
notions. Although security regimes are of lesser integrative quality than 
communities, they also mitigate the adverse consequences of anarchy by facilitating 
and institutionalising rule compliance and thus lessening uncertainty and ultimately, 
the security dilemma. A second reading of security regimes reveals that members do 
remain 
essentially self- 
interested states 
and 
continuously 
weigh up cost 
and  benefits  of 
compliance  and 
defection.  Thus, 
although 
uncertainty  and 
the risk of a security dilemma may be limited, they are evidently not yet erased and 
there is no unequivocal dependable expectation of peaceful change, yet. 
Before relating the above to the particularities of Asian regionalism from which this 
chapter will then categorise Asia-constructivism, one may ask whether there are 
clearly defined steps of community development to be found in constructivist and 
security community literature? Objective readers might feel slightly disappointed. 
Generally, the literature tends to concentrate on theory and the phenomenon as 
such and scholars have been rather vague and cautious as to a clear-cut 
characterisation of the steps leading towards an eventual (security-) community 
which inhibits process tracking. This changed somewhat in 2010, when Charles 
Kupchan209 outlined his approach. In the tradition of earlier English School scholars 
such as Hedley Bull,210 Kupchan attempts to build bridges across the theoretical 
divides of rationalist theories and constructivists and sets out to disclose the initial 
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conditions and the sequential process by which security communities can emerge. In 
agreement with realist traditions, a key element of the English School is that the 
international/regional system is indeed characterised by anarchy. However, there 
are socio-cultural (e.g. values) and cooperative elements (e.g. diplomacy) that affect 
this condition and interaction within it. States necessarily interact and may 
eventually form what the English School calls an “international society”.211 States 
may realise that they share some common interests as well as common values and 
may form a society within which states sees themselves as bound by a common set 
of rules, such as sovereignty, non-violence, or the importance of honouring 
agreements. Based on this, states cooperate within sets of common institutions and 
regimes.212 Unlike a mere system of states within which states may be in contact 
with each other without necessarily sharing common interests or values, a society of 
states accepts certain limitations within the condition of anarchy and voluntarily 
restrict their own total sovereignty to some extent in order to further greater 
interests of security and/or cooperation. While English School scholars, like strict 
rationalists, see the structural condition of anarchy as a crucial IV framing 
interaction, they emphasise the DV of consensus building mechanisms, such as rules- 
based institutions and subsequent socialisation processes based on shared values 
and norms.213 
This is the foundation of 
Kupchan’s 
methodologically eclectic 
approach to Southeast 
Asia in which he identifies 
an unambiguous four- 
step process of 
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Phase Activity Attribute Assessed Resulting Affect 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
Unilateral  Accommodation 
Reciprocal Restraint 
Societal Integration 
Narrative Generation 
Intent 
Motivation 
Character 
Identity 
Hope 
Confidence 
Trust 
Solidarity 
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community building, suggesting a path-dependant progression from a state of 
Hobbesian anarchy towards stable peace. 214 Admittedly, this is a courageous 
endeavour, for it allows for practical evaluation and progress tracking in form of case 
studies. Reconciliation, Kupchan argues, begins with an act of (1) “unilateral 
accommodation” by one nation state of another. Confronted with manifold security 
threats, nation states seek to limit insecurity by exercising restraint and 
accommodating the adversary’s position. Doing so signals the intent to take the 
firststep away from geostrategic competition, opening the door for detente. 
Subsequently, the practice of restraint takes hold. The accommodated nation state 
positively responds to cordial signals and a phase of (2) “reciprocal restraint” begins. 
Former adversaries trade concessions and practice a reciprocal accommodation, 
setting the scene for a lasting rapprochement. Hitherto, this model treats 
reconciliation as chiefly an elite process. The third phase of (3) “societal integration”, 
though, encompasses positive socialisation of civil society and the private sector, as 
citizens interact and interest groups begin to lobby in order to reduce economic and 
political impediments. This provides a real boost to the reconciliation process. The 
fourth and final phase of community formation, (4) “generation of new narratives 
and identities”, follows from this civil society engagement process and is 
characterised by a modification of the general political discourse around the former 
adversary. Through political, economic, and cultural symbolism such as common 
charters and statements of collective purpose, mutual perceptions are altered and 
identities begin to change. The distinction of the self and the other among former 
antagonists fades and gives way to the much-cited we-feeling.215 The constructivist 
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bias of this four-phased development of overcoming initially negative identification 
and subsequent cooperative security based on merging identities and interests is 
obvious. To some extent though, Kupchan is also eclectic and a functionalist, for he 
highlights the initially instrumentally motivated attempt to maximise ones security 
from which increased interaction follows. Upon careful reading it appears that 
Kupchan has reversed the Deutschian logic. Whereas Deutsch treated security as the 
unintended outcome of community building through increased transaction, Kupchan 
treats security as the cause of an emerging community. In the Deutschian logic, a 
general condition of increasing interdependence accelerates interaction/transaction 
and leads to the desirable, yet unintended condition of stable peace. Kupchan 
however treats the desire for security in a Hobbesian world as the essential IV of his 
research. It is certainly noteworthy how Kupchan utilises the quintessential realist IV 
of structural anarchy and state interest in terms of security as his point of departure, 
and arrives via transactionalist forces at what is essentially a constructivist 
destination of shared identity. 
To be fair to Adler and Barnett, they had also imagined a somewhat linear path from 
a (1) “nascent” and (2) “ascending” towards the ultimate (3) “mature” security 
community.216 Yet, they have been significantly less precise and thus, arguably less 
confident 
and 
falsifiable 
than 
Kupchan. At 
the nascent 
stage,   Adler 
and Barnett argue, a group of states begin to cooperate in order to increase security 
and/or lower the cost of transactions and/or encourage further interaction among 
them. 217 Although this group may retain some internal rivalry and competition, this 
is  muted  by  an  evolving  common  identity,  converging  threat  perceptions,  and 
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anticipation of economic gains. At that point, security may or may not be the 
motivating factor for an increase in interaction. While states may have come to 
realise that they share common security interests and their respective individual 
security might be enhanced by some degree of collective security on the lowest 
common denominator, integrative forces may just as well be economic benefits or 
other interests, including social interests. This arrangement is arguably akin to a 
security regime. Deutsch had called this a “no-war community”.218 At Adler and 
Barnett’s ascendant stage, cooperation has significantly increased, including such 
sensitive areas as military cooperation. Mutual trust increases and a transition 
towards intersubjectivity of meanings and expectations materialises. At this point, a 
common identity begins to unfold and both structure and agent change and, in 
constructivist terms, mutually re-construct each other. The final stage of a mature 
community is reached once a common identity has emerged and trust and 
cooperation has increased to a level where supranational institutionalisation is 
possible. There is a dependable expectation of peaceful change and violent conflict 
unthinkable, for members observe utmost self-restraint and expect no military 
threats from within the community. At this stage, the security community is 
characterised by institutionalisation and even certain degrees of supranationalism. 
Similar to Deutsch, the point of departure is also transactionalist. However, in 
constructivist tradition, Adler and Barnett account  from the outset for 
intersubjective social factors. 
There is no doubt that traditional constructivism has added some valuable insights 
into international politics in general. In particular taking account of non-materialist 
factors in order to explain a sense of normative appropriateness and what Max 
Weber called value-rational action which may well be a factor in policy decisions. 
Constructivism has also greatly enhanced both the scope and the intellectual quality 
of the debate in the IR community. The following investigates how this has impacted 
specific studies of Asian IR. 
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3.2. Asia-Constructivism 
 
[…] structural factors play only a limited role in determining the extent and 
nature of both multilateral activity and multilateralism in a given regional 
security complex. It is the cognitive features of the environment – the attitudes 
of the players toward each other, the rule and norms governing international 
interaction, the scope and nature of the security dilemmas that the actors 
perpetuate among themselves – that effectively determine the particular form 
of regional order that results.219 
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Until the late 1990s, analyses of Southeast and East Asia tended to be mainly realist 
and neo-realist in nature.220 In realist tradition, both the idea of an institutionalised 
community of states in general and ASEAN as an organisation in particular are at 
best regarded as secondary to balance of power considerations in the Asia-Pacific. 
Stability and security hinge on the crucial great power relationships to which Asia has 
always been a central stage. An amalgamation of weak nation states such as ASEAN 
is seen as marginalised accordingly.221 Realist assessments tend to focus on the 
national interest of AMS and the ineffectuality of the ASEAN way resulting in ASEAN 
being often seen as not more than a “talk shop”. Initially, there was great credence 
to  neo-realist  approaches.  Ever  since  its  founding,  ASEAN  was  essentially  the 
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institutional response to regional balance of power dynamics and traditional security 
threats. Self-help dynamics and security consideration were what motivated the o- 
AMS to cooperate. 222 However, the general advent of constructivism in post-Cold 
War IR also impacted IR of Asia scholars, most dominantly in relation to the security 
community concept. Constructivism more than other theories conformed to the 
post-Cold War zeitgeist. In particular the post-1997 years brought to the fore plenty 
of  East  and  Southeast  Asia  analyses  informed  by  constructivist  variables  and 
concepts. In a region where Deutschian prerequisites of democracy and liberal 
values were, and still are, few and far between, the emergence of non-liberal notions 
of security communities in the 1990s significantly aided application to the Asia- 
Pacific. 223 A new admittedly innovative type of constructivism biased scholars 
developed approaches to Southeast Asian IR that this thesis believes ought to be 
grouped and categorised as Asia-constructivism. This new type of regional observers 
is informed by an analytical mix of constructivism, functional regional 
institutionalism, and area studies. 
Although not all identity and norm based claims and observations are universally 
accepted and variations exist within the Asia-constructivist debate, there is a 
strikingly frequent reiteration of several mantras. More often than not, analyses are 
based on a rejection of state-centric realist approaches, arguing those are based on 
European experiences and unfitting to the post-Cold War Asian world.224 Take for 
instance Alistair Johnston’s claim that realist approaches ‘do not work well in the 
region.’225 Or alternatively David Kang arguing that those theories [neo-realism] ‘do a 
poor job as they are applied to Asia.’ 226 In 1999, Nikolas Busse dismissed realist 
notions of ASEAN and Southeast Asian regionalism in general, arguing that narrow 
self-interests in AMS are not what defines the region and one ought to rethink and 
consider a collective identity based on social practice and interaction, as the real 
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glue holding ASEAN together.227 Accordingly, the main focus of Asia-constructivism 
became the research variables of identity, norms, and social learning within a 
decisively non-liberal and as chapter 2 has demonstrated heterogeneous Southeast 
Asia. Common norms and identity sharing function often as IVs and facilitate 
practises of regional socialisation and social learning, resulting in a more or less 
robust regionalism.228 Analyses have often focussed on the role of ideational forces 
in Southeast Asian institutions and processes and thus, almost exclusively on 
ASEAN.229 Asia-constructivism tends to highlight the ostensibly great extent to which 
regional states have managed to transcend the vicious circle of realpolitik by means 
of regional institutions, bound by common norms and practices and characterised by 
an ever increasing pan-East Asian identity and reciprocal socialisation dynamics.230 
ASEAN has been analysed selectively as a security community, a community of 
institutionalised shared identity, norms, values, and shared understanding of 
regionalism as well as the living proof for a manifestation of pan-East Asian 
intersubjectivity. AMS are generally seen as components of a cohesive collective, 
capable of managing intramural relations on the basis of shared norms, practices and 
values and as being on a path towards fulfilling its AC15 ambitions. The ASEAN way is 
deemed to be at least a modus vivendi for post-colonial Southeast Asian nations still 
navigating the murky waters in between continued nation building and regional 
integration processes. But it is also more than that. The ASEAN way is celebrated for 
being the manifestation of intersubjective understanding of regional norms and 
shared values. It is celebrated for the degree of cooperational flexibility it allows 
AMS and for its ability to transcend Southeast Asia to be projected into the wider 
Asia-Pacific, endowing a collective of in material terms weak nation states with 
significant power in a constructivist sense. Supposedly, ASEAN’s centrality is the 
pivot of regional stability and the driver of extramural institutions and regimes. 
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This new school has flocked the field of ASEAN studies. Some critical observers have 
identified a ‘new constructivist orthodoxy’ in Southeast Asia.231 In fact, aside from a 
few realist232 and some recent popular non-academic publications,233 this new Asia- 
constructivist school has come to all but dominate the academic debate, 
marginalising  alternative  approaches.  Indeed  it  appears  that  Asia-constructivists 
have declared war on alternative, rationalist approaches, frequently universally 
discarding those as Eurocentric and outdated. Traditional and Asia-constructivists 
are characterised by similar research variables, perspectives, and conclusions and 
thus, evince similar strengths and weaknesses. Asia-constructivists appear to be 
unduly selective with their evidence and eschew sober hypothesis testing. Asia- 
constructivists seem too often to get caught up in epistemological debates and their 
sometimes sweeping claims are based on questionable IVs, such as collectively 
shared norms. Conclusions are unconvincing and often supported only by ASEAN’s 
own rhetoric. ASEAN, by referring to itself as a community and by progressively 
institutionalising as such within the scaffolding of AC15, has done its bit to 
encourage the now inextricable link between normative perspectives on security, 
community and Southeast Asia. Nor can it go unnoticed that there is a significant 
tendency towards “herd behaviour” by which scholars whom I group as Asia- 
constructivists almost exclusively cross-reference each others’ work. Interestingly, 
ASEAN-centred extramural mechanisms aside, Asia-constructivism is scarce in wider 
non-ASEAN Asian IR. I therefore suggest that Asia-constructivist prioritise ideology at 
the expense of empirical analysis and are thus guilty of a predisposition that 
obscures sound analyses. The theoretical and methodical resemblance to traditional 
constructivism justifies the argument that a sub-theory, henceforth termed Asia- 
constructivism, has emerged. Categorising and challenging Asia-constructivism is the 
raison d’être of this thesis. 
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3.2.1. Asia-Constructivism and ASEAN Community 
 
We in ASEAN have created a community of Southeast Asian nations at 
peace with one another and at peace with the world, rapidly achieving 
prosperity for our peoples and steadily improving their lives. Our rich 
diversity has provided the strength and inspiration to us to help one 
another foster a strong sense of community. (1997)234 
 
ASEAN shall continue to foster a community of caring societies and 
promote a common regional identity. (2003) 235 
 
[ASEAN sets out strategies for norm shaping and sharing] in order to 
contribute to building collective responsibilities and forming a 
standard or common adherence to norms of good conduct in a 
democratic, tolerant, participatory and open community, as a means 
to consolidating and strengthening ASEAN as solidarity, cohesiveness 
and harmony (the ”we feeling”). (2004)236 
 
 
Lamenting that even the most sophisticated analyses of the Asia-Pacific region 
allegedly ignored the significance of ideational questions, Richard Higgott was one of 
the earliest scholars to stress the potential importance of norms and identity in the 
Southeast Asian context, setting the stage for plenty more to follow.237 Busse found 
that AMS often acted beyond narrow defined national interests because it was felt 
that ‘countries had something more important in common - namely being a member 
of ASEAN.’238 In his view, interests of ASEAN Member States (AMS) do not derive 
from narrowly defined material national needs but from a collective identity based 
on commonly shared norms.  Indeed he claims that there was no such thing as 
distinctive individual AMS national interests at all, since in the ASEAN case, interest 
could no be seen as consequence of things such as strategic location or economic 
structure of individual AMS. 239 Reminiscent of Wendt, Busse sees identity as the 
basis of interests and one ought to factor in that the ASEAN group has acquired a 
collective identity when considering interstate relations in Southeast Asia. 
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Yet, before traditional community concepts could be applied to Asia, some 
normative modifications had to be made. Deutsch had explicitly used post-World 
War II liberal democracies in Europe that were eventually to become the EU as an 
example. How can this concept be applied to a region as heterogeneous as 
Southeast Asia? Back then, Myanmar was still a far cry from first steps of 
democratisation and liberalisation and even today progress remains feeble. Other 
AMS such as Brunei, Laos and Vietnam remain under more or less authoritarian rule, 
the democratic nature of Thailand’s political system is at best unconvincing and 
recently deteriorating and one would find it a tough task to argue that semi- 
democratic Singapore under the uninterrupted Lee dynasty is a liberal pluralist 
polity. How can nation states as diverse as Singapore and Myanmar or Laos and 
Indonesia have an intersubjective understanding of values and norms not to mention 
share associated principles? 
In terms of the function of constitutive and regulative norms, it might not matter 
whether a region consists of more or less liberal democracies. In theory, 
appropriateness can be defined in any way. As for the form – or the nature – of 
particular norms, though, Adler and Barnett felt the need to rectify Deutsch’s liberal 
disposition.240 Although in 1992 Adler had still argued that security communities 
share not just any kind of values but specifically ‘liberal democratic values’ in order 
to facilitate a strong civil society and identity formation,241 six years later Adler and 
Barnett’s amendments did indeed allow for ‘illiberal security communities’. Whilst a 
set of intersubjective values among a group of states is necessary to develop a 
community, those need not be liberal-democratic values at all. A community building 
project does not have to follow a Kantian path dependency as long as the 
constitutive norms, and thus an intersubjective understanding of appropriateness, 
are shared and in accordance with prevailing collective interpretations of reality, 
liberal or illiberal. 242  Other Asia-constructivists have also argued that shared illiberal 
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values can just be as robust a basis for community development as liberal ones.243 
Charles Kupchan agrees, doubting that liberal values and democracy are a necessary 
precondition for a stable ‘long-term peace to break out’.244 He declares that some 
minor disagreements notwithstanding, academic consensus existed that ASEAN is 
indeed a successfully integrated normative community. 245 Albeit questioning 
ASEAN’s motives and being ambivalent about the exact current level of integration, 
Kupchan names ASEAN as living proof for the possibility of successful illiberal 
security communities. According to those authors, Illiberal communities were bound 
less by a shared commitment to liberalism and popular democracy but by a practice 
of self-restraint.246 There appears to be a trend towards reinvigoration of a much 
older sociological awareness of self-restraint as an essential part of organised human 
society as identified by sociologist Norbert Elias’ work on “civilising processes”. Elias 
argued that self-restraint prevents illegitimate violence within sophisticated social 
relationships and is therefore a substantial part of the civilising process of 
humankind.247 Asia-constructivists have allowed Elias’ practice of self-restraint to 
transcend the domestic realm and have intergovernmentalised it as an essential 
practice in foreign and security policy. The practice of self-restraint developed from a 
common understanding of non-violence as a constitutive norm, becomes a habit of 
peaceful conflict management through social learning, is thereby internalised and 
develops as the new gold-standard regardless of whether or not actors share a 
similar ideology or domestic norms.248 In lieu of liberal-democratic norms, practices 
and habits facilitate trust, increase certainty and make violent conflict improbable. 
Emmanuel Adler champions the advance of “developmentalist” security 
communities instead249 and repeats and re-conceptualises his practice- rather than 
ex ante value based approach and specifically refers to ASEAN when he argues in 
favour of the possibility of the 
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development of (incipient) non-liberal security communities, such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations […]. As communities of practice, which 
are constituted around liberal practices, spread to non-liberal communities, the 
latter may be able to develop self-restraint subjectivities, such as cooperative 
security, that will help them evolve into non-liberal security communities.250 
Hence, while the independent (IV) and dependent variables (DV) in this particular 
part of Asia-constructivist literature remain true to traditional constructivism and 
traditional security community literature, Asia-constructivists eradicate the liberal 
content, or form, of the traditional variable of liberal norms and exclusively rely on 
the function of shared norms in order to make the concept compatible with the 
Southeast Asian context. Indeed, if the norm’s content is practice and not idealistic, 
then form and function of norms merge into one and the same thing. Moreover, the 
practice of self-restraint becomes both the cause and the outcome of community 
building. It is here where critics could begin to seriously leverage the accusations of 
tautology against constructivist logic.251 
No discussion of constructivism and ASEAN can take place without the perhaps most 
prolific contemporary scholar on Asian regionalism, Amitav Acharya. Acharya 
believes the fact that the o-AMS had not fought an outright war since ASEAN’s 
inception despite gloomy prospects during the Cold War proves ASEAN and the 
ASEAN way to be ‘one of the most successful experiments in regional cooperation in 
the developing world.’252 Without explicitly stating as much, Acharya’s numerous 
contributions to the study of Asian regionalism253 rely on constructivist reasoning, 
highlighting in particular shared norms and ideas as the drivers of a common 
regional identity, precipitating a sound community. His reoccurring argument is that 
AMS’ foreign policy by and large does not agree with realist power balancing logic 
and he explicitly rejects notions that hegemony and interest politics are decisive 
factors in institution building. Instead, Acharya views ASEAN as a social construct 
within  which  intersubjectivity  and  shared  identity  and  we-feeling,  not  coercive 
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power is the force behind ever deepening institutionalisation. Like most Asia- 
constructivists, he claims that the development of ASEAN and the ASEAN Community 
(AC15) is a process of institutionalisation of shared Southeast Asian norms, allowing 
elites to interact in a peaceful manner within clearly defined institutions and 
regimes.254 Although conceding that there had been some setbacks in the late 1990s, 
he understands contemporary ASEAN as a security community in between the 
nascent  and  ascendant  stage  in  Adler  and  Barnett’s  sense.  Largely  evincing 
characteristics of nascent security communities, Acharya detects a maturity of 
ASEAN identity that would be expected in the next higher, ascendant phase.255 
Acharya does acknowledge the risk of decline in the quality of security communities 
to what he calls ‘decadent security communities’. Reasons for degeneration of the 
security community can be inter alia inadequate governance capability in the face of 
new threats, membership expansion to include previously unsocialised states, or 
material burdens.256 In 1991 Acharya claims that ‘the current state of relations 
between ASEAN states is qualitatively different from that at the time of the 
grouping’s formation.’ He even goes as far as to claim that ‘ASEAN has indeed 
become a security community in the sense that its members do not foresee the 
prospect for resorting to armed confrontation among themselves to resolve existing 
bilateral disputes.’ Thanks to the ‘habit of cooperation developed through political, 
diplomatic, cultural and military exchanges’, Acharya continues, ‘ASEAN states have 
moved to a point at which intra-ASEAN conflicts have either become irrelevant or 
been muted considerably’.257 In 2000, he becomes somewhat more cautious and 
points out that AMS acted as a nascent community, evincing habitual intramural 
norm compliance and development of a shared Southeast Asian identity. This 
cohesion allegedly enhances regional resilience. Having supposedly read Alexander 
Wendt’s works on the mutually constitutive structure and agency relations, Acharya 
asserts ASEAN’s multilateralism not only shapes regional power politics by providing 
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ideational leadership, but ‘may even enable states to transcend the balance of power 
approach.’258 
Fundamental to his argument is what he terms the “imagined community” as 
ASEAN’s cognitive prior.259 Albeit the lack of a discernible sense of a collective 
identity in the past, Acharya argues Southeast Asian states had long been 
characterised by certain socio-cultural commonalities. Increasing regional 
cooperation had set in motion a still on-going process of socialisation precipitating 
incremental Southeast Asian identity formation beyond mere material  interests. 
With Southeast Asian regionalism evolving and ever more integrating in the decades 
following ASEAN’s inception, the region had become less defined by self-interested 
nation states and geographical borders but increasingly by a shared sense of a 
common Southeast Asian identity.260 In The Quest for Identity, Acharya argues261 that 
regions are first imagined and then constructed. He analyses how AMS 
institutionalised regional socialisation and norms within ASEAN and how that 
process allows ASEAN leaders to “imagine” themselves as part of a distinct Southeast 
Asian region, which led to remarkably great regional coherence and subsequently 
ever deeper institutionalisation. 
 
The question of course is how identity can be measured. Acharya admits that 
measuring identity poses a great challenge, but to his credit does address the issue. 
He argues that identity emerges from socialisation and interaction processes, based 
on shared norms (ASEAN way).262 Hence, a commitment to and acceptance of an 
intersubjective set of norms leads to the institutionalisation of some form of shared 
identity. Acharya does get more specific, though. He believes three key indicators 
capable of determining when a collective identity has materialised. The first is a 
commitment to multilateralism, replacing a preference for bi- or unilateralism. 
Second is the development of security cooperation, including collective defence and 
security and collaboration against internal threats. Thirdly, identity formation can be 
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sensed from the boundaries of membership criteria, i.e. who can be part of the 
community and who cannot.263 
Intramural interaction based on shared belief 
systems and subsequent socialisation 
processes thus, have to some extent allowed 
AMS to transcend realpolitik.264 This agrees 
with  traditional  constructivist  notions  as  to 
the mutual constitution and reconstitution of structure and agent-interest. As we 
know now, Wendt and others have argued that both are non-static and depend on 
the intersubjective interpretation of both elements. Acharya’s IV, whether defined as 
shared beliefs, norms, or identity, also resound with ASEAN elites. Former ASEAN 
Secretary General Rodolfo Severino, said in an interview in the aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis for instance that 
[t]he main reason for ASEAN's enduring strength has been the stake 
that each member has in the viability of the association. This stake 
goes beyond  the  results of  the  economic and  other  forms of 
cooperation that ASEAN has been undertaking over the past three 
decades. ASEAN is more than an association of states. It is also a 
process, a spirit, a state of mind.265 
Here Severino implicitly confirms Acharya’s constructivist notion that ASEAN begins 
as an imagined community whereby the drive to cooperate is derived from a 
cognitive prior; or in Severino’s words ‘a state of mind’. Although a political 
statement in Severino’s case, he and Acharya both share the logic of a cognitive prior 
upon which ASEAN and its cooperative norms could develop. 
Building on the work of Acharya, Timo Kivimaki has placed the alleged norms of the 
ASEAN way at the heart of first the ASEAN, and then the East Asian security 
community. He claims the norms specific to the ASEAN way result in a practice of 
intergovernmental  regionalism  that  has  contributed  to  the  Long  Peace  of  East 
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Asia.266 In particular the norm of non-interference as well as a reinterpretation of the 
raison d’etre  of the  state  in general  by  the elites,  the  new ‘state  identity’, has 
contributed to a political culture of governance and diplomacy that is essentially 
conflict adverse and highly conducive to peace. Since the establishment of ASEAN, 
regional political culture had moved on from its former ways of seeing the nation as 
an instrument of power and prestige and fostered an atmosphere of a 
‘developmentalist commitment’. ASEAN is the institutional outcome of elites having 
come to regard the state as an instrument to realise national development and 
prosperity, possible only in a region with a degree of commonly shared principles, 
goals, and identity.267 The reorientation of Southeast Asian identity away from 
conflict and revolution towards the common endeavour of development fostered an 
“ASEAN peace”. As ASEAN’s norms and practices associated with the ASEAN way and 
the new political culture spread further into East Asia in post-TAC times, an ASEAN 
peace apparently became an “East Asian peace”.268 Uncommon in research relying 
on  normative  IVs,  Kivimaki  utilises  mostly  quantitative  research  methods  for 
evidence. He analyses the decrease in battle-deaths and interstate conflict first in 
ASEAN since its inauguration and then in the rest of East Asia post-1979 ‘since only 
numbers can reveal tendencies, systematic regularities and the big picture of peace 
and war in East Asia’.269 Very elaborate and scientifically sound, Kivimaki shows in 
great detail that ASEAN membership has coincided with a significant reduction in 
both battle fatalities and interstate conflicts among AMS. This trend continued in the 
rest of East Asia as countries there adopted the ASEAN way post 1979.270 ‘Is it 
possible’ Kivimaki asks, ‘that the long peace of Asia began in ASEAN and spread, like 
a benign disease, to the rest of East Asia?’ His answer is a resounding yes, this 
“benign ASEAN disease” ostensibly significantly contributed to the peacefulness of 
East Asia.271 
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Also quite positive that ASEAN constitutes a sound security community is Alex 
Bellamy. The building bloc of his argument is reminiscent of that employed by a 
great many traditional constructivists. Rejecting classical realism, Bellamy believes 
the Hobbesian “state of nature” to be not more than a theoretical narrative and 
theories based on this realist IV are ill-informed from the outset. Instead, Bellamy 
relies on the English School international society concept and argues that all 
interactive system are sociological constructs by definition. 272 Like other Asia- 
constructivists, Bellamy also focuses on regional identity but is slightly more precise 
as to its origin than Acharya. By not shying away from addressing the elephant in the 
room, Bellamy dares the direct comparison between ASEAN and the EU and 
underlines the significantly different depth of institutionalisation.273 Reminding of 
David Kang’s claim above, Bellamy argues that criticism based on an alleged under- 
institutionalisation of Southeast Asian regionalism is based on an inappropriate and 
indeed misleading application of European standards that assign an apparently 
inappropriately great relevance to strong institutions in general. As far as ASEAN is 
concerned, deliberately informal networks of interaction and the ASEAN way 
adequately replace the policy coherence inducing quality of rules-based 
institutionalism. Indeed, to him, ASEAN has built a ‘loosely coupled community of 
values, interests and norms’274, which has developed and strengthened since its 
formative years. Although ASEAN had not embraced peoples’ based integration but 
followed an elite-led path, the outcome is what matters and AMS had achieved their 
primary goal of becoming a ‘no war community’. 275 Bellamy’s analysis therefore 
evinces Acharya-esque variables, such as shared norms as a tool – or starting point – 
in order to achieve non-violence standards. Quite unlike the European experience, 
Bellamy believes ASEAN’s community quality does not originate in a shared historical 
disaster, an ill-fated bellicose past creating a strong regional identity. ASEAN rather 
emerged from a commonly shared sense of vulnerability of embryonic, post-colonial 
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statehood, threatened by instability. 276 Bellamy therefore also indirectly 
presupposes a cognitive prior – without referring to it as such – in the form of a 
shared sense of disadvantage deriving from feeble (post-)colonial nationhood. 
Arguably, this all but resembles Acharya’s “shared beliefs” and Severino’s “state of 
mind”. In Southeast Asia, unlike in Europe, processes, as manifest in the ASEAN way, 
rather than historical calamities are the bedrock of unity and cooperation. Bellamy’s 
IntV are consequentially the regulative norms of the ASEAN way, eventually 
producing habitual non-violence and cooperation. ASEAN’s community quality 
therefore depends on norm construction through interactive processes. 
Communication has led ASEAN’s elites to realise that they share a common set of 
interests and ideas about possible cooperation. Bellamy is adamant that this unifying 
principle is of no lesser quality than the European counterpart and even allows 
ASEAN to constructively engage the wider Asian region in spite of pervasive 
ideological and political differences. Similar to Kivimaki, Bellamy believes the ASEAN 
way to be quite appealing not only to AMS themselves, but also to outsiders and 
thus, incrementally decreases the need for realist security practices in the region.277 
In this logic, the presence of and strong focus on process allows institutionalisation 
and interaction despite heterogeneity; intra- and extramurally. Yet again Asia- 
constructivist literature attempts to demonstrate the ability and socialising quality of 
normative forces and ideas in order to overcome realpolitik. Not only do community 
members  learn  to  cooperate  based  on  non-violent  interaction  and  reciprocal 
consideration and responsibility. Their processes can also socialise extramural actors 
into the same norms.278 In a similar vein, Charles Kupchan declares that some minor 
disagreements notwithstanding, academic consensus existed that ASEAN is indeed a 
successfully integrated normative community.279 Albeit questioning ASEAN’s motives 
and being ambivalent about the exact current level of integration, Kupchan names 
ASEAN as living proof for the possibility of successful illiberal security communities280 
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and applies his four-step framework.281 Kupchan reminds his readers of Suharto’s 
reaching out to Malaysia despite long standing enmity, setting the stage for both 
nations ratifying the Bangkok Declaration and subsequently embarking on long-term 
community building.282 In the light of increasing escalation and third-party pressure 
against Indonesia in reaction to Konfrontasi, Kupchan highlights the realist nature of 
Suharto’s post-Konfrontasi volte-face. Recalling his first phase of community 
building, accommodation was in this case the Indo-Malay rapprochement, motivated 
less by idealistic goals than by strategic requirements. According to his model, this 
realpolitik motive soon heralded societal integration, idealistic convergence and the 
emergence of new narratives in Southeast Asia. It highlights that what begins with 
realism can end in constructivism. Community emerged according to Kupchan from a 
shared need to overcome security threats in the context of anarchy. Following 
Deutschian logic, a general condition of increasing interdependence facilitated more 
meaningful interaction among the five founding ASEAN states (o-AMS) and 
unintentionally, in his words, ‘a stable peace broke out’.283 
A further staunch Asia-constructivist is Estrella Solidum who focuses on the outcome 
of identity formation. This local analyst’s optimism stands out even among Asia- 
constructivists. She could not lavish more praise on ASEAN as the top model of 
regional integration. Solidum regards ASEAN as the centrepiece of regional security 
and as a successfully integrated community.284 As early as 2003, she congratulated 
ASEAN for maintaining the ‘highest commitment to goals of peace, freedom, 
stability, prosperity, rule of law, and security’ and for having been able to remain 
cohesive and ‘able to respond and adapt to the changing conditions at the regional 
and international levels in coherent ways’. Solidum aligns with other process 
oriented Asia-constructivists and also believes that ASEAN has developed a sense of 
community and a community of caring societies. She acknowledges and subscribes 
to ASEAN’s assertion that its community represents ‘a concert of Southeast Asian 
nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability, and prosperity, bonded together 
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in partnership in development, and in a community of caring societies.’285 Although 
the emergence and exact realisation of this successful integration is left unclear, 
Solidum leaves no doubt as to ASEAN’s common identity shaped by peaceful norms. 
Upon those peaceful, commonly accepted norms, as apparently evident in the 
ASEAN way, ASEAN based institutions and ASEAN initiated treaties and regimes such 
as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), managed to establish security and 
stability in the region. 286 Yet again norms and an apparently intersubjective 
understanding of those are the basis upon which ASEAN developed and flourishes. 
ASEAN clearly agrees with this when it endorsed Vision 2020 as part of the HPA, it 
set out a vision for future integration goals. The journey was determined to take 
ASEAN to a new level, creating a ‘concert of Southeast Asian Nations, outward 
looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in 
dynamic development and in a community of caring societies.’287 Bali II reaffirmed 
that 
ASEAN is a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership 
in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, committed to 
upholding cultural diversity and social harmony.288 
Careful reading here reveals that ASEAN leaders saw the “concert of Southeast Asian 
nations” as having been completed. 
Before the following two parts will move on to the Asia-constructivist readings of the 
ASEAN way and ASEAN centrality, a refreshingly less enthusiastic and yet 
constructivism inclined analyses comes from Allan Collins who concludes that ASEAN 
has not yet integrated to security community depth. He shows how ASEAN’s 
constitutive norms have allowed ASEAN to form a security regime instead. As always 
in Asia-constructivism literature, the importance of constitutive norms is 
accentuated. Although Collins himself – like most Asia-constructivists – is likely to 
deny being a constructivist, he relies on constitutive norms as at least an intervening 
variable (IntV). However, criticising the general elite bias and the post-Deutschian 
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notion of illiberal communities in ASEAN scholarship, Collins adds an interesting new 
dimension to the debate.289 Indeed he calls for a new interpretation of community. 
To him, community is at least as much about civil society and positive transnational 
identification among the people as it is about elite interaction. His quest is in essence 
a return  to Deutschian basics  of more comprehensive  transnational synergy; an 
equal engagement of both, state elites and civil society. Accordingly, he argues 
[i]t is the sense of belonging together at the mass level that ensures the “we- 
feeling” is held by more than a select group of state elite. [...] It is therefore the 
extent and depth of the transnational ties that, through a process of social 
learning, establishes the collective identity that is the glue in a security 
community. This reveals that vibrant civil societies are necessary to enable the 
creation of a community-based civic culture.290 
ASEAN itself is of course in total symbiosis. It has frequently stressed its own 
ambition to establish a ‘peoples-oriented ASEAN’ in which all sectors of society are 
encouraged to participate in and benefit from ASEAN integration and community 
building. According to the association, this takes place within a democratic 
environment governed by the rule of law.291 As one of the few constructivism 
influenced observers, Collins concedes that while ASEAN does indicate an ambition 
to form a community based on Deutschian basics of liberal values and interaction on 
all levels, this language is not yet reflected in actual practice. He identifies a 
pluralistic political development in certain AMS, such as Indonesia, as the driving 
force behind this language of liberalism. Yet, precisely the lack thereof in most other 
AMS is preventing the people-community factor from gaining a permanent foothold 
in  Southeast  Asian  regionalism,  thus  inhibiting  the  community  building  process 
severely.292 His analysis suggests a refreshing dose of moderation. Indeed, despite 
ASEAN’s flamboyant language, the quality of intramurally shared understanding of 
community is doubtful and the Asia-constructivist argument regarding the 
irrelevancy of domestic ideological compatibility is unconvincing. 
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3.2.2. Asia-Constructivism and the ASEAN Way 
 
Chapter 2 has introduced the practice of the ASEAN way and argued that it is best 
understood as the realisation of a set of underpinning principles in the day-to-day 
routine of ASEAN politics; or as constructivist literature would have it, regulative 
norms in the context of constitutive norms. ASEAN’s main principles, such as non- 
interference (constitutive), are realised via informal, non-legalistic and fairly flexible 
processes of consultation and consensus building (regulative).293 ASEAN itself has 
explicitly stressed the utmost significance of the ASEAN way as the blueprint for its 
intra- and extramural engagement in all but every of its documents.294 Viewed in a 
negative light, the minimalist ASEAN way with its absolute principle of disagreement 
avoidance practices and “face-saving” principles in multilateral bargaining is of low 
agency quality and runs the risk of being relevant only if, either coincidently or as the 
smallest common denominator, all AMS’ agree and policies converge. According to 
realists, those processes make the ASEAN way – and by extension ASEAN as a whole 
– ineffective, as it de facto provides for unpunished non-compliance by 
delegitimising sanction  mechanisms. 295 Viewed  in a  positive light,  the deliberate 
avoidance of strictly rules-based and institutionalised procedures facilitates a 
flexible, cooperation style of interaction based on informal interpersonal contacts. 
AMS collectively determine the agenda and avoid disagreement by finding the 
lowest common denominator, reflecting particularly Asian values. Asia-constructivist 
observers tend to be full of praise rather than criticism, believing the ASEAN way to 
be the key to both successful ASEAN integration and intra-ASEAN socialisation and to 
drawing other, more powerful and resourceful Asian nations, such as China, into 
their regional socialising orbit. 296 The following paragraphs shall discuss Asia- 
constructivist perspectives on ASEAN’s procedures in more detail. 
Both critical and supportive views exist among Asia-constructivists as well as ASEAN 
leaders. Yet, all unanimously credit the ASEAN way as a useful mechanism to avoid 
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and/or manage conflict in a fragile region. As Haacke put it, ‘conceptualisations of 
the ASEAN way suggest that this normative framework is of significance in mediating 
disputes, guiding interaction and underpinning a process of identity construction.’297 
Alex Bellamy has already identified the ASEAN way as the source of the Southeast 
Asian community and habits of non-violent cooperation among AMS, which provides 
a secure place for development.298 Rajshree Jetly is even more positive in her 
assessment. Far from being an ineffectual way to do business, the informal, non- 
binding ways of political and economic conduct is highly appropriate in a region 
where tensions still reside and the simultaneous approach of deferring in particular 
delicate questions – shelving – while reaching consensus on other, less sensitive 
ones helps to avoid disagreement and strengthens a still fragile regionalism. Jetly 
correspondingly insist that instead of decrying the ASEAN way as ineffectual, it ought 
to be credited for its aptitude in a volatile and most diverse region.299 Here, she 
indirectly refers to the frequently reoccurring belief that ASEAN has come a long way 
from being a rather fragile region, comprised of instable juvenile states whose 
relationship was characterised by animosity more than by cooperational spirit. One 
ought to appreciate the status quo, this reasoning suggests, rather than criticising 
non-achievement of  the ideal condition.  Consider in this  light  former Secretary- 
General Phan Wannamethee’s blunt words saying that ASEAN is avoiding conflicts 
that may get in the way of regional business by putting ‘the problem under the 
carpet and not highlight it. What is a problem today may cease to be so in the 
future.’300 Other ASEAN elites have voiced the same positive attitude. Reacting to 
Thailand’s, in particular Surin Pitsuwan’s, proposals to apply some greater level of 
flexibility to ASEAN’s processes (flexible engagement) former Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas argued similarly to Phan and Jetly. Alatas, who later became an 
integral part in the process of drawing up the ASEAN Charter, remarkably described 
the sometimes clandestine processes of the ASEAN way as nothing less than the 
backbone of the association’s very existence 
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[i]f the [Thai] proposition is to now talk publicly about internal problems we will 
be back to  when Asean was not formed, when Southeast  Asia was full of 
tension, mutual suspicion, and only because Asean was created, we have had 
more than 30 years of stability, of common progress.301 
In this view, the ASEAN way possesses a strongly stabilising quality. The modus 
operandi is simultaneously also the modus vivendi. In other words, in this logic, 
process is again the IntV of the outcome of regional stability. 
Acharya argues that the ASEAN way has become not only a key symbol of ASEAN, 
but a tool to help the group to overcome tensions without falling apart.302 Again, 
Acharya relies on the constructivist IV of norms in order to explain relative success of 
regional integration. Shared norms were influential in shaping a deliberately weak 
and non-institutionalised ASEAN way. 303 Acharya concedes that this form of 
regionalism to some extent emulates some well-established international principles 
as documented for instance in the UN Charter or the 1955 Bandung Conference. 
While the underpinning principles as such are not distinctive, according to Acharya, 
the ASEAN way is unique in the way it informally, almost casually operationalises, or 
realises, those principles in the daily business of Southeast Asian regionalism. He 
identifies the norms materialised in the ASEAN way as possessing socialising quality, 
leading to a nascent ASEAN identity. ‘Clearly’, he argues, norms had ‘a major impact 
on ASEAN regionalism’ and ‘played a central role’ in the development of a nascent 
identity. The ASEAN way did not result from cultural sources, but quite the opposite, 
‘norms created culture.’304 
In an effort to contribute to norm diffusion literature and to become more precise as 
to the origin of norms that make up the ASEAN way and notion Acharya developed in 
2009 his norm localisation concept. Starting from the recognition that constructivist 
literature too often focuses on norm-entrepreneurs instead of emphasising the role 
of norm-takers, Acharya seeks to demonstrate why some norms, such as non- 
intervention, have been institutionalised within the ASEAN framework whilst others, 
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such as collective defence, have been rejected. He argues that key to norm 
acceptance is the ability of local agents to reconstruct external norms to match their 
local cognitive priors and pre-existing identities. Foreign norms, he argues, are more 
likely to be adopted if congruent with the pre-existing normative order in the region 
of the recipients. Local agents, AMS elites in his example, are active norm-takers not 
simply accepting or rejecting norms, but localising those by assessing, reconstructing 
and even extending foreign norms in order to fit local contexts.305 Localisation 
therefore is a process of norm assimilation by which foreign norms, previously 
external to ASEAN, are assessed and, if deemed appropriate, adjusted to fit the 
indigenous cultural and ideological background. In the same vein, local norms are 
rejected if they contradict locally held beliefs and identities. Whether or not 
localisation takes place depends on the extent to which the norm is legitimatised or 
de-legitimised by existing belief systems or even regarded inadequate in addressing 
the particular local challenges.306 In other words, if foreign norms can be adjusted to 
locally pre-existing belief systems, norms are more likely to be adopted. It is 
therefore correct when Rueland asserts that Acharya’s localisation approach marked 
a departure from traditional norm diffusion literature focus on norm providers to 
recipients. Recipients are no longer seen as passive norm takers who transform by 
adopting the new, seemingly superior external norm. Instead, recipients can be 
proactive to normative change by reconstructing external norms.307 Norms do not 
just appear so much as they are generally accepted, appropriately amended, and 
subsequently diffused by local agency. Foreign norms therefore often merge with 
local standards and by doing so produce a hybrid value compass whereby local 
behavioural standards and traditions are supplemented with foreign normative 
standards. Here, Acharya’s theories of ASEAN’s imagined community and norm 
localisation blend smoothly from a constructivist perspective, emulating the mutual 
reconstitution of structure and agent.  Fittingly, other Asia-constructivists continue 
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to rely on this cognitive prior and localisation model in their own analyses.308 In his 
localisation argument, the diffusion of norms becomes Acharya’s main DV, i.e. how 
do norms become internalised, or in his words, localised? 
Including Mely Caballero-Anthony into the reign of Asia-constructivists is a 
straightforward exercise. Notwithstanding claims she makes in her most prominent 
work, Regional Security in Southeast Asia, to be significantly more open to 
alternative approaches, specifically highlighting merits and limitations of all major IR 
theories as applied to Asia, she unambiguously adopts a constructivist perspective 
on ASEAN and regional security. 309 Once she has emphasised her professed 
theoretical semi-partiality at the beginning, Caballero-Anthony’s subsequent analysis 
follows exclusively Asia-constructivists reasoning. Her major concern is the way in 
which regional mechanisms of conflict management in accordance with ASEAN way, 
with particular attention on the TAC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), have 
changed over time in order to maintain effectiveness and relevance. She accounts 
for that change in unequivocal constructivist terms. With the help of several 
examples, she arrives at the conclusion that structural change of ASEAN processes 
has occurred, both amongst AMS themselves and in ASEAN’s extra-regional 
engagement, as a result of a reciprocal transformation of regional actors and ASEAN 
as an institution. Because  of this being the  case, Caballero-Anthony argues, the 
ASEAN way and by extension ASEAN as a whole has endured, managed to remain 
relevant, and even developed a sense of community.310 
 
By way of evidence, she draws on ASEAN’s experiences and its role in the resolution 
of the Cambodian conflict, as the driver behind the ARF, and most interestingly – and 
controversially – the role of non-state actors in the ASEAN policy process.311 In 
particular her assessment of ASEAN’s role in the Cambodian conflict is indicative of 
Asia-constructivist analytical preferences. Although ASEAN did not solve the conflict 
the author admits, and the norms of the ASEAN way were seriously tested, ASEAN 
 
 
 
308 
Rueland (2014). 
309  
Caballero-Anthony (2005): 43.  
310  
Caballero-Anthony (2005): 255ff. 
311 
In particular Caballero-Anthony (2005): Chapter 5; see also chapter 2 of this thesis for a brief 
discussion about the role of track -1.5 and -2 diplomacy in ASEAN policy making. 
134 
 
 
proved to be a skilful mediator amongst warring parties. Caballero-Anthony 
evidently follows much earlier analyses of self-professed constructivists such as 
Nikolas Busse who argued that ASEAN norms formed the basis for the o-AMS to 
jointly cooperate  in order  to internationally  ostracize Vietnam  and by  doing so, 
individual AMS chose ASEAN norms over national interest.312 Caballero-Anthony also 
writes that AMS managed to stay true to their major principles and norms and 
simultaneously balanced regional and national interests.313 In this process, the o- 
AMS realised ASEAN needed to change to a certain extent and a regional interest 
convergence took place, resulting in an ‘exercise of identity and community 
building’. 314 Generally, Caballero-Anthony accounts for ASEAN’s role in the 
Cambodian conflict not in external  terms of conflict resolution, i.e. an effort to 
intervene and solve the crisis, but rather in terms of inadvertent intra-ASEAN 
change, even maturity. The o-AMS apparently realised that they had to reconcile 
their national with a wider ASEAN communal interest but managed to remain largely 
true to ASEAN constitutive norms manifest in the ASEAN way. Incremental interest 
convergence and identity formation led to a growing sense of community and 
accelerated community-building. In a similar vein, the author explains how track-1.5 
and -2 forums and actors are now – as opposed to ASEAN’s early days – actively 
involved in ASEAN conflict management, arguing that matters of regional security 
have extended beyond state centrism and now heavily involve formal and informal 
networks such as the ASEAN-ISIS. The agenda setting success of external actors have 
enduringly influenced and altered the very core of ASEAN which is in total 
agreement with the informality and soft-institutionalism of ASEAN processes. This 
brings home Caballero-Anthony’s primary argument about the reciprocal influence 
of a set of state and non-state actors and ASEAN as an institution, indeed as an 
ideational regional concept. Or in traditional constructivist terms the mutual 
reconstitution of interests and identity. Structure-agency constructivist could 
certainly not be more pleased about the way Caballero-Anthony interprets precisely 
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those events others have deemed indicative of ASEAN incompetence rather than the 
opposite. 315 Socialisation of actors led to modified perspectives on ASEAN 
regionalism in general as a consequence of being forced to deal with matters of 
regional importance on a multilateral basis. Such matters of regional security have 
had a lasting transformative impact on ASEAN as an organisation. ASEAN changed in 
order to facilitate a growing sense of regional identity and community; a quasi- 
Wendtian reciprocal change of structure and agency. 
In terms of theory therefore, Caballero-Anthony is fairly transparent. Constructivism 
is seen as the most appropriate theoretical lens by which observers can account for 
both the emergence of ASEAN mechanisms and their change over time. Since 
constructivists allow for the importance of intersubjective understandings among 
elites and emphasise socialisation, this theory, Caballero-Anthony asserts, allows for 
a meaningful study of ASEAN. Congruently, she claims that both the initial birth and 
subsequent change of conflict management mechanisms in Southeast Asia are 
‘products of man-made understandings over certain ideas’.316 Her IVs and DVs are in 
perfect harmony with constructivist logic and in particular the structure-agency 
relationship has been applied in order to resolve her research question regarding 
change in and conservation of traditional ASEAN practices. As for a practical 
conclusion, Caballero-Anthony stresses the ostensibly continuing utmost relevance 
of the ASEAN way as the one unifying principle of Southeast Asian, indeed pan-East 
Asian regionalism. She believes the distinctive particularities of the ASEAN way ought 
to be understood not as bureaucratic mechanisms for the conduct of regionalism, 
but as a more subtle, regionally appropriate exercise of norm- and community- 
building via socialisation, both internal and external.317 
It is Allan Collins yet again who adds an interesting caveat. Although generally 
positive, Collins warns that the ASEAN way in its current form might in fact impede 
tighter integration and community formation, directly contradicting other observers. 
Norms do assume an important role in his analyses and Collins argues that precisely 
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those constitutive norms that have hitherto enabled ASEAN to establish a security 
regime, may prevent it from progressing any further. He favourably accounts for the 
ASEAN way like many others in terms of the region’s mostly colonial past, resulting in 
a greatly sensitive emphasis on sovereignty and statehood. Yet, while the ASEAN 
way  may  be  appropriate  to  those  feelings  and  might  help  to  mitigate  security 
dilemmas by enhancing certainty, they obstruct tighter community integration by 
manifesting the strong national state.318 
What these constitutive norms reveal […] is the form regionalism has taken in 
Southeast Asia has hindered community building because it is about the state 
and not an integrative process that community building entails.319 
Here, norms have led to a by and large stable status quo, a modus vivendi. ASEAN 
elites, wary of a lack of sovereignty, had initially come to a common understanding 
of security interdependence and therefore appropriately designed and complied by 
ASEAN norms. As soon as a condition of relative stability had been achieved though, 
ASEAN norms have outlived their cause. Although Collins refers to those norms as 
being constitutive, the clue to his argument I believe is in their regulative outcome. 
The security regime Collins believes ASEAN has achieved to create, seems to 
resemble Kupchan’s second step of security community formation of “reciprocal 
restraint” and is characterised by earlier notions of self-restraint practices as 
emphasised by Adler. Collins here relies on an eclectic mix of realist and 
constructivist logic. Although emphasising the role of norms, his claim is essentially 
based on the logic of consequence. Realisation of security interdependence and 
common threat perception elicits instrumental behaviour – norm establishment and 
compliance. If Collins is correct, hitherto established norms now prevent ASEAN 
from going all the way by obstructing community building beyond this instrumental 
rationalism. 
Several influential ASEAN leaders have conceded as much and highlighted the 
problem themselves. Rodolfo Severino delivered some input that must have been 
pleasing to most Asia-constructivist. 
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ASEAN is emerging as a true community or even family. There are 
differences within the family, even serious ones; but there is also the 
underlying consciousness that, in some cases, the problem of one is 
the problem of all, that the group must stick together to better deal 
with the world outside, and that, as in a family, the troubles of one 
can legitimately be the concern of the rest. 
However, Severino added a critical caveat. Although mentioned as a side note, he 
crucially finishes off talking about the ostensible “ASEAN family” by saying that 
because ‘the Southeast Asian community will be more closely integrated, a new 
equilibrium may have to be sought between national sovereignty and regional 
purpose.’320 This notion resembles die-hard realist perspectives on the ASEAN way, 
such as Smith and Jones’ who have argued that the ASEAN way, and in particular the 
norm of non-interference constitutes in effect the oxymoron to regional identity. 
ASEAN’s irresoluble paradox is that while it is intended to establish the notion 
of Southeast Asia, it calls on its members to recognize that there is no such 
entity. This implacable commitment to noninterference constitutes ASEAN’s 
core weakness. It is simply a non sequitur to build a community among 
neighboring states on the basis of official indifference to those neighbors.321 
The academic Collins and the former leader Severino of course did not intend to go 
quite that far. Despite criticism of the dichotomy between community building and 
established ASEAN practices, Collins believes too harsh assessments of non- 
interference to be based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the ASEAN context. 
At this point, Collins reveals himself as an Asia-constructivist, allowing us to include 
him in this category. Had he thus far – at least indirectly – argued on the basis of the 
logic of consequence and used some realist variables, he leaves that terrain when he 
argues that the origin of constitutive ASEAN way norms, the principles representing 
the glue that keeps the organisation together and has established it in the first place, 
ought to be seen in the light of the primary engagement of weak and often post- 
colonial nation state building and fortification efforts.322 Firm Asia-constructivists 
would readily agree. Acharya for instance highlights that non-interference ought not 
to be understood as indifference but as a means to assist each other in the struggle 
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for necessary domestic stability. This brings to the IR interested mind Barry Buzan’s 
dichotomy of strong and weak states. Weak states, such as post-colonial AMS, are 
characterised by high levels of concern for regime stability and domestic security 
threats that may weaken the government. 323 They have therefore an intrinsic 
interest in mutually supporting each other’s regime stability. 
This is of course indicative of the national and regional resilience dichotomy 
introduced in chapter 2. According to this view, there is a general agreement among 
AMS that their respective domestic stability (national resilience) is not only linked to, 
but constitutive of regional stability (regional resilience). As former Suharto adviser 
and CSIS co-founder Jusuf Wanandi puts it, if each constituent part remains strong, 
the chain will also be strong and therefore, regional resilience derives its strength 
from the ability of nations to overcome internal threats.324 This notion is repeated in 
its Vision 2020 
 
ASEAN shall have, by the year 2020, established a peaceful and stable 
Southeast Asia where each nation is at peace with itself and where the causes 
for conflict have been eliminated, through abiding respect for justice and the 
rule of law and through the strengthening of national and regional resilience.325 
The HPA specifies the purpose to ‘consolidate and strengthen ASEAN's solidarity, 
cohesiveness and harmony by strengthening national and regional resilience through 
enhanced cooperation and mutual assistance.’326 
The realist argument of non-interference being the logical opposite of community is 
turned on its head. Simultaneously, AMS have recognised that internal stability of 
one member is crucial to the stability of the region and as such, crucial to the 
stability of the own state. Collins links this to reciprocity and self-restraint in order to 
foster cordial regional cooperation. Reciprocity is exercised here in a negative sense. 
Non-interference means ‘deliberately eschewing the opportunities for self- 
aggrandizement presented by neighbouring states’ moments of weakness.’327 AMS 
therefore  refrain  from  obtaining  individual  gains  by  exploiting  a  neighbour’s 
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instability in favour of long-term positive-sum dynamics. Indeed, as the TAC Article 
11 specifies, ASEAN Member States 
shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their 
political, economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity with 
their respective ideals and aspirations as well as internal subversive activities in 
order to preserve their respective national identities.328 
A region consisting of strong national states, so the logic goes, enhances regional 
resilience and thus security for the community. Or as Alice Ba nicely writes, 
nationalism has always been the centrepiece of Southeast Asian regionalism.329 This 
is achieved by virtue of compliance with regulative norms defined by constitutive 
norms realised in the ASEAN way. ASEAN achieves regional resilience by avoiding 
conflict and remaining united. Even nowadays, as ASEAN is expanding in size and 
scope, regional  resilience in the form  of a strong ASEAN  remains imperative to 
Southeast Asian stability.330 National resilience in this reasoning is both a DV, as 
outcome of the practice of the ASEAN way and the IntV facilitating to overall 
regional resilience. 
This chapter will now turn to a summary of some selected major Asia-constructivist 
perspectives on ASEAN’s ability to transcend Southeast Asia. The aim is to 
demonstrate that yet again, ASEAN rhetoric and Asia-constructivists analyses share 
an optimistic assessment and conclusion, based on constructivist variables and in 
particular, the constructivist power to spread norms. Again, ASEAN itself has given 
rise to such debates by emphasising its centrality and extramural agency capacity. 
 
3.2.3. Asia-Constructivism and ASEAN Centrality 
 
The central and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its 
relations and cooperation with external partners in a regional architecture that 
is open, transparent and inclusive as emphasised by the Charter. This reflects 
ASEAN’s commitment to be the hub for the evolving and complementary 
structures in the region and for engaging the major players of the world for 
strategic and economic reasons. Such a role would help to balance the geo- 
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politics in the region thereby focusing ASEAN’s efforts in building its Community 
while contributing to peace and prosperity of greater East Asia.331 
 
 
Undoubtedly, since the end of the Cold War, East Asia has seen immense 
proliferation of both economic and security related multilateral regimes and 
institutions; ADMM+, APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3 and many more. For Asia-constructivists, 
in particular China’s interest in joining such regional institutions gives evidence as to 
the socialising quality of norms via institutions in general and ASEAN-based norms 
and processes in particular. As we recall, the ASEAN way is seen as a modus vivendi 
for AMS who would thus be enabled to safeguard stability in a context of mutually 
reinforcing national and regional resilience. ASEAN has thus used the ASEAN way in 
order to maintain what Michael Leifer has called ‘an institutionalised framework of 
multilateral constraint’.332 As Asia-constructivists would have it, a shared identity 
arose subsequently or is at the very least currently developing. In either case, the 
ASEAN way was an internal matter, focussed on intramural institutionalisation. With 
ASEAN’s post-Cold War institutional proliferation beyond the confines of Southeast 
Asia that focus shifted towards the greater neighbourhood.333 The new desire to 
engage extramural major players in the Pacific – in particular China, the U.S., and 
Japan, but also Australia and South Korea – added a new dimension to ASEAN 
diplomacy and (geo-)strategic posturing.334 ASEAN leaders aimed to upgrade their 
relationships with China while simultaneously ensuring continued U.S. presence in 
the region. ASEAN needed to tread carefully in order to avoid choosing a particular 
side, noticeable in initiatives such as ZOPFAN. According to some observers this 
resulted in the use of an “enmeshment strategy” whereby ASEAN’s neutrality and 
centrality would be maintained and even institutionalised.335 This concept of ASEAN 
centrality assumes ASEAN as the centre of Asian institutionalised multilateralism in 
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the wider Asia-Pacific region where it does not wish to be marginalised by other, 
greater powers. ASEAN ostensibly acquired and must remain in the “driver’s seat” of 
most Asian institutions in order to remain relevant against the odds of unequal 
power in the Asia-Pacific.336 According to ASEAN itself, centrality is the association’s 
role at the centre of an ASEAN-led regional architecture based on its unity and 
cohesiveness.337 ASEAN assumes the position of host, procedural prototype, and 
agenda setter in order to lead regional affairs on the basis of the ASEAN way and the 
principles of the TAC. Some Asia-constructivists have argued that a particular level of 
trust has enabled ASEAN to persuade regional powers (including the U.S.) to accept 
ASEAN’s normative foundation.338 The factual importance of a number of indeed 
ASEAN-based regional institutions is seen as indicative of ASEAN’s substantial agency 
beyond Southeast Asia.339 Mely Caballero-Anthony explains that ‘ASEAN’s centrality 
has to be understood in terms of its significance in amplifying the capability of ASEAN 
to influence and shape the regional environment and the regional order.’ 340 
Accordingly, Caballero-Anthony argues, ASEAN has been able to play a central role 
through its adroit creation of institutional networks and having positioned itself as 
the centre of regionalism allowing ASEAN leaders to initiate agendas and strategies. 
Thus, she claims, ‘ASEAN’s centrality is a result  of its skilful diplomacy nurtured 
through the years.’341 Alice Ba also bemoans the lack of both political and academic 
attention paid to ASEAN’s role as the region’s first-rate facilitator of peaceful 
cooperation. ASEAN’s contribution were often obscured and consequentially 
underestimated. Ba believes that the ability to draw actors into institutionalised 
settings is critical, as this initial willingness to cooperate is at the very least a 
necessary first step before anything more substantive could develop. In her view, 
ASEAN has made some ‘significant security contributions’ by providing an 
institutional environment that can moderate and channel regional competition and 
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tensions as well as facilitating policy specific coordination.342 ASEAN’s value added 
therefore tends to be more indirect and as such, easy to miss.343 A bold claim seeing 
ASEAN’s weakness as a matter of perception, not of realistic inability to play a 
relevant role in Asia. 
This is no small matter, for this notion implies that by engaging the wider Asia-Pacific 
under ASEAN leadership and on its own terms, or rather processes, an association of 
comparatively weak nation states (measured in terms of material capabilities) plays 
an over-proportionally powerful role in the wider East Asian regional architecture. If 
this is true, ASEAN centrality defies principle realist notions in International 
Relations. By virtue of an alleged appeal of ASEAN’s specific ideological and 
procedural system of regional interaction, the ASEAN way, as well as ASEAN being 
considered the only viable neutral or at least the least biased player in Asia, ASEAN 
would assume a position which is, according to realists, untenable. Naturally, realists 
could not possibly agree to the basis of centrality. In a context of limited capabilities 
vis-à-vis greater regional powers, AMS are both vulnerable and dependent on 
security guarantors. A congregation of weak states is unable to engage more 
materially powerful nations on its terms. Buoyed by greater material might, more 
powerful states will eventually be able to manipulate the ASEAN way for their own 
strategic advantage.344 Great power participation in ASEAN-led regional institutions 
is, if it takes place at all, merely a strategic tool in order to advance own strategic 
ends, such as China’s dual interest of increasing its influence in the region while 
limiting the risk of a backlash in form of balancing coalitions until strong enough to 
behave otherwise.345 In the Chinese case, this utilitarian logic suggests that less 
powerful and less wealthy AMS have a less to offer China than vice versa and China 
would be more inclined to act exclusively in accordance with its own self-interest 
and advance its own goals; by coercion if necessary. How could a coalition of weak 
nation  states  socialise  a  powerful  regional  player?  And  yet,  ASEAN  centrality 
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suggests that precisely this socialisation and this asymmetrical power is a key 
characteristic of East Asian IR. Due to its ostensible capabilities as the regional norm- 
entrepreneur and its collective bargaining potential, ASEAN itself as well as many 
Asia-constructivists regard ASEAN as the diplomatic hub of East Asia. 
As the introductory quote by former ASEAN Deputy Secretary General Pushpanathan 
demonstrates, ASEAN leaders see themselves well placed to be precisely this. In fact, 
ASEAN has even set this as one of its primary targets. Article 1 of the ASEAN Charter 
specifically states that it is one of ASEAN’s 15 listed purposes 
to maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving 
force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional 
architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive.346 
If this sentence is read carefully, it remarkably implies that ASEAN asks its members 
to fortify their right to bilateralism in favour of ASEAN led efforts. An astonishing 
request, in particular considering that all AMS have ratified it in the context of strong 
nationalist inclination as alluded to in chapter 2. There is an evident attempt to 
conduct extramural foreign policy on a strict ASEAN only basis, superseding 
bilateralism. The Charter then proceeds to prescribe the need to maintain ‘the 
centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social and cultural relations’ and 
stipulates ensuring ASEAN’s centrality as one of the main duties and responsibilities 
of the ASEAN chairman.347 As early as Bali II has ASEAN aspired to replace bilateral 
cooperation between AMS and extra-ASEAN powers in favour of a multilateral 
approach, led by the association and in accordance with its own procedures. Its 
preamble emphasises that the ARF 
shall remain the primary forum in enhancing political and security cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace and stability in 
the region. ASEAN shall enhance its role in further advancing the stages of 
cooperation within the ARF to ensure the security of the Asia Pacific region.348 
Such references ought to be seen within the wider context of post-Cold War 
stabilising efforts. A time when renewed enthusiasm for multilateral institutions and 
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their proliferation was a trend not only in Asia. At the same time, not only staunch 
institutionalists see multilateral institutions as a useful instrument for weak states to 
constrain potentially hegemonic ambitions of more powerful competitors and 
provide them with access to political processes in which they can press their 
interests collectively. Accordingly, ASEAN attempts to maintain its centrality in 
regional community building to exercise political influence over regional powers.349 
This notion reminds of Leifer who saw ASEAN in general and the ARF in particular as 
a way to maintain a balance of power by institutionally engaging as many powerful, 
potential dominant states as possible. Not in order to alter their preferences, but to 
keep a point of diplomatic contact.350 
ASEAN itself certainly believes it can now progress and its processes can transcend 
Southeast Asia through a united common stance on international issues. 
We see an outward-looking ASEAN playing a pivotal role in the international 
fora, and advancing ASEAN's common interests. We envision ASEAN having an 
intensified relationship with its Dialogue Partners and other regional 
organisations based on equal partnership and mutual respect.351 
Chapter 8 of the Hanoi Plan of Action states that ASEAN should ‘undertake, actively 
and energetically, measures to strengthen ASEAN's role as the primary driving force 
in the ARF’. This was best achieved if the association could ‘formulate initiatives to 
advance, on a consensus basis and at a pace comfortable to all, the ARF process from 
its current emphasis on confidence-building to promoting preventive diplomacy’ and 
by developing ‘a set of basic principles based on TAC as an instrument for promoting 
cooperative peace in the Asia-Pacific region.’352 
 
Traditional Constructivism Recap 
 
A large measure of the logic of centrality and ASEAN-led multilateral institutions 
extending into East Asia relies on the conviction that institutional membership would 
create expectations and obligations on the part of extramural great powers and 
socialise those “outsiders” into embracing constitutive and regulative norms of the 
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collective.353 At this point, it is worth recalling traditional constructivist notions of 
power, of the mutual reconstitution of structure and agency, and subsequently the 
norm diffusion literature. Earlier in this chapter, the constructivist notion of power 
was defined as the ability of the agent to shape the structure, which in turn re- 
defines the interests of interacting agents. Recalling Arendt’s notion of power as the 
possession of influence by a legitimate group of actors and Ted Hopf’s power of 
practice, providing ‘the capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that 
constitute social structures and actors alike,’354 the constructivist view on power is 
not coercion, but the ability to create intersubjectivity, establish and construct 
meanings and intersubjective knowledge, which may well be possessed by a group of 
states of low material capabilities, as long as they act, as Arendt has suggested, in 
concert. This construction ability is facilitated by institutions. Finnemore and Sikkink 
have raised the possibility of a norm cascade whereby norm leaders persuade others 
to become norm followers. Building on the Wendtian notion that structure and 
agency constantly and mutually reinvent themselves and both interests and identity 
arise and alter as a result, norm diffusion literature has provided for the possibility of 
socialisation within the international system. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, 
norm-entrepreneurs require and organisational platform such as international 
organisations on which they depend for expertise and resources. From this platform, 
norms can become institutionalised within multilateral organisations which 
subsequently facilitates a norm cascade.355 Socialisation via norm diffusion relates to 
the process by which outsider states accept standards of appropriate behaviour of 
the collective. Individual states joining the collective within institutions adjust 
interests and subsequently their identity and become more akin to the group. 
Hence, via socialisation processes by a group of legitimate states individual outsiders 
adopt the group’s standards of behaviour and alter interests, policy behaviour, and 
identity.  Alexander  Wendt  has  exemplified  this  with  his  revisionist  state  versus 
status quo state comparison. As long as the collective acts in Hannah Arendt’s terms 
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in concert, material capabilities are secondary. Norm cascade and norm 
internalisation are independent from material coercion. Accordingly, with its 
emphasis on ideational forces and social learning, traditional constructivism appears 
to be a well chosen starting point for optimistic analyses. 
By now readers will not be surprised to learn that it did not take long for Asia- 
constructivist academics to pick up on this. Acharya underlined in 2001 that 
ASEAN’s diplomatic centrality was evident not just in the name ASEAN’ (as 
opposed to Asian‘) Regional Forum, it was also reflected in the fact that ARF 
annual sessions were to be held in ASEAN countries.356 
English School influenced scholar Evelyn Goh agrees. Multilateral institutions can 
address and constrain unequal power as well as changing the hierarchy of how 
regional power is distributed.357 In order to understand how Asia-constructivists 
believe this to be achieved, it is worth recalling the neo-security community 
literature that emphasised practice as opposed to liberal value content with regards 
to Southeast Asia. It has been demonstrated above that scholars such as Adler, 
Bellamy, and Kupchan have identified a practice of self-restraint as pivotal to 
community building in general and ASEAN in particular. Adler and Greve have 
additionally identified a set of further practices of security communities, including 
the tendency to spread intramural norms and values through processes of 
socialisation of external actors.358 Other than confirming traditional constructivist 
notions about norm diffusion, this tendency suggests a general expansionist 
predisposition of communities by including others into the own existing framework 
of norms, values, and processes through socialisation. At face value, this makes 
perfect sense in security terms, of course. If, as constructivist logic in general and 
Asia-constructivist in particular suggests, security and stability derives from intrinsic 
norm compliance, then, in a situation of strategic uncertainty, including as many 
potential foes as possible is a perfectly legitimate way to create the greatest possible 
level of security and stability for all. As we recall, Asia-constructivist notions as well 
as ASEAN’s own self-perception hold that the intramural cohesion achieved by virtue 
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of compliance with the ASEAN way of cooperation has led to a (nascent) community 
and non-violence habits. If Adler and Greve’s provisions for expansion is correct in 
assuming that intramural norms and practices can indeed inform extramural 
multilateralism to the advantage of the collective, ASEAN would be a compelling 
case for constructivist studies. It could then be demonstrated that an association of 
weak states could, contrary to realist notions, attain and institutionalise a position of 
strength vis-à-vis greater regional powers disproportionate to its own actual material 
capabilities. ASEAN is in this view in a position to alter preferences of extramural 
powers through socialisation processes leading to the latters’ compliance by ASEAN 
inspired and drawn up norms and procedures and thus, ultimately play by ASEAN 
rules. Forums based on ASEAN’s procedural architecture such as the ARF or the 
ASEAN+ extensions therefore allow, institutionalise, and ultimately establish a 
structural domination of great powers by smaller ones. Present day ASEAN and Asia- 
constructivists continue to voice the explicit ambition and ability to be the force 
behind regional engagement. Both believe in the association’s ability to conduct 
external relations as a united community, capable of engaging the wider region, 
including significantly more powerful actors by virtue of combined strength and well 
rehearsed procedures. In 2015, Amitav Acharya repeated his ASEAN perspective in 
this regard, noting that 
ASEAN is an anomaly in the universe of great power politics. Not only has it 
survived, but it has contributed significantly to conflict reduction and 
management in Southeast Asia and served as the main anchor of regional 
cooperation now involving all the major powers of Asia and indeed the world. 
As a result, Asia is the only region in known history where the strong live in the 
world of the weak, and the weak lead the strong.359 
 
Although Alex Bellamy has devoted some considerable attention to particular case 
studies, ASEAN being one of them, Bellamy’s main purpose is the question to what 
extent and to what end security communities in general engage with “outsiders”.360 
He claims that the literature has hitherto overlooked ‘the relationship between those 
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on the inside and those on the outside of the security community.’ His principle 
question then is whether 
the development of norms by a community of states, the articulation of shared 
interests, and production of common identities project themselves beyond the 
borders of the community or do they provoke a withdrawal from engagement 
with outsiders?361 
Like other Asia-constructivists, Bellamy had rejected realist interpretations of 
structure as being anarchic and essentially bellicose. Instead, he proposes a socially 
constructed international society. Hypothesising that all interactive systems are 
socially constructed, the question follows whether a proliferation of security 
communities and the extension of existing communities in general would facilitate 
‘integrative transnational relations between insiders and outsiders or create regional 
fortresses preparing for the kind of civilisational conflict envisaged by Samuel 
Huntington?’362 It has been shown above that Bellamy is resolute in his conclusion 
that ASEAN has, via the norms realised in the ASEAN way, developed a habit of non- 
violent cooperation to an extent that a security community has been formed. This 
successful cooperation based on the ASEAN way of regionalism has, according to 
Bellamy, successively attracted outsiders such as pre-1995 Vietnam and nowadays 
countries such as China. In the Chinese case, ASEAN managed to successfully create 
security community offshoot institutions such as the ARF and ASEAN+3 in order to 
engage this outsider. Bellamy believes that the ASEAN way has therefore facilitated 
not only an increasingly sturdy Southeast Asian community, characterised by 
intramural habits of non-violence, but has also managed to decrease the likelihood 
of ‘realist security practices and discourses on its borders’ since outsiders would 
eagerly subscribe to ASEAN’s principles.363 
Here, two principle constructivist elements come back to mind; the rejection of 
realism’s independent variable (IV) of anarchy/state of nature; and secondly, 
constructivist power through socialisation. Power in terms of the ability to initiate 
auspicious  change  to  the  structure,  which,  true  to  constructivist  logic,  in  turn 
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changes the agents interacting within it. Arendt saw power as the result of a 
legitimate and cohesive social group influencing the environment. In Bellamy’s case 
and his emphasis on processes, it is also worth remembering what Ted Hopf has 
called the power of practice that provides ‘the capacity to reproduce the 
intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors alike.’ 364 
Relating to ASEAN’s ability to spread its norms into the wider Asian region, as 
Bellamy believes it does, socialisation via norm diffusion takes place. Non-ASEAN 
Asia accepts standards of appropriate behaviour of the ASEAN collective. New 
members adopt the group’s standards of behaviour and alter their interests, policy 
behaviour, and ultimately identity accordingly. Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm 
cascade occurs and includes former outsiders. Again, as material might does not 
matter as much to constructivists as it does to realists, the insiders may well be a 
collective of smaller states, socialising a larger, in material terms more powerful one, 
as long as they act in concert. Norm internalisation on the other end can take place 
regardless of material capabilities of the group. Appropriateness is what matters. 
Similarly, Asia-constructivist Alice Ba notes that ASEAN has benefitted a great deal 
from those East Asian forums of institutionalised multilateralism, providing ‘a 
coalition of lesser powers [ASEAN], a geostrategic centrality that it might not 
otherwise have had.’365 Authors such as Cruz de Castro and Eaton and Stubbs also 
believe this to be the case.366 Eaton and Stubbs call ASEAN’s supposed asymmetric 
capability ASEAN’s “competence power”. 367 Specifically referring to Wendt and 
sociological power perspectives, it appears that Eaton and Stubbs’ competence 
power translates into precisely the constructivist view on non-coercive power as the 
ability to create intersubjectivity, establish and construct meanings and 
intersubjective knowledge. In other words, the power to shape structure in a way 
favourable to the wielding agent, facilitated by concerted action within institutions. 
From these constructivist foundations, Eaton and Stubbs hypothesise that ASEAN 
indeed possesses significant competence power. They conclude that ‘ASEAN has 
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been able to reduce regional tensions and increase regional economic cooperation to 
its advantage by having regional states sign on to its norms and follow its 
practices.’368 Or as Evelyn Goh puts it, weak AMS have gained the advantage by 
enmeshing greater powers to ensure ASEAN autonomy.369 Alice Ba concurs and 
believes ASEAN’s extramural socialisation potential to be one of the association’s 
greatest capabilities. In 2009, she speaks of ASEAN in most flamboyant terms, 
arguing that ASEAN has assumed a pivotal role in initialising, pushing, and energising 
the development of institutionalised East Asian regionalism. Ba states that the 
association has over recent years not only retained its relevance in the region but 
also advanced it.370 Moe Thuzar also states that the U.S., China, and Japan are 
among those with the most active interest in wider spaces within these 
[ASEAN-led] forums. The competing interests of China with those of the US and 
Japan in the different ASEAN-led forums have led to an entrenching of unique 
approaches towards regional institutions where ASEAN takes a central role.371 
 
Although being less convinced that institutions such as the ARF strictly follow the 
ASEAN way, Evelyn Goh describes ASEAN’s ambition and its power as the ability to 
dominate the bargaining process over regional politics. Arguing that although ASEAN 
had to make relatively radical departures from their original norms against military 
or security consultations seen as violating the principles of non-interference and 
regional autonomy, the association did gain control over what she calls the 
“institutional bargain”. 372 Indeed, in several regional institutions ASEAN insisted on 
being granted leadership and was able to dominate the bargaining process over 
what those institutions are and what they are for. In other words, ASEAN increased 
its regional influence by owning the multilateral bargaining process. According to 
Goh, ASEAN’s proactive “plus impulse” was  the association’s  attempt not to be 
marginalised and maintain its initiative in regional relations characterised by 
hierarchical  power  structures  of  great  and  medium  powers.  Over  time,  ASEAN 
 
 
 
 
368  
Eaton/Stubbs (2006): 151. 
369 
Goh (2014): 53. 
370 
Ba (2009). 
371 
Thuzar (2015). 
372 
Goh (2014): 28ff. 
151 
 
 
gained initiative and was enabled to use its own political priorities and processes to 
shape the  nature  of institutions. For Goh,  the  ARF for example has  become  an 
“omni-enmeshing forum” promoting constraints of all regional competitors on the 
basis of norms in the interest of regional stability.373 It specifically emphasised 
inclusivity of all regional powers and informality, which implied equality and 
prevented “agenda-hogging” by Western states as well as promoting AMS’ counter- 
realpolitik agenda precluding domination by any one great power.374 Goh believes 
that in particular the ARF is designed to bind and constrain all powers engaged in the 
region, for those to develop a practice of self-restraint. 
This must be music to ASEAN ears and ASEAN policy makers would most certainly 
agree. After all, the HPA had already specifically stated that ASEAN ought to 
undertake, actively and energetically, measures to strengthen ASEAN's role as 
the primary driving force in the ARF, including directing the ASEAN Secretary- 
General to provide the necessary support and services to the ASC Chairman in 
coordinating ARF activities.375 
 
 
If power is viewed in this way, as the ability to generate constitutive and regulative 
norms that subsequently transcend the norm creator and include others through 
institutional enmeshment, then ASEAN has the potential to be a truly powerful actor 
in East Asian relations. That is, if the norm takers would indeed comply which is at 
least open for debate. Nonetheless, the notion of ASEAN agency in pan-Asian 
institutions is so entrenched that even some realists seem to accept it. Donald 
Emmerson noted in 2011 that ASEAN leaders think of China and the U.S. as each 
having a particular role in the region. Emmerson alleges a ‘tendency in Southeast 
Asia to think of Beijing and Washington as playing specialized roles: China the 
economic partner who facilitates prosperity, America the security provider who 
guards the peace.’ Despite adding several caveats, Emmerson nonetheless sees a 
dichotomy which captures the comparative advantage for ASEAN that both offer. 
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‘China's booming economy, America's matchless military.’ 376 Those comments are 
striking in their presumption. Consider that, if such a division of labour between 
Washington and Beijing was indeed accurate, ASEAN could hedge against the risk of 
increasing PLA presence – some might say domination – in the region by engaging 
the U.S. and at the same time capitalise on the growing Chinese economy. Although 
Emmerson highlights that not ASEAN, but individual AMS are engaging the great 
powers to this end, in its final conclusion, this argument still suggests that lesser 
powers – whether individually or as a collective – can be active shaper of regional 
affairs, capable of playing the two most powerful actors in Asia, perhaps the world, 
to its own ends. Regardless of whether Emmerson believes AMS capable of wielding 
such power, presupposing such a significant degree of agency on the part of ASEAN 
and its members must resonate well with Asia-constructivists, in particular 
originating in the realist camp. 
Similarly to Goh and less ambitious than Ba, Catherine Jones somewhat qualified 
ASEAN’s agency. She believes ASEAN’s role to be one of a mediator between the 
great powers. ASEAN’s regional influence materialises in its ability to “use” its 
external dialogue partners, the great and middle powers, to ensure relative stability 
and security. In this process, ASEAN has succeeded in maintaining relative security, 
but has also been put in a position whereby, in order to make the most out of those 
partnerships, it had to establish internal cohesion. The ability to ‘use external powers 
and external organisations to deal with security problems within the region can be 
seen to benefit ASEAN’s community identity rather than being detrimental.’377 She 
further explains that dealing effectively with the security contribution of external 
actors has forced AMS to move closer together. Maintaining ASEAN’s security 
function as the leader led to the development of security forums in which ASEAN 
assumes the driving seat. This forces ASEAN to act as a group to lead and direct 
regional security. Although there may be a deep ASEAN fear that external powers 
may divide the region, AMS, Jones claims, have not forged ahead with developing 
deeper and deeper bilateral agreements but have tried and fostered institutional 
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forum(s) that ensure ASEAN relevance and continuing integration.378 Busse argued 
similarly, claiming that ASEAN states did not see alliances, but collective organisation 
based on shared norms as definitive of regional security beyond narrowly defined 
material interest.379 
Amitav Acharya’s kind disposition towards the ASEAN way has already been 
introduced. As early as 1997 he had also considered how the ASEAN way could 
spread into the wider region and be auspicious to both peace in Asia-Pacific and 
ASEAN’s extramural influence. He emphasised the procedural flexibility the ASEAN 
way entails and identified it as the facilitating mechanism of enduringly constructive 
Asian regionalism.380 According to Acharya, avoiding legalistic, bureaucratic, and 
primarily outcome-oriented procedures in favour of consensus oriented 
consultations has appealed to the region, corresponding with general Asian 
preferences. It is worth pointing towards Acharya’s basic IV of the “imagined 
community” as introduced above. Taking the liberty of extending his logic from 
ASEAN’s cognitive prior, one can safely assume that when Acharya refers to the 
ASEAN way resounding with general Asian preferences, he also imagines a general 
Asian cognitive prior. Adding to this promising environment were pre-1997 successes 
of ASEAN-led multilateralism. He writes 
[s]uch was ASEAN’s credibility in the wake of the settlement of the Cambodia 
conflict that the countries of the Asia Pacific region accepted its nominal 
leadership and institutional model as the basis for creating a regional 
multilateral security dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ASEAN itself 
aspired to a role in regulating the behaviour of major powers and in creating a 
stable post-Cold War regional order in the Asia Pacific.381 
As a result, ‘regional actors have grown comfortable with the idea of 
multilateralism.’382 In Acharya’s view, the agency role of ASEAN as a collation of 
weak states has too often been overlooked. The regional appeal of the ASEAN way 
has turned ASEAN into the hub of wider Asia-Pacific regionalism.383 By and large, 
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’Asian regional institutions, whether in the economic or security sphere, continue to 
remain closely tied to the soft and non-legalistic ASEAN way’.384 Acharya again 
reiterates his norm localisation argument in an attempt to explain the origin of 
institutions facilitating this apparent extramural engagement. Exemplifying this, 
Acharya argues that the ARF is a manifestation of the post-Cold War localisation of 
the international norm of common security.385 The creation of the ARF and the 
inclusion of the regional great powers, Acharya argues, universalised the ASEAN 
process and is evidence for his argument of norm diffusion at the same time.386 On 
the one hand, the ARF was the institutionalised outcome of the localisation of the 
international norm of collective security or security cooperation. This norm was 
localised by ASEAN elites who accepted a need for security cooperation and 
simultaneously reconstructed it on the basis of pre-existing ASEAN  principles  in 
order to adjust the norm as to make it wholly compatible with the ASEAN way. On 
the other hand, the integration of regional powers within an institution based on the 
ASEAN way shows ASEAN’s normative power. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as 
the institutionalised result of a foreign norm localisation, subsequently expanded 
ASEAN’s security agenda, Acharya claims, by including extramural powers. ASEAN 
was to occupy the driver’s seat and thus universalised the ASEAN way.387 
Like other Asia-constructivist accounts, Mely Caballero-Anthony is particularly 
concerned with rejecting realist interpretations of the ARF – Leifer (1996) and 
Emmers (2003). In the wake of potential instability resulting from the end of the Cold 
War, she argues that it was ASEAN that managed to achieve what seemed to be 
impossible, namely to bring the major powers together into one single security 
forum.388 Without specifically referring to Acharya’s localisation in this context, 
Caballero-Anthony argues that foreign norms were indeed adopted, but also 
modified to fit regional circumstances and reservations.389 She asks why greater 
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powers in the region allowed for an ASEAN prerogative to be the driving force within 
the ARF – as it ostensibly is. In answer to her own question, Caballero-Anthony 
suggests that ASEAN was seen as a safe neutral middleman in between the great 
powers. Had the ARF initiative originated elsewhere, it would have been impossible 
to bring all major powers into the same regional security forum. 390 Although being 
critical of the ARF’s achievements to date, she believes that the fact that an 
organisation of small powers played such an influential role in ‘steering a multilateral 
security forum’ proves realists wrong.391 In defence of the ARF shortcomings, she 
further argues that the forum must be seen as sui generis forum, lacking a precedent 
and is thus still ‘work in progress’. Dismissing it prematurely would be unwise.392 
Moreover, critics, such as Leifer and Emmers, would simply overstate the ARF’s 
intentions and thus, apply false thresholds. Apparently, the ARF never intended to be 
the most significant anchor of regional security, but was designed to be a ‘norm- 
building mechanism’ and ‘part of the process oriented mechanisms adopted by 
ASEAN in building a peaceful community of states in the Southeast Asian region’. She 
believes this to be ‘very modest objectives’. 393 ASEAN’s greatest achievement 
therefore was to assemble all major powers in one setting. Undoubtedly true, but 
the question remains how much of this was due to ASEAN agency and how much to 
the initiative of greater powers, seeing ASEAN as a useful, non-influential vehicle to 
conduct their very own regional business amongst themselves. 
Hiro Katsumata is yet another one in the line of scholars subscribing to the notion 
that extramural engagement ought to be seen less in material and more in 
normative terms; as a “norm-brewery”. 394 He is in agreement with Caballero- 
Anthony and Acharya that ASEAN’s norms were adopted, modified, and spread. 
Katsumata is adamant that what ASEAN attempts is a pan-regional diplomatic 
exercise that relies on dialogue and confidence building measures in order to find 
solutions   for   security   problems   that   transcend   ASEAN   itself   and   to   dismiss 
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uncertainties and misunderstandings arising from a lack of communication.395 In 
particular within the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN is conducting a “norm-building 
exercise”.396 Katsumata challenges rationalist perspectives of the ARF and argues 
that the intention of the ARF has always been the management of the association’s 
external relations with the goal to establish a peaceful and stable regional security 
environment by projecting its very own security norms, i.e. cooperation mirroring 
the ASEAN way through dialogue and mutual understanding into the wider Asian 
orbit. He develops a typical Asia-constructivist explanation, emphasising the 
importance of ASEAN initiated security cooperation norms, both in constitutive and 
regulative terms. Similar to Acharya’s concept of localisation, Katsumata argues that 
regional security cooperation norms originate essentially from the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe model of cooperative security, conducted in the 
local ASEAN way of consultation and consensus. In other words, Southeast Asian 
actors drew upon foreign norms but adjusted them to fit regional appropriateness – 
specifically defined as ‘standard of appropriateness defined by the ASEAN Way’.397 
He attempts to offer an explanation as to why security cooperation emerged in the 
first place. Elite discussion on regional security in mostly ASEAN based track-2 
forums led to a nascent ideology of cooperative security in Asia. Thus developed 
ideas included the realisation that regional security was indivisible and security can 
be achieved only through cooperative undertakings. The notion of security therefore 
began to be increasingly seen as regional rather than national. CBMs ought to 
become the main security focus of regional security actors. Moreover, since the 
ideational brewery in track-2 forums had allegedly been so successful that 
participants concluded discussions ought to be elevated to the track-1 levels. As this 
materialised in the early 1990s, the ARF became very much an ideas based 
institutional reality.398 In this view, the norm of security cooperation was constructed 
via ASEAN based track-2 localisation (in Acharya’s terms) of external ideas. It was 
therefore ASEAN’s agenda, drawn up in track-1.5 and -2 channels (ASEAN-ISIS) upon 
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which the ARF was established and ASEAN led the conceptualisation of extramural 
security cooperation. ASEAN actors initiated a regional security agenda meeting 
standards of appropriateness of ASEAN as defined in its constitutive norms. Hence, 
where realist observers look at the ARF in terms of the balance of power efforts, the 
Asia-constructivist Katsumata begins by alleging a cooperation on security which 
brought to the fore a realisation of security interdependence, subsequently 
facilitating the establishment of commonly shared security norms.399 
Katsumata is not alone of course. Plenty of other observers, and as per usual the 
stakeholders themselves, have agreed and argued in similar fashion. ASEAN and its 
plus extensions are not primarily a forum for ASEAN interest based foreign policy, 
but rather a benevolent meeting environment to get all regional actors to talk by 
way of ASEAN’s informal procedures. The primary function of ASEAN’s extension 
beyond  intramural  cooperation  is  thus  regarded  as  pan-East  Asian  relationship 
facilitator.400 Just like Katsumata, Rodolfo Severino argued the ARF adopted some 
core principles of the ASEAN way by working on consensual basis only, not 
establishing a formal secretariat and at a ‘pace comfortable to all participants.’401 
Former ASEAN Secretary-General Severino explains that the idea behind projecting 
the general principles of the ASEAN way into extramural regional institutions was 
that all participants would be reassured that ‘nobody would railroad or ram through 
measures that others might deem to be threatening to them.’402 
As a result, power asymmetries in the region do not lead to bandwagoning or 
balancing trends, but to ASEAN initiated institutionalisation of norms which 
substantially contributes to the ‘stabilization of expectations, even some common 
understandings, about their respective roles, as well as a new appreciation for their 
relations.’403 Alex Bellamy concurs. In line with his emphasis on practice, Bellamy 
argues that the ASEAN way and thus, processes rather than normative and 
ideological harmony – often seen as key to EU integration – facilitate non-violent 
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regional cooperation both intramurally and in ASEAN-led engagement with its 
neighbours.404 The Chairman’s Statement of the first ever ARF meeting in Bangkok 
prominently declares that all members have agreed to 
endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations 
between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence- 
building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation.405 
Ostensibly, this is accepted by ASEAN’s neighbours who are above all interested in 
cooperation and stability, irrespective of on whose terms this cooperation 
materialises. In those views, ASEAN is indeed a successful norm-entrepreneur, 
capable not only of regulating intra- but also extramural relations. ASEAN itself 
certainly delivered the input for this. As early as 1995 for instance, the ARF Concept 
Paper, drawn up and circulated by AMS, 406 proposing the ARF’s institutional 
parameters, tasks, and challenges, suggests that ‘ASEAN has a pivotal role to play in 
the ARF’ and that 
[t]he rules of procedure of ARF meetings shall be based on prevailing, ASEAN 
norms and practices. Decisions should be made by consensus after careful and 
extensive consultations. No voting will take place. In accordance with prevailing 
ASEAN practices, the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee shall provide 
the secretarial support and coordinate ARF activities.407 
 
 
A final very noteworthy point is made by Alice Ba. She connects this extra-ASEAN 
dimension of centrality to the intramural community building. Ba argues that 
ASEAN’s ever increasing interest in multilateral engagement of the wider Asia-Pacific 
region and its allegedly significant contributions in the form of the various ASEAN+ 
arrangements facilitated the internal AC15 project (note: not vice versa). As a direct 
result of increasing extramural commitments, ASEAN saw itself in need of greater 
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intramural cohesion and an intensification of intra-ASEAN relations in order to 
maintain and fully utilise its centrality and relevance vis-à-vis extramural actors. The 
ASEAN community and its identification of expanded cooperation, she argues, is also 
a particular example of expanded ASEAN cooperation in response to external 
requirements.408 As we recall, this is an argument also made by Caballero-Anthony 
who argued that in response to the Cambodian conflict, the o-AMS needed to define 
a common regional position, partly at the expense of self-interest defined in purely 
national terms. This facilitated identity genesis and helped establishing the ARF. Ba 
gives this thought an internal institutional edge by combining the external dimension 
with the exclusively intramural AC15 community building. 
ASEAN and China 
 
In practical terms, most Asia-constructivists naturally look towards China. By way of 
evidence for their arguments more often than not Sino-ASEAN relations and Chinese 
participation in ASEAN initiated institutions and regimes is cited. Plenty of authors 
begin by accepting that ASEAN has indeed been able to take the lead in wider East 
Asian institution building and manages to increasingly engage externals such  as 
China and the United States. 409 The existence of institutions such as the ARF, 
ASEAN+3, and EAS confirm that ASEAN has managed to become the driver of 
multilateral diplomacy in Asia just as much as China’s signature of the TAC in 2003. 
English School scholar Evelyn Goh states that although Southeast Asian nations 
continue to rely on the U.S. as ‘the balancer of first resort against China’ they 
proactively try to engage the PRC into regional institutions.410 Acharya concurs and 
writes 
Asean seek to ensure China’s enmeshment in a system of regional order in 
which the costs of any use of force in dealing with problems with its neighbours 
will be outweighed by benefits. The key element of this approach is the ARF.411 
Ba credits ASEAN with enhancing regional stability in East Asia by solidifying and 
reinforcing the willingness of China to participate in regional initiatives at a time of 
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uncertain domestic and global politics and when regional multilateralism was more 
foreign and even a bit suspect, in particular to the Chinese leadership.412 In her view, 
ASEAN has managed to ’persuade China to think differently and less 
confrontationally about regional security and its relations with the ASEAN states.’413 
She considers it ‘most striking’ that despite ever increasing Chinese leverage, the 
PRC ostensibly continues to reassure ASEAN Member States (AMS) by being actively 
involved in multilateral initiatives and by continued emphasis on dialogue and 
consultation. China regarded ASEAN now as ‘potential partner and even friend.’414 
Acharya does not see any evidence either that China might attempt to disunite AMS 
in order to exercise its dominance. Instead it largely adheres by ARF rules.415 Hughes 
has highlighted in this regard the similarities between the ASEAN way and China’s 
own norms of the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” and how this apparent 
norm convergence facilitates stable Sino-ASEAN interaction.416 Alice Ba claims that 
although AMS continuously rely on the U.S. as a regional  stabiliser,  uncertainty 
about the future of U.S. engagement in the region has forced ASEAN to engage China 
by pursuing a strategy of “complex engagement”, which Ba describes as ‘an active 
search for points of consensus towards persuading another to change its attitudes 
and/or beliefs about a particular subject, issue, or relationship.’417 The success of this 
parallel engagement strategy has apparently been so great that Ba concludes 
the last decade has seen ASEAN give greater prominence and centrality to 
complex engagement processes, such that increasingly, it is now U.S. security 
guarantees that provide the hedge for engagement processes with China, 
rather than the other way around as it was in the early 1990s.418 
David Shambaugh agrees that Beijing’s regional ambitions can be channelled through 
regional engagement. China signing up to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and 
the  Declaration  on  the  Conduct  of  Parties  in  the  South  China  Sea  was  an 
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‘unprecedented step’ that ‘binds China to the core elements of ASEAN’s 1967 charter’ 
and ‘formally commits China to enforcing the principles of nonaggression and 
noninterference, as well as a variety of other conflict resolution mechanisms.’419 He 
continues that unlike a few years ago ‘the majority of Asian states currently view 
China as more benign than malign and are accommodating themselves to its rise’.420 
Chinese participation in many regional institutions and regimes will not only mollify 
potentially revisionist expansionism, but also increase transparency, reduce 
transaction costs and thus increase mutually beneficial cooperation. Hence, the 
recent proliferation of pan-East Asian institutions is significantly increasing Asia’s 
future stability.421 In both cases, it is not only ASEAN trying to engage China on terms 
favourable to ASEAN out of instrumental necessity in the face of great power 
asymmetry, but China is apparently reciprocating with a more benign regional policy. 
Asian actors such as China and Japan increasingly looked towards ‘the most 
successful regional organisation’ because they understand that ‘they themselves lack 
the legitimacy and authority to lead regional processes. This dynamic widens the 
opportunity for ASEAN to shape new arrangements.’ 422 Eventually, Alice Ba argues, 
ASEAN’s expanding horizon and active engagement of the wider region has led East 
Asia to become ‘ASEAN-ised in content and form.’423 
[…] there does appear to be awareness among the major powers [...] that they 
each, in different ways and varying degrees, have reputational problems that 
can detract from their ability to achieve goals, and that ASEAN and regional 
multilateralism offer them ways to make their own roles and interests in the 
region less controversial and provocative – in a word, legitimate. This is most 
apparent in the incorporation of regional multilateralism in China’s “new 
security” practices in which regional multilateralism has become a key piece.424 
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IV DV IntV 
Acharya Regional security; is 
ASEAN a security 
community? Origin 
and role of norms in 
Southeast Asia; norm 
diffusion. 
ASEAN cooperation 
based on shared 
norms and common 
understanding of 
regionalism (ASEAN 
way); regional 
adoption of norms 
creating identity and 
security/stability. 
Cognitive prior 
(imagined 
community); socially 
constructed 
international/region 
al system; Norms 
and Norm-setting 
(ASEAN way, 
localisation). 
Shared identity; 
security 
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norms. 
ASEAN 
way; non- 
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cooperatio 
n; 
reinterpret 
ation of 
norms. 
ASEAN is a 
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security 
community 
with shared 
identity. 
Adler; 
Adler/Barn 
ett 
Illiberal security 
communities. 
Regional integration 
through mutual 
identification; social 
learning. 
Socially 
constructible 
international/region 
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Security; we- 
feeling; cordial 
cooperation. 
Shared 
identity, 
values and 
conceptual 
meanings; 
shared 
practices 
(self- 
restraint) 
and habits; 
social 
learning. 
ASEAN as 
illiberal 
security 
community. 
Ba Regional security; 
ASEAN’s role in wider 
East Asian security 
architecture. 
ASEAN managed to 
engage relevant 
powers in institutions 
and regimes where 
norm-spreading and - 
receiving takes place. 
Lack of legitimate 
regional leadership, 
(organisational 
vacuum); socially 
constructed 
international/region 
al system; also pan- 
East Asian values. 
ASEAN-isation of 
East- and 
Southeast Asian 
security. 
ASEAN 
cohesion; 
Asian wide 
appeal of 
ASEAN 
way; norm 
diffusion 
and social 
learning. 
ASEAN 
contributes 
significantly 
to regional 
security as 
the facilitator 
of peaceful 
cooperation. 
Bellamy Security communities 
(ASEAN and others); 
alternatives to 
security dilemma 
dynamics. 
No pre-society “state 
of nature”; all 
interactive system are 
sociologically 
constructed. 
Socially constructed 
environment; 
shared sense of 
post-colonial 
vulnerability; 
common threat 
perceptions 
(instability). 
No war 
communities and 
spreading of 
those. 
Practises 
and habits 
of ASEAN 
way; (intra- 
and 
extramurall 
y) 
No war 
community 
ASEAN; 
ASEAN 
centrality. 
Katsumata Institutions as 
management 
mechanism of 
ASEAN’s external 
relations; rejection of 
rationalist 
explanations of the 
ARF; norm based 
alternative. 
ASEAN is Asia’s norm- 
brewer; insufficient 
explanatory quality of 
rationalist theory. 
Discourseon 
regional security led 
to nascent ideology 
of cooperative 
security in Asia. 
Asian security 
institutions as 
result of norm- 
based security 
cooperation. 
Track-1.5 
and -2 
ideas 
(security 
norms). 
ASEAN 
dominates 
regional 
security 
architecture 
as regional 
norm brewer. 
Caballero- 
Anthony 
East and Southeast 
Asian security; 
ASEAN’s role in 
regional conflict 
resolutions/managem 
ent. 
ASEAN way 
contributes 
significantly to 
establishment and 
maintenance of 
regional stability. 
Need for security 
cooperation; 
socially constructed 
international/region 
al system. 
ASEAN centrality; 
conflict 
management 
mechanisms as a 
norm-building 
exercise based on 
ASEAN way. 
Intersubjec 
tive 
understand 
ing. 
ASEAN 
successful in 
establishing 
and 
maintaining 
stability. 
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Change and evolution 
in ASEAN mechanisms 
of conflict 
Actors and processes 
influence each other 
and alter interests, 
Power Vacuum; 
socially constructed 
international/region 
ASEAN 
institutional 
change as result 
ASEAN 
way; 
intersubjec 
ASEAN way 
and ASEAN 
remained 
management; preferences, norms, al system; elite of responding to tivity; relevant and 
Rejection of rationalist and identity (both perception of challenges; interaction significant. 
explanations; 
reciprocal influence of 
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regional). 
threats to stability 
in post-Cold War 
Southeast Asian 
identity and sense 
with non- 
state 
 
state and non-state  Southeast Asia; of community. actors.  
actors and ASEAN.  need to maintain 
equilibrium. 
   
 
 
 
Asia- 
constructivis 
ts concepts 
 
Selection 
of some 
key 
Authors 
 
Application to ASEAN Conceptual relation to traditional 
constructivism 
 
ASEAN’s 
competence 
power 
Eaton/ 
Stubbs 
ASEAN ability to define the terms of interaction 
in extramural ASEAN+ institutions and regimes. 
Power seen as social concept, defined in terms 
of structure shaping ability (e.g. Hopf; Ruggie; 
Arendt); norm-cascade (e.g. 
Finnemore/Sikkink). 
 
Power to 
enmesh 
Goh ASEAN’s ability to engage greater powers on 
their terms. 
Power seen as social concept, facilitated by 
institutions where norm cascade can occur 
(e.g. Finnemore/Sikkink). 
In Goh’s case also: practical considerations, 
ASEAN as the only viable actor to facilitate 
regional relations (English School approach) 
 
ASEAN way Acharya ASEAN terms of interaction establish the rules 
by which AMS interact. 
Constitutive and regulative norms (e.g. 
Katzenstein); norms as the collective 
understanding of proper behaviour guiding 
interaction (e.g. Legro). 
 
Caballero- 
Anthony 
Shared understanding of appropriate 
mechanism to manage regionalism. 
Intersubjective understandings of ideas, 
norms, and appropriateness (e.g. Katzenstein; 
March/Olsen). 
 
Practices Adler The illiberal security community ASEAN 
developed due to practices of self-restraint, 
fostering habitual adherence to the ASEAN way. 
Communities lacking shared interpretations of 
liberalism and democracy cooperate on the 
basis of non-violence as the constitutive norm; 
habitus formation occurs through continuing 
practice of non-violence and self-restraint (e.g. 
Bjola/Kornprobst); Elias) 
 
Socialising 
extra mural 
powers/ 
Norm- 
brewery 
Ba; 
Caballero- 
Anthony 
ASEAN’s ability to spread the norms of the 
ASEAN way into the wider region, which will be 
accepted by external actors; norm-building 
exercise through socialisation. 
Norm cascade via institutions; norm- 
entrepreneurs spread norms and norm-takers 
adopt; norm cascade occurs and -takers 
internalise norms via practices facilitating 
identity convergence (e.g. Finnemore/Sikkink). 
Katsumata Diffusion of peaceful ASEAN norms via 
institutions such as the ARF. 
 
Norm 
localisation 
Acharya Adoption and local re-interpretation of foreign 
norms. 
Not similar, but in technical terms related to 
norm-cascade. 
 
ASEAN 
identity 
Acharya Identity and interest convergence among o-AMS 
and assimilation of both by new AMS based on 
commonly shared norms and cognitive prior; 
facilitates community building. 
Identity and interests as the appreciation of 
the self in relation to others and the 
environment; definition and acceptance of 
appropriateness by social interaction in 
various settings; produced and re-produced. 
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ASEAN as 
(nascent) 
security 
community 
 
 
Caballero- In the context of common threat/problem 
Anthony (Cambodian conflict), AMS interacted, balanced 
regional and national interests and realised an 
interest convergence among all AMS; developed 
a sense of community and regional identity. 
All systems of interactions socially  
constructed; various ways to establish a 
situation of dependable expectation of 
peaceful change; mutual reconstitution of 
identity and interest; also more practical: 
functional spill-over from material self-interest 
to identity of trust and community (e.g. 
Deutsch, Wendt). 
Bellamy Based on shared post-colonial experience, AMS 
build a community of shared norms and values, 
leading to a security community. 
 
 
3.3. Some Preliminary Conclusions 
 
This thesis does acknowledge that the typical post-Cold War theoretical pluralism in 
IR has also been applied to Asia. The characteristic dichotomy of constructivist vs. 
rationalist paradigms (including realist and liberal schools) exists and has in recent 
years been valuably expanded by English school scholars who try to offer a picture of 
regional relations based on the analytical tripartite of objective observation, 
historicism, and theoretical eclecticism.425 Nonetheless, it cannot go unnoticed that 
in the case of specifically Southeast Asia’s IR, there is a conspicuous dominance of 
constructivism influenced approaches borrowing constructivist variables and 
presumptions. Echoing much of ASEAN rhetoric, the above introduced authors and 
concepts perceive ASEAN as the region’s norm-entrepreneur par excellence and its 
main contribution to Asian regionalism as normative and ideational inspiration, even 
leadership facilitating intra- and extramural stability and security. The association 
has in those views managed to create a (nascent) security community, based on 
shared norms and a burgeoning ASEAN identity. ASEAN has ostensibly also acquired 
the regional and global image of being a neutral and honest broker of regional 
affairs, enabling it to engage all relevant actors, including more powerful ones, in 
institutionalised ASEAN-centred regionalism. According to some, this has enabled 
ASEAN to impact the regional architecture and even alter other actors’ preferences 
and interests, making those more amenable. 
What we witness here is that plenty of regional experts implicitly rely on 
constructivist variables of norms, identity, social learning, and the emphasis of the 
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social rather than strictly material environment. For instance, the emphasis on the 
merits of the ASEAN way has its roots in constructivist norm literature. Wendt’s 
notion of mutually constitutive structure and agency dynamic, a socially 
constructible regional system, norm diffusion concepts, and the ultimate results of 
constructivist perceptions of power – competence power – are frequent reference 
points in what I have called Asia-constructivist analyses. Thus inclined authors have 
applied their concepts to Asian regionalism rigorously and been inclined to see 
ASEAN as a security community, the intra- and extramural socialiser in the driver’s 
seat of regionalism, and by an large presuppose a great deal of ASEAN actorness. 
Unfortunately, those claims seem to be not backed-up by hypotheses testing and 
solid evidence, which is at the very least suspicious. When making variables such as 
behavioural norms and identity change the centrepiece of analyses, there ought to 
be an observable and tangible impact on policy behaviour. Prima facie observation of 
East- and Southeast Asian IR however suggests that Asia-constructivist eyes seem to 
remain wide shut. There is the possibility of a norm-biased ideological predisposition 
among Asia-constructivists and perhaps even an undue credit to ASEAN actorness. 
The following case studies shall try to reconcile this prima facie observation and Asia- 
constructivist assumption. They shall assess ASEAN’s practical “supply” in the context 
of this indeed high theoretical “demand”. The following empirical part of this thesis 
also attempts to help rectifying the lack of empirical evidence and shed some light 
on the status quo of East- and Southeast Asian regionalism. Results will aid critical 
appraisal of both Asia-constructivists and ASEAN itself. 
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4.1. Case Study 1: South China Sea 
Disputes – ASEAN Central or 
Sidelined? 
 
 
 
It is necessary for us if we are really to be successful in giving life to 
ASEAN to marry national thinking with regional thinking. We must 
now think at two levels. We must think not only of our national 
interests but posit them against regional interests. (S. Rajaratnam, 
1967) 
Centrality is a phrase coined by ASEAN, enshrined in our Charter, and 
conveniently subscribed to by our Dialogue Partners and others. But it 
is a role that needs to be earned and re-earned all the time. It is not 
prescribed, but must be acquired. (Surin Pitsuwan, 2015)426 
We still see a gap between the diplomatic track and the political 
commitment, and the real situation out at sea (ASG Le Luong Minh, 
2015)427 
 
 
This is the first of three case studies intending to evaluate the degree of ASEAN’s 
actorness in the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) pillar. Attention will be 
on the fundamental element of centrality. Consistent with the overall research 
design, this empirical case study as part of the overall critical appraisal of ASEAN 
actorness takes place against the backdrop of a set of benchmarks derived from the 
“demand side” consisting of conclusions of Asia-constructivists as well as ASEAN 
ambition and self-perception. The empirical part incorporates a number  of 
individual, yet interconnected maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) over 
both territory and resources. Most prominently around the Spratly and Paracel 
Islands and adjacent waters, including features such as the Scarborough Shoal, as 
well  as,  owing  to  recent  developments,  the  Natuna  Islands. 428  All  official  SCS 
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claimants (China, Taiwan,429 Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei) have multiple 
overlapping claims in the SCS. Additionally there are what shall henceforth be called 
the “interested parties”, particularly Indonesia and Singapore. Territorial disputes in 
Southeast Asia are not limited to the SCS and there is also the very significant mostly 
non-ASEAN, geopolitical element of a wider great power struggle currently unfolding 
between Washington and Beijing.430 However, as arguably the greatest traditional 
security concern of contemporary Southeast Asia, largely determining Sino-ASEAN 
relations, the SCS represents a great test for ASEAN’s claims to be in the “driver’s 
seat” of multilateral regional security, i.e. its centrality. As argued in previous 
chapters ASEAN centrality is indicative of ASEAN’s extramural relevance, in particular 
within the APSC pillar. The quality, effectiveness, and integrity of centrality consists 
of several elements, most importantly ASEAN’s ability to project its norms into the 
wider Asia-Pacific security theatre by setting, or at least overproportionately 
affecting the rules of regional multilateralism, i.e. it’s alleged “competence power”. 
Centrality requires a certain degree of internal unity and organisation as well as 
external recognition. 
I propose the following case specific research question: 
 
Can the notion of ASEAN centrality in the wider regional security architecture be 
substantiated in practice? 
This chapter represents a “hard case study” of ASEAN and arguably throws ASEAN 
into the deep end. China has become a formidable regional power and appears to be 
determined to increasingly shape the region in its favour. In material terms, ASEAN 
and its members are no match for China and even the only regional super power, the 
U.S. is struggling. What is more, Beijing behaves increasingly aggressive in waters 
that AMS consider their own. Yet, there are many channels of communication and 
close historical and personal links between individual AMS, ASEAN as an organisation 
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and China. Disputes as they are unfolding in the SCS will determine future Sino- 
ASEAN relations. Precisely because of this, the SCS is a perfect case study of ASEAN’s 
ability to be in the driver’s seat of regional security. 
Like all case studies, we begin by introducing some of the ASEAN and Asia- 
constructivist perspectives that make up the demand side. This will partly be a brief 
recap of chapter 3, but more case specific. From this, I shall derive three critical 
benchmarks and corresponding KPIs against which ASEAN’s agency, the “supply” can 
be measured. Since the matter is very complex, the background part of this first case 
study must inevitably include a brief background analysis, including the importance 
of the SCS in general, relevant claims, and China’s greater geopolitical strategy. It 
would however be tedious and well beyond the scope of a single case study to 
recount every instance of dispute related confrontation between claimants. Instead, 
a few selected examples will clarify Chinese assertiveness and the regional response. 
After ASEAN supply has subsequently been analysed, the final part of this chapter 
will ask whether or not benchmarks have been met and some preliminary case 
specific conclusions shall be drawn. In sum, I content that although ASEAN fails to 
meet most of the KPIs and thus critical benchmarks, ASEAN does have a crucial role 
to play in the wider East Asia security architecture. Albeit not coming close to the 
remarkable security relevance Asia-constructivists and the association presume, 
ASEAN is not superfluous to extramural East Asian security. The concept of centrality 
is overstated and has been misunderstood. 
 
Demand Side – ASEAN and Centrality. 
 
In theory, ASEAN is the chief organisation in East- and Southeast Asian security 
multilateralism and thus, at the heart of the South China Sea disputes. Considering 
ASEAN’s stated goals and ambitions, the organisation demands nothing less of itself. 
Asia-constructivists have taken ASEAN rhetoric at face value and are by and large 
fairly optimistic that the association possesses both the ambition and the means to 
be in the driver’s seat of regional security and by extension, at the centre of the 
quarrels surrounding the South China Sea (SCS). 
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ASEAN Rhetoric 
The central and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in 
its relations and cooperation with external partners in a regional 
architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive as emphasised by 
the Charter. This reflects ASEAN’s commitment to be the hub for the 
evolving and complementary structures in the region and for engaging 
the major players of the world for strategic and economic reasons. 
Such a role would help to balance the geo-politics in the region 
thereby focusing ASEAN’s efforts in building its Community while 
contributing to peace and prosperity of greater East Asia.431 
[ASEAN shall be a] community that strengthens our unity, 
cohesiveness and ASEAN centrality as well as remains the primary 
driving force in shaping the evolving regional architecture that is built 
upon ASEAN-led mechanisms.432 
The 2009 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint envisages three elements to 
be the underlying characteristics of the security pillar of AC15. 
1. A Rules-based Community of shared values and norms; 
2. A Cohesive, Peaceful, Stable and Resilient Region with shared 
responsibility for comprehensive security; 
3. A Dynamic and Outward-looking Region in an increasingly 
integrated and interdependent world.433 
In order to fulfil those characteristics, ASEAN declared in the immediate aftermath of 
the Cold War and crucially, ASEAN extension, it ought to strengthen its role as the 
primary driver of extramural security processes in the form of ASEAN-based 
institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) or the 
later day ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+).434 ASEAN elites believed 
that if complex engagement had managed to positively transform Southeast Asia’s 
conflictual pre-ASEAN relations, it could do the same in the wider Asia-Pacific. In 
particular, ASEAN had an evidently rising, hard to calculate China, the military 
dominance of the U.S., and how those two elements would relate to each other in 
mind.435 As already highlighted in previous chapters, the primary goal, manifest in 
the centrality concept, was to remain relevant in the light of great power dynamics 
 
 
 
431 
Speech by Pushpanathan, S., Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN (2009). 
432 
ASEAN Community Vision 2025 (2015): Art 8.8. 
433 
APSC Blueprint (2009): II.10, available: www.asean.org, accessed: 22/06/2016. . 
434 
ASEAN Hanoi Plan of Action (1997): ASEAN Vision 2020, available: www.asean.org, accessed: 
02/01/2016. 
435 
Leifer (1989). 
170 
 
 
and a changing post-Cold War security environment. The ambitions embedded in 
centrality were firmly placed with the APSC and articulated and constantly 
reinforced inter alia in the various Bali Concords, the corresponding APSC blueprints, 
the Hanoi Plan of Action, the Charter, and most recently Vision 2025. The very first 
article of ASEAN’s main legal body, the Charter, specifically states that it is one of 
ASEAN’s foremost purposes 
to maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary 
driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners 
in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive.436 
In this light, ASEAN regarded the acceleration of the AC15 integration process by five 
years as a means to forcefully strengthen the institutional substance of ASEAN. This 
in turn would also quicken and ‘reinforce ASEAN’s centrality and role as the driving 
force in charting the evolving regional architecture.’437 Against the backdrop of 
China’s exorbitant rise accelerated in the aftermath of the Cold War and increasingly 
obvious in the post Asian financial crisis years, ASEAN argued that fast-tracking the 
integration schedule would result in much needed greater regional resilience and by 
extension enhance and effectively strengthen its overall clout in the regional security 
theatre as 
[a] community, in the interest of developing friendly and mutually beneficial 
relations, that deepens cooperation with Dialogue Partners, strengthens 
engagement with other external parties, reaches out to potential partners, as 
well as responds collectively and constructively to global developments and 
issues of common concern.438 
Most recent documents such as the 2015 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025 
further accentuated this ambitious endeavour in particular in the light of the new 
geopolitical realities in the Asia-Pacific with an effectively “risen” China. 
Recognising that the rapidly changing geostrategic landscape 
continues to present both opportunities and challenges which require 
ASEAN to respond proactively, in order to remain relevant as well as to 
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maintain ASEAN centrality and role as the primary driving force in the 
evolving regional architecture.439 
ASEAN elites had undeniably set an early unambiguous goal and to this day continue 
to emphasise their ambition to maintain centrality in the multilateral Asian security 
architecture. Simultaneously, those assertions imply that ASEAN interestingly 
regards its ostensible centrality not as an ambition as much as a status quo to be 
preserved. 
Achieving and maintaining centrality is of course no end in itself for ASEAN. In the 
driver’s seat of regional security multilateralism, ASEAN intends to shape the 
evolving regional architecture in order to contribute to peace, security, and stability 
on the basis of proactive engagement and 
friendly and mutually beneficial relations with external parties to 
ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace 
with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious 
environment.440 
To substantiate and realise those laudable objectives, ASEAN defines plenty of 
necessary preconditions as well as means and processes. It does not take much to 
appreciate that effectiveness in regional security is greatly enhanced by internal 
unity and coherence. Consequently, ASEAN primarily feels it needs to be united in 
order to be central and centrality depends on the robustness of the ASEAN 
Community project. The 2005 Kuala Lumpur Declaration had already promulgated 
that ASEAN must realise the 
ASEAN community [as] a concert of Southeast Asian nations; outward 
looking, […] bonded together in partnership in dynamic development 
and in a community of caring societies.441 
In 2015, this was reinforced by declaring that ASEAN ‘upholds and strengthens 
ASEAN unity, cohesiveness and ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture 
that is built upon ASEAN-led mechanisms.’442 In order to establish this unity and 
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cohesiveness, the Charter had already specified the need for and means of internal 
institutional coherence before extramural relevance can be realised. ASEAN ought to 
conduct internal ‘enhanced consultations on matters seriously affecting the common 
interest of ASEAN’443 and critically demanded that AMS abstain from 
participation in any policy or activity […] by any ASEAN Member State 
or non-ASEAN Member State or any non-State actor, which threatens 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political and economic stability 
of ASEAN Member States.444 
In a position of intramural unity and cohesion, ASEAN considers itself well placed to 
spawn institutional opportunities for extramural interaction and the engagement 
with relevant outside actors. The 2011 Bali Concord III for example declares ASEAN 
feels encouraged 
by the progress of ASEAN cooperation and partnership with its 
external partners in all of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community 
within the framework of ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN 
Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit, as well as other ASEAN- 
initiated regional processes, while maintaining ASEAN centrality.445 
ASEAN therefore sees its ambition fulfilled by hosting and shaping regional 
institutions and forums where centrality should be advanced and current and future 
security challenges can be addressed in the context of enhanced capacities and 
capabilities.446 As explained in chapter 2, the ARF in particular should reduce conflict 
by igniting a cooperative process that would lead participants from initial confidence 
building measures (CBM) all the way towards eventual preventive diplomacy. The 
ASEAN spawned ARF therefore intends to ‘foster the habit of constructive dialogue 
and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern’ in 
order to ‘make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and 
preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.’447 Although most observers agree 
that the EAS as a more comprehensive, and the ADMM+ as a more security relevant 
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forum have largely taken over in terms of multilateral security, ASEAN declared in 
2015 that it intends to further strengthen the role of the ARF Chair in order to 
effectively enhance dialogue, promotion of CBMs, preventive diplomacy, and conflict 
resolution.448 Hence, despite a present day multitude of relevant security institutions 
in the international relations of the Asia-Pacific,449 ASEAN continues to attach great 
relevance to one of its “first-born” and sees the role of the ARF first and foremost as 
the facilitator of tangible cooperation and confidence building between itself and 
relevant extramural actors. 
Via the plethora of such diverse avenues, ASEAN elites intend to project their own 
core norms, encapsulated in the ASEAN way, that have ostensibly helped to stabilise 
a post-1967 Southeast Asia, into the wider Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN intends to 
[c]ontinue initiating, hosting, chairing and/or co-chairing activities and 
meetings with Dialogue Partners and other external parties within the 
context of all ASEAN-led mechanisms.450 
 
 
Chapter 3 has explained how Asia-constructivists see ASEAN as the pan-Asian norm- 
entrepreneur. The above shows that ASEAN itself implicitly agrees, intending to 
export, maintain, and reinforce an ASEAN-initiated, -based, and critically ASEAN-led 
rules-based order reflecting its own ASEAN way, its own norms. This order 
represents the ‘main vehicle in realising the long-term goal of an East Asia 
community with ASEAN as the driving force in the evolving regional architecture.’451 
Whatever the interpretation, this certainly is an ambitious and unambiguous project. 
To its great credit, ASEAN has not stayed on the surface of generalisation but 
identified certain key areas that it regards as pivotal to fulfil the greater objective of 
reliable rules-based regional security. In the light of this case study particular Bali II is 
noteworthy, highlighting that 
[m]aritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and 
therefore  shall  be  addressed  regionally  in  holistic,  integrated  and 
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comprehensive manner. Maritime cooperation between and among 
ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the evolution of the 
ASEAN Security Community.452 
Something ASEAN’s latest notable document that could be considered in this thesis, 
ASEAN Vision 2025, reaffirms by stating that it wants to be 
 
[a] community that enhances maritime security and maritime 
cooperation for peace and stability in the region and beyond, through 
ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms and adopts internationally- 
accepted maritime conventions and principles.453 
 
 
The above samples allow us to get some insight into ASEAN’s ambitions and goals 
and thus, what ASEAN leaders ex- and implicitly demand of their common 
organisation. In sum, ASEAN seeks to realise, maintain, and continuously strengthen 
its relevance by being the initiator, procedural proto-type, host, agenda-setter, and 
key participant in wider East Asian institutionalised regional security multilateralism. 
This can, ASEAN believes, only be realised on the basis of internal unity and 
coherence, regional resilience in the context of a “concert of Southeast Asian 
nations”. Centrality is of course no end in itself but laudably pursues the overall goal 
to facilitate, establish, and maintain a rules-based security environment certainly 
conducive to a peaceful, stable, and harmonious East- and Southeast Asia. ASEAN 
seems convinced that its own norms and processes are the yardstick. This explicitly 
includes both security in the maritime domain and China. 
Asia-constructivists 
 
Considering their norm-bias, not surprisingly Asia-constructivists have been attracted 
by ASEAN’s ambition to engage all relevant regional powers within a multilateral 
security architecture constructed around ASEAN indigenous norms. As demonstrated 
in detail in chapter 3, unlike realist theories, a constructivist take on such ASEAN 
centred engagement process does not concentrate on material asymmetries or 
sanction- and reward mechanisms but on the socialising impact of the ASEAN way. In 
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this view, ASEAN-initiated and -led institutions and regimes facilitate norm diffusion 
processes that enable ASEAN to act as East Asia’s socialiser while the thus engaged 
extramural actors become norm-recipients by appreciation, adoption, and 
internalisation of ASEAN spawned procedural and ideational norms. Acting in 
concert, ASEAN initiates what Finnemore and Sikkink have termed a “norm cascade” 
process. Constructivist logic in general and Asia-constructivist logic in this particular 
case suggests that regional security and stability can derive from this diffusion and 
internalisation that results in pan-Asian security norm compliance, including all 
relevant actors. Norm-diffusion within institutions in this view creates habits of non- 
violent cooperation and eventually fosters common identities. The ASEAN model is 
thus transferred into the wider Asia-Pacific. This is seen as the practical outcome of 
ASEAN centrality. 
In her 2014 comprehensive and groundbreaking work Evelyn Goh calls the attempt 
to bind extramural actors into ASEAN-based processes “institutional entrapment”.454 
Goh skilfully demonstrates how multilateral institutions can address the realist 
problem of unequal power by enmeshing the materially more powerful state into 
norm-based processes, establishing habits of cooperation along a particular set of 
norms and principles that may well be based on the standards of the weaker 
party.455 In this view, power asymmetries become less of a disadvantage to the 
weaker and the negative parameters of realpolitik are, if not transcended, at least 
mitigated against. If one was to buy this argument in general while accepting the 
significant power asymmetries underlying ASEAN-China relations, then ASEAN has 
the potential to wield a significant degree of a specific kind of power, unproportional 
to its combined material weight vis-à-vis China. Facilitated by ASEAN-led institutions 
and regimes, ASEAN would be able to create an intersubjective understanding of 
appropriate behaviour based on its own preferences. This essentially constructivist 
concept  of  power  could  be  used  to  initiate,  manage,  and  perpetuate  ASEAN’s 
preferred rules-based regional order. In other words, outsiders subscribe to, or in 
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Alice Ba’s words are being socialised456 into the insiders’ norms and practices. Eaton 
and Stubbs had termed this understanding of ASEAN power “competence power”.457 
If successful, in this specific case ASEAN would be able to tame Chinese ambitions in 
the SCS over time and mitigate the inherent power asymmetries that realists regard 
as the main determinant of unequal interstate relations. ASEAN would have attained 
and institutionalised a position of unproportional strength vis-à-vis China in the SCS. 
 
This is at the heart of Asia-constructivist perspectives of ASEAN centrality and lends 
credence to ASEAN’s claim to the driver’s seat of East Asian security multilateralism. 
ASEAN’s security institutions are seen as forums of social interaction where ASEAN 
can promote and project its norms and thereby establish rules of regional 
cooperation. Whereas pessimists have asserted that institutions based on the ASEAN 
way cannot possibly be more than “talking shops”, lacking binding commitments and 
compliance enforcement mechanisms, 458 optimistic Asia-constructivists see the 
proliferation of ASEAN norms not only as the reason for successful security 
multilateralism in East Asia, but also as confirmation of variables of constructivist 
theory.459 In 2009 Alice Ba for instance wrote, 
[a]s a dialogue-driven process, ASEAN regionalism is in fact a lot of 
talk; however, it is not talk without substantive, material effects. 
ASEAN’s talk shop has produced new social norms, a new culture of 
regional dialogue, as well as new social and institutional practices that 
stress respect (manifested most notably in a consensus-based 
regionalism) and nonconfrontational, inclusive engagement. The 
practical effect of such changes is a regional system based on 
nonviolent resolution of problems and the normative belief that states 
should work toward regional solutions. One can criticize ASEAN norms 
[…], but they are also why interstate conflicts have not escalated.460 
Asia-constructivists such as Ba and Caballero-Anthony therefore see precisely those 
elements that pessimists have identified as weaknesses, as the strengths of ASEAN- 
based institutionalism. ASEAN’s centrality, as Caballero-Anthony has argued, should 
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be understood in terms of its significance in amplifying the capability of ASEAN to 
influence and shape the regional environment and security order.461 
In practical terms, ASEAN assumes centrality by being the host, mediator, and 
agenda-setter and by providing the procedural prototype. In a context of mutual 
great power enmity none of the major material powers could lead multilateral 
dialogues the way the honest broker ASEAN is able to. With ASEAN being apparently 
non-aligned and the only viable alternative, the association became the default host 
of all regional security multilateralism. ASEAN has in this view been put in a position 
where it can persuade extramural powers to subscribe to its normative principles, to 
become norm-recipients. In ASEAN initiated networks, created and maintained by 
institutions and regimes, ASEAN’s centrality materialises in the ability to define and 
create a rules-based order based on precisely those principles codified in the ASEAN 
way and security regimes such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Of 
particular importance are ASEAN’s agenda setting ability and its power to determine 
who may participate.462 Catherine Jones believes ASEAN’s role to be one of a 
mediator between the great powers, allowing it to “use” its external dialogue 
partners to ensure relative stability and security.463 
Increasing Chinese participation since the mid-1990s is often cited as empirical 
evidence.464 In the wake of the Cold War when China was still comparatively weak, 
ASEAN’s focus turned towards managing its inevitable rise by engaging it in 
institutions and regimes. As Evelyn Goh writes, 
[i]nsofar as a large measure of the logic of ASEAN-style multilateral 
institutions relies on the constructivist conviction that institutional 
membership would, over the medium term, create expectations and 
obligations on the part of the great powers, and over time, socialize 
them into embracing peaceful norms, China’s voluntary self-restraint 
and pursuit of mutual benefits signaled a good start to what was 
potentially the most dangerous part of the post-Cold War transition. 
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By expanding the ASEAN process weak AMS had indeed gained the advantage by 
enmeshing greater powers. Similarly, Acharya asserts ‘ASEAN has used socialization 
and persuasion to engage not only other Southeast Asian and East Asian countries, 
but all the great powers of the current international order.’466 Beginning with China 
joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, signing up to the Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) and the TAC in subsequent 
years, China ostensibly agreed to a set of ASEAN conceived norms and implicitly 
acknowledged and accepted ASEAN centrality. China would choose to participate in 
an ASEAN-led regional order and implicitly recognise ASEAN as the convener, the 
procedural role model, and the agenda-setter of the regional multilateral 
architecture. A number of relevant Asian actors increasingly looked towards ‘the 
most   successful   regional   organisation’   because   they   understand   that   ‘they 
themselves lack the legitimacy and authority to lead regional processes. This dynamic 
widens the opportunity for ASEAN to shape new arrangements.’ 467 Corresponding 
well with traditional constructivist notions, this ASEAN-based multilateral security 
architecture ostensibly ignited a socialisation process beginning to alter Chinese 
preferences.468 Over time, ASEAN gained the initiative and was enabled to use its 
own political priorities and processes to shape the nature of institutions, such as the 
ARF, which, in Hiro Katsumata’s view became the regional “norm-brewery”. 
Institutionalised CMBs are therefore seen as ASEAN-led, pan-Asian norm building 
exercises by which ASEAN projects constructivist power in the form of norms, not 
material might.469 China as the recipient of ASEAN established norms and procedures 
is thus being socialised into rules-based patterns of behaviour acceptable to ASEAN. 
For Goh also, the ARF has become an “omni-enmeshment forum” promoting 
normative constraints on all regional competitors in the interest of regional 
stability. 470 It specifically emphasised inclusivity of all regional powers and 
informality, which implied procedural equality in the face of material asymmetry, 
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reminiscent of the ASEAN way. This prevented “agenda-hogging” by Western states 
and promoted AMS’ counter-realpolitik agenda, precluding domination by any one 
great power while keeping them engaged at the same time.471 ASEAN provides a 
central focus for dialogue – as convenor and integrator, with ASEAN procedures and 
the ASEAN way dominating the strategic forums. The competing interests of China, 
the U.S., and Japan in various ASEAN-led forums have led to an entrenching of 
ASEAN’s unique approach towards regional cooperation.472 
As a result, Beijing’s regional ambitions, including maritime ambitions, have been 
channelled through institutional enmeshment. Ba has gone as far as arguing that 
East Asia has become ‘ASEAN-ised in content and form.’473 China had now been 
persuaded ’to think differently and less confrontationally about regional security and 
its relations with the ASEAN states’474 and regarded ASEAN now as ‘potential partner 
and even friend.’ 475 ASEAN had now begun to give such great prominence to 
engagement processes that increasingly it was now U.S. security guarantees that 
provided the hedge for engagement processes, rather than the other way around as 
it was in the early 1990s.476 Shambaugh agrees, the unprecedented step of China 
signing up to ASEAN initiated agreements binds China to the core elements of ASEAN 
to an extent that nowadays most states view China as more benign than malign.477 In 
those optimistic views, China has been remarkably compliant. Its willingness to 
address disputes such as in the SCS  in multilateral forums under acceptance of 
ASEAN’s competence power, as opposed to addressing those bilaterally where it 
could play out its material superiority. Chinese implicit willingness to participate in 
regional institutions and ratify regional security regimes such as the TAC and the DoC 
showed that while ASEAN’s overtures to China were central, China’s response is just 
as important. Engagement, Ba argues, works both ways.478 This not only reinforces 
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ASEAN-led multilateralism, but also gives reasons for great optimism as far as the 
future of regional security is concerned.479 Chapter 3 already showed how Timo 
Kivimaki credited the commonly shared political culture of the ASEAN way with a 
transnational identity that at first created an ASEAN- and eventually an East Asian 
peace.480 
At the same time and in perfect symbiosis with ASEAN’s own rationale as outlined 
above, an auspicious side-effect had been the ostensible increase in ASEAN’s internal 
cohesiveness and unity, enhancing its effectiveness as a result of additional 
extramural demands on the association, forcing AMS to cooperate closely and 
coherently. 481 Jones argues that ASEAN had succeeded in maintaining relative 
security and been put in a position whereby, in order to make the most out of 
external partnerships, it had to establish internal cohesion. In order to deal with the 
security contribution of external actors, centrality has forced AMS to move closer 
together. What is more, maintaining ASEAN’s leading security function has not only 
led to AMS developing and fostering security forums, but also significantly 
diminished the need for AMS to develop deeper bilateral agreements.482 In sum, just 
like the association itself, Asia-constructivists are putting the bar over which ASEAN 
has to jump, the demand, rather high. 
 
Supply Side – Does ASEAN Measure Up in the SCS? 
 
So what can be expected from ASEAN in the South China Sea? If one employs realist 
theory the answer is not much. Individually small ASEAN members (AMS) do not 
have any real choices in the light of the significant power asymmetries in the Asia- 
Pacific and an a priori assumed condition of anarchy. At the same time, even if 
united with the ASEAN body, leverage is small since organisations and institutions 
are epiphenomenal to the realist reality of power balances and self-interested nation 
states. Hence, security in the SCS depends not on ASEAN, but on balance of power 
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dynamics unfolding in the region.483 Drawing on the above perspectives however, 
the picture is rather different and Asia-constructivists have argued strongly in favour 
of ASEAN agency. ASEAN itself has set ambitious goals in precisely this direction. 
Benchmarks 
 
In the light of those perspectives we can derive a set of three critical benchmarks 
against which ASEAN’s supply can be measured in order to determine the substance 
of its alleged centrality: cohesiveness, convening power, and competence power. If 
ASEAN supply meets those benchmarks, one can conclude that ASEAN has met the 
centrality demand in practice. The result would be a positive answer to the case 
specific research question and the first critical element of ASEAN overall security 
actorness can be deemed sufficiently high in order to warrant Asia-constructivist 
optimism and validate ASEAN rhetoric. 
The benchmark of cohesiveness originates predominantly from ASEAN’s own 
ambitions of regional resilience. The association declared it intends to uphold 
centrality by projecting ASEAN-led mechanisms into the wider regional security 
theatre. An effort that ASEAN rightly believes demands intramural unity and 
cohesion as a necessary precondition. As a concert of Southeast Asian nations ASEAN 
has claimed to be bonded together in partnership, in a community of caring 
societies. In this community ASEAN would uphold and even further strengthen its 
internal unity and cohesion in order to maintain centrality. As a basic requirement 
ASEAN called on its members to conduct for instance internal consultations on all 
matters affecting their common interests and to refrain from any policy or activity 
that may weaken the integrity or stability of any other AMS or the association as a 
whole. Only from this position of internal cohesiveness ASEAN considers itself 
capable of exercising centrality. In this light, I suggest that the cohesiveness 
benchmark is justified and can be measured and tested in terms of ASEAN’s ability to 
remain resilient and autonomous in the face of external pressure as well as the 
support extended by non-claimants to fellow AMS who do feel Chinese pressure in 
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the SCS. Can ASEAN capitalise on its collective weight vis-à-vis the more powerful 
China? In other words, can claimants and interested parties count on non-claimants 
and galvanise ASEAN in support of a common regional approach? 
In order to exercise centrality, convening power is also a necessary precondition, for 
only if ASEAN manages to get all the major powers together, meaningful 
multilateralism can occur. In particular Asia-constructivists have based their 
socialisation claims on the precondition of relevant powers participating in ASEAN- 
led forums of interaction. After all, what good are extramural institutions and 
dialogue forums if only AMS participate? Congruent KPIs to measure this benchmark 
is ASEAN’s record in setting up institutions and regimes and set the agenda. At least 
as critical is the willingness of great powers to acknowledge the legitimacy of such 
ASEAN-initiated, -based, and -led avenues of engagement and to actively participate. 
Do the relevant actors invest political capital into ASEAN? If ASEAN performs well in 
this respect, it can be seen as having a satisfactory degree of convening power. 
Lastly, the most divisive of the three benchmarks, competence power derives from 
Asia-constructivist assertions that see ASEAN as the East Asian norm-entrepreneur 
and China as the -recipient. Asia-constructivists have argued that in spite of 
significant power asymmetries, ASEAN wields a certain degree of power in a 
constructivist sense. If ASEAN, on the basis of intramural cohesiveness, via the 
vehicle of its convening power, manages to impact the regional environment in its 
own favour by educating and socialising China into its own norms and principles, 
ASEAN does indeed possess a large degree of non-material power. If China were to 
buy into ASEAN’s preferred rules-based order and complies with corresponding rules 
and restrictions, principles, and processes instead of pursuing its own strategic 
interests regardless of the their Southeast Asian neighbours’ preferences, then 
ASEAN competence power performance is indeed remarkable. China would be 
accepting and gradually internalising ASEAN norms and ASEAN agency would be able 
to pro-actively shape the regional security environment, contributing decisively to 
ASEAN actorness. 
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Centrality 
Benchmarks 
cohesiveness convening power competence power 
 
 
Correspondin 
g KPIs 
Ability to remain resilient and 
autonomous, capable of 
withstanding outside 
interference amidst great 
power rivalry; ability to act as a 
unit and to capitalise on 
collective weight; 
preparedness of non-claimants 
to support claimants for 
greater ASEAN good. 
Initiate security forums and 
regimes; set the agenda; 
invite participation of great 
powers; investment of great 
powers into ASEAN. 
Chinese internalisation of ASEAN 
spawned norms and acceptance of 
thus defined rules; acting in, rather 
than reacting to regional events. 
 
 
The benchmarks and corresponding KPIs can be applied to the perhaps most critical 
and most serious traditional security threat ASEAN and a number if its members 
have faced in decades, namely Chinese assertiveness in the SCS. At the 2015 Shangri- 
La Dialogue Malaysia's Minister for Defence Hussein has after all claimed himself 
that the SCS conflict could ‘escalate into one of the deadliest conflict of our time’.484 
Asia-constructivist and ASEAN’s own perspective suggest that ASEAN ought to score 
reasonably well in all three benchmarks and if it indeed does, it can be concluded 
that ASEAN posses significant security actorness in East Asia, allowing us to positively 
answer the case specific, and mark a first milestone regarding the overall research 
question. In the following, this case study will assess ASEAN success or failure in 
achieving those benchmarks, measured by applying specified KPIs to ASEAN’s action 
in the SCS dispute against the backdrop of intense and increasing Chinese 
assertiveness and illegal and rather bellicose behaviour. We will find out whether 
China has embraced ASEAN as the centre of regional security architecture and the 
extent to which ASEAN is a cohesive unit in the face of an adverse and dangerous 
security situation. ASEAN performance in the SCS is indicative of its ability to be in 
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the driver’s seat of East Asian security and by extension of its overall security 
actorness. 
 
Background - The South China Sea 
 
Remembering the heterogeneity of 
the AMS in political and economic 
terms, adding to this the powerful 
and ambitious nation that is China 
and then throwing a history 
characterised by conflict and 
territorial uncertainty into the mix, 
one gets a potentially messy 
arrangement. The geographical 
meeting point of this arrangement is 
the South China Sea. The importance 
of the SCS can barely be 
overestimated for three reasons; 
resources, trade, and geopolitical 
posturing. Firstly, the U.S. believes 
the SCS holds about 15.6bn barrels 
of petroleum, while Chinese estimates are as high as 213bn barrels, in addition to 
high volumes of natural gas.485 It is also one of the most biologically diverse marine 
areas and home to some of the world’s richest fishing grounds contributing a 
minimum of 12% of the global catch.486 China is the world’s largest exporter of 
marine products (15.1%).487 But local fisheries also provide critical local food supply 
throughout Asia where fish protein accounts for as much as 22.3% of the overall 
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protein intake.488 Secondly, some 30% of all global trade passes through the vicinity 
of the SCS, including US$1.2tri worth of U.S. trade.489 Since it connects the Western 
Pacific to the Indian Ocean and further towards the Middle East, most of the East 
Asian global goods and resource trade passes through the SCS, most of it via the 
Strait of Malacca. In the opposite direction, almost all East Asia-bound crude oil 
transports cross these waters, almost five times more than through the Suez Canal, 
with China being the world’s largest net oil importer. Currently 80% of all Chinese 
imports pass the Strait of Malacca, which is controlled and patrolled by mostly U.S. 
and Singaporean forces. This has come to be known as China’s “Malacca 
Dilemma”,490 meaning that currently China has only limited control over its most 
crucial Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Certainly one of China’s greatest 
strategic weaknesses. With this in mind, imagining the wider geostrategic and 
political consequences is not a tough ask. Maritime domain control in the SCS is of 
utmost importance to all relevant states including the U.S. and strategic positioning 
has become a principle task of all navies involved. What is more, to a greater or 
lesser extent all claimant states are guilty of playing domestic politics with their 
respective claims and tough approaches occasionally serve to please domestic 
audiences. Hence, claimant or not, most Asian states and the U.S. have significant 
interests in the SCS, including territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) control, 
safeguarding SLOC, and general freedom of navigation (FON). Only with this in mind, 
one is able to appreciate the significance of the contest unfolding in the SCS among a 
multitude of claimant states, in 
particular around the Spratly, 
Paracel, and Natuna Islands as 
well as Scarborough Shoal. 
The situation  is  further 
complicated by Southeast Asia’s 
uniquely        dense        maritime 
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geography, resulting in the entire SCS being a claimed maritime zone of some kind. 
The UN umbrella agreement regulating the maritime domain, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) divides seas into two basic categories 
endowed with respective jurisdiction and rights; territorial seas stretch 12 nautical 
miles (nm) off a state’s coastline and constitute sovereign territory, while the high 
seas are essentially the global commons and thus, theoretically open to unrestricted 
navigation for all. UNCLOS also provides for EEZs extending 200nm from a state's 
coastline into the high seas, more if coastal states can claim a continental shelf 
extension within which the respective state possesses sovereign rights to all natural 
resources. All claims must be derived from sovereign land-territory or archipelagic 
baselines, although a median line may apply should legal zones overlap. UNCLOS 
effectively leaves it to international courts and arbitration tribunals, such as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), to interpret maritime law if no bilateral 
agreement can be reached.491 All parties to UNCLOS, including China and AMS, have 
committed themselves to abide by such rules. One of the main problems with 
UNCLOS as far as the SCS is concerned is the regime’s ambiguity as to what exactly 
counts as an island. To be considered capable of generating maritime zones, the land 
must be above water at high-tide and capable of sustaining human or economic life. 
Artificially created islands do not count.492 
All littoral states claim an EEZ, but 
all officially disputing parties have 
directly competing, partially 
overlapping claims in the SCS. 
While Vietnam and China have 
solved their disputes in the Gulf of 
Tonkin, both claim all of the 
Paracel Islands. The Philippines, 
Vietnam,     and     Malaysia     have 
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overlapping claims to either some or all of the Spratly Islands. The most low-key 
claimant and the only one to not have established military outposts is Brunei. 
Although no official claimants, countries such as Indonesia or Singapore shall be 
considered interested parties. Indonesia is an archipelagic state and values a rules- 
based   maritime   order   while   the   Singaporean   economy   depends   on   the 
uninterrupted flow of goods transported via the Strait of Malacca and regards 
stability here as a top security priority.493 Jakarta has also had EEZ problems with 
China around the Natunas of late. 
But most important to this case study is China’s infamous nine-dash line (9DL). This 
imprecise ambiguous demarcation line expresses Beijing’s claim on the outer limits 
of its maritime territory, enclosing almost 90% of the entire SCS. Although party to 
UNCLOS, Beijing implicitly rejects, or at least violates UNCLOS principles by insisting 
on the 9DL, extending far beyond any reasonable maritime zone and cutting deep 
into the EEZ of other littoral states.494 With some exceptions in the Paracels, under 
Beijing’s control since 1974, China’s legal EEZ gives it not much but deep blue water. 
Beijing has for instance no UNCLOS based right to the very distant Spratlys (Nansha) 
but claims some unspecified “historic rights”.495 In a note verbale to the UN in 2009, 
Beijing argued that ‘China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South 
China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
the relevant waters.’496 Similarly, Xi Jinping stated that 
the South China Sea islands have been Chinese territory since ancient 
times. It is the bounded duty of the Chinese government to uphold 
China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate maritime rights and 
interests.497 
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Brunei 
(insignificant 
claimant) 
Claims UNCLOS based EEZ; overlaps with 
Malaysia’s EEZ; also, 2 Spratly Island 
features within EEZ (Louisa Reef, Rifleman 
Bank, both low-tide elevations, not 
generating further extensions). 
Potential dispute; 9DL cuts into 
Brunei’s EEZ. 
None occupied; no 
military presence. 
China (crucial 
claimant) 
Largest claimant (80% - 90% of entire SCS); 
keeps claim basis ambiguous; claims 
undefined “historic rights” to all islands in 
Paracel and Spratlys and surrounding 
grounds; Natuna Islands only surroundings, 
not islands themselves. 
--- Significant military 
presence; occupies 
several islands in 
Spratlys (incl. 7 artificial) 
and all Paracel Islands, 
incl. artificial islands. 
Indonesia 
(unofficial 
claimant) 
UNCLOS EEZ and continental shelf 
extensions off coastline and Natuna Islands; 
owns Natuna Islands (undisputed). 
9DL overlaps with Natuna 
generated EEZ; important fisheries 
effected; significant ongoing 
conflict. 
Significant military 
presence on Natunas 
and in surrounding 
waters. 
Malaysia 
(claimant) 
EEZ and continental shelf extension; at least 
3 islands in the Spratlys. 
9DL extends into EEZ; important 
fisheries; dispute over some 
Spratly islands. 
Military and coast guard 
presence on several 
islands and features; 5 
outposts in the Spratlys. 
Philippines 
(claimant) 
Significant parts of SCS, EEZ and continental 
shelf generated by archipelagic baseline; 8 
islands in the Spratlys, Scarborough Shoal. 
Most significant conflict in 2012; 
ongoing. 
Military presence on 8 
outposts in Spratlys. 
Vietnam 
(claimant) 
Significant parts of the SCS; EEZ and 
continental shelf extensions. 
Overlapping EEZs; competing 
claims to entire Paracels and some 
Spratly features; significant 
ongoing conflicts. 
Occupies 48 outposts in 
Spratlys with military 
presence on some. 
 
 
 
China - Creating Facts in the South China Sea 
 
China, as a rising regional power, has plausible and to some extent justifiable 
security interests in the South China Sea. In the light of geographical and economic 
facts, having a strong presence in the SCS is a strategic necessity for Beijing. Add to 
this rich fisheries, dependence on economic growth, Middle Kingdom ambitions, and 
the popular nationalist demand498 and one can imagine that Beijing is unlikely to be 
accommodating. At the same time, China is party to UNCLOS and if adhered to, 
international law would be sufficient to ensure legitimate access to both resources 
and SLOC to all littoral states. Yet, over recent years China has become increasingly 
assertive  over  what  it  claims  to  be  its  very  own  rights  within  the  legally 
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unsubstantiated 9DL. Whilst the Deng Xiaoping policy was to “keep a low profile” 
and subsequent leadership generations had exercised some restraint true to the 
narrative of “China’s peaceful rise”, foreign policy assertiveness has increased 
significantly under of Xi Jinping. With a strong sense of nationalism, Xi advocated his 
very own narrative of the “Chinese Dream”  (Zhongguo meng), or the “the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” after a century of humiliation in order to restore 
what he regards as China’s rightful place in Asia.499 The SCS is the maritime realm of 
this “rightful place”, since 2010 considered one of China’s non-negotiable “core 
interests”,500 putting the SCS on an equal footing with interests such as the “one- 
China policy” and Tibet, to be militarily defended if necessary.501 In rather peculiar 
fashion China demonstrated that it has no intention to back-track on its SCS position 
by including the 9DL on maps printed inside new Chinese passports; valid for 10 
years.502 Similarly, Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) commander Wu Shengli 
said ‘[H]ow would you feel if I cut off your arms and legs? That’s how China feels 
about the South China Sea.’503 By now, Chinese elites have managed to generate 
near popular domestic consensus within China that they posses sovereign rights in 
the SCS and any disagreement with this is an offensive act carried out by a hostile 
foreign coalition ganging up against China.504 
In this light, China has 
become increasingly 
assertive in the region 
over recent years. 
Research for this case 
study suggests that 
China’s strategy in the 
SCS   consists   of   four 
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fundamental components, two of which are diplomatic (one positive-cooperative; 
one negative-obstructive), and two are material (one militarily-assertive; one 
strategic-physical). On the one hand, Beijing claims to be a benign facilitator of 
Asian-led regional growth for mutual benefit with  minimum  non-Asian 
involvement. 505 Engagement is also a way to balance the significantly tougher, 
material measures Beijing employs analogously in order to realise ambitions. It 
creates facts on the ground by hard power means of land reclamation and high-level 
hybrid aggression through military, paramilitary, and civilian forces. 506 China 
employs a “carrot-and-stick” tactic vis-à-vis its neighbours while simultaneously 
ensuring that no outsider gains too much leverage. Effectively, China is creating faits 
accomplis while staying just shy of escalation, “salami-slicing” in other words, or as 
Lin has called it “strategy of struggle without breaking”.507 
First, Beijing attempts to engage the region in economic, diplomatic, and military 
terms. The centrepiece of this engagement is the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 
initiative; a combination of diplomatic and economic regionalism centred on China, 
connecting the Asian continent. OBOR includes projects such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), but also 
numerous land based infrastructure projects especially in Southeast Asia.508 OBOR 
intends to provide China with the level of regional influence Beijing believes it is 
entitled to in a Community of Common Destiny (mingy un gong tong ti), an Asia built 
and led by Asians.509 Simultaneously, Chinese officials reject any internationalisation 
and multilateralisation of SCS disputes with another claimant, matters they regard as 
a strictly bilateral. Any kind of third party interference, either international judicial 
arbitration or any meaningful ASEAN involvement is unwelcome. Chinese 
delegations continue to refuse all SCS references in any multilateral channel, 
including specific security forums in which China participates. According to Chinese 
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Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the SCS disputes are ‘not an issue between China and the 
ASEAN, and many ASEAN countries do not wish to see specific forces expanding 
specific matters.’510 At the ASEAN+3 Foreign Minister’s Meeting in 2014, Wang Yi for 
instance proposed his “dual-track approach” to the SCS. According to him, all AMS 
and China should jointly maintain peace and stability in the region, but all disputes 
must be addressed through bilateral negotiations between directly concerned 
countries. 511 However, ever since the Gulf of Tonkin agreement in 2000, 512 no 
serious bilateral settlements have occurred. 
One prominent example is Manila’s 2013 initiation of international arbitration 
proceedings. 513 Following several incidents Manila initiated proceedings against 
Beijing at the ICJ and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). China reacted 
furiously, rejected the submission and refused to participate outright. The Foreign 
Ministry argued that the PCA had no jurisdiction in what was a strictly regional 
matter and that Manila had in fact dishonoured the consensus outlined in the DoC to 
resolve disputes through negotiations between directly concerned sovereign 
states.514 By initiating an internationalisation, China accused Manila of 
running counter to the common wish and joint efforts of China and the ASEAN 
member States. Its underlying goal is […] to put political pressure on China, so 
as to deny China's lawful rights in the South China Sea.515 
Wang further accused the Philippines of malign intentions arguing that it 
 
knew only too well that China would never accept arbitration on this matter, 
yet it insisted on pursuing the so-called arbitration with no regard to Article 4 of 
the DOC and its earlier agreement with China to settle dispute through bilateral 
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channels. So why did it do this? There can be only one explanation, that is, it 
wants to provoke confrontation with China.516 
When in 2015 the PCA (ITLOS) announced that it would indeed exercise jurisdiction 
in this case and initiate due procedure and in July 2016 decided decisively in Manila’s 
favour, Beijing’s response was more of the same rejecting any jurisdiction of the 
tribunal and refusing to participate, not to mention comply.517 
On the hard, material side, Xi Jinping’s China is more willing to use the PLA as well as 
a set of paramilitary forces mostly coming in the form of the Chinese Coast Guard 
(CCG),518 and increasingly (sometimes armed) militia style civilians, in particular 
fishermen, in order to realise goals in the SCS. Beijing allows, most likely  even 
actively dispatches means of resource exploitation such as fishing fleets or oilrigs 
into disputed waters and ensures “protection” by either paramilitary CCG forces or 
even PLA-N warships.519 This is supposed to signal dominance and control over 
disputed waters, to block vessels of other claimants and to protect Chinese 
fishermen from being detained by foreign navies and coast guards when fishing in 
disputed areas. Beijing is using its fishing and paramilitary fleets for geopolitical 
purposes, designed to reinforce its sovereignty and resource claims in disputed 
waters and coerce other claimants into acceptance. It acquires domain control and 
often follows up with land reclamations and construction of military fortifications. 
Dupont and Baker call this the “fish, protect, contest, and occupy” strategy.520 
In 2012, for the first time since the 1995 Mischief Reef (Philippines) incident, China 
grabbed an uninhabited island, Scarborough Shoal, approximately 120nm west off 
Luzon, claimed by both the Philippines and China. Following a more than two 
months confrontation between the prime vessel of the Philippine Navy and several 
paramilitary CCG ships over the use of local fishing grounds, Manila had to give in 
and forfeit the shoal to China, which established de facto administrative control 
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(Sansha). Occupation and control is not limited to land features though. Over the 
past five years instances have increased where Chinese state-owned companies 
placed movable oilrigs into disputed waters or invited foreign companies to tender 
for such rights. In May 2014 for instance, China moved the oilrig Haiyang Shiyou 981 
(HY-981) close to the Paracels where China’s and Vietnam’s Exclusive  Economic 
Zones (EEZ) overlap. The ensuing standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese coast 
guard and navy vessels marked perhaps the worst Sino-Vietnamese row since the 
Third Indochina War and triggered anti-China protests and even riots in Vietnam that 
left several people dead and prompted China to evacuate citizens from Vietnam.521 
Although China removed the rig, on 16 January 2016 Hanoi alleged that HY-981 was 
being steered back into nearby waters. 522 
Malaysia reported some 100 intrusions by CCG vessels as well as at least two PLA-N 
exercises around the disputed James Shoal in 2013. Back then Kuala Lumpur (KL) had 
been largely quiet in line with its overall China policy. In late 2015 though, the tone 
began to change following a series of events that suggested Beijing was upping the 
ante vis-à-vis KL. Malay fishermen have reported that the CCG frequently intimidates 
Malaysian fishing vessels and actively prevents fishing around Luconia Shoals 84nm 
off the Malay coast and within China’s nine-dash line (9DL). Malaysian fishermen 
claimed that they were chased from the shoals by PLA-N boats and would not dare 
to  return  to  their  usual  fishing  grounds.523 The  Philippines  have  reported  many 
similar  cases  in  the  Spratlys.524    Indonesia  considers  itself  not  party  to  any  SCS 
disputes, but has tried to position itself as a mediator. However, when China 
officially published its 9DL in 2009, the mood in Jakarta also changed. For one, as 
imprecise as it is, the 9DL definitely overlaps with Indonesia’s EEZ generated by the 
Natuna Islands, administered by Indonesia as part of its Riau Islands Province.525 
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Secondly, as a large archipelagic state and untypically lacking a strong navy, 
Indonesia depends on the credibility and integrity of a rules-based maritime order. 
China has publically accepted Indonesian ownership over the islands as such, but has 
eschewed clarification of its “historic claims” in surrounding waters.526 Well within 
Jakarta’s EEZ, authorities have identified close to 400 Chinese fishing boats, some 
heavily guarded,527 one of which the Indonesian Coast Guard detained in 2016. In a 
remarkably aggressive mission, an allegedly armed CCG ship forcefully freed the 
Chinese vessel as it was being towed towards Indonesian shores. In the diplomatic 
spat that arose, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson argued that this incident 
occurred within ‘traditional Chinese fishing grounds.’528 
Lastly, China is engaging in significant land reclamation and militarisation projects in 
the SCS as well as establishing administrative control on occupied islands. Often, 
construction efforts turn initially uninhabitable features into actual islands that 
either can or already do host military facilities. 529 Although China is not the only 
claimant to have unilaterally occupied disputed features, the extent dwarfs all others 
in comparison and increasingly alarms non-Chinese stakeholders. For example, in 
less than two years China has built outposts on top of seven reefs in the Spratlys, 
covering more than 12km2 of new land, 8 km2 in the first half of 2015 alone.530 
Satellite images evidence at least three airstrips on these outposts, including a 3km 
long runway on Fiery Cross reef, which China successfully tested in December 2015 
prompting severe protest by other claimants. Additionally, there are aircraft aprons, 
helicopter   pads,   deep   ports   to   accommodate   large   warships,   and   satellite 
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facilities.531 In January 2016, it was reported that two more runways had been 
completed in record time on Subi and Mischief Reef to link-up with the 
infrastructure already in place.532 In the wake of the U.S-ASEAN Summit in January 
2016, the deployment of an advanced Chinese ground-to-air missile system on 
Woody Island in the Paracels was reported, followed by the deployment of at least 
16 Shenyang J-11 4th generation fighter jets. Since 2012, when Beijing established 
control over Scarborough Shoal, administrative quasi-governmental structures have 
been set up and despite agreements to the contrary, the PLA-N maintains a military 
presence. Construction of significant further military facilities are likely and 
observers have warned that China intends to establish an Air Defence Identification 
Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS.533 In sum, by basing significant military assets on Hainan and 
subsequently expanding further southwards into the SCS, Beijing gains an island 
chain from where it can more effectively enforce its authority within the 9DL. China 
has already established point defence capabilities on its outposts and has created 
the necessary military infrastructure for future area-denial capabilities. Chinese 
Ambassador to the Philippines Zhao Jianhua insinuated that Beijing may limit FON 
should it encroach with its sovereign interests.534 As Head of U.S. Pacific Command 
Admiral Harris put it, ‘China is clearly militarizing [the SCS]. You’d have to believe in a 
flat earth to believe otherwise.’535 Professor Shen Hongfang went as far as suggesting 
that some influential PLA figures believed that it was the right time to ‘teach some 
countries a lesson’ and that it may be legitimate to go to war over this issue against 
“the invaders”.536 
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ASEAN’s Role in the SCS 
 
The SCS can reasonably be called the most significant traditional security threat 
ASEAN has faced in decades. In spite of stark power asymmetries, AMS as a 
collective as well as individually still try to be masters of their own fate. 
ASEAN’s Legal Measures 
 
In terms of ASEAN’s desire to create a rules-based order based on its own norms, it is 
useful to begin with the laudable efforts to codify specific rules of behaviour in the 
SCS. The need for regional conflict resolution measures was realised early on when 
ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in 1992. In line with 
the ASEAN way, it was an informal code geared towards conflict management and 
avoidance.537 Asia-constructivists have pointed to the undisputable fact that in 2003, 
China signed up to the ASEAN initiated Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), 
becoming the first non-Southeast Asian country to do so. This would be the first 
point of call for a legal settlement. All parties have committed themselves to the 
‘renunciation of the threat or use of force’, ‘respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity’ of states, and the ‘settlement of differences 
or disputes by peaceful means’.538 Accordingly, in the SCS all claimants would have to 
honour their primary obligation to maintain peace. If adhered to, the TAC could 
deescalate the SCS into an ordinary legal dispute over sovereignty. While the regime 
does not encompass a permanent tribunal to settle territorial disputes, failing 
bilateral “friendly negotiations” legal procedure continues with the High Council.539 
Articles 14 – 17 prescribe the rather elaborate mechanisms to ‘settle disputes 
through regional processes’ whenever situations arise that were ‘likely to disturb 
regional peace and harmony.’540 
More specific than the TAC, Chinese ratification of the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) in 2002 including promises to work towards a 
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binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (CoC) raised hopes that disputes 
were manageable despite China’s continuous rise. Based on more general TAC 
principles, the DoC commits signatories to a more specific rules-based order in the 
SCS, such as respect of freedom of navigation (FON) and to exercise self-restraint so 
as not to complicate or escalate disputes. Crucially, signatories also agreed not to 
inhabit non-occupied features and to work toward a binding CoC.541 With the DoC 
process ASEAN clearly delivered some early institutional progress. Following 
ratification, in 2004/05 ASEAN and China established the ASEAN-China Joint Working 
Group (JWG) to Implement the DoC. This was certainly a step into the right direction 
and the JWG was tasked to increase cooperation and to draw up guidelines to 
implement the DoC.542 At  the first JWG meeting in 2005 in Manila, ASEAN was 
proactive and officials tabled a draft for the Guidelines to Implement the DOC.543 
However, the Chinese delegation was unhappy, with reference point 2 ‘ASEAN will 
continue its current practice of consulting among themselves before meeting with 
China’ becoming a serious sticking point.544 Since the ASEAN Charter requires AMS to 
coordinate and develop common positions and pursue joint actions on the basis of 
unity and solidarity in the conduct of external relations,545 this clause was only due 
ASEAN procedure; a legal requirement. Yet, reflective of Beijing’s strategy of 
privileging bi- over multilateralism, China barricaded and the entire JWG project had 
to be put on hold for more than five years, although ASEAN officials allegedly 
rephrased the clause 21 times. China knew it could not prevent AMS from conferring 
but wanted to prevent concerted ASEAN action and profanely but successfully 
impeded progress.546 In 2011, the guidelines were eventually adopted, following 
some American pressure and only once reference point 2 was amended to now read 
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‘[t]he Parties to the DOC will continue to promote dialogue and consultations in 
accordance with the spirit of the DOC.’547 
At the same time, ironically, the adoption of the guidelines backfired. When the 
Philippines submitted their dispute with China for international arbitration in 2013, 
Beijing – correctly – argued that Manila’s internationalisation was in violation of 
reference point 2. Legal settlement of disputes should only be initiated if other 
avenues of friendly negotiations have been to no avail. The question is at what point 
one can conclude that friendly negotiations have not delivered results? Moreover, 
both the DoC and the guidelines are tentative and nothing is binding or sanctions 
non-compliance. As the Philippine Foreign Secretary remarked, ‘[w]e’re looking for 
the participants to be honourable. Beyond that there’s not much room for us to exact 
consequences for misbehaviour.’548 
Multilateral Forums 
 
The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 was an ASEAN effort 
to control a stable regional security architecture under native regional leadership to 
minimise outside interference while keeping all regional powers engaged. Most of all 
to support establishment of the rules-based system required for ASEAN to be central 
in the light of deficient material might.549 China joined immediately and became a 
regular participant in a number of additional subsequent security forums where the 
SCS could be addressed (e.g. EAS, ASEAN+3, ADMM+). This was perceived to 
encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder with a good sense of 
international citizenship, to be constrained through participation based on norms 
and principles.550 It seemed as if China was indeed turning towards norm acceptance 
in an ASEAN-led security environment.551 However, as many critics rightly argued, 
regional cooperative security mechanisms in Southeast Asia tend to prefer soft- 
security issues and eschew discussion of territorial disputes. Based on the ASEAN 
 
 
 
547 
Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC (2011), available: www.asean.org, accessed 
01/02/2016. 
548 
As quoted in Thayer (2011b): 92. 
549 
See chapter 2 for more detail on the ARF. 
550  
Emmers (2003): 117. 
551 
Acharya (2014): 257. 
199 
 
 
way, conflicts are at best multilaterally managed, not solved, since individual parties 
are able to keep certain contentious issues off the official agenda. For that reason, as 
Juergen Haacke has shown, even less sensitive security cooperation, such as 
combating piracy where all participants have a more or less common interest, takes 
place on bi- or trilateral agreements among ARF members outside the ARF 
avenue.552 Each participant is able to more or less effectively block any multilateral 
discussions within ARF, ASEAN+3, or ADMM+ channels, as was the case with Beijing 
and the guidelines. Institutional effectiveness is therefore limited and as Ian Storey 
argues increasingly being held hostage to great power rivalry. This could lead to a 
situation where ASEAN meetings become so ineffective as to have outlived their 
usefulness and may become entirely irrelevant in SCS matters. 553 This was 
exemplified at the November 2015 ADMM+ meeting in Malaysia where Defence 
Ministers could not agree on the usual end of summit joint statement. Allegedly, 
China would not allow any mentioning of the SCS, while the U.S. would not agree to 
a declaration without even mentioning the greatest security issue. 554 China’s 
Defence Minister Wanquan stated that “regional outsiders” had attempted to 
include matters that should not be subject of the meeting.555 
A notable exception was the 2010 ARF summit in Hanoi. Then Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton articulated a strong U.S. interest in the SCS disputes and thus, 
controversially raised a sensitive topic of hard security openly in a multilateral 
setting.556 As per usual Chinese negotiators had in preparatory meetings ensured 
that the SCS disputes were not to be raised, but did not count on Hillary Clinton 
breaking the unscripted rules of Asia’s “quiet diplomacy”. Once it became clear that 
the Americans would not step back, AMS also took courage and agreed that the 
topic ought to be raised.557 At the inaugural ADMM+ meeting in the same year, 
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Clinton’s colleague Secretary of Defence Gates performed a similar task and also 
mentioned the SCS although it had not appeared on the official agenda. China was 
diplomatically outmanoeuvred and isolated in rare instances of collective pressure in 
an ASEAN-led forum, backed up by the U.S. Unfortunately for ASEAN, 2010 remained 
an exception. 
Lastly, as chapter 2 has argued, track-1.5 and -2 networks play an important role in 
Southeast Asia, often filling the void track-1 leaves in sensitive policy fields. 
Accordingly, informal diplomacy has become a vital part of SCS security 
multilateralism, taking the form of initiatives such as the workshop on Managing 
Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea organised and initiated by Indonesia (and 
curiously Canada). Article 16 of the TAC provides for the possibility of regional non- 
disputants to offer ‘all possible assistance’ to settle disputes to which all parties to 
the dispute should be ‘well disposed towards’.558 In particular Indonesia has tried to 
be proactive in this regard and initiated several workshops beginning in 1990 at the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Although disputes are unlikely to be solved, those 
conventions do provide a forum for discussion in informal settings and gauge 
possibilities of functional cooperation from which CBMs, such as the International 
Workshop on the SCS or the science workshop ASEAN-China Cooperation Fund, have 
resulted.559 As Hasjim Djalal, former Indonesian ambassador to the UN and leader of 
the workshops points out, those avenues do not intend to solve territorial disputes, 
but aim to create cooperative programs in which all participants can take part. They 
hope to promote dialogue among the directly interested parties so as to find 
common ground auspicious to their larger, underlying problems. A confidence- 
building process that makes everyone feel comfortable with one another.560 In other 
words, CBMs to manage conflict and reduce risks of miscalculation in order to 
navigate underlying tensions. Unfortunately, after more than two decades of 
workshops, no noteworthy spill-over effects have materialised, yet. 
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The above is indicative of ASEAN’s multilateral dilemma. Existing security forums and 
regimes including all relevant actors ought to result in the ability to effectively deal 
with SCS via multilateral channels. Yet, since all ASEAN-spawned initiatives have 
inherited the ASEAN way, they do allow for maximum flexibility but their 
inconclusive non-binding outcomes and consensus requirements more often than 
not cause inefficacy. The question is, what is the value of those meetings if the most 
serious challenge to regional security is not dealt with, often not even discussed? As 
Nicholas Khoo brought it neatly to the point: ‘[once] the meetings end and the real 
international politics begins, an alarming and unimpressive record has been recorded 
on an issue that is critical to [ASEAN] members’ security.’561 As of yet, those ASEAN- 
based vehicles of alleged norm projection, a few CBMs notwithstanding, have not 
yet managed to move beyond dialogue. 
Galvanising the Community 
 
Recognising the limitations but also the potential of ASEAN-based, collective legal 
and institutional agency, individual ASEAN Member States (AMS) have often taken 
the initiative to hold their fellow AMS to the community promise and establish and 
utilise precisely this unity and coherence ASEAN as a collective has repeatedly 
entreated. Yet, the attempt to galvanise all AMS behind the supposedly common 
maritime security threat can be an up-hill battle. Possibly more than any other 
ASEAN claimant the Philippines have tested ASEAN’s resolve to substantiate its 
‘concert of Southeast Asian nations […] bonded together in partnership […] in a 
community of caring societies.’562 In 2011 top government representatives embarked 
on a tour across several AMS in order to get a unified ASEAN voice to collectively 
increase the pressure on China.563 Corresponding well with Charter requirements of 
“enhanced consultations”, 564 Foreign Minister del Rosario visited Vietnam and 
President Aquino himself went to Thailand and Brunei. Disillusioned after years of 
fruitless  DoC  talks,  Manila  proposed  an  alternative  Zone  of  Peace,  Freedom, 
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Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFFC), which would be consistent with UNCLOS and 
more comprehensive and specific than an eventual CoC.565  ZoPFFC was in fact 
significantly more elaborate and diplomatically sound approach to the SCS impasse 
including practical dispute resolution, but endorsing and proposing ZoPFFC would 
have required a joint ASEAN10 position in support of the four ASEAN claimants. To 
Manila’s disappointment, when legal experts of each AMS met in September 2011 to 
consider the proposal, Cambodia and Laos did not attend and no joint position on 
behalf of ASEAN could be achieved. Implying that Beijing had exerted some influence 
on the two absentees, Del Rosario voiced his anger in, by ASEAN standards unusually 
tough words, saying Manila had ‘the impression that political and economic 
considerations had hindered a fruitful and mutually acceptable outcome on the 
discussions.’ 566 Possibly weary of a similar experience observed ASEAN efforts 
Vietnam tried the bilateral channel. Then leader of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV) Nguyen Phu Trong visited Hu Jintao in 2011 and agreed a six-point agreement 
on the principles governing the settlement of bilateral maritime issues. Crucially, 
Aquino had visited Hu earlier in the year and reiterated Manila’s heartfelt position 
that the SCS disputes ought to be a “regional matter” requiring a “regional solution”. 
While Manila criticised Vietnam for undercutting a multilateral ASEAN approach, 
Hanoi defended its position by arguing that it considered bilateralism to be more 
promising.567 
That year, ASEAN’s disunity became public knowledge first at the 45th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 2012 and again at the Summit in November where 
the Cambodian Chair spoiled the community party. In particular Vietnam had been 
proactive and vocal regarding ASEAN’s common goals in the SCS and had pushed 
hard for a decisive, concerted response. Then Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor 
Namhong however blocked efforts to include a reference to the SCS into the AMM 
joint communiqué, although those issues had clearly been discussed.568 Despite 
great efforts by other delegates, in particular Indonesia and Singapore, to present 
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and rewrite numerous drafts, Hor Namhong was resolute in his objection to any 
reference to the SCS and stubbornly refused to give his consent to the otherwise 
procedural standard of a joint communiqué. 569 Similarly reflective of China’s 
strategy, at the 2012 Summit, the Cambodian Chair attempted to insert a reference 
into the communiqué that all ASEAN leaders had agreed not to internationalise the 
SCS disputes, to which Manila could not possibly agree. President Aquino stated 
‘[f]or the record, this is not our understanding. The ASEAN route is not the only route 
for us. As a sovereign state it is our right to defend our national interests’.570 As a 
result, at the AMM no joint communiqué was issued at all – a first in its history – and 
the reference was dropped at the Summit. Very few – if any – doubts exist that this 
impasse was a result of successful Chinese pressure on an ASEAN Chair not wanting 
to antagonise Beijing. Despite public embarrassment Phnom Penh does not seem to 
have changed course. In January 2016 in preparation for the U.S.-ASEAN meeting at 
Sunnylands, California, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry paid a visit to some of the 
potential spoiler countries (Cambodia, Laos) suggesting that the U.S. tried to avoid a 
similar debacle. Apparently Kerry failed, for Hor Namhong maintained immediately 
after the meeting that Phnom Penh believed individual countries should settle 
disputes among themselves without any ASEAN involvement.571 
In 2016, under Laotian ASEAN Chairmanship, first indications are similarly 
inauspicious as far as ASEAN unity is concerned. Laos is neither a claimant nor an 
interested party and Vientiane’s political apparatus lacks diplomatic skill and 
experience. As a landlocked country, small in both material and diplomatic terms, 
bordering – and economically and politically depending – on China, Laos is perhaps 
the most vulnerable of all AMS to Chinese strategic pressure and thus, worst placed 
to be the bedrock of ASEAN coherence vis-à-vis Beijing. Sure enough, in May 2016, 
Wang Yi reported at a meeting in Vientiane that China does not want the SCS to 
affect China-ASEAN relations and had to that end reached a four-point consensus 
with Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei, including the provision that disputes are a bilateral 
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rather than an ASEAN matter and claimants would confer only among themselves.572 
Apparently three AMS, one of which being the incumbent Chair, agreed to China’s 
principle that ASEAN claimants should forfeit their collective weight potential in 
multilateral ASEAN channels and negotiate directly with Beijing instead. In particular 
in Manila and Hanoi this will be read as yet another act of disloyalty in the face of 
Chinese pressure on the “weakest link”. 
Nonetheless, if the above makes concerted ASEAN  action seem an entirely lost 
cause, there are also some reasons for optimism. 2015 was the year of the Malaysian 
Chair. KL showed great determination to include SCS statements during the April 
Summit as well as the AMM in August. Although it could not secure a joint 
declaration at the ADMM+ in November due to the known divisions over the 
dispute, the Malaysian Chair managed to produce some of the strongest ASEAN 
language on the SCS to date. The Chairman’s Statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit 
expressed 
serious concerns […] on the land reclamation being undertaken in the 
South China Sea, which has eroded trust and confidence and may 
undermine peace, security and stability. 573 
Not only was this the first time that ASEAN leaders had called the action in the SCS 
“land reclamation” but they also collectively ‘instructed our Foreign Ministers to 
urgently address this matter constructively.’ Although China was not directly 
mentioned as the principle source of threat, the Foreign Ministers were instructed to 
address this issue under ‘various frameworks such as ASEAN-China relations’.574 And 
sure enough, at the following AMM, Foreign Ministers jointly expressed the same 
serious concerns […] on the land reclamations in the South China Sea, 
which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may 
undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea.575 
In the world of consensus seeking, conflict avoiding ASEAN, where unity can be hard 
to obtain, this was certainly great effort on ASEAN’s part and testimony to KL’s 
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political aptness. Even more so, considering that China is Malaysia’s largest trading 
partner. The Chinese side responded by stating that it ‘opposes a few countries' 
taking hostage the entire ASEAN and China-ASEAN relations’576 
AMS Working Outside ASEAN 
 
Catherine Jones has argued that ASEAN Member States (AMS) do not seek to deepen 
their external alliances, but prefer to engage in ASEAN-based institution building in 
order to work towards and maintain ASEAN’s centrality relevance.577 Research for 
this case study suggests otherwise. The Malaysian effort notwithstanding, AMS are 
increasingly convinced that ASEAN-led initiatives are both unreliable and not 
delivering. Aside from intra-ASEAN divisions that frustrate any degree of concerted 
action, the fact is also that ASEAN lacks the material muscle and defence pacts in 
order to protect its members against external threats. Within their means, individual 
ASEAN claimants are defending against what they perceive as encroachment into 
their waters. Frustrated with the lack of diplomatic progress and increasingly feeling 
the Chinese heat, individual AMS seem to increasingly regard ASEAN as at best 
adjunct to their security. 
In Vietnam China has long been regarded as the greatest foreign policy threat 578 and 
in 2015 the Vietnamese people apparently view tensions with China as their number 
one security concern.579 Unsurprisingly, policy makers cannot be idle and despite 
possessing a reasonably strong, battle-experienced military force, Hanoi has begun 
reaching out to the U.S. At no point since the normalisation of U.S.-Vietnam relations 
in 1995 has rapprochement been as noticeable as today and the motive is Chinese 
expansion in the SCS. In 2012 then U.S. Defense Secretary Panetta said that 
Washington wished to work with Vietnam ‘on critical maritime issues including a 
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code of conduct focusing on the South China Sea’.580 Under Panetta’s successor 
Carter, military-to-military cooperation as well as aid in both monetary and 
hardware supply has significantly increased.581 Hanoi answered proactively and took 
measures such as the 2016 inauguration of a new port facility at Cam Ranh Bay in 
the SCS, capable of hosting aircraft carriers and submarines – unofficially this reads, 
hosting U.S., Japanese, and Australian aircraft carriers and submarines. Two 
Japanese Navy destroyers paid a visit immediately in April 2016, following a similar 
call to Subic Bay in the Philippines. Japanese Defence Minister Nakatani declared the 
visit would strengthen security ties and guarantee FON in the SCS.582 At the same 
time, as Li Jianwei583 pointed out, somewhat ironically Sino-Vietnamese cooperation 
is the most extensive and institutionalised bilateral relationship between any ASEAN 
claimant and China. Following normalisation of relations in 1991, Hanoi and Beijing 
set up an extensive web of cooperation mechanisms that already facilitated the Gulf 
of Tonkin settlement. Congruently, high-level Sino-Vietnamese visits have picked up 
and encompass the SCS.584 Both also arranged for a hotline in order to quickly 
manage possible incidents.585 
The Philippines on the other hand lack such established channels of bilateral 
communication with China, but Manila’s security policy also suggests frustration 
with ASEAN. What Manila seeks first and foremost is a rules-based regional order, 586 
in agreement with ASEAN’s collective goals. Yet, it is noteworthy that the current 
Philippine strategy does not seem to include ASEAN in any significant way. Having 
been left frustrated with ASEAN in the legal and institutional arena, Manila 
internationalised their individual legal case by initiating arbitral proceedings based 
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on UNCLOS involving both the ICJ and the PCA.587 Manila argued that China illegally 
occupied several features within the Philippine EEZ and asked for a correct 
interpretation of UNCLOS regulations in the SCS. As mentioned above, the PCA ruled 
decisively in Manila’s favour in July 2016, but Beijing rejected ruling and legitimacy of 
the PCA. It was even argued that Manila had disguised the real issue of territorial 
control in a legal case about the definition minor attachments to UNCLOS.588 Be this 
as it may, Manila is well aware that China is unlikely to adhere to the international 
ruling and thus simultaneously engages in internal and external balancing by 
upgrading own capabilities, while frenziedly reinvigorating military alliances with 
external security providers such as the U.S. and Japan. When the prime flagship of 
the Philippine Navy lost control over Scarborough Shoal to mere Chinese  Coast 
Guard vessels in 2012, it became painfully obvious that Manila needs to step up its 
military game. Since Tokyo re-evaluated its security strategy under the Abe 
administration,589 Manila benefitted in form of significant hardware, such as ten 
patrol boats and at least three Beechcraft TC 90 surveillance planes. Manila also 
received five armed versions of the European Agusta Westlands  AW  109 
helicopter, 590 three U.S. frigates and are in talks about Lockheed Martin anti- 
submarine P3-C planes. Washington has also responded in the form of the 2014 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), allowing the U.S. Navy to 
comprehensively re-accesses Philippine military bases it had originally vacated in the 
1990s, and to increase joint military exercises. Washington more than doubled its 
annual military aid in 2016 591 and gave the Philippines a central role in the 
American-led Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) in order to strengthen 
maritime domain awareness.592 In order to raise Manila’s own capabilities, Benigno 
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Aquino brought a 998bn Peso military procurement plan under way. A remarkable 
investment relative to GDP.593 
Although not an official claimant, Indonesia is also subject to increasing Chinese 
assertiveness within the 9DL. Referring to the 2016 Natuna incident, Indonesia’s Vice 
President Jusuf Kalla stated that he was increasingly worried about Chinese 
behaviour within the Indonesian EEZ as well as Chinese construction of military 
facilities on artificial islands in the SCS. Security Chief and close aide to President 
Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Luhut Panjaitan, added that Jakarta must realign its defence 
posture facing threats from SCS dynamics. Correspondingly, Jakarta began to 
strengthen its EEZ defence capabilities by deploying seven warships to the waters 
surrounding the Natuna Islands and doubling current troop numbers. Jakarta will 
also strengthen the local Ranai air and naval base and deploy a new fleet of jet 
fighters, additional warships, a drone squadron and will purchase additional kilo- 
class submarines in order to ‘answer the question of how we can project our power 
in the Natuna archipelago.’ 594 This military fortification takes place not only around 
the Natunas but is part of a greater resolve to protect Indonesian maritime territory 
and EEZ under the Jokowi administration, who tries to establish Indonesia as the 
regional maritime fulcrum. 595 Instead of ASEAN’s rules-based order, Jokowi outlined 
his vision for Indonesia’s own future foreign policy strategy with heavy emphasis on 
what has become known as the “Jokowi doctrine”.596 This includes a general increase 
in military spending and a vast expansion of naval capabilities in order to protect key 
maritime interests. 597 As Beijing has grown more assertive in the SCS, Jakarta has 
grown more proactive in asserting what it sees as its right. This may turn out to be a 
blessing for ASEAN, as then still acting Head of the Indonesian military General 
Moeldoko suggested Jakarta might again take the military lead in Southeast Asia.598 
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Malaysia is also an interesting example. Unlike Hanoi or Manila, KL has for many 
years pursued a strategy of rather cautious diplomacy and tended to be patient with 
and cordial towards Beijing.599 Chinese encroachment around Malaysian claimed 
Luconia Shoals however, led to a change in both language, as seen above, and in 
military policy. In an initial response to the detection of Chinese vessels in 2015, the 
Royal Malaysian Navy assigned a Laksamana-class guided-missile corvette on a 
monitoring mission600 and the defence ministry announced the establishment of a 
new naval base and troop deployment close by. Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid 
Hamidi noted in 2015 that ‘a regional superpower has encroached into (Malaysia’s) 
maritime territory by constructing airstrips, jetties and other facilities on three atolls 
just 155km from Sabah.’ This regional superpower’s motives were  questionable 
given that that ‘the country in question is 3,218km away’.601 In this light, Malaysian 
Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein proclaimed that Beijing’s actions were 
forcing KL to militarily ‘pushback against China’, internally and externally. This signals 
that Malaysia, just like other ASEAN claimants and interested parties, will not accept 
the Chinese expansion within the 9DL on the basis of “historic rights” 602 and intends 
to “pushback” unilaterally. 
 
Supply and Demand. ASEAN Central to Regional Security? 
 
The above case study has shown that in the aftermath of the Cold War in Asia, there 
has been an increasing Chinese interest in regional, chiefly ASEAN-based security 
multilateralism. At first sight, by joining ASEAN institutions such as the ARF and 
becoming party to such ASEAN-initiated security regimes as the TAC, China has lend 
credence to Asia-constructivists who see ASEAN as the fulcrum of regional security 
and has also substantiated ASEAN’s ambition to be in the driver’s seat of regional 
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security. Present and unfolding conflicts in the South China Sea are a litmus test for 
this substance, for ASEAN’s extramural security relevance and ultimately for Asia- 
constructivists who see ASEAN as overproportionally potent. One ought to 
remember what Surin Pitsuwan, never too shy to put his finger into the wound, 
pointed out about centrality in the introductory quote. The former ASEAN Secretary 
General reminded us that centrality was a phrase coined by ASEAN itself, enshrined 
in  its  documents  and  conveniently  subscribed  to  by  ASEAN’s  dialogue  partners. 
Centrality however, cannot simply be prescribed but must be acquired, earned, and 
re-earned to be substantive.603 
In this light this case study has investigated certain aspects of perhaps the most 
critical traditional security threat the region currently faces. Like all case studies in 
this thesis, this took place within the demand-supply framework of optimistic 
perspectives on ASEAN’s centrality in extramural security multilateralism from which 
benchmarks and corresponding KPIs have been devised. Subsequent sampling of 
factual evidence has been sufficient to evaluate the practical ASEAN supply. Both 
elements shall now be reconciled. The following is the first of three case specific 
appraisals of ASEAN security agency as a key component of actorness. Has the 
association met said benchmarks? 
Cohesiveness – Largely Failed 
 
The APSC is built on the presumption that its members share a common security 
outlook as ‘a community of caring Southeast Asian societies bonded together in 
partnership’. 604 This builds on one of the key principles of the ASEAN Charter 
committing its members to act under the guidance of shared commitments and 
collective responsibility in enhancing regional security. In order to realise unity and 
ultimately its ability to be central, ASEAN had specified the need for and means of 
internal institutional cohesion, such as enhanced internal consultations before 
extramural  relevance  and  ultimately  centrality  can  be  realised.  The  Charter 
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specifically demanded that AMS must refrain from any policy or activity that 
threatens sovereignty, territorial integrity or stability of any other member of the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community.605 In order to asses performance, some KPIs 
included ASEAN’s ability to remain an autonomous organisation, capable to act as a 
unit and in concert, as ASEAN itself as well as Asia-constructivists specified. In order 
to contribute to the common good of ASEAN resilience it must withstand outside 
interference and act in accordance with its own goals. If ASEAN was able to meet 
those KPIs despite substantial adversity and pressure, it could reasonably be argued 
that one necessary precondition for centrality has been met. In the light of the above 
however, the best conclusion this case study can come to is that this benchmark of 
cohesiveness has been largely missed. 
On the one hand, it was found that when individual AMS attempt to take the 
initiative within ASEAN channels in order to give Southeast Asian multilateral 
processes some “teeth”, they meet disunity. The Philippine attempt to unite and 
engage ASEAN in order to advance towards a more robust, rules-based legal 
framework exemplified the resistance pro-active AMS may face. Manila’s failure to 
win backing of fellow AMS for pushing China towards acceptance and 
implementation of their ostensible common desire of a rules-based order 
demonstrated to everyone involved that ASEAN cannot be relied on to facilitate 
regional solutions to regional problems. The 2012 Cambodian debacle also 
particularly stands out. More publically than Manila’s 2011 experience, 2012 
exposed the limits of ASEAN’s institutional cohesion and demonstrated to its 
members, the wider region, and indeed to a global audience that ASEAN cannot act 
as a reliably loyal and united organisation if need be. Singaporean Foreign Minister 
at   the   time   Shanmugam   observed   correctly   that   ‘this   has   dented   ASEAN’s 
credibility.’606 Some have argued the 2012 Cambodian case was exception rather 
than the rule and things had changed since. Unlike in 2012, China now faced a more 
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unified and determined ASEAN.607 But latest events of 2016 such as the dubious 
meeting between China’s Wang Yi and a number of AMS in Laos suggest otherwise. 
At the time of writing, with Laos as Chair 2016 already looks like another lost year as 
far as the SCS is concerned. Indeed, as a Laotian diplomat disclosed to this author, 
his country’s Chairmanship tenure will eschew the SCS as much as possible and focus 
on “low hanging fruits” such as advancing ASEAN Connectivity.608 In particular 2012, 
but also  negotiations  over the  DoC  guidelines and  other  examples showed  that 
ASEAN processes and institutional weaknesses allow for a degree of outside 
interference in internal matters that enables China to “divide and rule” ASEAN. 
Beijing’s ability to painlessly manipulate due ASEAN processes and hold meetings 
and processes hostage to its self-interest suggests that the basic pillar of cohesion 
underpinning centrality in the APSC is feeble. Apparently, plenty of AMS are not 
ready to risk antagonising China. 
At the same time, one should not judge Cambodia or Laos all too harshly. While it is 
true that “weakest links” easily falter allowing China to undermine ASEAN, who 
would compensate Cambodia for potential real losses, financially and diplomatically, 
incurred by antagonising China? Fellow AMS with significantly higher interests in the 
SCS like Vietnam or the Philippines? Hardly. China has been able to divide and rule 
ASEAN on the basis of economic and political cleavages and dependence. Individual 
as opposed to regional positions reflect that AMS among themselves exist and act in 
a strategic context of competition for the most favourable agreements with the 
greatest emerging regional power. 609 Whether ASEAN likes it or not, Beijing’s 
influence in the region is strong and will only grow in the context of the One Belt 
One Road initiative. Many ASEAN leaders look towards Beijing for a share of China’s 
value added to the Asia-Pacific region. In that context, it is rather naïve to believe 
that spoilsport Cambodia was a one-off. National self-interest coincides with 
structural and institutional shortcomings within an extremely heterogeneous ASEAN. 
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As a result of this lack of cohesion and efficacy, in the legal realm claimants find 
themselves bogged down in negotiations over a toothless DoC and implementation 
guidelines to this day. After more than a decade of fruitless talks, not many in ASEAN 
– if anyone – believe this will eventually bear satisfactory results. Although talking to 
China is certainly preferable to not talking, Manila’s unilateral submission for 
international arbitration in 2013 is a clear indication that the government has lost 
patience with ASEAN. This is reflected in the fact that this submission was made 
without the much called for prior internal ASEAN consultation and came out of the 
blue for other ASEAN leaders. 610 After failing to galvanise all of ASEAN, the 
submission  was  a  Philippine  effort  to  contribute  towards  a  reliable  rules-based 
security order in Asia while having concluded that the main proponent of such order, 
ASEAN, is neither a sufficient nor necessary organisation to realise this aspiration. In 
that sense, Manila is trying to unilaterally realise a collective ASEAN goal. Bringing 
this point home, not even the remaining ASEAN claimants made any effort to join or 
officially endorse Manila’s arbitration case. Similarly disappointed with ASEAN 
channels, Vietnam is increasingly trying to solve the matter directly with Beijing; a 
means particularly favourable to the latter. Although the SCS disputes have proven 
to be more difficult to settle then the Gulf of Tonkin, already established 
mechanisms of talks facilitate bilateralism and allow Hanoi to conclude that in the 
light of frustrating ASEAN experiences, exhausting such avenues is merited.611 
A second result from the absence of internal cohesiveness has been an increasingly 
“hard” non-ASEAN response by individual littoral states. Virtually all littoral Asian 
states are stepping up their military game with varying degrees of external and 
internal balancing measures. Some measures taken by Hanoi, Manila, Jakarta, and KL 
sought to exemplify this trend. Knowing from experience that an ASEAN rules-based 
order is at best work in progress, but more likely simple window dressing, there has 
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been an increase in both military spending and procurement and a widening of 
external security guarantees. 
And yet, before one was to conclude that ASEAN has not performed at all against the 
KPIs generated from the demand side in this case study and thus missed the 
benchmark entirely, one ought to remember the optimistic takeaways. Those came 
mostly in the form of a strong ASEAN Chair producing some robust language. A 
determined Malaysian Chair somewhat vindicated post-2012 ASEAN and took 
ownership of this issue during its reign, in spite of China being KL’s largest trading 
partner. Not only Chairman’s Statements but also ASEAN institutions under 
Malaysian guidance articulated a common stance. In the light of the above, realising 
unity and policy coherence across several institutions by including the SCS in 
unanimously agreed upon communiqués and statements are achievements in their 
own right. This signals that under auspicious circumstances ASEAN can find unity and 
coherence in the face of adversity. It also alludes to the critical role of the Chair. 
During the year at the forefront of ASEAN, the respective country must balance its 
national with regional interests and must wear both the national and the ASEAN 
“hat”, as Tang Siew Mun rightly put it.612 Albeit no easy ask in such diverse a region, 
this is key to ASEAN’s ability to act as a collective and by extension, key to centrality. 
The Chairmanship must come with national and regional interest parity in order to 
prevent undue outside influence. Effectiveness of the Chair is key to effectiveness of 
ASEAN. 
In sum, despite some positive takeaways, this case study showed that AMS more 
often than not pursue extra-ASEAN measures, mixing internal and external balancing 
with increased non-ASEAN third-party involvement. In other words, bilateral 
approaches are not only China’s default mode but also increasingly AMS’. Quite 
unlike China though, this case study suggests that AMS are not motivated by a 
general preference for bi- over multilateralism. On the contrary, ASEAN avenues are 
frequently tried, but unfortunately quickly exhausted. Heterogeneity and diverging 
interests under the limitations inherent to ASEAN processes complicates cohesion 
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and makes dependable ASEAN effectiveness near impossible. Hitherto, China has 
been fairly successful in driving a wedge between AMS in order to resists a rules- 
based order. ASEAN does currently not display the degree of cohesions and unity 
necessary to match Chinese strategy. ASEAN is thus not the sum of its individual 
parts but significantly less. Since it occasionally manages to find a common voice, 
though, ASEAN does have some, albeit limited agency. 
Convening Power – Met. 
 
While ASEAN has had only very limited success in terms of cohesiveness, this case 
study allows the conclusion that it does have substantial convening power to show 
for. Hence, there is a case to be made for Asia-constructivist enmeshment 
arguments. Although not extending beyond getting the great powers involved, 
ASEAN does engage all players in regular frequent dialogue. Convening power was 
above defined as ASEAN’s ability to assemble and host all relevant regional actors 
and sett the agenda. Case study specific KPIs were ASEAN’s pro-activeness in 
initiating security related forums, workshops, etc. to which it would invite relevant 
players, who would then willingly participate and invest political capital into ASEAN 
processes. This benchmark therefore inquires as to ASEAN credibility as a provider of 
security multilateralism. 
The factual outcome in the South China Sea will largely be determined by great 
power relations between China on the one and the U.S.-led coalition on the other 
side. The role of ASEAN, as Asia-constructivists have pointed out, can be to provide 
platforms for security cooperation, facilitate dialogue and negotiations in which 
ASEAN and AMS play a role that may indeed be unproproportionatly greater than 
many realists would accept. Consider for instance the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting-plus (ADMM+). This ASEAN-initiated and -chaired high-level meeting 
engages all EAS defence ministers and thus, the persons second in command in 
terms of security of all actors relevant to East Asian security. As a result, ADMM+ has 
since its inauguration become the most important Asian security forum,  having 
taken over only from another ASEAN-initiated and –led forum, the ASEAN Regional 
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Forum (ARF).613 Those forums make meaningful contributions to keeping tensions at 
bay through dialogue and this alone suggests that convening power is useful in its 
own right. For instance, the November 2015 ADMM+ meeting under Malaysian 
leadership coincidently directly followed a very controversial U.S. FON operation in 
the SCS to which Beijing reacted with great discontent and regional apprehensions 
increased. Only a week later, Chinese Defence Minister Chang Wanquan attended 
the ADMM+ in KL and met both his Southeast Asian and crucially, his U.S. 
counterpart for talks where such things could immediately be discussed. It can 
certainly be hailed as a success that relevant parties hold high-level talks on military 
matters at a time of regional military tensions. Also important is the ARF. Although it 
has been shown that China typically – with 2010 being one of the few exceptions – 
manages to keep the SCS off the agenda, the ARF is another ASEAN-based high-level 
(foreign minsters) forum where dialogue takes place. ARF critics of whom there is a 
long list, are overly pessimistic by declaring it a useless talk-shop, while Asia- 
constructivists see it as a perfect regional “norm-brewery”. 614 The truth is 
somewhere in between. After more than two decades the ARF has achieved little in 
terms of its goal to move from confidence building towards conflict-resolution and 
has hitherto failed to progress beyond the first stage. Unusually self-critical ASEAN 
has acknowledged this failure.615 The SCS dispute are not going to be solved within 
the ARF framework. However critical confidence building measures (CBMs) are 
agreed and acted upon. One can argue that CBMs are just that, weak instruments of 
trust building, not mechanisms by which crises can be mitigated. And yet, not least 
due to ASEAN assembling all relevant actors, CBMs are maintained and constantly 
expanded, even at times of severe crisis. In this light, it is valuable to note one 
expert’s recent risk assessment of the maritime security situation in Asia. Sam 
Bateman concluded that in particular CBMs are helping to facilitate strategic trust in 
the long run by allowing continued cooperation necessary for the management of 
regional seas. What the region needed was a greater not lesser cooperative mindset. 
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Maritime cooperation was not ‘something nice to have’ but ‘an obligation and a 
necessity.’ 616 
It has been argued that the SCS is one of the critical places of 21st century great 
power politics. In a climate of mutual Sino-U.S. mistrust, as for instance evident at 
the 2010 ARF, there is no alternative to ASEAN’s role as convener, for the major Asia- 
Pacific players are unable to create and entertain multilateral avenues for necessary 
discussion within which they could diplomatically engage. Under current 
circumstance, the reciprocal lack of trust and legitimacy felt by the respective other 
prevent anyone but ASEAN to assume this role. In addition, the non-committing 
ASEAN way conveniently allows the major powers to cooperate without great costs. 
Not least due to this non-commitment, tangible success is very limited indeed. But 
forums such as ADMM+ and ARF are not obsolete. Their real value has always been 
explained best by Michael Leifer who saw the ARF as a soft supplement to hard 
balancing measures. 
The ARF’s limited objective is to improve the climate in which regional 
relations take place in the hope that bilateral and multilateral 
problems may be easier to manage.617 
As is the case in the great number of workshops Indonesia initiated on ASEAN’s 
behalf, the value added of all ASEAN-led track-1 to 2 security forums is indirect. 
Rational institutionalists have argued that such forums are an institutionalisation of 
mutual reassurance whereby regional stability and cooperation requires efficient 
information transmission among stakeholders.618 Asia-constructivists do have a point 
and ASEAN may well be the only honest broker capable of facilitating this 
transmission. 
The question left of course is whether or not the relevant actors participate. Hence, 
a further critical KPI for ASEAN’s convening power was determined as the political 
investment great powers are willing to make into ASEAN. It could be demonstrated 
that   both   Beijing   and   Washington   frequently   participate   in   ASEAN-initiated 
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multilateralism. Tangible results aside, participation in ASEAN institutions and 
regimes is in itself an investment into ASEAN-led processes. In particular the Obama 
administration has stepped up their commitment to ASEAN. As former National 
Security Advisor Tom Donilon noted in 2013, Barack Obama 
has made a decision to participate at the Head of State level every 
year at the East Asia Summit, consistent with the United States’ goal 
to elevate the EAS as the premier forum for dealing with political and 
security issues in Asia.619 
Moreover, the U.S. hosted the first ever U.S.-ASEAN Summit on American soil in 
California in 2016 and inaugurated the U.S.-ASEAN Connect initiative. Although it still 
remains the case that Washington first and foremost promotes bilateral military 
alliances and strategic partnerships with individual AMS, knowing that ASEAN-led 
multilateralism yields few tangible results. But Washington and other players do 
invest political capital into ASEAN by attending meetings and entertaining dialogues 
at the highest level and crucially, widely publicise and communicate this investment 
to a regional and global audience. In particular the Americans frequently reiterate 
their dedication to ASEAN centrality in the evolving security architecture of the Asia- 
Pacific.620 In spite or perhaps precisely because of China’s strategy in the SCS, to a 
lesser extent this is also the case with Beijing. The argument can be made that 
talking to ASEAN was all show and sits well with Beijing’s overall strategy in the SCS. 
Nonetheless, although eschewing mentioning of ASEAN centrality and trying to 
establish a regional architecture of its own making, Beijing frequently participates in 
all critical ASEAN-based meetings and regimes it is invited to and engages in CBMs, 
thus lending credibility to the association. 
 
In sum, convening Power is perhaps the greatest contribution ASEAN can make to 
East Asian security and is perhaps its greatest asset. Despite significant material 
asymmetries, ASEAN maintains a certain degree of relevance by keeping all actors 
upon whom regional stability depends engaged and talking. Although this is not 
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sufficient, dialogue is better than no dialogue and this alone significantly reduces the 
risks of miscalculation and escalation, although both still exist; or in Michael Leifer’s 
words, ‘bricks made without straw are better than no bricks at all’.621 
Although ASEAN does not have a great degree of autonomous agency within its own 
institutions other than being the convener and factual security depends on the great 
powers, the fact that they come together at all lends credence to ASEAN relevance. 
As the late Lee Kuan Yew put it once, ‘multilateral security dialogues can build 
understanding and confidence. But they are no substitute for a stable balance of 
power.’622 Hence, this benchmark has been met and ASEAN has some relevance in 
regional security to show for and by extension partially fulfils centrality demands. 
ASEAN may not be in the driver’s seat of regional security, but perhaps it owns the 
car. 
Competence Power – Not Met. 
 
If one was to accept the Asia-constructivist argument and ASEAN’s desire to create a 
rules-based order in its own image, projecting its norms into the wider region, 
hosting all relevant actors is no end itself. In order to live up to Asia-constructivists’ 
greatest promise, ASEAN must back up its convening with its competence power. 
Arguably the most important of all benchmarks to be met if one was to conclude an 
appraisal of ASEAN’s centrality in the wider regional security architecture on a 
positive note. If it could be proven that ASEAN possesses this constructivist reading 
of power and use it to meaningfully influence the interests and preferences of 
external, often more powerful players in Asia, ASEAN would not only be central to 
regional multilateralism and capable of creating a rules-based order conducive to its 
own ambitions. ASEAN would also falsify one of the most critical conclusions of 
realist theory. A loose congregation of small, materially weak states would have 
overcome international anarchy and tamed unequal power with the help of norm 
building via institutions. Building on traditional constructivism, it has been shown 
that Asia-constructivists believe ASEAN capable of precisely this; of socialising China 
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into regionally acceptable behaviour by having it subscribe to ASEAN-initiated norms 
and principles. Enmeshment in institutions and regimes produces cooperative habits, 
eventually leading to the rules-based regional security architecture ASEAN desires. It 
is the power to educate and re-educate relevant actors in the ways of regional 
conduct established and accepted by the ASEAN collective. 
Unfortunately, this case study found that while Asia-constructivists are right in that 
ASEAN has indeed tried to socialise China into a non-military rules-based order, this 
has been remarkably unsuccessful. It was argued that performance could be 
measured in terms of Chinese acceptance, application, and internalisation of ASEAN 
projected norms and corresponding rules. Results illustrate that in spite of ASEAN 
socialising initiatives and an at first sight remarkably responsive Beijing, signatures 
under documents and institutional participation are no ends in themselves. As Asia- 
constructivists rightly point out, Beijing does not refuse participation in forums and 
official subscription to associated norms. On the contrary, it appears even keen on 
putting pen to paper and has committed to the normative order of both TAC and 
DoC and engages in high-level multilateralism for negotiations as well as CBMs. 
China made an unambiguous commitment to the principles of peaceful dispute 
resolution and an eventual rules-based order accepted on both sides of the SCS, in 
accordance with UNCLOS. China also agreed not to inhabit non-occupied features 
and to work toward a binding CoC. Yet, as the case study demonstrated, the impact 
of such cooperation has shown to be little beyond rhetoric. The socialisation or even 
partial acceptance of ASEAN norms has not occurred in practice, as China has not 
internalised cooperative, non-violent ASEAN norms. This is not due to a lack of 
trying. Chinese ratification of the DoC in 2002 and continuous work towards a 
binding Code of Conduct is ASEAN’s greatest achievement to date as far as the 
specifics of the SCS disputes are concerned. No surprise that Asia-constructivists and 
ASEAN alike rally behind the code and frequently reiterated its importance and refer 
to its progress. Many have also argued that it is evidence for a rethink of Chinese 
traditional aversion to multilateralism and the ability of ASEAN to enmesh and 
socialise China. 
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However, militarisation, increasing aggression, even outright violence however 
directly contradict the key principles China has accepted on paper. Creation of 
artificial islands and their subsequent militarisation and the establishment of 
administrative control are in harsh violation of both UNCLOS and the DoC. It also 
goes against the cooperative spirit of the ostensibly continuing effort to work 
towards a binding CoC. As it stands, there are only very limited real costs associated 
with ratification of ASEAN-based treaties and participation in ASEAN institutions. 
ASEAN-based multilateralism has failed to elicit meaningful compromises and 
solutions. Legal acceptance has been exposed as insubstantial in practice. Far from 
socialising China into the ASEAN orbit, the non-committing ASEAN way allows China 
to participate without noteworthy costs and even to manipulate processes almost at 
will. As Chinese actions in the SCS, consistent with the material, hard components of 
its strategy, unambiguously demonstrate, China is paying lip-service to norms and 
legal frameworks while creating contrary, even polar opposite facts on the ground. 
While the TAC provides no effective conflict settlement mechanism and is entirely 
voluntary, the DoC is de facto not more than a statement of intent to perhaps 
eventually as some unspecified point in the future, come to an elusive binding 
agreement. Both Chinese militarisation of natural as well as artificially created 
islands and its aggressive behaviour only marginally shy of open military conflict is in 
stark contrast to what it has committed itself to on paper. Effectively, China lets facts 
determine regional negotiations and rules, not the other way around. 
What is more, China is not only not internalising ASEAN-initiated norms, but it is in 
line with its overall SCS strategy. China obstructs the effective application of ASEAN 
norms and rules into which it is apparently being socialised by extending its military 
and civilian presence across the entire SCS, while simultaneously participating in 
dialogue. By engaging the region, Beijing appears to reassure all regional actors of its 
good intentions, while creating facts on the ground and manipulating processes in 
order to prevent both internationalisation and multilateralisation of the disputes. 
Regional multilateralism does not only fail to socialise China, it is to some extent 
even working in the opposite direction. 
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In terms of the final KPI, action instead of reaction, ASEAN has unfortunately also 
failed. Whenever ASEAN tried to take the initiative it could not succeed in its aims. 
Indicative are the two examples of the guidelines and ZoPFFC. At the first JWG 
meeting in 2005 ASEAN took the initiative and tabled a draft for the Guidelines to 
Implement the DoC. However, Beijing successfully barricaded and managed to block 
the process for several years, although the clause in contention was rephrased by 
ASEAN 21 times to make it acceptable to China. When negotiators eventually 
returned to the JWG to proceed, it followed pro-activity on the American, not 
ASEAN’s part, by Clinton raising the stakes at the 2010 ARF. Moreover, far from 
being socialised into ASEAN’s norms, the Chinese delegation only agreed to return to 
the negotiating table once the guidelines were amended in its favour. Similarly, one 
AMS, namely the Philippines, attempted to take ownership by galvanising ASEAN 
behind the laudable ZoPFFC, consistent with UNCLOS and more specific than the 
CoC. ZoPFFC represented a clear legalised framework that envisioned a two-step 
socialisation of China into an eventual rules-based order in the SCS. To Manila’s 
disappointment, two spoiler countries inhibited ASEAN pro-activeness. 
Asia-constructivists predicted that through its centrality, ASEAN is able to devise, 
shape, and lead regional institutions in its own image and could therefore mitigate, 
or even negate the consequences of significant material power asymmetries. This 
competence power would be a pivotal component of ASEAN centrality and 
ultimately its actorness. Yet, the greatest of all security issues as far as ASEAN and its 
extramural environment is concerned has shown that ASEAN-initiated instruments 
to transfer its own preferences and socialise an outsider have not yielded any 
tangible results on the ground. ASEAN has not been able to project its norms 
meaningfully into the wider Asia-Pacific and Chinese commitments remain entirely 
rhetorical. The benchmark of competence power has been missed entirely. Not only 
has it been unambiguously demonstrated that ASEAN lacks the teeth to be a 
successful socialiser or norm-enforcer, but also more critically that China is refusing 
to be the norm-recipient. 
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A Preliminary Conclusion 
 
In this first case study, only one of the set benchmarks has been met. Thus, neither 
Asia-constructivist nor ASEAN’s own assertions as to ASEAN’s centrality in 
multilateral security can be confirmed. The answer to the case specific research 
question is therefore a “qualified no”. It is a no of because two critical benchmarks of 
cohesion and competence power have been failed. It is qualified, because ASEAN 
does possess some convening power. 
Centrality has been determined as one of the crucial pillars supporting Asia- 
constructivist and ASEAN’s own claims as to its relevance and actorness. Noteworthy 
independent ASEAN agency in the driver’s seat of East Asian security multilateralism 
would hint towards a significant degree of overall ASEAN actorness within the APSC. 
The association itself and constructivism-biased observers fancy ASEAN as the 
fulcrum of cooperative regional security architecture. We found however that this 
fulcrum is rather off balance. The major takeaway point is that ASEAN cannot fully 
transcend the power asymmetries specifically inherent to Sino-ASEAN relations. 
Although Asia-constructivists have made some great contributions to the study of 
ASEAN and in particular alluded to its convening power, it cannot put to bed basic 
notions of balance of power considerations. Chinese ambitions are hitherto more or 
less effectively checked not by a cohesive and coherent ASEAN-initiated and -led 
rules-based order, but by hard internal and external balancing. It is not norm 
socialisation or institutional enmeshment that harnesses Chinese expansion, but first 
and foremost a U.S. balancer and security guarantor. At least as worrying as far as 
ASEAN actorness is concerned, the U.S. is also often the backbone of the limited 
meaningful ASEAN action there is. If anyone is in the driver’s seat at all, then it is 
likely to be the great powers. 
ASEAN does not lack leverage per se. It only lacks the institutional ability to use its 
leverage effectively enough to prescribe a degree of agency that would measure up 
to centrality claims. The weak ASEAN-based system allows China to dictate the 
direction of regional multilateralism by manipulating processes as well as dictating 
the character of future regional power balances. ASEAN’s consensus principle and its 
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near obsession with informality and non-commitment are largely to blame for the 
association’s ineffectiveness leading to it being “sidelined rather than central”. The 
consensus principle inhibits a resolution due to the significant split along diverging 
interests in the SCS. Not least due to ASEAN’s heterogeneity it happens to be the 
case that the association is essentially bisected allowing China to divide and rule. 
ASEAN fails to establish unity and fails to maintain autonomous regional resilience. It 
fails to dictate the terms of regional multilateralism and collective action is easily 
undermined, in some cases even by its own members. As a consequence, not only 
are Asia-constructivists wrong in their optimism, ASEAN also repeatedly shows itself 
incapable of being a reliable organisation. Trust in ASEAN-based processes is low and 
AMS resort to alternative measures. Ironically, ASEAN’s ineffectiveness is therefore 
self-reinforcing. While AMS remain the “masters of the treaties” and it was up to 
them to reform ASEAN processes that constrain its effectiveness, ASEAN failures 
have led to an erosion of trust into multilateral processes among AMS themselves to 
a point where individual governments have grown frustrated and increasingly exploit 
external avenues. In the same vein, as ASEAN has shown to be unreliable in security 
matters, for non-claimant AMS the price tag for ASEAN unity is simply not worth it. 
As far as the DoC is concerned, the perhaps greatest problem with the DoC and its 
implementation is that it has become a matter of great urgency. The slow pace of 
progress of talks for the legally binding CoC stands in stark contrast to the increasing 
militarisation in the SCS. China is adamant that there can be no CoC until the DoC is 
fully implemented while at the same time blocking any attempt to implement the 
DoC guidelines. China’s ongoing forceful changes to the political and strategic status 
quo makes the CoC process simply a diplomatic delaying tactic, for the status at the 
time of eventual ratification is precisely what an eventually binding CoC intends to 
maintain. Even if Beijing was to eventually agree, the situation in the SCS is likely to 
have changed in its favour to an extent as to render a CoC in its current form virtually 
meaningless. In other words, Beijing only needs to play for time while consolidating 
its presence in the SCS. In a context of legal ambiguity, there is the possibility that 
over time,  law  develops from established  practice  and de jure  sovereignty  may 
follow from de facto control. 
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The above is unflattering for ASEAN actorness. But there are positive conclusions 
working in ASEAN’s defence. It has been demonstrated that, albeit limited, the 
association does play a role in regional security. Although ASEAN aspires to be 
significantly more than that, it is at a minimum contributing to conflict avoidance in a 
very volatile region by enabling dialogue and confidence building and it often goes 
unnoticed that talks have merit in themselves. It has been argued that Asia- 
constructivists significantly overestimate ASEAN’s impact in the Asia-Pacific security 
theatre. Yet, most avenues of regional security discussion there are, are indeed 
ASEAN-based and maintained. 623 Hence, ASEAN critics are equally wrong by 
underestimating the merit of ASEAN and affiliated forums. ASEAN hosts and chairs 
the meetings, sets the agenda and procedures take ASEAN as a prototype. This in 
itself gives ASEAN a certain degree of agency. As a final word of caution, Asia- 
constructivists who argued that ASEAN’s centrality was also manifest in its ability to 
“use” externals to its ends are misled.624 One is well advised not to credit ASEAN for 
every effective check on Chinese aggression in the region. Nothing in this case study 
suggests that continuing U.S. balancing in the SCS is due to ASEAN “using” the U.S. to 
do so. ASEAN’s convening power, though existent, does not derive from ASEAN 
agency as much as from the greater geopolitical context, a coincidental strategic 
environment.625 
In sum, since two of the three key characteristics of the APSC have not been fulfilled, 
ASEAN centrality cannot be accepted. As far as ASEAN is concerned, despite some 
positive signs, there is not much is to be expected. To be fair to ASEAN, even the 
primary provider of global security and only global superpower, the U.S., finds it a 
tough ask to deal with Chinese assertiveness effectively. Salami-tactics in 
international relations are notorious and inherently difficult to answer without 
escalation. How could one ask ASEAN to find a SCS solution? Ultimately, short of a 
settlement, the best outcome of the SCS disputes will look like a frozen conflict along 
the status quo where a mix of hard balancing, subtle diplomacy, and legal elements 
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mitigate against immediate crises and hot conflict. Mostly, AMS will apprehensively 
look towards the U.S. and increasingly Japan for security. ASEAN will continue to be 
sidelined rather than being central; in the passenger’s rather than the driver’s seat. 
Or has Bilahari Kausikan has famously put it, sometimes, the person in the driver’s 
seat is only the chauffeur.626 
 
 
4.2. Case Study 2: The “SC” in the 
APSC – The Thai-Cambodian Conflict 
and the ASEAN Security Community. 
 
 
 
 
ASEAN has indeed become a security community in the sense that its 
members do not foresee the prospect for resorting to armed 
confrontation among themselves to resolve existing bilateral disputes. 
Thanks to the “habit” of cooperation developed through political, 
diplomatic, cultural and military exchanges, ASEAN states have moved 
to a point at which intra-ASEAN conflicts have “either become 
irrelevant or been muted considerably” (Amitav Acharya, 1991) 627 
 
The Thai-Cambodia border dispute shows that members of ASEAN 
can’t refrain from using force with each other. How can you say they 
we are a community if we attack each other? (Rizal Sukma, 2011)628 
 
 
At the heart of the first ASEAN Community (AC15) pillar, the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community (APSC) is the “SC” – the “security community”. This second case study 
intends to evaluate the degree of ASEAN’s actorness in regional security by 
investigating the quality of security community claims. Supposedly, the umbrella of 
APSC covers a community of nation states that cooperate under the precondition of 
dependably non-violent multilateralism, displaying at least a burgeoning sense of a 
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common identity based on norm sharing as well as a commonly shared, 
intersubjective understanding of security and stability. This chapter will assess 
whether the APSC “supplies” the Deutschian indicator of dependable expectations of 
peaceful change, “supplies” the much acclaimed identity, and lastly “supplies” the 
degree of institutional agency in intramural conflict mediation that certifies security 
actorness in times of inevitable intramural disagreement. 
This case study asks whether or not AMS can be considered to be living under the 
condition of a robust and reliable security community, resulting from ASEAN 
integration into AC15. Has ASEAN fostered dependable expectations of peaceful 
change, a degree of common identity and contributed to non-violent conflict 
resolution? 
Like case study 1, we investigate a “hard” case for ASEAN. This time in the form of 
the Thailand-Cambodia border war629 within the 2008 – 2011 time frame when, due 
to a bilateral dispute over the ancient temple of Preah Vihear, respective militaries 
were summoned along the border and an initially minor dispute was incrementally 
escalated by both sides. Both belligerents were and are ASEAN Member States 
(AMS), the ASEAN Charter was in force and AC15 well underway. This conflict 
represented as great a challenge to ASEAN’s very raison d’être of security as it 
presented an opportunity for ASEAN to substantiate the APSC pillar. 
I offer the following case specific research question: 
 
Does the APSC sufficiently satisfy the demands of the security community concept to 
warrant its name? 
Following the overall research design, this case study commences with a thorough 
analysis of the “demand side”, drawing on chapter 3. From this, it derives a set of 
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benchmarks and corresponding KPIs. A subsequent analysis of the “supply side” will 
give a thorough footing for the second of this thesis’ three empirical appraisals of 
ASEAN’s security actorness. I arrive at the conclusion that ASEAN is not a security 
community, since the APSC mostly fails critical benchmarks. The fact that two AMS 
have fought a hot conflict negates the basic security community claim. At the same 
time, an investigation of political background and motivation for deliberate 
escalation of the conflict raises serious doubts as to the substance versus rhetoric of 
regional as opposed to national identity. Yet, the picture is more balanced than a 
simple “F” for fail. ASEAN can, within its structurally limited means, contribute to 
escalation prevention and conflict mediation. Based on results of this case study, the 
answer to the research question is a “no”. But although the APSC is window dressing, 
ASEAN is by no means redundant in regional security. 
 
Demand Side – The APSC. 
 
Even the most cautious or apologetic observer will find it hard to deny that ASEAN 
casts itself as a security community and Asia-constructivists follow suit. Chapter 3 
has in great detail introduced both perspectives and clarified the Asia-constructivist 
concepts of identity and community as well as their implications for ASEAN. As in all 
case studies, the following will recall some of the basic arguments as they relate to 
the specific case in order to develop a coherent set of benchmarks. 
ASEAN Rhetoric 
The APSC [ASEAN Political-Security Community] will ensure that the 
peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with one another 
and with the world at large […] (ASEAN, 2009)630 
 
 
Evidencing that ASEAN fancies itself as a security community, characterised by the 
renunciation of inter-state violence and peaceful conflict resolution, based on a 
shared regional identity and the realisation that each other’s security is inextricably 
linked, is not a difficult task by any means. ASEAN itself continues year after year to 
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flamboyantly and prominently declare precisely that. The first clue is certainly in the 
name itself. The second in APSC’s raison d’être; to ensure that ‘[AMS and the peoples 
of ASEAN] live in peace with one another and with the world at large’ in a ‘just, 
democratic and harmonious environment.’ This objective, ASEAN declared, is realised 
by creation of a ‘rules-based’ community of ‘shared values and norms’ in a ‘cohesive, 
peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive 
security’.631 ASEAN envisages that the APSC will ‘bring ASEAN’s political and security 
cooperation to a higher plane.’632 
By ASEAN’s own accounts, through the APSC, Southeast Asia shall be 
 
[a] region that resolves differences and disputes by peaceful means, 
including refraining from the threat or use of force and adopting 
peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms while strengthening 
confidence-building measures, promoting preventive diplomacy 
activities and conflict resolution initiatives.633 
Although the key characteristic of the APSC is therefore the absence of war, it is 
allegedly also the institutionalisation of shared norms, values, and identity as the 
reason for the absence of war. The 2015 APSC Blueprint, formally adopted at the 
14th ASEAN Summit in 2009 prominently identified its first community pillar as a 
rules-based, people-oriented, people-centred community bound by 
fundamental principles, shared values and norms, in which our 
peoples enjoy human rights, fundamental freedoms and social justice, 
embrace the values of tolerance and moderation, and share a strong 
sense of togetherness, common identity and destiny. 634 
In other words, ASEAN declares itself a fully-fledged security community. 
 
Of course, attentive critical observers may point out that the declarations made in 
ASEAN’s 2015 document Vision 2025 are precisely that, ambitions and visions to be 
realised by 2025. However, by ASEAN’s own account of 2009, the 
Political-Security Community has its genesis of over four decades of 
close co-operation and solidarity. The ASEAN Heads of 
States/Governments, at their Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 
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1997 envisioned a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward 
looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in 
partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring 
societies.635 
What ASEAN is referring to here is its 1997 Kuala Lumpur Summit where the idea of 
community and concert of nations was first articulated and specified. Like Vision 
2025, the 2020 version stated what ASEAN will have achieved come the respective 
year in terms of integration, including security integration. As chapter 2 explained, 
the date 2020 was ambitiously rescheduled and put forward to 2015 at the 9th 
ASEAN Summit. ASEAN was determined that by the year 2020 (now 2015) it will have 
established a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia where each nation is 
at peace with itself and where the causes for conflict have been 
eliminated, through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law […] 
Southeast Asia where territorial and other disputes are resolved by 
peaceful means. 
Until then, ASEAN declares – grammatically relying on present perfect tense – that 
 
[w]e in ASEAN have created a community of Southeast Asian nations 
[…] Our rich diversity has provided the strength and inspiration to us 
to help one another foster a strong sense of community.636 
This regional sense of community was defined more precisely in 1999 by then ASG 
Rodolfo Severino who pointed out – this time relying on the present perfect 
continuous – that 
[t]he main reason for ASEAN's enduring strength has been the stake 
that each member has in the viability of the association. This stake 
goes beyond  the  results  of the economic and other  forms  of 
cooperation that ASEAN has been undertaking over the past three 
decades. ASEAN is more than an association of states. It is also a 
process, a spirit, a state of mind.637 
On the basis of this continuing “strong sense of community”, or this “state of mind”, 
ASEAN will be a ‘concert of Southeast Asian Nations’; a ‘community […] bound by a 
common regional identity’638 once vision becomes reality. 
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In 2003, Bali II speaks more determinedly of ASEAN as a ‘community of caring 
societies [which] promote a common regional identity’. 639 One year later, some 
strategies were mapped out in order to 
contribute to building collective responsibilities and forming a 
standard or common adherence to norms of good conduct in a 
democratic, tolerant, participatory and open community, as a means 
to consolidating and strengthening ASEAN as solidarity, cohesiveness 
and harmony (the ”we feeling”) 640 
This identity was built on security preservation and cooperation and the realisation 
of the common stake in each other’s security situation. In fact, as early as 1967, 
ASEAN’s founding document, the Bangkok Declaration, identified the promotion of 
intramural Southeast Asian peace and stability as a main purpose and ASEAN as a 
forum for the resolution of intramural conflicts. It is certainly possible to argue that 
the prevention of military conflict in Southeast Asia was one of the two main reasons 
ASEAN was conceived in the first place – in addition to keeping the great powers 
engaged in a potentially instable security vacuum. Following the end of Konfrontasi, 
the declaration explains that as of 1967 the very existence of ASEAN ‘represents the 
collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in 
friendship and cooperation […] for the blessings of peace’. Nations are engaged in 
‘joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the 
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations.’641 
Accordingly, Bali Concord I of 1976 asked AMS to act ‘in the spirit of ASEAN 
solidarity’ and to ‘rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra- 
regional differences.’642 The second edition of 2003, establishing the actual pillars of 
AC15, elaborated further and added to “the spirit of ASEAN solidarity” for this 
“exclusively peaceful” security cooperation a constitutive, ideational basis. All 
members of the ASEAN security community (by that time all current ASEAN10) 
ostensibly ‘regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound 
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by geographic location, common vision and objectives’.643 This allegedly being the 
case, the regulative element that intramural cooperation must take place under an 
unconditional ‘renunciation of the threat or the use of force’644 was reiterated. 
In addition to APSC-specific agreements, the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC) still represents one of the fundamental pillars of codified constitutive and 
regulative ASEAN security cooperation. The TAC prescribes to all contracting parties 
(all ASEAN10 in addition to a number of extramural states) the utmost respect for 
the one universal principle that is “peaceful coexistence” and “friendly cooperation” 
among signatory states. Indeed, the very ambitious, flamboyant purpose of the TAC 
is the promotion of ‘perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation’.645 All 
contracting parties have unanimously agreed to put pen to paper in order to 
henceforth conduct their interrelations in accordance with such fundamental 
principles as mutual respect for sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, freedom 
from external interference, subversion or coercion, peaceful settlement of 
differences or disputes, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force.646 Article 
10 specifically requires each signatory to ‘not in any manner or form participate in 
any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability […] 
of another [signatory]’.647 
Article 13 trusts in the good faith of all parties to prevent any conflict from occurring. 
However, principles aside, should a dispute ever arise, Chapter 4 of the TAC, titled 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes provides well defined guidelines as to the process of 
settlement. In case bilateral negotiations – always the first point of call – are to no 
avail, the TAC provides for the High Council648 as the ad-hoc, but default mechanism 
to arbitrate and settle disputes through ASEAN-based regional processes. In cases of 
disturbances to ‘regional peace and harmony’, ASEAN can therefore be authorised to 
take cognizance via the High Council, which should initiate appropriate means of 
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settlement and prevention of deterioration, such as offering good offices and 
mediation.649 
Far from being outdated, in 2003 ASEAN reaffirmed the validity of the TAC and that 
in ASEAN’s eyes this treaty remains ‘an effective code of conduct for relations among 
governments.’ In particular the High Council ostensibly reflects ASEAN’s commitment 
to peaceful conflict resolution and accordingly merges with the APSC in that the High 
Council, ‘shall be the important component in the ASEAN Security Community’.650 The 
APSC Blueprint therefore accentuates the applicability and mechanisms of the TAC in 
intramural security and disputes,651 reinforced in ASEAN’s latest security community 
roadmap from 2015. 652 The 2009 edition devotes an entire section to conflict 
resolution and calls for the strengthening of existing mechanisms for the settlement 
of disputes under the TAC. It also urges enhanced development of ASEAN modalities 
for good offices, conciliation and mediation. The 2015 blueprint reiterates 2009 
provisions for a 
constructive role of ASEAN in, and promote a rules-based approach towards the 
peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the ASEAN Charter, the TAC 
and other relevant ASEAN instruments.653 
 
One could reasonably argue that both the inauguration of a security community in 
general as well as peaceful cooperation and dispute settlements became de facto 
legal requirements in form of the very first provisions of Article 1 in ASEAN’s main 
legal framework, the Charter. In the tradition of 1967, Charter Article 1 declares 
ASEAN’s main purpose to be 
[t]o maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further 
strengthen peace-oriented values in the region; To enhance regional 
resilience by promoting greater political, security, economic and socio- 
cultural cooperation 654 
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In order to meet the security community goals of stability, peace and security, and 
socio-cultural cooperation, the Charter legally obliges AMS to act in accordance with 
principles including ‘shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing 
regional peace, security and prosperity’ and ‘enhanced consultations on matters 
seriously affecting the common interest of ASEAN.’655 Charter Article 22 and 23 urge 
AMS to negotiate peacefully among themselves and via ASEAN established and 
maintained mechanisms. Disputing parties can call upon ASEAN to provide good 
offices and mediate in particular through the hands  of  the  ASEAN  Chair  or  the 
ASG. 656 The Charter also specifically reconfirms the validity of TAC settlement 
mechanisms.657 The ultima ratio the Charter provides for is still an ASEAN-based 
political solution. Article 26 stipulates 
when a  dispute  remains  unresolved,  after  the  application  of  the  preceding 
provisions of this Charter [friendly negotiations, mediation, TAC settlement 
provisions], this dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit, for its 
decision.658 
Taken together, AMS map out their commitment to be a ‘united, inclusive and 
resilient community’ that will ‘remain cohesive, responsive and relevant in addressing 
challenges to regional peace and security.’659 
The purpose of these strategies shall be to prevent disputes and 
conflicts from arising between ASEAN Member States that could 
potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability.660 
 
 
In sum, with such documents and legal treaties, security regimes, and declarations of 
intent, AMS furnished ASEAN with a clear mandate to be, albeit on basis of voluntary 
compliance corresponding with the ASEAN way, the mediator of first resort in a 
rules-based security community, founded on normative as well as functional security 
principles. 
 
 
 
655 
ASEAN Charter (2007): Art 2. 
656 
ASEAN Charter (2007): Art 22; 23. 
657 
ASEAN Charter (2007): Art 24; the same article also recognises the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM). EDSM is the default provision for economic 
dispute resolution among AMS and thus, of no concern for the purpose of this thesis. 
658 
ASEAN Charter (2007): Art 26. 
659 
ASEAN Community Vision 2025 (2015): Art 7. 
660 
APSC Blueprint (2009): B2.21. 
235 
 
 
Asia-constructivists 
 
Chapter 3 has already demonstrated the importance and ideological basis of 
principles and concepts such as community, norms, and identity. It was also shown 
that such defined principles and concepts are alien to realists and accordingly, do not 
matter much in realist accounts of ASEAN security cooperation. Indeed they do not 
matter much at all. If actors (states) cooperate in security at all, neo-realists are 
likely to believe that this will at most be a limited functional multilateralism, directed 
against a common threat perception.661 To thus inclined observers the development 
of the APSC and security cooperation in general is, just like the founding of ASEAN 
itself, threat rather than norm and identity dependent. 
On the other side of the fence, such concepts are the very essence of constructivism 
and thus, not surprisingly at the heart of Asia-constructivist perspectives on intra- 
ASEAN security cooperation. Chapter 3 explained in great detail the extent to which 
observers whom I have termed Asia-constructivists rely on traditional constructivist 
and security community literature. Communities in general were sociologically well 
explained by Ferdinand Toennies who juxtaposed “society” as rationally constructed 
cooperatives, formed in anticipation of gains by self-interested individuals and 
“community” in which members are bound by an intrinsic identification with the 
overall collective and common objective. 662 A shared interpretation and 
intersubjective understanding of norms and values bind community members, 
shaping a feeling of togetherness. Community members act in Max Weber’s terms 
“value-rational”, guided by an intrinsic orientation on the fundamental norms and 
values of the group. Behaviour is thus guided by March and Olsen’s “logic of 
appropriateness”. 663 Characteristic of community behaviour is therefore an 
orientation along acceptability of appropriateness defined by a common identity and 
constitutive norms. In the context of a mutual reconstructive structure-agency 
relationship, we saw how some traditional constructivists argued that a redefinition 
of self in relation to others within an interactive environment is the dependent 
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variable of a we-feeling and a collective identity. Identity itself is again constantly 
produced and re-produced by social interaction and in turn defines the interest of 
the individual unit.664 Both identity and interest are therefore extrinsic, mutually 
constitutive and constantly re-negotiated. Interaction facilitates identity 
construction and intersubjective understandings of commonly shared interests. 
Adler and Barnett argued that in practice, a community evinces the three 
characteristics  of  shared  identity,  values,  and  meanings;  engage  in  frequent 
interactions in numerous settings; and lastly evince reciprocity. Members are 
supposed to have convergent definitions of the common regional good; a 
consideration that prevails over narrowly defined self-interest.665 Hence, in theory, a 
security community is characterised by inter-subjective understanding of belonging 
together. In practical terms, incremental institutionalisation of positive cooperation 
practices follows from shared identity, successively acquired by reliable patterns of 
norm adherence. As opposed to neo-realist understandings of narrow, self-interest- 
based functional cooperation, nation states can in this view opt to cooperate and 
over time establish a collective non-violence identity through appropriate behaviour 
and cordial interaction.666 
We found that in the Deutschian tradition, at their core, security communities are 
regarded as a group of states among which war has become inconceivable due to an 
experience of habitually reciprocated trust and non-violent cooperation, appropriate 
behaviour, and incremental identity formation. In early security community 
literature, Karl Deutsch had defined a security community as an integrated group 
with a developed sense of community and institutionalised unifying habits and 
practices. This community has ‘come to an agreement on at least this one point: that 
common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful 
change’.667 In other words, inter-state relations take place in absence of war and 
preparations for war, under the conditions of dependable expectation of peaceful 
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change.668 A security community once formed will have created the foundations for 
reliable long-term peace. 
Adler and Barnett were shown to be supportive of this notion and specified the need 
for institutional regional integration and the resulting dynamics. This decreases the 
likelihood of war. Whereas Deutsch had put functional cooperation, or transactions 
as he put it as his IntV, Adler and Barnett see integration not only as a functionalist 
spill-over but emphasised the institutionalisation of ‘mutual identification, 
transnational values, intersubjective understandings, and shared identities’.669 The 
authors believe that 
violent conflict can be mitigated and even eliminated by the 
development of mutual identification among peoples and not through 
conventional practices such as balancing and collective security 
schemes.670 
 
 
Charles Kupchan boldly declared that despite minor disagreements, academic 
consensus existed that ASEAN was indeed a successfully integrated, normative 
security community.671 Accordingly, ASEAN has supposedly arrived at Kupchan’s 
fourth and final phase of community formation, the “generation of new narratives 
and identities”. As chapter 3 explained, this phase is characterised by a modification 
of the general political discourse around former adversaries, now security 
community members. Through political, economic, and cultural symbolism, mutual 
perceptions are altered and identities begin to converge. The distinction of the self 
and the other among former antagonists fades and gives way to the much cited we- 
feeling.672 
This ought to result in what Timo Kivimaki called the long peace of ASEAN.673 We saw 
how Kivimaki’s quantitative research on the decrease of interstate conflict in ASEAN 
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since 1967 and even more so in the post-TAC era, led him to conclude that a trend of 
Southeast Asian identity construction facilitated the “long peace of Asia”, beginning 
with ASEAN and spreading “like a benign disease”.674 He regards ASEAN as the peace 
generating institutional outcome of an elite realisation of the importance of 
commonly shared principles, goals, and identity, specifically due to the practices of 
the ASEAN way. A conflict adverse political culture of governance and diplomacy has 
produced ASEAN’s security community. 675 
With this, Kivimaki built on earlier ground breaking Asia-constructivist notions of 
writers such as Nikolas Busse who had seen a collective identity based on social 
practice and interaction as “the real glue” holding ASEAN together.676 Individual AMS 
often acted beyond narrowly defined national interests, since they collectively felt 
that they ‘had something more important in common - namely being a member of 
ASEAN.’677 In Busse’s view, there is only very limited distinctive individual national 
interest across ASEAN. Perhaps borrowing from Wendt, Busse believes that interest 
should not be seen as consequence of strategic location or economic structure. 
Instead, AMS’ interests derive from the groupings acquired collective ASEAN 
identity.678 The arguably most prominent contemporary Asia-constructivists Amitav 
Acharya argued in very similar fashion. Due to socio-cultural commonalities, 
increasing regional cooperation had apparently ignited a still on-going process of 
intramural socialisation, precipitating gradual Southeast Asian identity formation 
beyond mere material interests. Acharya sketches how decades of incrementally 
institutionalised regional socialisation processes allowed ASEAN elites to “imagine” 
themselves as part of a distinct Southeast Asian region, conducive to evolving 
regionalism and remarkably great regional coherence. Deeper institutionalisation of 
norms fostered an eventually shared regional identity, less defined by self-interested 
nation states and geographical borders but by a shared sense of a common, 
Southeast  Asian  identity,  producing  what  is  now  a  “nascent  ASEAN  security 
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community”.679 As we recall, at the nascent stage a group of states begins to 
cooperate in order to increase individual security and encourage further interaction 
amongst them. Although this group may retain some internal rivalry and 
competition, at the nascent stage rivalry is muted by a noticeably evolving shared 
identity, appreciation of common threats, and anticipation of gains that may well be 
mutual as opposed to zero-sum. Those states have come to realise that they share 
common security interests and that their respective individual security may be 
enhanced by collective security cooperation on the lowest common denominator.680 
Whereas Acharya’s 2001, by his standards pessimistic conclusion noticed a dip from 
the more promising early 1990s – perhaps influenced by inauspicious effects of 
enlargement or the Asian financial crisis – in 2014, Acharya regained his cautious 
optimism and discovered an ASEAN identity not normally expected in the nascent 
phase but resembling security community identity of the advanced “ascendant” 
tier.681 
Also of interest to this case study, according to Acharya’s writing, not conflict as such 
but membership expansion to include previously “unsocialised” states is the greatest 
threat to security communities.682 Acharya argues that security community claims 
are not contradicted by the presence of intermural tensions at all. In fact, those may 
well arise at any time. What mattered though, was peaceful tension management 
around identity and norms commonly shared by all members.683 Acharya’s 2011 
prediction for ASEAN in the year 2030 is worth a read in this regard. Here, Acharya 
lists what he sees as ASEAN’s greatest previous achievements as well as future 
challenges.684 He argues that 
ASEAN’s single greatest success as a regional body, a central basis of 
its claim to be a “nascent security community”, was its ability to dilute 
and manage, if not entirely resolve intra-mural disputes. […] Over the 
years, ASEAN members have not allowed their bilateral territorial 
disputes   and   political   tensions,   including   those   over   maritime 
 
 
 
679 
Acharya (2014). 
680 
Acharya (1991); (2001); Adler/Barnett (1998): 37ff; also chapter 3 of this thesis for more detail. 
681 
Acharya (2014): 264. 
682 
Acharya (2014): 31f. 
683 
Acharya (2005): 107. 
684 
Acharya (2011). 
240 
 
 
boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand, South China Sea, the Sulu Seas and 
other areas, to cripple the organization.685 
Others have shown to be equally, or even more positive that ASEAN indeed 
constituted a security community. Alex Bellamy had for instance argued that ASEAN 
deliberately constructed informal networks of interaction that match the benefits of 
supranational qualities of  comparable communities  such as  the European  Union 
(EU), by being a ‘loosely coupled community of values, interests and norms’.686 Like 
other Asia-constructivists, Bellamy argues that ASEAN managed to build a ‘no war 
community’, his argument’s dependent variable (DV), on the solid basis of shared 
norms, constituting Bellamy’s independent variable (IV).687 Likewise, Estrella Solidum 
regards the successfully integrated community that is ASEAN as the centrepiece of 
intramural security and stability.688 ASEAN had been able to maintain the ‘highest 
commitment to goals of peace, freedom, stability, prosperity, rule of law, and 
security’ in ‘a concert of Southeast Asian nations.’689 Solidum leaves no doubt as to 
her causal variable and, like Acharya, believes a common identity shaped by the Asia- 
constructivists IV of choice, shared norms, fostered an ASEAN sense of community 
and a peaceful community of caring societies.690 
 
Supply Side – How Secure is the Community? 
 
According to the above, leaders of ASEAN Member States (AMS) can reasonably 
expect peaceful intramural relations. ASEAN names itself a security community, 
albeit remaining vague as to whether it has already fully matured or was still 
remaining just below the maturity threshold. Asia-constructivists see ASEAN at least 
as a nascent security community on an upward trajectory. Some have gone 
significantly further. Ostensibly, Southeast Asian regionalism is of transformative 
character, establishing a shared identity and ultimately reliable long-term peace. It is 
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therefore not unreasonable to see ASEAN as a security facilitator by promoting and 
contributing to standards of non-violence across its regional jurisdiction. Indeed the 
very name the association gave its first AC15 pillar, the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community (APSC), seemingly lends credibility to Asia-constructivists assessments of 
ASEAN as an identity sharing community under the condition of dependable 
expectations of peaceful change. 
Benchmarks 
 
The benchmarks devised for this case study connect the two critical elements of the 
APSC – “security” and “community”, the “S” and the “C”. While security relates to 
the benchmark of the Deutschian prerequisite of dependable expectations of 
peaceful change, the second element is the umbrella for the two benchmarks of 
identity and conflict mediation. In their sum, the three benchmarks ask the two 
fundamental questions concealed in the “SC”; does ASEAN have security?; and, is 
ASEAN a community? 
The benchmark of dependable expectations of peaceful change is justified for it has 
been identified as the hallmark of security communities. According to Deutsch, 
security community members have ‘come to an agreement on at least this one point: 
that common problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful 
change’.691 Or in ASEAN’s words a ‘concert of Southeast Asian nations’ ‘resolves 
differences and disputes by peaceful means, including refraining from the threat or 
use of force’.692 The grouping has added further impetus by tireless reiteration of the 
utmost necessity, even legal requirement to ensure that political disagreement must 
occur under the provision of non-violence and no intra-ASEAN relations may involve 
the use or threat of force. Asia-constructivists have seized on that point and declared 
ASEAN a security community and while tensions may still arise, peaceful tension 
management is what matters. Hence, this benchmark justifiably inquires as to the 
extent to which war has become inconceivable among members of the APSC and the 
 
 
 
 
 
691 
Deutsch et al. (1957) op. cit. 
692 
ASEAN (1997); (2015) op. cit. 
242 
 
 
prospect of and preparation for conflict has been replaced by reliable patterns of 
non-violent conduct. 
As such, specific KPIs are easily set. Do AMS rely on peaceful means for conflict 
settlement or not? To what extent has non-violence rather than the use and/or 
threat of force become the default mode for intramural dispute settlement? This can 
be measured in terms of military force applied by warring parties, perhaps even 
including battle-deaths of soldiers and civilians as well as conflict related interruption 
of human development, such as civilian displacements and disturbance of economic 
activity. Have AMS violated the TAC requirement to ‘not in any manner or form 
participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and 
economic stability […] of another [signatory]’?693 
The identity benchmark derives largely from the intervening variable (IntV) of choice 
by many Asia-constructivists. On the basis of common norms, a shared identity has 
emerged and become the tool through which the ASEAN security community is 
constructed. This benchmark intends to assess whether APSC members act “value- 
rational”, guided by intrinsic orientation on what is collectively appropriate, 
characteristic of identity as the “real glue” binding the association. Since individual 
AMS ostensibly often felt that they ‘had something more important in common - 
namely being a member of ASEAN’, they tended to act beyond narrowly defined 
national interest.694 Acharya argued that although typically not yet expected in the 
nascent phase of security community building, ASEAN showed a regional identity 
resembling more matured security communities. 695 An awareness of common 
security interests and converging threat perceptions ought to be recognisable. 
Apparently, adding to a functional appreciation of collective security is a sense of 
community, of belonging together. ASEAN itself has also contributed to this 
benchmark. What began with Severino’s vague “sense of community” or a “state of 
mind” became a “concert of Southeast Asian Nations” and a ‘community […] bound 
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by a common regional identity’696 of ‘caring societies’, 697 even specifically “we- 
feeling”.698 
Do APSC members at least indicate some orientation along convergent definitions of 
the common regional good, replacing narrowly defined self-interest, as Adler and 
Barnett have specified they ought to?699 Have shared ideas, values, and norms that 
codify appropriate behaviour generated a sense of ASEAN identity as Asia- 
constructivists assume? Although identity is a notoriously hard to measure concept, 
a “free-for-all” exist,700 and convincing yardsticks are absent, we should, after many 
years of Southeast Asian security community building, be able to identify an 
intersubjective understanding of belonging together that redefined AMS’ interests in 
Wendtian tradition. 
Since we are dealing with a very specific case here, I propose two indicators of a 
common regional ASEAN identity in terms of security policy of two APSC members. 
The degree to which we can identify intrinsic value rational behaviour and a sense of 
appropriateness in accordance with commonly shared and agreed upon norms, 
Acharya’s IV. I.e. foreign- and security policy orientation on the common regional 
good instead of narrowly defined self-interest. Furthermore, it ought to be possible 
to observe Kupchan’s formation of “generation of new narratives and identities” 
characterised by a positive or at least restrained general political discourse around 
former adversaries among security community members. 
The final benchmark relates to ASEAN’s ability to facilitate dispute resolution 
between AMS should the need arise; its conflict mediation capability. This assesses 
the ability of ASEAN to function as the conflict mediator of first resort in case 
bilateral negotiations are to no avail. Chapter 4 of the TAC provides clear measures 
for dispute settlement such as the High Council and the facilitation of good offices by 
ASEAN   institutions.   The   Charter   further   codified   those   conflict   resolution 
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mechanisms. ASEAN demands for itself a “constructive role” in ‘the peaceful 
settlement of disputes in accordance with the ASEAN Charter, the TAC and other 
relevant ASEAN instruments.’701 As early as in its formative years of 1967 has ASEAN 
justified its very existence with the facilitation of peaceful, stable, and reliable 
intramural cooperation. Ever since, this has been the very raison d’être of ASEAN. 
Asia-constructivists have argued that it is the existence and subsequent 
institutionalisation of non-violent cooperative norms that aids identity building and 
ultimately, intramural security. Indeed, as Acharya had argued, tensions may still 
arise but the peaceful settlement of those is what matters. In case of disagreement, 
we can therefore reasonably expect ASEAN to pull its weight and at least offer good 
offices to conflicting parties. This benchmark therefore assesses the extent to which 
AMS trust in ASEAN abilities and call on their common organisation to be the 
number one facilitator of conflict mediation should bilateral means fail to produce 
satisfactory results. At the same time, there should be some degree of ASEAN 
proactivity to ardently substantiate commonly agreed upon norms by providing good 
offices and facilitating meaningful mediation among members. The extent to which 
members request ASEAN involvement and the extent to which ASEAN is enabled to 
respond is indicative of its overall security actorness. KPIs therefore are the proactive 
role of ASEAN as opposed to idleness and inability, the enthusiasm of conflicting 
security community members to call on their common institutions, and the latters’ 
effectiveness in mediating efforts, measured in concrete outcomes. 
 
 
 
Benchmarks Dependable expectations of 
peaceful change 
Identity Conflict mediation 
 
 
Corresponding 
KPIs 
Absence of violence and 
military means in conflict 
resolution processes; no 
interruption of human 
development due to inter-AMS 
military activity. 
Policy incorporates 
consideration of regional 
good rather than narrowly 
defined self-interest; new 
narratives and positive 
discourse towards others. 
AMS readiness to rely on ASEAN 
good offices; ASEAN’s pro-active 
role in immediate conflict 
resolution; effectiveness of 
ASEAN-based mediation and 
crisis response. 
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Common sense of belonging 
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I content that the Thai-Cambodian border conflict is a valid test case and represents 
a great contribution to this thesis’ critical appraisal of overall ASEAN security 
actorness. Although root causes date back to historic times, the crisis at hand is a 
contemporary one. It occurred unquestionably between two members of the APSC, 
included officially sanctioned military activity and is thus indisputably within the 
scope of the APSC. The three benchmarks allow a comprehensive analysis of all 
elements of the institutionalised security community in Southeast Asia. If supply 
meets demand, the case specific research question can be answered positively, 
allowing us to conclude that the APSC’s qualities sufficiently warrant its name. A 
further critical element of ASEAN actorness in the APSC pillar could be deemed 
sufficiently high in order to justifiably endorse Asia-constructivist optimism and 
ASEAN’s genuine resolve to live up to its rhetoric. In the following, an overview of 
the conflict itself, inter-combatant relations, and external involvement precede an 
evaluation of the validity of security community claims in the light of the three 
benchmarks and corresponding KPIs. 
 
Background – The Thai-Cambodian Border War of 2008 - 2011 
Preah Vihear is a 11th 
century Hindu temple  in 
the Dangrek Mountain 
region along the Thai- 
Cambodian border. The 
unfortunate struggle over 
Preah Vihear is an old one, 
long predating Cambodian 
independence and 
originally         a         contest 
between what were then the French Protectorate of Cambodia and Siam (Thailand). 
Early maps drawn by the colonial regimes showed the temple and surrounding 
territory as belonging to what is present day Cambodia. However, in post-WWII 
decades Bangkok not entirely unreasonably insisted that colonial maps were not a 
Preah Vihear Temple and adjacent territory; Source: BBC News. 
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valid source of territorial claims. On that basis, the most recent serious crisis began 
to unfold in 2008 and incrementally worsened until a hitherto undecided 
termination of conflict in 2011. The Preah Vihear temple became the site of the most 
significant inter-state military confrontation in Southeast Asia since the end of the 
Vietnam-Cambodia war in 1979. 
In 1962 Phnom Penh referred their simmering dispute with Bangkok to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague for clarification and received a ruling 
in its favour.702 The ICJ awarded the temple itself to Cambodia, but omitted ruling 
definitively on the wider surrounding territory703 claimed by both Bangkok and 
Phnom Penh on grounds of diverging interpretations as to the validity of historical 
documents.704 Although it was a ruling that large parts of the extended Thai political 
and societal establishment had never been entirely content with, it was largely 
accepted by the Bangkok government and did not deter bilateral relations greatly 
over the following years. Thailand has at no point laid official claim to temple 
ownership, but the question as to the surrounding 4.6 km2 territory remained 
unresolved and ambiguous. Access to the temple is complicated by geography and 
while there is easy access and direct transport links to the Thai side and temple 
visitors do not require any permission, Cambodian access is impeded by difficult 
terrain and until 2003 the lack of even as much as a road. 
Tensions Escalate in the “Security Community” 
 
Although the conflict was largely muted for several decades, an immediate crisis 
erupted in the aftermath of a Cambodian application to the United Nations, 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) to list the temple as a 
World Heritage site. In July 2008 UNESCO approved Phnom Penh’s application and 
listed the temple as an official UNESCO World Heritage under Cambodian ownership. 
Initially  Bangkok  had  proposed  a  joint  Thai-Cambodia  listing,  but  after  some 
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negotiations with Cambodian leader Prime Minister Hun Sen, his Thai counterpart 
Samak Sundaravej supported Cambodia’s unilateral UNESCO bid. In the context of a 
relatively minor matter and in anticipation of substantial investment opportunities 
as well as an arguably genuine interest in sound bilateral relations, PM Samak and 
his Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama returned from a Phnom Penh trip in June 
that year with a joint communiqué in which Bangkok publicly endorsed Cambodia’s 
bid. At that point, there was governmental consensus on the minor importance of 
the matter itself in the context of what was to gain.705 
This endorsement enraged Thai nationalists and fatefully coincided with great 
domestic instability and turmoil. The Thai army, a traditionally influential institution 
in Thailand, publicly signalled readiness to become involved and block all access to 
Preah Vihear. Between 15 and 17 July 2008 both Thailand and Cambodia summoned 
troops at the border and the dispute gradually expanded from the temple itself to 
the border territory. According to the Cambodian ambassador to the United Nations 
(UN), on 15 July 50 Thai soldiers had entered the vicinity of the Keo Sikha Kiri Svara 
pagoda, located inside the disputed 4.6 km2 and only several hundred metres from 
Preah Vihear. Allegedly, only two days later the number of Thai troops had increased 
to 480.706 In a U.S. embassy cable to Washington published by WikiLeaks, Hun Sen 
pleaded with the seemingly powerless Thai government to take measures to ease 
tensions and requested Thailand to immediately withdraw troops encroaching on 
Cambodian territory. A request Thailand refused insisting that the area concerned 
was the sovereign territory of Thailand.707 By early 2009 the area had become 
seriously militarised on both sides and strong bellicose rhetoric could be heard on 
both sides of the border. First shots were exchanged in late 2008 and again in April 
2009, killing  at  least two Thai and  two  Cambodian soldiers and injuring  several 
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more. 708 The situation deteriorated further. Diplomatic ties were terminated, 
ambassadors recalled and then Thai Deputy PM Suthep Thaugsuban threatened to 
close the entire Thai-Cambodian border altogether. By mid-2009 the situation was 
such that a prolonged conflict was both entirely out of proportion in relation to the 
factual issue and unfortunately, all but inevitable. 
After some calm, early 2011 saw a previously unknown escalation of violence and 
heavy border clashes between the two militaries that had by now been deployed for 
some three years. The sporadic but serious fighting that followed over the coming 
weeks left at least 16 people dead and many more injured. Some 100,000 civilian 
village dwellers on both sides were reported to have fled their homes, becoming 
internally displaced.709 Indicative of the severity are confirmed allegations levelled 
against Thailand that it employed cluster bombs, banned under the UN Convention 
on Cluster Munitions by 108 countries. A claim not rejected by Bangkok.710 
Internationalising the Issue 
 
In observance of TAC and Charter requirements, the Cambodian and Thai 
governments held a number of meetings at different levels in an effort to reduce the 
tension bilaterally, but failed. After Hun Sen’s appeal to the Thai government to 
withdraw troops was to no avail and tensions seemed to spiral out of control, 
Cambodia, as the militarily weaker warring party, tried to internationalise the 
conflict and appealed to both ASEAN and the UN. Confronted with ever increasing 
militarisation and tensions along the border, on 21 July 2008 Cambodia informed 
Singapore,  at  that  point  ASEAN  Chair,  of  the  situation  and  requested  ASEAN 
assistance. Several days following the first military mobilisation around and inside 
the temple Singapore was due to host the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). 
Critically for Hun Sen, it was only days before Thailand would assume the rotational 
ASEAN Chairmanship. At the meeting, Cambodia proposed ASEAN involvement to 
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facilitate a peaceful settlement, but the joint communiqué of 21 July does not 
include any reference whatsoever to the issue. 711 Precisely, Cambodia wanted 
Singapore to initiate and host an ASEAN Contact Group (ACG) to find a peaceful 
resolution. In response the Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo urged both 
sides to resolve the matter in the spirit of solidarity, but communicated that the 
ASEAN foreign ministers felt the issue should be dealt with bilaterally. Presumably, 
no consensus could be reached with Thailand not wanting to multilateralise the 
conflict. Although not evident at that time, subsequent events evidenced that in 
particular the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs had at all times insisted on a solution 
through negotiations under the framework of Thai-Cambodian bilateral relations. 
Thailand was adamant ‘this issue should not be internationalized nor raised within 
the ASEAN framework as agreed to by both countries.’712 
In his capacity as AMM Chair, Yeo informed Cambodia that the establishment of an 
ACG had been rejected, but reiterated his appeal to both sides to act amicably in the 
spirit of solidarity and exercise utmost restraint. Under current circumstances 
neither ASEAN, nor any AMS would become involved, Yeo stated, but both parties 
were free to call on ASEAN again to facilitate a distinctively bilateral dialogue.713 At 
the same time, Yeo confirmed that there was agreement within the AMM that 
Cambodia ought to refrain from taking the issue anywhere beyond Southeast Asia, 
such as to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as this would cause harm to 
ASEAN’s reputation and may even impede long-term conflict resolution.714 
ASEAN assistance was also sought in 2009, but in the light of the Thai chairmanship 
Cambodian expectations could presumably not have been high. And indeed the joint 
communiqué of the 42nd  AMM, held in Phuket, would refer to number of regional 
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security threats, but failed yet again to mention even in a single reference the Thai- 
Cambodian conflict that was unfolding. The same applies to the Chairman’s 
Statement of the subsequently held 16th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting.715 
But 2009 was also the year of the non-ASEAN, 21st APEC Summit taking place in 
Singapore. Although in theory not the right forum to address ASEAN internal security 
issues, both Thailand and Cambodia must have thought this Singapore meeting an 
auspicious opportunity for discussions. At the sidelines of the Summit, Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono met his Thai and Cambodian counterparts and 
respective foreign ministers in an effort to mediate. Perhaps to the dismay of 
Cambodia, Yudhoyono stated that, as was the case in the previous year, ASEAN 
leaders preferred not to get the association involved, or in fact internationalise the 
issue at all. Yudhoyono made it clear that in his opinion 
there are still opportunities for Thailand and Cambodia to solve their border 
issue bilaterally […] it’s better for the two leaders to overcome the problem 
bilaterally without bringing it to an ASEAN forum or to make it an international 
issue because it would not be good for ASEAN as a whole.716 
He did however instruct his new foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa to continue this 
act of informal shuttle-diplomacy and serve as ad-hoc mediator between the two 
parties. Unfortunately, no substantial progress could be made. In particular Bangkok 
still rejected multilateralisation and, perhaps sensing ASEAN’s uneasiness, insisted 
on and referred to the sanctity of the non-interference.717 
On 14 August 2010, in the midst of intense political unrest in Bangkok, Cambodia 
again requested that Vietnam, as ASEAN chair, invoked Charter mechanisms of good 
office provisions, which would allow ASEAN to mediate in the dispute. Hun Sen 
insisted that given the severity of the conflict ‘[w]e need to resort to multilateral 
mechanisms. We call upon the ASEAN member countries, the UN and other 
countries’.718 After the Chair consulted with Thailand and the latter refusing to give 
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consent, Vietnam decided to take no further action. For the time being, no ASEAN 
support was to be expected. 
Frustrated by the lack of bilateral or ASEAN-based progress, Cambodia proceeded to 
the UNSC on 7 February 2011. At a time when the situation had spiralled out of 
control, cluster-bombs were allegedly being used and several military and civilian 
battle-deaths became known, Hun Sen asked for UN peacekeepers to be deployed 
along  the  border  to  establish  and  safeguard  a  buffer  zone.  Thailand  refused  to 
accept UN intervention and remained yet again true to its position that conflict 
ought to remain a bilateral matter.719 Yet, in spite of Thai opposition, the UNSC 
seized the issue and Indonesia’s Marty Natalegawa and the foreign ministers of 
Cambodia and Thailand attended a special UNSC closed-door meeting on 14 
February. The UNSC articulated its ‘grave concern’ and urged a permanent ceasefire 
and a peaceful resolution through effective dialogue. In an unprecedented move and 
at a time of great tension, the UNSC directly referred the issue back to ASEAN by 
requesting Thailand and Cambodia to cooperate within ASEAN frameworks and by 
doing so, encouraged the association to step up to what was also its problem in its 
own backyard. The UNSC specifically asked Indonesia as the 2011 ASEAN Chair to 
continue and increase its mediation efforts. 720 
The ASEAN Charter allows the parties to a dispute ‘to request the Chairman of ASEAN 
or the Secretary-General of ASEAN […] to provide good offices, conciliation or 
mediation’ and Marty Natalegawa, now endowed with an international community 
mandate, confidently went to Cambodia and Thailand on 7 and 8 February 
respectively in order to work out a strategy to implement the UNSC request. Marty 
Natalegawa successfully negotiated the convention of a special ad-hoc AMM, the 
Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN (IMAMM), on 22 February 2011 
in Jakarta. In a statement before the UNSC in New York ahead of the IMAMM, 
Natalegawa  articulated  that  based  on  the  communications  he  had  had  with 
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Cambodia and Thailand, he believed that ASEAN could achieve three basic objectives 
at the meeting. First, an ASEAN call on the warring parties to continue to commit to 
the peaceful settlement of disputes and renunciation of the use and threat of the 
use of force, as requested by TAC and Charter; second, active ASEAN support to 
ensure a ceasefire by enhancing communication; third, an ASEAN facilitation of 
efforts to ensure a conducive climate for the resumption of bilateral negotiations.721 
This could rightly be hailed as a surprising breakthrough for both the warring parties 
and ASEAN as an organisation. 
Surprisingly, both Cambodia’s Foreign Minister Hor Namhong and his Thai 
counterpart Kasit agreed in Jakarta not only to respect a negotiated ceasefire, but 
also to accept civilian Indonesian observers (read: not peacekeepers) in the conflict 
zone. The IMAMM statement following the meeting reveals that Cambodia and 
Thailand had committed to hold high-level military to military talks and subsequently 
invited the Indonesian observers to 
to assist and support the parties in respecting their commitment to avoid 
further armed clashes between them, by observing and reporting accurately, as 
well as impartially on complaints of violations and submitting its findings to 
each party through Indonesia, current Chair of ASEAN.722 
Consequently, Indonesia was expected to dispatch 30 unarmed observers to the 
disputed border area in what then ASG Surin Pitsuwan called a historic day for 
ASEAN. Although both governments had agreed to the plan at the meeting, one 
month later the Indonesian Foreign Ministry admitted that the process had stalled 
and Thailand’s powerful Army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha had apparently defiantly and 
successfully overruled the agreement by denying access to Indonesian observers. 
Prayuth rejected any such deployment and would, as he said, not allow outside 
interference into what was a strictly bilateral matter. 723 Supposedly, as Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun has argued, in the light of substantial domestic political change 
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taking place in Thailand, the traditionally influential Thai military wanted to retain 
foreign policy authority and influence.724 Prayuth was therefore unlikely to ever 
accept external oversight, drawn up and agreed to by politicians without military 
participation. 
In a final internationalisation attempt, during heavy fighting on 28 April 2011, 
Cambodia’s government once again appealed to the ICJ asking for clarification of the 
1962 ruling and an unambiguous verdict as well as an immediate withdrawal of Thai 
troops in order to end all military activity in the temple’s vicinity. The Thai 
government rejected ICJ jurisdiction considering an appeal inappropriate, for 
Bangkok regarded itself not in violation of the 1962 decision. The Hague issued a 
preliminary decision on 18 July 2011 and ordered both countries to immediately 
withdraw troops and devised a provisional demilitarised zone. The final and 
unanimously issued ICJ ruling of 11 November 2013 commanded maintenance of the 
demilitarised zone and affirmed its 1962 decision, awarding sovereignty over the 
temple and surrounding areas to Cambodia, but also granted some territory to 
Thailand. It omitted ruling on some areas where it found it had no jurisdiction. As for 
the military, the court unanimously declared that ‘Thailand was under an obligation 
to withdraw from that territory the Thai military or police forces, or other guards or 
keepers,  that  were  stationed  there.’725 Judges  also  encouraged  the  two  AMS  to 
continue cooperation within ASEAN channels and implement the Indonesian 
observer agreement and to ensure unimpeded access to the temple. Essentially, due 
to the residual ambiguity, both sides can claim at least a partial victory to their 
respective domestic audience and neither government challenged the ruling. 
Since then, the situation has been deescalated as both governments publicly 
welcomed the ruling and agreed to cooperate in order to keep the border 
peaceful. 726  Bilateral  relations  have  since  improved  under  Thai  Prime  Minister 
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Yingluck Shinawatra and more recently under a diplomatic charm offensive led by 
the Thai junta government that ousted her in 2014. It appears that for the time 
being, the Cambodian and Thai governments have found an uneasy modus vivendi, 
having decided not to mention this sensitive matter; a situation that may persist for 
some  time.  Promising  bilateral  signs  included  now  Thai  Prime  Minister  General 
Prayuth’s visit to Cambodia in October 2014, yielding progress on economic and 
tourism cooperation.727 At the time of writing, there had been no serious further 
clashes since 2011. 
 
Military Means for Domestic Ends in a Community of Caring Societies 
 
Most obtrusive is the question why and how a conflict over an issue of arguably 
limited significance could escalate to the degree it did. This escalation cannot be 
understood without the context of underlying domestic motives in both Bangkok 
and Phnom Penh.728 The conflict occurred at a time of deep domestic political crisis 
in Thailand while across the border Hun Sen was about to hold an election to extend 
and cement his already decades long stronghold on power. Although mostly muted 
for several decades, the temple and its surrounding area had occasionally been used 
to stir nationalist sentiments for domestic political ends. In particular in Bangkok had 
the 2008 UNESCO World Heritage decision inadvertently increased political 
commotions that had been boiling for several years and the conflict over Preah 
Vihear became heavily politicised. On 23 December 2007 the first general elections 
were held since the military ousting of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
and the official ban of his Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT), Thailand’s hitherto largest 
political party. The Thai Supreme Court banned not only Thaksin himself but also 
other leading party figures from political office. However, some former members 
regrouped and founded the People’s Power Party (PPP). Under the leader Samak 
Sundaravej, the PPP contested the 2007 elections and just like its predecessor under 
Thaksin, it won the democratic contest decisively, commanding strong support in 
Thailand’s poorer rural north. Especially the staunch anti-Thaksin political movement 
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People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), better known as “yellow shirts” accused 
Samak’s PPP government of being not more than a Thaksin-proxy regime. Samak did 
not much to deter this notion. While the leader of the PPP's major rival the 
Democrat Party (DP), Abhisit Vejjajiva said his party would accept the result and 
form  the  opposition,  Samak  claimed  to  have  spoken  to  the  exiled  Thaksin 
immediately and extended Thaksin’s congratulations to this ‘victory for all Thai 
people who unreasonably lost their freedom on 19 September.’729 Subsequently he 
invited the former prime minister back into the country. 
In that context Samak and his Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama returned from 
the fateful trip to Cambodia in June with a joint communiqué officially endorsing 
Phnom Penh’s UNESCO bid. The PAD had hitherto failed to topple Samak. The 
communiqué however presented them with a new, promising opportunity and in 
Thailand’s highly factionalised post-coup political landscape in particular the PAD 
utilised the Cambodian border conflict to undermine the Samak government. A well 
organised anti-Thaksin grouping, consisting of ultra-royalist and nationalist Bangkok 
residents, upper-class Thais, and some anti-Thaksin factions in the South of Thailand, 
the PAD also had strong connections to the Thai military, DP leaders, and much of 
the country’s business community. Thaksin’s TRT and its successor PPP drew their 
strength from Thailand’s majority of mostly northern peasants and the working class. 
Campaigning on a strong nationalist platform, PAD figures argued that this 
communiqué would weaken Thailand’s claim to the temple and more importantly, 
the surrounding territory in future negotiations. The PAD realised that the 
ambiguous territorial situation around the Preah Vihear temple could be exploited in 
a country where nationalism is a cherished principle in everyday life. 
Months of political unrest in Bangkok followed, including riots and the siege of much 
of Thailand’s infrastructure by the PAD and thousands of mobilised yellow-shirted 
supporters. The PAD and DP initiated numerous attempts to topple the elected 
Samak government. In fact domestic turmoil in Thailand was such that the 14th 
ASEAN  Summit,  originally  scheduled  for  December  2008  was  postponed  to  28 
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February 2009 since ASEAN felt that under current circumstances, including 
declaration of martial law, the Thai Chair was unable to host a peaceful and 
productive Summit. 
In September Thailand’s Supreme Court found Samak guilty of peculiar and dubious 
corruption charges and terminated his premiership after he had appeared on a Thai 
TV cooking show. Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law, succeeded Samak. 
This even worsened yellow-shirt resentment and led to further PAD initiated political 
riots in Bangkok, including in blockade of government buildings, the parliament, and 
Bangkok’s main airport. After weeks of serious opposition protests the Supreme 
Court also dissolved the PPP and several other parties and banned a number of 
elected parliamentarians including Somchai himself from office. In that context, 
without calling an election, the decimated and under-pressure Thai parliament chose 
DP leader Abhisit as Prime Minister on 15 December 2008. 
Southeast Asia historian Shane Strate explains that successive Thai administrations 
managed to construct a national historical narrative that he calls the “national 
humiliation narrative”. Historically at best inadequate, this narrative associates 
Preah Vihear and the surrounding area with the territories lost mostly under Thai 
King Chulalongkorn during French and British colonial rule in Indochina and Burma 
and with the ostensible betrayal inflicted on Thailand by U.S. anti-communist 
campaigns in Indochina.730 Strate argues that this intrinsic national narrative of 
unfair treatment conserves a perception among Thai society that the Thai 
motherland is under constant threat from the enemies of Thailand, both from 
abroad and even more crucial from within Thai society. In such an environment, Thai 
citizens must demonstrate “Thainess” by standing united behind strong leadership in 
Bangkok.731 This narrative and with it Preah Vihear continues to resurface if political 
forces regard it as opportune to stoke nationalism in a country where generations of 
people have learned that massive chunks of territory had allegedly been unfairly 
conceded during colonial times. 
 
 
 
730 
Strate (2015), in particular chapter 1 and 2 for the Franco-Siamese treaties and chapter 5 for the 
role of the national humiliation narrative in the Thai-Cambodian conflict erupting in 2008. 
731 
Strate (2015): 12f. 
257 
 
 
Apart from capitalising on the strong sense of Thai nationalism and historical 
humiliation the PAD also accused the Samak government of virtually “selling the 
motherland” to the Khmer enemy.732 Without having substantial evidence, PAD 
populists claimed that the alleged Thaksin puppet regime of Samak had now traded 
the temple and the 4.6 km2 of territory in exchange for business deals between 
Thaksin and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and thereby forfeiting Thai dignity 
as well as territorial integrity. They also dismissed the impression held among some 
observers that this move was part of an attempt to improve socio-cultural and 
economic ties between the Southeast Asian neighbours who have long had a difficult 
relationship.733 Nonetheless, not least due to greater influence with the Bangkok 
establishment including the main media outlets, the PAD managed to monopolise 
the discourse to an extent that the allegations against the government became 
almost universal “knowledge” and galvanised even more people who took to the 
streets of Bangkok in fits of nationalist outrage. Yellow-shirted PAD supporters 
demonstrated in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government. PAD 
populists formed a protest coalition together with the DP and further mobilised ever 
more yellow-shirts in order to exert overwhelming pressure on the Thai government 
to  act  swiftly  and  harshly.734 On  10  July  2008,  Thai  Foreign  Minister  Noppadon 
resigned over the communiqué.735 The PAD had filed a legal case against Noppadon 
at the Thai Supreme Court, accusing him of bypassing parliament and with it the Thai 
people by agreeing the Thai- Cambodian communiqué, which they claimed ought to 
have passed through parliament beforehand. The Court ruled eight-to-one that 
Noppadon had indeed violated Article 190 of the 2007 Thai constitution and 
Noppadon, facing an impeachment hearing in parliament, chose to jump before 
being pushed and resigned. 736 
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The relationship between Thailand and Cambodia deteriorated further when the 
Abhisit became Prime Minister in December 2008. Equally opposed to Thaksin and 
his allies, DP politicians had engaged in the same nationalist discourse. As opposition 
leader Abhisit had unreservedly agreed with the PAD on the Preah Vihear temple 
and surrounding territory and had used similarly strong anti-Cambodian rhetoric. 
Not only had a number of DP figures insulted Hun Sen personally. In October 2008, 
shadow deputy PM Kasit Piromya called Hun Sen a kui ba (an insulting term in Thai, 
roughly translating as gangster or vagabond) and a slave of Thaksin on Thai 
television. The DP also invoked the notion of the Khmer enemy of Thailand and the 
Thai people. Abhisit himself maintained that the Thai people had never accepted the 
ICJ decision of 1962 and Thailand should appeal the verdict. According to Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun,  this  was  calculated  populism  in  order  to  satisfy  nationalistic 
needs of the anti-Thaksin coalition in order to destabilise the sitting and elected 
government. 737 Sensing success, Abhisit reassured the PAD that under his DP 
government Bangkok would not give in to Cambodia.738 Upon Samak’s resignation 
and subsequent failure of the PPP to remain in power following court orders, the DP 
managed to form a government. It was however lacking a popular mandate and 
legitimacy in a context of a highly unstable Thai polity. As Prime Minister then, 
Abhisit saw himself forced to continue his populist nationalist attitude and tough 
stance on both Cambodia in general and the temple issue in particular. Not least due 
to his populist rhetoric his popularity rating more than doubled during 2009.739 
Abhisit’s opposition to ASEAN or any external involvement as described above ought 
to be seen in this context. His fragile government needed to retain support from Thai 
nationalist forces, in particular the military establishment but also the yellow-shirts 
whose protests had allowed the DP to assume power in the first place. The 2011 
election brought the 3rd edition of Thaksin affiliated parties Pheu Thai Party (PTP) to 
an absolute majority under the leadership of Thaksin’s sister Yingluck and ended the 
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immediate political crisis in Thailand – at least temporarily until the renewed military 
coup in 2014. 
In Cambodia too, the temple had long been used as a nationalist, anti-Thai symbol. 
When the Thai military occupied the temple in the aftermath of World War II, Prince 
Sihanouk responded by suspending diplomatic ties with Thailand. He launched an 
anti-Thai campaign and encouraged Cambodians to demonstrate outside the Thai 
Embassy. Regaining sovereignty over the temple became an important part in 
Sihanouk’s nationalist agenda.740 Stoking anti-Thai resentment and xenophobia is as 
easy in Cambodia as stoking anti-Khmer resentment is in Thailand. In 2003 for 
instance the Cambodian media incorrectly reported that a famous Thai actress had 
claimed that the great Cambodian temple ruins of Angkor Wat in fact belonged to 
and should be taken over by Thailand. This led to riots with demonstrators gathering 
outside the Thai embassy and eventually burned the building. It also led to violent 
attacks against Thais and Thai-run businesses in Phnom Penh.741 
At the time when the conflict erupted, Cambodia was about to hold an election on 
27 July 2008 and Cambodian strongman and long term Prime Minister Hun Sen 
fought a tough and as usual dubious general election campaign in order to extend his 
more than two decades in power. Hun Sen had used the UNESCO World Heritage 
listing in order to increase his popularity and promised things such as increasing 
tourism in the run-up to the elections. During the crisis, he rallied populist nationalist 
support by taking a firm stance on the issue in order to demonstrate both his 
strength and very own nationalism to his people. Wagener has argued that it was no 
coincidence that the Cambodian rhetorical build-up intensified immediately before 
the election. Hun Sen styled himself as the defender of the cultural claims of the 
Khmer people. He also intended to significantly increase Cambodia’s military 
expenditure  and  wanted  to  divert  attention  from  the  questionable  and  widely 
criticised Khmer Rouge trials that were taking place at that time.742 
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The Prime Minister (PM) gained great approval for taking a tough stance vis-à-vis 
Thailand and observers and analysts noted that the Cambodian people were 
significantly more concerned with the border conflict then with the at least 
questionable electoral process in Cambodia that regularly promises Hun Sen the 
office, and seemed to overlook a great number of other domestic challenges.743 
Elections resulted in yet another sweeping victory for the ruling Cambodian People's 
Party (CPP) with Hun Sen as its leader. It won 90 of the 123 seats, a 20% increase 
from the previous election744 and the biggest winning margin since the first critical 
post-civil war 1993 elections of modern Cambodia. The CPP had used the UNESCO 
approval as evidence for Hun Sen’s charismatic, skilful leadership and pushed poor 
governance performance into the background by utilising Cambodian nationalism 
versus Thai aggression. Hun Sen continued his tough rhetoric calling the temple site 
a ‘life-and-death battle zone’ and promising that Cambodia would not accept Thai 
encroachment on Cambodia territory and set an ultimatum for a complete Thai 
withdrawal.745 
The Cambodian PM missed no opportunity to aggravate Thai antagonism even 
further. In 2009 Hun Sen provocatively appointed Thaksin himself as economic 
advisor, instead of following a Thai request to extradite him. Of all places to make 
this public knowledge, Hun Sen chose to announce the appointment at the 15th 
ASEAN Summit on 23 October 2009 in Hua Hin, Thailand, knowing that in the context 
of the deeply divided Thailand, in the grip of serious political unrest, this would 
clearly force Bangkok to respond. Certain enough, this caused great dismay within 
the DP government. Not only was there an official arrest warrant against Thaksin on 
corruption charges, the fugitive former Thai prime minister had extensive knowledge 
as to Thai political processes and the military machinery.746 The appointment was a 
move that Thailand, in its current state of domestic turmoil, could  not possibly 
ignore and Hun Sen’s flat out refusal to extradite Thaksin led to both countries 
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breaking off diplomatic ties.747 Not unjustified, Thai Foreign Minister Kasit called it 
‘intentionally provocative and interference in Thai politics.’748 Hun Sen’s undiplomatic 
move was at least partly caused by the substantial verbal attacks from Thailand and 
the increasing row between the Hun Sen and Abhisit government. But more 
importantly, as Pavin Chachavalpongpun suggested, Hun Sen realised that Thaksin, a 
long-term business partner, commanded loyalty among Thailand’s majority of mostly 
rural farmers and the non-Bangkok working class. Discrediting the Abhisit regime 
and support for Thaksin was in Hun Sen’s long-term interests. Hun Sen called Thaksin 
his friend and even compared him to Aung San Suu Kyi. He also offered his moral 
support to the so called “red shirts” in Thailand that had formed in opposition to 
their yellow counterparts.749 Hun Sen went on accusing the DP of having stolen 
power from the democratically elected PPP. He arguably believed it to be in 
Cambodia’s interest to support the red-shirt faction and Thaksin allies, as Hun Sen 
perceived a permanent DP government as unlikely. In February 2011, in the midst of 
increasing tensions along the border, a Cambodian court sentenced two Thai PAD 
nationals to eight years in prison for espionage.750 
 
Supply and Demand. How Much “S” and “C” in APSC? 
 
Arguably above all else, the “SC” in the APSC demands non-violence. ASEAN set out 
to establish 
a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia where each nation is at peace 
with itself and where the causes for conflict have been eliminated, 
through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law […] Southeast 
Asia where territorial and other disputes are resolved by peaceful 
means.751 
In a security community members in general have ‘come to an agreement on at least 
this one point: that common problems must and can be resolved by processes of 
 
 
 
 
747 
Diplomatic Note of the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh, 
11 November 2009, available: www.cambodianconsular.wordpress.com, accessed 15/06/2016. 
748 
Quoted in International Crisis Group (2011): 12. 
749  
Chachavalpongpun (2012): 91f. 
750 
BBC News (1 Feb, 2011): Cambodia finds two Thai nationalists guilty of spying. 
751 
ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997): op. cit. 
262 
 
 
peaceful change’.752 Certainly this is meant when ASEAN speaks of itself as a ‘concert 
of Southeast Asian nations’ that ‘resolves differences and disputes by peaceful 
means, including refraining from the threat or use of force’.753 
Subsets to this are somewhat loftier expectations of a community evincing a shared 
identity, a we-feeling across ASEAN and its peoples. At the 14th Summit in 2009, 
ASEAN defined its security community pillar (APSC) as a ‘rules-based […] community 
bound by fundamental principles, shared values and norms’, embracing ‘the values of 
tolerance and moderation, and share a strong sense of togetherness, common 
identity and destiny.’754 Asia-constructivists such as Acharya have identified ASEAN 
as a nascent security community on an upward trajectory.755 We do now know that 
at the nascent stage a community begins to cooperate in order to increase security 
and that although some intramural rivalry and competition may persist, this is 
expected to be muted by the onset of a common identity and a realisation of shared 
security interests and collective security cooperation. We should therefore expect 
the “C” to be evidenced by signs of a shared identity as well as a regulating, or at 
least mediating role for the organised collective. Yet, the way this dispute unfolded 
beckons two fundamental questions. First, can the APSC be considered a security 
community at all if members employ military means and readily sacrifice regional 
integration for the sake of domestic posturing? Second, how meaningful is the APSC 
and its institutions if ASEAN is intentionally immobilised and marginalised at the 
sidelines? In order to appraise ASEAN’s security community quality, this case study 
designed three benchmarks and corresponding KPIs, which in their sum ask two 
critical questions: Does ASEAN have security?; and is ASEAN a community? 
Dependable Expectation of Peaceful Change – Not Met 
 
The benchmark of dependable expectations of peaceful change had been identified 
as the fundamental security community characteristic and ASEAN has itself declared 
as such. Asia-constructivist have as well, although less emphatically. This benchmark 
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is therefore grounded on the contention that it is indeed reasonable to ask to what 
extent war has become inconceivable in Southeast Asia, replaced in favour of 
habitual non-violence in fulfilment of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
requirement not to ‘in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall 
constitute a threat to the political and economic stability […] of another 
[signatory]’?756 KPIs were set as the measurable extent to which violence has either 
been absent or occurred and to whether or not progress of human development has 
been interrupted by military activity. 
As far as the fundamental ultimate requirement of non-violence is concerned, the 
verdict is fairly easy. The turn into a hot – albeit limited – conflict violates the 
primary security community principle as well as ASEAN’s very own principle of non- 
violence and peaceful dispute settlement, which have become the fundamental 
dogma of not only the APSC pillar but all of ASEAN. Ever since 1967 ASEAN’s main 
achievement has been that no armed conflict has taken place between AMS. Until 
2008 one could have reasonably argued that ASEAN indeed fulfils the main security 
community prerequisite of non-violence. When for instance Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia in 1975, neither were AMS and although Hanoi’s decision could be 
interpreted as a significant security threat to ASEAN, it was in its final consequence 
an external matter. Perhaps, one could have been forgiven for believing that after 
more than four decades of security integration, there really were dependable 
expectations of peaceful change among ASEAN leaders. 
Although largely ignored in the Asia-constructivist literature, I argue that the year 
2008 changed everything for the APSC. It did so because this conflict was not just 
about historic Thai-Khmer animosity.  Nor was it simply about domestic political 
positioning. It is much more than that, for events in that year question ASEAN’s very 
raison d’être, its security relevance. It challenged the basic substance of the APSC 
and thus, the entire integration project that is the ASEAN Community (AC15). The 
grouping has tireless reiterated the utmost necessity, even legal requirement to 
ensure that political disagreement must occur under the provision of non-violence 
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and no intra-ASEAN relations may involve the use or threat of force. Asia- 
constructivists have gone further  and declared it a full security community, the 
reason for the “long peace” of Southeast Asia.757 It is curious to note that as late as 
2011, discussing the challenges to ASEAN security, Acharya discusses the climate 
change threat in great detail over several pages, 758 but devotes a mere two 
sentences to the Thai-Cambodian conflict which, as he correctly observes himself, 
seriously challenges ASEAN’s claim to be a security community.759 Similarly, in 2014, 
Acharya acknowledges that ASEAN is no mature security community yet, but sees it 
at a nascent stage on an upward trajectory.760 And although he devotes one entire 
chapter in his comprehensive book to intra-ASEAN security relations, he allocates a 
mere 12 lines to the Thai-Cambodia conflict.761 This is most curious given that the 
topic of his book is ASEAN’s security community qualities, based on norms, 
facilitated by identity. It is also indicative of one of this thesis’ major hypotheses and 
accusations levelled against Asia-constructivists. Such incomprehensive selection of 
evidence casts serious doubts as to the validity of security community arguments by 
Asia-constructivists. 
The above case study unequivocally evidenced that violence and military conflict has 
occurred between two members of the ostensible security community that is ASEAN. 
Both Thailand and Cambodia are not only ASEAN members (AMS) and thus, APSC 
members and ASEAN Charter signatories. They are also both contracting parties to 
the TAC, which remains in force to this day and is in fact even constantly reinforced. 
Initiated by ASEAN, the TAC’s primary universal principles of peaceful coexistence 
and friendly cooperation in the settlement of conflict,762 is violated by two AMS. 
Between 2008 in 2011 several undertakings and activities have taken place that 
contradict the dependable expectation of peaceful change set by Deutsch. First, 
initial preparations for war took place when between 15 and 17 July 2008 both 
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Thailand and Cambodia summoned troops at the border. Within two days, the 
number of Thai troops increased tenfold and expanded from the temple itself 
outwards into surrounding territory. By early 2009, the area had become seriously 
militarised on both sides, strong bellicose rhetoric was publically perceptible in 
either country and diplomatic ties were terminated. Second, outright military 
engagement occurred. First military exchanges occurred in late 2008 and again in 
April 2009, the situation escalated further in 2011. Those included use of cluster 
ammunition and resulted in casualties estimated to be between 25 and 40 directly 
battle related deaths as well as tens of thousands displaced villagers. Thirdly, events, 
rhetoric, and suspension of diplomatic cooperation meant that at no times during 
and after the conflict either government could reasonably rely on the premise of 
non-violence; that the respective other would not resort to the use or threat of 
force. As for human development, there can equally be no doubt as to a serious 
interruption of civilian life. According to some estimates the fighting displaced as 
many as 27,000 residents permanently and close to four times as many 
temporarily,763 although it is hard to approximate and verify a realistic definitive 
count. 
From the very beginning of ASEAN it declared itself to be the forum to create and 
maintain regional peace and stability. To this very day, ASEAN continues to reinforce 
and even build on this testament. But at what point exactly, one may reasonably ask, 
has the time come to stop declaring and start delivering? When can we assess 
whether or not ASEAN has been successful as a security community if each 
successive document elaborates in ever greater detail on its soon to be security 
community qualities? Asia-constructivists may respond that this conflict predates 
Cambodia’s admission to ASEAN by decades, perhaps centuries and may not be an 
ASEAN matter. Alternatively, in particular Acharya could argue this war may be a 
“decadent” element within a nascent security community, for the previously 
“unsocialised”  Cambodia  had  recently  entered  ASEAN  and  tests  the  APSC  to  its 
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limits;764 i.e. a setback not disagreement with the concept. Both arguments  are 
weak, though. The conflict erupted due to contemporary dynamics, not ancient 
history. Secondly, it was shown above that Thailand is at least as much to blame for 
escalation as Cambodia, perhaps more. Equally unconvincing is the claim that this 
was a clash or a skirmish rather than war. Kivimaki for instance insinuated that 
according to the Uppsala criteria this conflict simply never was one.765 In a personal 
discussion, Amitav Acharya articulated the same objection to classifying this as a 
conflict capable of negating the security community provision due to Uppsala 
criteria.766 This however is at best a statistical exercise and although quantitatively 
correct, does not do the severity of the conflict justice. In fact one wonders whether 
this particular argument is determination and attempt to vindicate a theoretical 
argument at the expense of empiricism and prudence. This confirms one of this 
thesis’ main accusations against Asia-constructivism, its ideological predisposition. 
Hence, I content that in consequence, the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia 
undermined the very soul of the APSC. It has undone some major achievements of 
four decades of relative stability in a potentially instable region and unambiguously 
evidenced that ASEAN is no security community. Whatever security community 
notion one puts to the test, this case study demonstrated that the explicit 
commitment to non-violent conflict settlement cannot be taken for grated within 
ASEAN. The members of the APSC do not appear to have ‘come to an agreement on 
at least this one point: that common problems must and can be resolved by processes 
of peaceful change.’767 Logically, this allows for two conclusions; either ASEAN is not 
a security community, or there are antecedent conditions in intra-ASEAN relations 
that allow for some form of conflict among members without disproving security 
community notions. 
With the “S” not having been substantiated, how about the “C”? Does ASEAN display 
a shared regional identity strong enough to satisfy community demands? 
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Identity – Not Met 
 
The identity benchmark asked whether we could detect a common sense of 
belonging, evidence of we-feeling within ASEAN as the “real glue” binding AMS. Asia- 
constructivists such as Acharya explained the DV of an at least nascent, security 
community with the emergence of a shared identity. Some argued that since AMS 
‘had something more important in common - namely being a member of ASEAN’ and 
tended to act beyond narrowly defined national interests. 768 In other words, 
members of the APSC were capable and willing to act “value-rational”, guided by 
intrinsic orientation on what is collectively appropriate. Beyond security and ever 
closer economic and socio-cultural links, building a strong regional identity to pave 
the way for deeper integration has been a long-term priority of community 
integration into AC15. This thesis has at all times acknowledged how hard an 
exercise measuring an  ideational variable can be. In  practical terms, the critical 
question is whether or not APSC members indicate orientation along convergent 
definitions of the common regional good, as Adler and Barnett have specified they 
ought to as a security community.769 KPIs set for the identity benchmark included the 
incorporation of regional considerations rather than narrowly defined national 
interest in foreign- and security policy calculations. I also suggested that there should 
be evidence of a positive discourse towards fellow community members in 
accordance with Kupchan’s model. 
With the above case study in mind, one can assess the extent to which foreign policy 
decision-making was guided by appropriateness and value orientation in the context 
of regional versus strictly national parameters. The intention here is not to pass 
judgement on one side or another. Whereas some analysts see the responsibility 
mainly in Bangkok,770 others have argued that Hun Sen is to blame for escalation.771 
The above suggests that populist factions in Thailand are as much to blame for 
escalation as Hun Sen’s constant interference in Thai domestic politics. More critical 
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to the research question is that ultimately both Thailand and Cambodia are guilty of 
grossly violating ASEAN traditions, challenging integration, and, under complete 
disregard of regional integration dynamics, both are equally guilty of exposing the 
APSC’s ostensible spirit of a “community of caring societies” as at best feeble and at 
worst hollow rhetoric. Two APSC members have readily, knowingly, and without 
hesitation held hostage the entire regional integration and identity building process 
to domestic posturing and nationalism. Therefore, the identity benchmark has been 
missed. 
In short order a minor dispute was turned into a significant military border conflict 
by national elites who showed no sign of “we”, but revealed their “I”, their 
nationalism as opposed to regionalism. Hun Sen for instance used the UNESCO listing 
to increase his popularity in the run-up to the 2008 elections in Cambodia and took a 
decidedly nationalist stance afterwards. The PM successfully utilised the conflict in 
order to present himself as the strong defender of Cambodian interests and on the 
frontline of the protection of the Khmer people. Hun Sen also inconsiderately 
violated one of the most important norms of the ASEAN way, non-interference into 
the domestic affairs of another AMS, by appointing Thaksin as his advisor. Although 
arguments have been made and appreciated that this was done to raise 
international awareness, Hun Sen also realised that his long-term business partner 
still commanded substantial loyalty and support among the mostly rural red-shirts in 
the north of Thailand. He considered support for Thaksin and the red-shirted 
movement to be in his long-term interests to discredit the loathed Abhisit 
government to which at that stage all bridges were burnt. Even worse, the hostility 
between the combatants was deliberately spilled over into the ASEAN arena. 
Choosing the 15th ASEAN Summit, fatefully held in Thailand, to announce this very 
provocative appointment was as irresponsible as it was against the spirit of the 
“community of caring societies”. Hun Sen manipulated ASEAN and Southeast Asian 
regionalism in shrewd calculation, by involving the common regional organisation, 
the “community”, in order to further his narrowly defined national and indeed 
personal ends. He thus ungrudgingly hijacked ASEAN regional meetings in order to 
conduct proxy warfare at the expense of ASEAN operability and unity, knowing that 
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this provocation would cause considerable disharmony within ASEAN. For the 
remaining AMS of course realised that ASEAN was being used as arena not only to 
fight out a bilateral dispute, but more critically for domestic political posturing. It is 
not without a hint of irony, that at the previous 14th ASEAN Summit only some seven 
months earlier, all AMS had unanimously agreed that they intended to be 
[a] region that resolves differences and disputes by peaceful means, 
including refraining from the threat or use of force and adopting 
peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms while strengthening 
confidence-building measures, promoting preventive diplomacy 
activities and conflict resolution initiatives.772 
 
 
On the other side of the border, the Thai opposition in particular utilised the dispute 
just as thoughtlessly in order to topple an elected government and subsequently to 
consolidate their own hold on power. Thailand has been a highly divided nation for 
many years. At the same time, royalism and nationalism had been the two constant 
stable features in domestic politics. In particular since the advent of the TRT party 
and the Thaksin administration in 2001, opposition groups such as the PAD, have 
stirred up nationalism and utilised public national pride and royal devotion recklessly 
to discredit the government. 773 Additionally, territorial integrity is generally a 
sensitive issue anywhere in the world and easily utilised to that end. In 2008, the 
political struggle in Thailand’s deeply divided polity produced an irredentist 
environment where ostensive threats to Thai territorial integrity and national pride 
connected with the monarchy were blown out of proportion by a political faction 
relying on the national humiliation narrative as identified by Strate.774 In particular 
for the PAD the temple dispute was a mere populist means to the end of 
overthrowing the Thaksin-affiliated government in the aftermath of the 2007 
election. Pavin Chachavalpongpun believes that the PAD used a military 
confrontation and anti-Khmer rhetoric in order to gain popular support at a time 
when the yellow-shirt movement was struggling to keep up the momentum of its 
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anti-government demonstrations.775 DP and PAD populists joined forces and utilised 
a historically inaccurate, nationalist narrative under total disregard of bilateral 
relations and regional stability in order to gain political capital, while weakening the 
Samak government. They tried to “prove” government failure by connecting the 
dispute of Preah Vihear ownership to purported allegations of corruption and anti- 
Thainess of an elected government in Bangkok, supposedly led by businessmen and 
proxy regimes. Yellow-shirt leaders would however step up and come to the rescue 
of the Thai nation and portray themselves as the saviours of the Thai tripartite of 
Nation, Religion, and Monarchy, battling those who sell out the Thai Kingdom. 
Subsequently, as Pawakapan has argued, the opposition would demand unrealistic 
governmental action in order to then claim ineffective government performance and 
unpatriotic, weak responses to Cambodian aggression.776 It is one of the few cases in 
contemporary political history where a civil society organisation has been seriously 
detrimental to inter-state and intra-regional relations, provoking an armed conflict. 
In an open letter, regional expert Lee Jones writes that the Abhisit administration 
came to power by ‘naked manipulation of Thai politics by cynical political elites’, 
including manipulation of the judiciary which has ‘clearly been used in a highly 
political fashion to dismantle the democratically elected government’ and ‘create a 
lethal confrontation with Cambodia over Preah Vihear temple for purely domestic 
political reasons’.777 It is open for debate whether the DP government once in power 
as of December 2008, genuinely sympathised with the PAD position or had simply 
manoeuvred itself into a position in which aggressive nationalist populism was the 
only way to maintain a relatively stable government in an unstable country. In either 
case though, Bangkok readily sacrificed its relationship with a fellow APSC 
government in Phnom Penh for domestic political gains. Militarisation in 2008 and 
again in 2011 were irresponsible reactions to domestic pressure and subordinated 
the interests of regional peace and stability and intra-ASEAN understanding and 
integration to the dictates of domestic political posturing on both sides. 
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On this basis, I strongly suggest that neither side has incorporated the greater 
regional good into their foreign- and security policy calculations. Evidently, narrowly 
defined national domestic interest prevailed. It is impossible to prove to what extent 
the impact of this deliberate escalation on ASEAN regional integration was even 
considered in Bangkok and Phnom Penh. But empiricism suggests that elites in 
neither country were capable or willing to act value-rational, guided by intrinsic 
orientation on what is collectively appropriate. One could even argue that Bangkok’s 
initial endorsement of the UNESCO listing and the communiqué of the Samak 
administration represented an effort to bring bilateral, and with this regional 
relations to “a higher plane” as ASEAN had desired. In order to strengthen social and 
economic ties and bury past grievances between the two countries now bound in a 
regional organisation. Although allegations of corruption on part of Thaksin and Hun 
Sen and profitable business deals are not discarded here at all and may well be true, 
what matters is that the encouraging burgeoning spirit of regional solidarity easily 
collapsed with the involvement of an anti-Thaksin coalition. Until 2011, leaders of 
neither country ceased taking narrowly defined political advantage from the 
confrontation. 
In the light of the Thai-Cambodian animosity and confrontational rhetoric, it is also 
hard to accept that ASEAN has indeed arrived at Kupchan’s fourth and final phase of 
community formation. Evidence originating in statements from Bangkok and Phnom 
Penh suggest that “generation of new narratives and identities”, characterised by a 
modification of the political discourse around former adversaries has not occurred. 
The national humiliation narrative has historically been exploited by successive 
administration in Thailand in order to maintain a popular perception of constant 
external threat in order to ensure internal national solidarity and support for a 
strong, central leadership in Bangkok. This narrative could easily be re-activated by 
the yellow-shirts and resurfaced quickly as soon as it was regarded opportune; 
shared Southeast Asian identity or not. This case study demonstrated that 
nationalism and bellicose rhetoric trumped efforts of good neighbourliness and a 
friendly disposition towards one another easily. Instead of the emergence of new 
narratives  for  a  positive,  cordial  discourse,  rhetoric  was  employed  towards  a 
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diametrically opposed means to a domestic end. Not only the populist PAD 
employed nationalist xenophobia and anti-Khmer propaganda against the “enemy” 
in Phnom Penh. The parliamentary opposition and subsequent DP government also 
did. DP leaders stocked populist resentment and even personally insulted Hun Sen. 
Once in power, Abhisit did not undertake any efforts to calm the domestic discourse 
in order to mend ties with Cambodia. Hun Sen himself also publicly announced that 
he considered the Abhisit government, unlike his own, to be an undemocratic 
regime.778 He directly criticised Thailand’s political instability and the yellow-shirted 
failure to achieve internal political reconciliation and suggested that this political 
bickering would render Thailand unfit to assume its ASEAN Chairmanship duties as of 
2008.779 
I suggest that the identity benchmark, in spite of some promising signs in the Thaksin 
years, could not be met. The “real glue” binding AMS is illusive. If AMS have indeed 
realised that they have ‘something more important in common - namely being a 
member of ASEAN’, 780 word has not yet spread to Bangkok or Phnom Penh. 
Conflict Mediation – Partially Met. 
 
This final benchmark now assesses the extent to which ASEAN can function as a 
meaningful forum in case of an exhaustion of bilateral means to intramural conflict 
resolution. This must be done from two different angles, i.e. AMS requesting the 
association’s involvement and whether or not ASEAN can respond to such requests. 
KPIs were correspondingly determined as the degree of enthusiasm of conflicting 
parties to call on ASEAN as well as the latter’s pro-activity in case of such conflict. 
Naturally, equally important is the outcome of potential mediating efforts. 
The Thai-Cambodian conflict has been a frustrating experience for ASEAN and the 
impact on the APSC has been enduring. Acharya had argued that ASEAN’s single 
greatest success ‘was its ability to dilute and manage […] intra- mural disputes’ since 
AMS ‘have not allowed their bilateral territorial disputes and political tensions […] to 
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cripple the organization.’781 However, individual AMS impeded ASEAN’s effectiveness 
and while Thailand rejected any outside interference, Cambodia frequently called 
upon extra-ASEAN bodies. The argument could be made that neither party had any 
faith in ASEAN-based dispute settlement mechanisms, nor showed great enthusiasm 
to get ASEAN involved. Indeed, most accounts of the conflict emphasise the role of 
the UNSC and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). I content that such emphasis is, 
while reasonable, insufficient and omits both Hun Sen’s appeal to ASEAN and the 
reasons for Thai rejection of multilateral solutions. Hun Sen and Hor Namhong had 
called on ASEAN more than once before turning to the UN and the appeal at The 
Hague was not meant to replace, but to supplement ASEAN and UNSC efforts. 
Cambodia hoped for immediate conflict mediation through the hands of ASEAN and 
the UNSC – and in this order – while the ICJ appeal was an attempt to achieve more 
long-term legal clarification. While it is true that the Cambodian government was 
frustrated by a lack of regional progress and turned towards the international 
community, it was also keen to have ASEAN involved from the outset. Hun Sen 
specifically requested invocation of dispute settlement mechanisms of the Charter 
and the TAC. The Thais on the other hand did their utmost to marginalise ASEAN. In 
the light of the domestic political condition however, this ought to be interpreted 
not as a sign of lack of trust in the association as such, but of domestic political 
considerations. A quiet, sober, and unpretentious conflict management as would 
have been the ASEAN way, was not auspicious to particular Thai interests. After all, 
the conflict was escalated mostly for populist purposes and Thailand had no interest 
in conflict mediation in the first place. At that time, it did not serve elite interest in 
Bangkok to solve the dispute and multilateralise in general, may it be through 
ASEAN, ICJ, UNSC, or Indonesia. 
This brings us right to the second criteria, ASEAN’s proactivity. Here ASEAN has had 
an unfortunate start, missing numerous opportunities to intervene between 2008 
and 2011. That it did get involved eventually vindicated ASEAN to some degree and 
proved  some  relevance.  Despite  Hun  Sen’s  appeal  to  ASEAN  and  despite  early 
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warning signs of pending militarisation in 2008, ASEAN initially remained passive 
rather than proactive. In the light of the above analysis, ASEAN’s unanimity 
requirement is largely to blame. Not only would ASEAN proactivity require consent 
in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, but also among the other eight capitals. The case study 
argued that Thailand successfully managed to keep ASEAN sidelined by procedurally 
inhibiting a multilateral  mandate,  because  serious, quiet, and outcome oriented 
negotiations were not necessarily in Thailand’s interest – at least not in the early 
phases of the conflict. Continuing to play domestic politics was easy and influential 
sections of the political establishment in Bangkok, such as the PAD and the DP 
government as well as the Thai military were reluctant to multilateralise. ASEAN’s 
consensus principle worked in Bangkok’s favour and Thailand was able to keep the 
issue off the agenda at ASEAN meetings and impeded Vietnamese involvement in 
2010 in its role as the ASEAN Chair. But this is of course precisely what ASEAN 
unanimity was invented for in the first place; to provide all members with a veto on 
the degree of possible interference as to ensure that ASEAN moves only at a pace 
comfortable to all. 
It remains unclear why the steadfast Thai preference for bilateralism faded in 2009 
and Bangkok somewhat retreated from its position. It is most likely that the Abhisit 
government had by then already achieved its major aim of replacing the alleged 
Thaksin proxy-government and banishing both the party and its offsprings as well as 
leading figures such as Samak and Noppadon with the help of the Thai Supreme 
Court. Although the opposition DP had been irresponsibly complicit to PAD 
nationalist campaigning in order to gain political control, Abhisit had certainly no 
interest in further escalating a perhaps prolonged military conflict on the Thai 
border. Once in power as of late 2008, the new Thai government agreed to 
Indonesia initiated minilateral discussions on the sidelines of the 2009 APEC and 
other meetings. Further impetus for change came by Hun Sen’s controversial public 
announcement of the appointment of Thaksin as his economic advisor, only several 
weeks before the APEC meeting. Sokbunthoeun has suggested that the appointment 
sent a strong message to the international community that bilateral relations were 
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spiraling out of control and required immediate outside attention.782 It is likely that 
all ASEAN stakeholders, including the new Thai government may have wanted to 
preempt possible interference. 
But it would be insufficient to locate blame for initial ASEAN idleness in Bangkok 
alone. We also saw that in spite of numerous opportunities to intervene from when 
fighting first broke out in 2008, a number of ASEAN leaders, including the 
Singaporean or Vietnamese Chair, at several meetings such as the AMM or ARF were 
reluctant to get involved. The utmost consideration was paid not to the conflict but 
to the prevention of permanent damage to the cherished non-interference doctrine 
and the setting of a potentially fateful precedent. The Singaporean Foreign Minister 
Yeo articulated a general ASEAN preference for strict bilateralism during the 41st 
AMM. ASEAN assistance was also unsuccessfully sought at the 42nd AMM in Phuket. 
Although the conflict was increasingly tense and being militarised at that point, the 
joint communiqué failed to include a single reference. The same holds true for the 
Chairman’s Statement of the subsequently held 16th ARF meeting.783 In the early 
years, ASEAN chose to ignore the conflict. Even worse, instead of simply ignoring and 
failing to utilise existing conflict settlement mechanisms, ASEAN leaders even tried to 
impede extended multilateralism by requesting Cambodia to refrain from taking the 
issue beyond Southeast Asia towards the UNSC. Instead of appreciating both its 
responsibility and the unique opportunity to be the vanguard of regional security, 
ASEAN remained idle; even did the opposite and insinuated that a referral to 
international bodies would do harm to ASEAN’s standing and perhaps open the door 
for potentially detrimental extramural interference. A position voiced by the 
Singaporean Chair and later confirmed by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 
Yet, to  ASEAN’s  credit,  this changed as  of  2009.  Although, or perhaps  precisely 
because APEC is not strictly an ASEAN forum, on the sidelines of the 2009 Summit, 
Indonesia reiterated ASEAN’s preference for non-involvement, but quietly began to 
engage in informal shuttle-diplomacy, most likely sanctioned by all AMS. Although 
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without immediate result, Marty Natalegawa commenced his “job” as an informal 
mediator. Although it tragically took further casualties and displaced people as well 
as a serious UNSC scolding for things to progress, at the renewed outbreak of serious 
fighting in 2011 ASEAN took ownership of its own security. It was also the good 
fortune of having Indonesia as ASEAN chair. Eventually Thailand and Cambodia 
began to cooperate within ASEAN frameworks and Indonesia as the current ASEAN 
Chair stepped up its mediation efforts. Although action could have been taken 
significantly sooner, an ASEAN option materialised and Jakarta somewhat salvaged 
the association. 
Once in the game, ASEAN certainly broke ground by convincing both parties to agree 
to and arrange an Indonesian monitoring mission. Several informal minilateral 
discussions took place and the special IMAMM was called, paving the way for 
Indonesian intermediation. In particular in the light of ASEAN’s earlier reluctance to 
encroach on the non-interference doctrine, the IMAMM pushed sensitive 
boundaries and managed to achieve consensus on the first ever intramural security 
monitoring mission. Essentially, the Charter and the TAC could work indirectly rather 
than officially and ceremoniously and ASEAN could provide good offices through 
Indonesian hands. Indonesian conflict mediation meant that the High Council as an 
institutionalised and highly public mediation facility did not need to be formally 
invoked and potentially be interpreted as a precedent for institutional interference, 
possibly changing ASEAN forever. After all, the disputing parties are not obliged to 
use regional mechanisms as a means to resolve conflicts at all, but free to choose 
other mechanisms. 
One could certainly argue that it was Indonesia, not ASEAN that took the initiative 
and of course, not everything that happens in Southeast Asia is the work of ASEAN. 
While not entirely implausible an argument, it would be unfair to give ASEAN no 
credit. Indonesian mediation efforts can be considered a genuine attempt to 
implement ASEAN sanctioned conflict settlement mechanisms in order to solve an 
intraregional, not Indonesian problem and to demonstrate ASEAN relevance to both 
the international audience and to its own members. Indonesia under Yudhoyono 
was still considered ASEAN’s natural leader, engaged as its primus inter pares and 
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interested in ASEAN-based regionalism. Indonesia was also ASEAN chair in 2011 and 
most crucially perhaps, Marty Natalegawa did not take this diplomatic initiative in his 
capacity as Indonesia’s top diplomat but as the ASEAN chair.784 I shall therefore 
argue that this mediation can credibly be considered an ASEAN effort, although 
dependent on a proactive Chair. While the association did not have a realistic option 
to remain idle when two security community members violated its fundamental 
principles and the international community called it to action, ASEAN had taken a big 
step nonetheless. It also regained some credibility as to being able to, if not regulate, 
at least contribute to peace and stability in the region. The UNSC referred this 
contentious issue back to ASEAN and ASEAN took on the challenge, despite 
Thailand’s and others initial insistence on exclusive bilateralism. 
If one accepts this argument, one must also ask how effective ASEAN’s labour 
eventually was. Unfortunately, we saw that the mission ultimately failed. At the 
beginning, all IMAMM participants were certain that there was unanimity among 
AMS this time, including Thailand.785 Bangkok’s eventual resistance, mostly by the 
Thai military and the strong persona of General Prayuth is testimony though, to 
enduring procedural shortcomings and the ensuing fragility of ASEAN initiated 
processes. No matter how much AMS may agree on the need to resolve a common 
security concern, all it takes is one influential stakeholder to sabotage the entire 
enterprise and thus, devastate all progress. Effectiveness therefore hinges entirely 
on voluntary compliance of diverse and capricious stakeholders. 
This conflict has occurred at a time when ASEAN’s community project was gathering 
momentum and the association kept fairly quiet arguably for that very reason. 
ASEAN action only materialised meaningfully once the UNSC had specifically 
requested it to take ownership of its own internal security. Asia-constructivists have 
traditionally  argued  that  3rd    party  mediation  is  a  testimony  to  the  spirit  of 
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accommodation among AMS 786 and has become an acceptable way of conflict 
resolution among AMS albeit being generally wary of outside interference.787 But the 
impression remains that it was not ASEAN’s finest hour, requiring international 
scolding before attempting to take care of its own backyard. But that it eventually 
did allows for three inferences. First, Surin Pitsuwan not completely unwarrantedly 
claimed that this could be read as a sign of faith on the UN’s part into ASEAN’s ability 
to find amicable regional solutions to bilateral problems among its members and 
thus, have some trust in the ASEAN security community.788 Second, that earlier 
reluctance to get involved was no straightforward agreement on non-action, but 
may have been intensely deliberated with the non-involvement faction winning. 
Lastly and most importantly, it shows that ASEAN can be proactive and even willing 
and able to apply flexibility to one of the most sensitive principles. The proactive role 
of ASEAN, its Chair, and the agreement between Thailand and Cambodia heralded a 
diplomatic and institutional victory for ASEAN. 
 
A Preliminary Conclusion 
 
Thai-Cambodia relations have never been and still are far from easy. In particular 
between 2008 and 2011 bilateral ties were very much dominated by respective 
domestic politics, complex personal relationships, and military tensions. But by no 
means a strictly bilateral matter. Events during those years have had significant 
implications for ASEAN’s Political-Security Community (APSC) and Asia-constructivist 
assertions, for they questioned the substance of both the institutionalised security 
community as well as notions of Southeast Asian community identity. The answer to 
the initial, case specific research question is therefore a qualified “no”. The case 
study found that the APSC has clearly missed the “S” by failing the benchmark of 
dependable expectations of peaceful change. Having also missed the identity 
benchmark,  ASEAN  has  been  somewhat  vindicated  by  partially  meeting  the 
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benchmark of conflict mediation. AMS do not, as the 2009 Blueprint promised, live in 
a ‘cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for 
comprehensive security’.789 ASEAN has not been entirely apathetic, though and has 
in spite of severe structural restraints attempted to contribute to regional order. 
Thus, there is still at least some merit to the “C”. 
The fundamental argument this chapter has tried to make is that domestic politics 
and inter-factional struggles over narrow national ends have led to the politicisation 
and military escalation of a sensitive but essentially manageable dispute. In order to 
gain domestic political capital populists and interest groups have encouraged and 
harnessed nationalist sentiments for political ends and infested not only a bilateral 
relationship but also regional integration as a whole. Populist culprits in Bangkok and 
Phnom Penh have recklessly held hostage the APSC, Southeast Asian integration and 
exposed the fragility of ASEAN institutions and insubstantiality of their shared 
community. 
First, the Thai-Cambodian conflict undermined the critical “S” in the APSC, which is 
built on the presupposition that no AMS will use force against another. This case 
study unmistakably evidenced that there is no dependable expectation of peaceful 
change in Southeast Asia. Over decades of security integration and community 
building, ASEAN has forged ahead with a rhetorical transformation from a 
segmented, war-torn Southeast Asia into a “concert of Southeast Asian nations”, a 
security community. However, this military engagement reminded all of ASEAN that 
some neighbours may remain a substantial traditional security threat. Hitherto, 
ASEAN has not created a security community. With the APSC, it has institutionalised 
a status post; institutionalised a security community that exists on paper only. 
Second, the intervening variable (IntV) of much of Asia-constructivist literature on 
ASEAN integration, a sense of a common identity, has shown to be weak. In the light 
of events and language employed, even most optimistic Asia-constructivists will find 
it hard to dismiss the reality of narrowly defined self-interest determining foreign 
policy choices whenever opportune, under total disregard of those they ostensibly 
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share an identity with. Perhaps this is why Acharya chose to largely ignore the 2008 – 
2011 years. Political elites in both countries readily sabotaged regional relations for 
domestic political purposes and deliberately and calculatedly employed a hostile mix 
of nationalism and xenophobia as opposed to rhetoric of a “community of caring 
societies”. Apparently, not all AMS have realised that they have something more 
important in common, namely being a member of ASEAN, as Busse once claimed. 
Short-term gains of pursuing narrowly defined national interests are still perceived 
as greater than associated regional costs. Clearly Cambodia and Thailand have 
skipped the “regional identity-sharing lesson” of the Asia-constructivists. The latter 
have also applied the Wendtian sense of interest transformation as a consequence 
of merging individual national into common regional identities, facilitating security 
community formation. This case study has shown that influential political factions, in 
cooperation with national courts and the military did not hesitate at all to use 
military force against a fellow AMS in order to gain domestic political momentum 
and present themselves as either the true vanguard of the Thai nation, or the strong 
defender of the Khmer people respectively. This casts doubts as to the substance of 
Asia-constructivist research variables. Critics may hold that Wendt himself had 
warned that the process of identity convergence and subsequent interest 
transformation would be incremental and slow. But after decades of identity and 
community rhetoric, at what point is it permissible to question not the process 
timing, but the validity of the argument as such? 
Although this case study granted ASEAN a certain degree of security actorness, it 
also brought home the notion of ASEAN’s inability to act beyond the smallest 
common denominator. The Thai-Cambodian conflict highlighted ASEAN’s intrinsic 
impediments to transcend national sovereignty even if its very reason for being, 
regional security, is under serious threat. For large parts, the entire organisation was 
successfully marginalised by individual national actors and forced to watch on 
helplessly as two of its members militarised and mobilised against each other and 
violated ASEAN’s fundamental core of stability and security. Consequently, claiming 
that ASEAN has initially failed its ambition to be the facilitator of peaceful intramural 
conflict resolution is as easy as it is appropriate. The perpetuation of this serious 
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intra-ASEAN conflict despite requests for ASEAN to mediate indicates just how frail 
the institutional foundations of the APSC really are. As is common practice in ASEAN, 
TAC and Charter provisions such as the good offices of the Chair or the High Council 
can only initiate dispute settlement procedures if all parties not only agree to, but 
even request such procedures. In other words, all provisions remain entirely 
intergovernmental. This is of course no coincidental mishap but reflects ASEAN’s 
general antipathy to multilateralism and a necessary precondition for such 
mechanisms to exist in the first place. Thai rejection of multilateralism as well as 
ASEAN’s own reluctance to set an interference precedent has exposed the inherent 
weakness of the ASEAN way. By seeking external 3rd  party help Cambodia signalled 
its  despair  with  ASEAN’s  ineffectiveness  and,  as  is  often  the  case  in  ASEAN, 790 
depended on international arbitration, not regional solutions. This results from a 
realisation that ASEAN cannot always be the vanguard of Southeast Asian security 
and territorial integrity of first resort and that AMS are better off looking for security 
elsewhere. The preponderant danger is that individual ASEAN members may 
entrench this habit. As a result, the already feeble APSC and ASEAN mechanisms for 
dispute settlement may become complete window dressing; adroit but misleadingly 
superficial. Structural impediments can und inauspicious circumstances render 
ASEAN-based mechanisms almost inoperable. This is and will remain the perennial 
problem of ASEAN. 
This being said, those mechanisms are not redundant. While ASEAN has not been 
very effective in dealing with the Thai-Cambodia border war, it would be equally 
insufficient to declare ASEAN entirely absent and pathetic. It could be demonstrated 
that under certain conditions ASEAN does have the ability to be, if not regulative 
mediator, at least a valuable facilitator of conflict mitigation. With its staggering 
number of regular and ad-hoc meetings ASEAN facilitates important inter-elite 
dialogue and confidence building, even practical conflict management in a 
heterogeneous region. The results of the IMAMM or stakeholder conventions at the 
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sidelines of regular gatherings are testimony to that. ASEAN offers its members 
institutionalised as well as ad-hoc conflict management facilities. 
For now, this specific conflict is largely muted, but not overcome and indeed several 
more frozen conflicts exist in Southeast Asia. As long as Thailand’s domestic 
factionalist predicament remains and as long as Hun Sen sees fit to employ the “Thai 
threat” as a means to perpetuate his hold on power, Preah Vihear will remain a 
dangerous political tool, liable to cast its shadow over the APSC. Present day ASEAN 
can therefore continue to offer its services as a mediator, but is unlikely and indeed 
incapable to do much more than that. Granted, this is significantly less than security 
community language promises. But there is the argument to be made that Southeast 
Asia would be less secure without ASEAN. 
 
 
4.3. Case Study 3: The Rohingya 
Refugee Crisis – Norm Diffusion and 
Effective Governance. 
 
 
 
 
The purposes of ASEAN are: […] To strengthen democracy, enhance 
good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the 
rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN; (ASEAN 
Charter; 2007)791 
 
ASEAN must establish a culture of honouring and implementing its 
decision and agreements, and carrying them out on time. Delays and 
non-compliance will be counter-productive, undermine ASEAN’s 
credibility and disrupt ASEAN’s efforts in building the ASEAN 
Community. […] ASEAN’s problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas, 
and action plans. The problem is one of ensuring compliance and 
effective implementation of decisions. (ASEC; 2007)792 
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This final case study intends to evaluate the degree of ASEAN’s actorness in the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community pillar by inquiring as to ASEAN’s overall 
institutional effectiveness, its institutional value in other words. To that end, it will 
assess ASEAN’s norm cascading quality and governance capacity relating to 
commonly agreed upon norms. More case specific, can ASEAN contribute towards 
solving, improving, or at least alleviating human rights crises? ASEAN in recent years 
increasingly promoted corresponding principles and norms, suggesting that it may 
fulfil the function of a normative exchange forum auspicious to a normative 
evolution across Southeast Asia. 
As was the case in the previous two assessments, this final appraisal of ASEAN 
devises a set of benchmarks originating from the demand side of Asia-constructivist 
perspectives on ASEAN’s ostensible qualities as well as ASEAN’s own ambitions in the 
specific field of the non-traditional security (NTS) issue of human rights. The supply 
side shall be assessed against the background of the 2015 Rohingya refugee crisis 
unfolding in the Andaman Sea. The ASEAN human rights mechanism (HRM) and the 
crisis response will serve as test for ASEAN effectiveness in terms of both governance 
and ideational exchange. To this end, I propose the following case specific research 
question: 
Have human rights norms been diffused and internalised across ASEAN and 
translated into sufficient governance capacity for ASEAN to act meaningfully in 
events of human rights crises? 
Following a thorough analysis of both demand and supply, this case study 
unfortunately concludes that although there is strong evidence of norm diffusion, in 
terms of ability to affect corresponding crises, ASEAN has underperformed. Low 
governance capacity stands in stark contrast to ASEAN’s rhetorical commitments and 
casts doubts as to the alleged norm cascading process within the association beyond 
rhetoric. 
284 
 
 
Demand Side – Non-traditional Security and Human Rights on 
ASEAN’s Agenda. 
In line with the overall case study design, the following paragraphs will outline some 
of the most critical examples of what guidelines and principles ASEAN has set out for 
itself with regards to NTS in general and human rights in particular. Once relevant 
perspectives of Asia-constructivists have been added, this case study will devise a set 
of benchmarks. 
ASEAN Rhetoric 
 
Human rights is an important component of our people’s lives, and it 
is important for the people-based community we plan to build. But the 
success of AICHR goes beyond the advancement of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as envisaged by the ASEAN Charter. 
Ultimately, it is all about the commitment of Member States to 
enhancing the quality of the life of ASEAN peoples, empowering and 
engaging them in ASEAN’s community building process, all of which 
are the fundamental basis of a genuine community for peoples. […] 
ASEAN’s regionalism must draw strength from our peoples in order for 
us to achieve a genuine ASEAN Community – a community not only of 
peace and prosperity, but also one in which there is a mutual respect 
for human dignity and human development. (Abhisit Vejjajiva, 
2009)793 
 
 
In theory at least, ever since the Charter ASEAN has become a staunch defender of 
human rights.  Such normative commitment has become both a very  prominent 
feature in all ASEAN community rhetoric as well as a legal requirement. As far as this 
case study is concerned, two basic elements are of greater relevance. First, what 
commitments has ASEAN made towards normative principles that can realistically be 
interpreted as relating to human rights. Second, to what degree has ASEAN declared 
itself authorised, capable, and willing to deal with human rights and tackle related 
issues/threats should those arise? 
 
 
 
 
 
793 
Remarks by H.E. Abhisit Vejjajiva, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, on the Occasion of 
the Inaugural Ceremony of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (2009), 
available: www.asean.org, accessed: 24/05/2016. 
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As early as 1993, all ASEAN Member States (six at that time) attended the United 
Nations (UN) World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna where all participants 
jointly and by consensus produced the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action.794 With this globally endorsed document, the founding ASEAN states and 
post-accession Brunei, the “old” ASEAN members (o-AMS), accepted the general 
universality of human rights as well as specific provisions such as the entitlement of 
every individual to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution, the right to return to 
the native country, or the protection of minorities. As far as this thesis has been able 
to find out, the term human rights was first introduced to official ASEAN language in 
1993 at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMS) in Singapore. Arguably not 
entirely coincidental, in the wake of the Vienna Declaration and prior to ASEAN 
enlargement to include the CLMV states (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam), 
ASEAN foreign ministers stressed the importance of ‘strengthening international 
cooperation on all aspects of human rights’ and agreed that ‘all governments should 
uphold humane standards and respect human dignity.’795 A few years later, ASEAN 
foresaw a region where all nations – including AMS – govern in the interest of ‘the 
welfare and dignity of the human person’ in a region ‘where all people enjoy 
equitable access to opportunities for total human development regardless of gender, 
race, religion, language, or social and cultural background.’796 
While the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali II) fails to mention human rights or 
human security at all, it declares that AMS should live in ‘a just, democratic and 
harmonious environment.’ This founding document initiating AC15 integration does 
subscribe to a comprehensive perspective on security in general and all threats to 
security, transboundary and regional in nature, should be addressed holistically and 
comprehensively, recognising the ‘broad political, economic, social and cultural 
aspects’  of  security. 797  The  following  year,  the  Vientiane  Action  Programme 
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United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (1993): Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, available: www.ohhcr.org, accessed: 24/12/2015; henceforth Vienna 
Declaration. 
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AMM (1993): Joint Communiqué of the 26
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AMM: 18; available at: asean.org, accessed: 
18/05/2016. 
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ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997), available: www.asean.org, accessed: 19/01/2016. 
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Bali Concord II (2003): A.2., available: www.asean.org, accessed: 02/01/2016. 
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highlighted the need to promote human rights, but unlike later documents, did not 
mention protection thereof.798 Subsequently, human rights appeared frequently in 
the ASEAN discourse and subsequent documents. 
At least in theory ASEAN main legal body, the Charter is indicative of ASEAN’s 
normative evolution in terms of human security, as clear references to human rights 
protection can be found. While the Charter, as chapter 2 explained, organises 
ASEAN’s institutions so as to reinforce the traditional intergovernmental principles of 
the ASEAN way, the association’s supreme legal body also obliges ASEAN to respect 
a wide set of normative humanitarian principles. Alongside ‘respect for the different 
cultures, languages and religions of the peoples of ASEAN’, 799 promotion and 
protection of human rights and social justice is frequently highlighted. Even the very 
preamble expresses ASEAN adherence to ‘respect for and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.’ It is proclaimed as two of ASEAN’s primary purposes to 
‘promote and protect human rights’ and ‘providing them [the peoples of ASEAN] with 
equitable access to opportunities for human development, social welfare and 
justice’.800 In order to live up to those commitments and principles, Article 14 
demands the creation of an official HRM.801 Something that would later materialise 
in form of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). 
The first comprehensive APSC Blueprint of 2009 devoted seven action lines to the 
promotion and protection of human rights, making it the security issue with the 
second most action requirements in the entire Blueprint. It even garnered 15 action 
lines and the greatest attention in the 2015 edition.802 While the 2009 title of human 
rights related action requirements reads Promotion and Protection of human rights, 
the later edition added ‘social justice and freedom’ as well as ‘dignity and harmony’ 
to the title. Just like the Charter suggested a normative evolution, the new title is 
indicative of an interpretational broadening of the human rights concept including 
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ASEAN Vientiane Action Programme (2004): Art 1.1(ii), available: www.asean.org, accessed: 
24/05/2016; this chapter will return to the critical differentiation of “promotion” and “protection” at 
a later stage. 
799 
ASEAN Charter (2007): Art. 2.l. 
800 
ASEAN Charter (2007): Preamble; Art. 1.7; 1.11. 
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ASEAN Charter (2007): Art. 14. 
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APSC Blueprint (2009): A1.5; (2015): A2.5. 
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not only the physical but also a more comprehensive understanding of human well- 
being and societal freedoms. The 2009 Blueprint identifies NTS in general as vital803 
and commits ASEAN to strengthen transnational humanitarian assistance, by 
providing ‘basic services or assistance to bring relief to victims of conflict in 
consultation with the receiving State’ and to ‘promote cooperation for orderly 
repatriation of refugees/displaced persons and resettlement of internally displaced 
persons.’804 In order to do so, the Blueprint specifies the need for ASEAN to respond 
to NTS threats, including transboundary challenges in an ‘effective and timely 
manner’. 805 The 2015 edition repeats and elaborates on this, adding elements of 
awareness promotion, ASEAN inter-sectorial body cooperation and crucially, 
encouragement of individual AMS to implement commitments.806 Thus defined, the 
issue of human rights was firmly anchored in the jurisdiction of the APSC pillar and 
bestowed with specific obligations to take action. Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Wirajuda stated that the inclusion of human rights in the APSC pillar meant that 
ASEAN had at last taken ‘the bull by the horn’ in terms of human rights.807 
ASEAN’s latest document Vision 2025 declares that ASEAN shall consolidate the now 
ostensibly established community and realise a ‘rules-based, people-oriented, 
people-centred ASEAN Community where our peoples enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’.808 It continued with the call of ASEAN leaders that ‘[o]ur 
peoples shall live in a safe, harmonious and secure environment, embrace the values 
of tolerance and moderation as well as uphold ASEAN fundamental principles, shared 
values and norms.’809 This rules-based 
inclusive and  responsive  community […]  ensures  our  peoples enjoy 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as thrive in a just, […] 
environment in accordance with the principles of democracy, good 
governance and the rule of law; [in respect of] different religions, 
cultures and languages of our peoples. 
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804 
APSC Blueprint (2009): B.3.1. 
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This community also ‘upholds common values in the spirit of unity in diversity as well 
as addresses the threat of extremism in all its forms and manifestations’ in a region 
that will be able to ‘address effectively and in a timely manner existing and emerging 
challenges, including non-traditional security issues, particularly transnational crimes 
and transboundary challenges’. 810 Remarkably domestically intrusive by ASEAN 
standards, to this end ASEAN Member States (AMS) are individually encouraged ‘to 
strengthen domestic legislation and institutions, promote human rights education 
and hold consultations with relevant stakeholders’ including ‘engagement with the 
UN and relevant human rights mechanisms to which ASEAN Member States are 
parties.’ Internally, AMS are advised to enhance consultation with relevant ASEAN 
sectorial bodies, among each other and most striking in ASEAN, civil society 
organisations.811 One could of course argue that Vision 2025 merely stated ambitions 
as to what leaders would want the ASEAN community to look like in a decade or so, 
if it was not for the fact that the APSC Blueprint of 2009 had in almost precisely the 
same words declared that the APSC, in force as of 2015, would be able to the 
same.812 
Aside from Charter and community documents, the most specific ASEAN document 
relating to the issue at hand is, as the name suggests, the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration (AHRD) of 2012,813 drawn up by the AICHR and sanctioned at the ASEAN 
Summit in 2012. It champions internationally accepted standards in line with all 
previous ASEAN commitments, including principles such as equality, freedom of 
movement within the native country, a right to education, and freedom from 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion as basic human rights. In addition 
to such repetitions of previous commitments, the cooperative elements articulated 
in the AHRD are noteworthy. It recognises that AMS ‘share a common interest in and 
commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’. This commitment, the declaration continues, ‘shall be achieved through, 
inter alia, cooperation with one another as well as with relevant national, regional 
 
 
 
810 
All in ASEAN Community Vision 2025 (2015): Art 8.1-8.4. 
811 
APSC Blueprint (2015): A.2.5. i.- xi. 
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APSC Blueprint (2009; 2015): e.g. II.7; II.10; A.1.5; B4.1. 
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and international institutions/organisations, in accordance with the ASEAN 
Charter.814 
In sum, there is an evident and unambiguous normative commitment to both 
promote and protect human rights and freedoms of all peoples across ASEAN, 
coupled with a very ambitious, but more ambiguous promise as to the tangible 
implementation of such principles. Intra-ASEAN cooperation as well as civil society 
and international community engagement is frequently mentioned and AMS are 
encouraged to contribute their bit. 
Asia-constructivists 
The APSC represent a desire of ASEAN to move beyond functional 
security cooperation, to develop a framework of regional governance 
based not only on practical necessities but also on normative 
considerations, such as notions of democracy, human rights, 
transparency, and justice. As such the APSC goes beyond being a mere 
security initiative and is arguably also a political project for the 
Southeast Asia region.815 
 
 
While a realist perspective would suggest that ASEAN human rights institutions and 
declarations are a product of traditional state centred security concerns, Asia- 
constructivists tend to argue that ASEAN has experienced a normative evolution and 
regard the AHRD and the AICHR as evidence for intramural norm diffusion. Chapter 3 
drew attention to the concept of norm diffusion in traditional constructivism which 
relates to the possibility of socialisation processes unfolding within a forum of 
interactive exchange of ideas. Finnemore and Sikkink have called the process from 
initial infusion towards eventual internalisation “norm cascade”. At the final end of 
the “life cycle of norms” the norm follower will internalise the promoted norm, 
which from then on assumes a taken-for-granted quality.816 As is to be expected, the 
role of international organisations and the institutionalisation of norms frequently 
feature in norm diffusion literature.817 Organisations act as platforms through which 
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proactive norm-entrepreneurs can promote and cascade their normative pledge 
which may subsequently be institutionalised and result in regulative mechanisms.818 
I.e., international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), European Union 
(EU), or indeed ASEAN, become a forum of interactive exchange of ideas. Individual 
norm-entrepreneurs feed the wider discourse within the organisational forum and 
encourage institutionalisation of the respective norm. If successful, subsequent 
internalisation by all participants can occur. 
Building on this, Amitav Acharya particularly highlighted the role of regional 
organisations within which formerly foreign norms can become “localised”. As 
chapter 3 laid out, according to Acharya’s localisation argument, the agency of 
regional actors does not end with receiving and internalising the ideational input of 
international norm-entrepreneurs. In particular within the framework of regional 
organisations such as ASEAN, the foreign input (norms/ideas) is redefined and re- 
interpreted in order to make it compatible with pre-existing local conditions, 
harmonise it with pre-existing belief systems.819 The socialisation of relevant actors 
into acceptance and internalisation of the thus cascaded and attuned norm is the 
final stage of the norm progression, or “norm life cycle” as Finnemore and Sikkink 
have called it. 
It does not take a great deal of imagination to draw parallels between this general 
conceptual framework and ASEAN specific application by Asia-constructivists. In this 
specific case norm diffusion is the process by which actors, such as individual AMS or 
civil society organisations attempt introduction of new, perhaps harmonised 
standards of appropriate behaviour, i.e. new constitutive norms. Those norm- 
entrepreneurs persuade others to become norm-recipients. Asia-constructivists may 
then for instance look at how individual AMS or local civil society organisations tried 
to induce liberal human rights norms into the ASEAN discourse, expecting the norm 
life cycle to progress, eventually leading to institutionalisation and internalisation of 
human rights norms across Southeast Asia. Achraya has argued that norm diffusion 
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has frequently taken place in Asia through institution building.820 Organisations such 
as ASEAN and its offsprings have functioned as platforms for ‘normative 
contestations and localisations involving global and regional norms.’821 According to 
him, the impact of norms on regional order is substantial, for norms shape 
institutional designs in Asia, which then facilitate creation and management of 
order.822 In other words, the causal impact of international norms, harmonised in the 
Asian context is manifest in diverse institutional outcomes across Asia. 
Kerstin Radtke is a prime example and her study highly interesting. She believes that 
above detailed human rights pledges by ASEAN are evidence in itself that norm 
infusion by the hand of norm-entrepreneurs has occurred. Interestingly, Radkte adds 
the element of opportunism and commences her analysis with ASEAN enlargement 
as her IV. With ASEAN expansion to include the allegedly internationally “stigmatised 
pariah state” Myanmar, an opportunity presented itself to tackle the tricky issue of 
human rights.823 Myanmar’s accession opened a window of opportunity for norm- 
entrepreneurs to ‘strengthen their discourse and to introduce ideas about democracy 
and human rights as components of regional identity into ASEAN.’ 824 External 
pressure from the EU and the U.S. had stigmatised Myanmar, forcing ASEAN elites to 
be responsive to normative change and to reflect on ‘what it does not want to be’ in 
order to avoid similar international stigmatisation.825 In this conducive context, 
internal norm-entrepreneurs in the form of Thailand, the Philippines, and post- 
Suharto Indonesia as well certain civil society actors strategically seized the moment 
in order to force a normative evolution in ASEAN’s general political discourse. ASEAN 
had to open itself to such issues as a collective organisation and its normative 
framework began to change from purely procedural towards constitutive norms, 
including respect for human rights.826 Although still inadequate, Radtke claims there 
has  since  been  ‘increased  activity  on  human  rights  and  democracy  issues  in 
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ASEAN’.827 By way of evidence she compares the 1967 Bangkok Declaration to the 
2007/08 Charter. Doing so provided evidence for a normative evolution in ASEAN’s 
positions, now ‘emphasising its idea of a “community sharing and caring for social 
problems”, with a “vision of one identity”.’ Radkte believes the adoption of the 
ASEAN Charter and the AICHR to be progress in itself since legally- and morally 
binding commitment were made by all AMS states.828 
One may argue that the ASEAN HRMs are juvenile and at this point, it is unrealistic to 
expect well functioning maturity. Indeed, some Asia-constructivists have argued that 
first the Charter and subsequently the AHRD mark an important shift in ASEAN’s 
discourse and substantiate ASEAN’s evolutionary normatism. For staunch defenders 
of the ASEAN’s human rights evolution, the AICHR and the AHRD is a stage in a 
journey rather than a destination. 
[a] tangible step in a structured, inclusive and evolutionary process to build an 
ASEAN human rights system that promotes and protects the rights of 570 
million people in South-East Asia, and helps to ensure their security, well-being 
and distinctive cultural identities.829 
Clarke for instance believes that only a small step could be taken towards a more 
robust institutionalised human rights protection in Southeast Asia, due to internal 
divisions between more liberals and more conservative camps. Clarke is confidently 
optimistic, though and argues in 2012 that ‘evidence suggests that these cleavages 
may well be managed productively and creatively in the years ahead.’830 Even if it 
had started as a political project, institutional as well as normative evolution in 
Southeast Asia would over time ensure a satisfactory mechanism. He sees in 
particular the AHRD as part of this normative and structural evolution towards 
universally accepted, robust mechanisms of human rights protection. He identifies 
the Declaration as evidence for a discourse change that would eventually facilitate 
robust protection mechanisms. Similarly, Caballero-Anthony believes that a topic 
that was out of bounds previously found its way prominently into the first pillar of 
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the ASEAN community was ‘indeed a milestone’. 831 Perhaps this evolutionary 
journey of ASEAN’s agenda was on former Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s 
mind when he stated in that respect that the ‘AICHR is not an end in itself but an 
evolutionary process towards strengthening the human rights architecture within the 
region.’832 
In particular the wide ranging ASEAN track-2 literature offers some convincing 
arguments that the global and regional recognition of the specific nature of NTS and 
the emergence of new-regionalism led to an increasing participation of non-state 
actors in security.833 As a result of a thus increased inclusion of society-based actors 
in regional policy making mechanisms, the nature and focus of regional security 
cooperation had noticeably been extended and redefined becoming more attentive 
of  human  security  related  issues.  Some  have  argued  that  increasing  ASEAN-ISIS 
engagement with the issue of human rights in the form of workshops is indicative of 
an ever-increasing constituency of human rights advocates within ASEAN who 
increasingly manage to actively involve officials on both regional and national level. 
Indigenous regional agency (track-2 and -3) is therefore instrumental in increasing 
the pressure on ASEAN to officially adopt an ASEAN mechanism for promotion and 
protection of  human rights.834 In particular through workshops,  non-state actors 
have not only set the scene, but are instrumental to an internal socialisation process 
within ASEAN channels, leading to a changed political atmosphere in Southeast Asia 
in which discussions on promotion and protection of human rights became 
appropriate.835 As is common practice in ASEAN, track-2 is thus regarded as having a 
slow but noticeable impact on official policy. A civil society based norm infusion 
process provoked norm building in policy areas that had previously been out of 
ASEAN  confines,  e.g.  human  rights.  Advancement  of  discourse  and  functional 
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inclusion of NTS in ASEAN processes diversified the hitherto stringent focus on the 
nation state as the security referent and included individuals and societies.836 Kerstin 
Radtke alluded to the fact that some ASEAN leaders have occasionally articulated 
their concern as to Myanmar’s domestic human rights situation. Since this is in 
violation of the non-interference norm, Radtke argues that ASEAN evolved to an 
extent that even its core principles underwent a rethink in order to account for 
higher standards of human rights, communicated by norm-entrepreneurs.837 In sum, 
the norm cascading process from infusion to institutionalisation has occurred 
through the initial agency of norm-entrepreneurs via the ideational and functional 
ASEAN forum. 
This inevitably leads us to the final stage of the norm life cycle, internalisation, 
initiating behavioural change. Mely Caballero-Anthony moves this largely theoretical, 
normative discussion beyond the abstract and directly adds ASEAN governance to 
the discussion. She considers the ever more prevalent inclusion of human rights in 
ASEAN’s constitutive documents as indicative of a new ASEAN consensus that locates 
human rights at the core of a ‘human security community for Southeast Asia.’ The 
diligent work of pro-human rights track-2 actors since the early 1990s, was ‘finally 
bearing  fruit.’ 838 Diligent  norm  building  had  by  now  facilitated  a  framework  of 
governance that is both functional and normative and will eventually develop a more 
effective model of governance.839 She believes 
ASEAN has demonstrated that it is serious about building a system of regional 
governance. This is evident in two important projects of regional governance: 
the AICHR and the ACWC [ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children].840 
Supposedly, the AICHR gives credence to ASEAN’s commitment to move the region 
forward not only on human rights, but even more crucially on the broader goal to 
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build a regional framework of governance that will be capable of addressing the 
wide range of NTS threats impinging on human security.841 
 
Supply Side – Does ASEAN  Promote and Protect Human 
Rights? 
According to the above, we can expect great things of ASEAN. Human security and 
the principle of human rights promotion and protection have been part of the ASEAN 
discourse for over a decade now and are enshrined in the main legal body, the 
Charter. The priority of human rights is confirmed and consistently reinforced in the 
community building endeavour and the corresponding ASEAN Political-Security 
Community (APSC) roadmaps. The same roadmaps also aspire to effectively and 
timely respond to challenges arising from non-traditional security (NTS) in general. 
Hence, it is not unreasonable to demand at least pro-active ASEAN contribution. The 
increasing proliferation of human rights pledges and commitments since 2003 also 
seems to give credence to Asia-constructivists norm diffusion arguments within an 
increasingly normative ASEAN. At first sight, ASEAN seems to function as a forum of 
normative exchange within which agents induced new positive norms of human 
rights and ignited norm cascading dynamics and a normative evolution. This 
eventually leads to institutionalisation and facilitates normative internalisation and 
enhanced governance capabilities. 
Benchmarks 
 
With the above demand in mind, I propose two benchmarks against which ASEAN’s 
performance, its supply, can be measured. The first assesses the norm diffusion 
quality of ASEAN as a forum for ideational exchange, while the second represents a 
governance audit relating to the newly cascaded norms. In other words, is normative 
evolution occurring and if so, does it meaningfully translate into practice? 
The benchmark of intramural norm diffusion is a justified first benchmark of 
significant analytical value. First, it connects a very specific principle of ASEAN’s 
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official normative agenda with Asia-constructivist theory. Second, it can credibly be 
related to the empirical issue of the Rohingya refugee crisis of 2015. By briefly 
revisiting chapter 3, it was summarised how constructivist theory believes norms 
diffuse at the agency of norm-entrepreneurs within organisations and institutions. 
Asia-constructivist literature has argued that this process may indeed be occurring 
within ASEAN in the case of human rights and the cascading process was well under 
way. This benchmark inquires as to the extent to which and possible reasons why 
human rights have been cascaded in ASEAN, found their way into the ASEAN 
discourse, and institutionally progressed from there. 
Setting specific KPIs is tricky in this case, for the final stage of “internalisation” is a 
social and subjective variable and may be, like identity in case study 2, hard to 
measure. Moreover, it may also be that internalisation of human rights norms varies 
greatly across the ASEAN10 and it could be argued that a conclusive report on the 
exact progress of the cascade would require in-depth analysis of discourse and 
application in each AMS. However, one does not need to go quite that far. Not only 
is ASEAN deemed to be the forum where the cascade takes place, it also serves as a 
sufficient indicator of the progress of norm diffusion since the empirical case study 
of the Rohingya refugees will unambiguously be identified as a transnational, ASEAN- 
wide matter. It suffices therefore to assess the progress and quality of norm 
diffusion in terms of AMS readiness to support transnational ASEAN frameworks and 
commonly apply new constitutive norms, the redefined standards of appropriate 
behaviour, to immediate issues at hand to ensure regional stability and security, as 
mandated in the APSC. If one were to apply the norm diffusion model, it would be 
possible to identify norm-entrepreneurs who have used ASEAN as a forum of 
interactive ideational exchange in order to induce new norms into the regional 
discourse, a normative evolution as well as a robust mandate. KPIs are therefore the 
extent to and the way by which human rights have entered the ASEAN-wide 
discourse, allowing conclusions as to the role of norm-entrepreneurs as well as the 
quality of post-infusion discourse dynamics. Those norms can be expected to 
become localised within ASEAN-based processes and, if successful, subsequently 
become institutionalised and internalised. Social learning within an ASEAN human 
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rights forum can be anticipated to eventually facilitate normative assimilation of 
human rights standards across ASEAN and be auspicious to human rights legislation 
and mechanisms. This, I argue, can be measured in terms of support, 
implementation, and adherence to an appropriately defined mandate for ASEAN to 
effectively respond to crises on the basis of a normative consensus. 
The second benchmark requires less imagination and logically follows from the first. 
It inquires as to the institutional effectiveness of ASEAN to affect behavioural and 
regulative change and be responsive to crises relating to commonly accepted norms 
and principles in ASEAN; its governance capacity. This benchmark derives largely 
from ASEAN’s own rhetorical commitments but may also allow assessment of the 
final stage of the norm life cycle, substantive norm internalisation. ASEAN leaders 
themselves declared that they will particularly address transboundary challenges 
effectively and in a timely manner because the peoples of ASEAN were all to enjoy 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in a safe, harmonious, and secure 
environment within a rules-based, people-oriented, people-centred ASEAN 
Community. This rules-based, inclusive, and responsive community would uphold 
common values and address challenges effectively and in a timely manner. If norms 
are sufficiently internalised, this can be expected to be observable in terms of 
voluntary application and compliance with the new standards of acceptable 
behaviour. Not only domestically, but more crucial to this thesis, regionally in terms 
of collective enabling, or at least not inhibiting ASEAN action. If regional 
internalisation has occurred, consensus must be assumed to exist. In other words, in 
the light of the specific consensus requirements and a robust mandate, is ASEAN 
empowered to take meaningful action in issues concerning human rights? KPIs are 
thus meaningful ASEAN-led initiatives to inter alia alleviate immediate crises, finding 
long term solutions, and support members in their own individual efforts to alleviate 
humanitarian crises. 
Asia-constructivist but especially ASEAN’s own demand suggests that the association 
ought to score reasonably well in those two benchmarks. If supply meets demand, 
one must conclude that ASEAN lives up to its normative demands and practical 
institutional effectiveness and value is high, suggesting that ASEAN indeed possesses 
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significant security actorness by virtue of being able to take meaningful action. A 
further critical element of its actorness in the APSC pillar can be deemed sufficiently 
high in order to warrant Asia-constructivist optimism and confirm ASEAN’s genuine 
resolve to live up to its rhetoric. Moreover, if supply meets demand, Asia- 
constructivist would indeed have a strong case for norm diffusion and a positive 
normative evolution of ASEAN. 
 
 
 
Benchmarks of 
ASEAN’s 
institutional 
effectiveness 
Intramural norm diffusion Governance capacity 
 
 
Corresponding 
KPIs 
Penetration by norm-entrepreneurs; evolution 
of discourse; acceptance and internalisation of 
cascaded norms, manifest in endorsement of 
appropriate rules and institutions; AMS support 
for an ASEAN mandate on behalf of normative 
values. 
ASEAN’s ability to be responsive and to take 
meaningful action in order to address to human 
rights crises, incl. immediate disaster relief, long 
term problem solving; facilitate and initiate policy 
change and implementation; providing good office 
(mediation, negotiations, financial support etc.); 
support of individual members’ efforts. 
 
 
I content that one of the most severe refugee crises of current times enables us to 
assess precisely this institutional effectiveness and thus, gives clues as to ASEAN 
actorness in general terms of regional security. In the following, I shall assess ASEAN 
success or failure in achieving the above benchmarks, measured by KPI application to 
ASEAN’s (re-)action to the transnational human catastrophe that was the Rohingya 
refugee crisis of 2015. 
 
Background – The Plight and Flight of Myanmar’s Rohingya 
 
A to that extent unprecedented NTS issue arose in Southeast Asia in 2015 in form of 
a refugee crisis involving members of the Rohingya Muslim minority, predominantly 
originating in Rakhine State, Myanmar. The plight of Muslim minorities in several 
regions across Myanmar who suffer at the hand of Burmese extremist groups as well 
ASEAN as a forum for exchange of ideas; ASEAN’s willingness and ability to monitor and 
ASEAN’s ability to contribute to normative affect behavioural change and immediate crises in 
evolution of Southeast Asia by projecting Southeast Asia in accordance with agreed upon 
commonly agreed upon norms; to socialise, standards. 
educate and re-educate governments in AMS in 
the context of the determined and established 
regional rules-based order based on its norms. 
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as local and indeed central Myanmar governments is unfortunately not new.842 Nor 
are the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar the only oppressed minority in Southeast 
Asia. However, the migration crisis that unfolded in the early months of 2015 is of 
particularly high analytical value to this thesis for two reasons. First and foremost, 
this crisis cannot reasonably be called an exclusively domestic Burmese affair, for at 
least three further AMS (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) were directly affected. 
Secondly, it particularly stands out in its severity of human suffering. No matter what 
definition of human rights is applied and what exactly counts as a human right, the 
suffering of the Rohingya cannot justifiably be excluded. This narrows the scope of 
possible criticism addressing case selection. 
The Rohingya in Rakhine State 
 
Early in 2015, the world witnessed an in intensity and magnitude momentous exodus 
of Rohingya Muslims whom the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) ranks as ‘one of the 
most excluded, persecuted and vulnerable communities in the world.’843 Although 
some of the refugees originated in Bangladesh, the vast majority were persecuted 
Rohingya from Rakhine State, Myanmar, fleeing conditions in their country of origin 
that can only be described as institutionalised oppression and ethnic persecution. 
Some have gone as far as speaking of genocide.844 Most Rohingya were Malaysia and 
Indonesia bound with both countries having a predominantly Muslim population. 
But also bordering Thailand has been affected greatly due to its geographic location 
and as it tends  to be  the land  route of  choice for  human traffickers that have 
capitalised on the dire situation for many years, running a lucrative criminal 
transnational business. 
As Su-Ann Oh explains, the Myanmar government labels the Rohingya as Bengali 
migrants whereas the Rohingya themselves maintain that they have been living in 
Rakhine  State  (Arakan)  for  centuries. 845      Far  from  being  a  simple  matter  of 
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terminology, this official classification means that under Burmese law, the Rohingya 
minority is excluded from all rights that come with citizenship. In 1982 the then 
ruling military junta amended citizenship regulations and excluded the Rohingya 
from the list of 135 national ethnicities. Henceforth, the Rohingya were effectively 
denied citizenship, de facto making them stateless. In international law and in line 
with several UN treaties such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
creation of stateless people is illegal.846 National censuses in Myanmar do not allow 
registering as Rohingya. At the same time, they refuse to register as Bengali, as this 
would be a de facto declaration of being an illegal migrant. This deprived an entire 
ethnic group consisting of an estimated 1.4 million people of all rights associated 
with citizenship in Myanmar. No longer were Rohingya granted even basic political 
and human rights available to the rest of the population. Rohingya have no access to 
health care or education and entirely depend on support of domestic and 
international non-governmental organisations (NGO), which themselves depend on 
the goodwill of the Burmese government. Free movement was restricted, as was 
free choice of marriage and bearing children. Practicing Islam freely became difficult 
and indeed dangerous. The Rohingya live under apartheid conditions. 
Even under the new democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) 
government led by the Nobel Peace Price winner Aung San Suu Kyi, the Rohingya 
continue to be subject to systematic, institutionalised persecution and oppression by 
local and central governments and are frequent victims of violence by extremist 
groups within parts of the Burmese majority, often ignited by Buddhist communities. 
International hopes that the NLD government would end the maltreatment of the 
Rohingya have not been realised as of yet and even sunk in May 2016 when the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, run by Suu Kyi herself, requested diplomats to refrain 
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from using the term Rohingya, since they were not a recognised ethnic minority and 
using the term was not supportive of Myanmar's national reconciliation process.847 
Some very prominent and exceptionally violent attacks occurred in June 2012 in 
Rakhine State. Rohingya men, women, and children were attacked, killed and buried 
in mass graves. Violent mobs, often led by radical Buddhist monks attacked and 
burned Rohingya villages. Instead of legal persecution of the attackers, this violence 
led to the official, government sanctioned internal displacement of at least 145,000 
Rohingya into internally displaced person camps in Myanmar where many still 
remain with limited access to basic nutrition, health care, and humanitarian aid. 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) refers to this as ‘crimes against humanity carried out as 
part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing.’848 Violence has continued sporadically and 
not unwarrantedly, the Rohingya live in fear of further such attacks without any 
state protection on a daily basis. The Burmese government continues to deny any 
information on the attacks and on their role in the violence and persecution. 
However, Amnesty International and many other observers, found direct 
involvement of state security forces and reported that no independent investigation 
had been carried out and not one state official is being held to account. Instead, 
authorities have arrested and imprisoned Rohingya community leaders.849 
A comprehensive study by the British International State Crime Initiative (ISCI) 
concludes that the Rohingya in Myanmar are subject to conditions of systematic 
genocide.850 ISCI provides compelling evidence for their conclusion that the Rohingya 
suffer systematic, institutionalised stigmatisation and dehumanisation; harassment, 
violence and terror; organised isolation and segregation in detention camps, prison 
villages and ghettos; and a systematic weakening of their ethnic community. The 
authors  of  this  report  find  that  in  particular  the  seemingly  organised  and  state 
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sanctioned mass killings of Rohingya in 2012 and the segregated internal detention 
camps reveal that genocidal processes had been orchestrated at the highest levels of 
government. Additionally, virulent and official nationwide policy and propaganda 
campaigns incrementally removed the Rohingya from the state’s sphere of 
responsibility. The government promulgated a persistent “othering” of the Rohingya 
minority as outsiders, such as illegal Bengali immigrants and potential terrorists. 
Naypyidaw facilitated and precipitated ‘invidious campaigns of race and religious 
hatred reminiscent of those witnessed in Germany in the 1930s and Rwanda in the 
early 1990s.’ 851 Although the final stage of genocide, mass-annihilation, has 
fortunately not yet occurred, the report is disconcerting and indicative of scope and 
severity of human rights abuses within an AMS. A mass exodus of hundreds of 
thousands refugees could reasonably be expected. 
Over the past decades and increasingly since 2012, Rohingya who were able to flee 
had done so via land based routes across Thailand and further into Malaysia at the 
hand of mostly Thai traffickers collaborating with corrupt officials. In the context of a 
general intensification of the fight against transnational crime in Southeast Asia, 
global expressions of serious concern and a discovery of several refugee mass graves 
in Thailand prompted the post-coup junta in Bangkok to put an end to the trafficking 
business. Bangkok initiated a serious and genuine crackdown on traffickers and their 
on-shore routes. This turned out to be a mixed blessing. It subdued the human 
smuggling business in Thailand but inadvertently triggered a major regional human 
security crisis, officially termed as “irregular migration [alternatively: movement of 
people] by sea”. Language aside, in reality it produced the greatest number of 
trapped-at-sea boat people in Asia since the Second Indochina War. Some estimated 
130,000 refugees have fled Myanmar took to the Andaman Sea. 
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“Irregular Movement of People in the Indian Ocean” 
 
‘The alarming rise in the 
irregular movement of people 
in the Indian Ocean’ 852 was 
the euphemistic description of 
what was one of the most 
serious man-made non- 
traditional      security      (NTS) 
crises Southeast Asia had witnessed in decades. Thousands of ethnic Rohingya were 
found adrift in the Andaman Sea, just off the coasts of Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia in May 2015.853 The UN estimates that in the first half of 2015 alone some 
31,000 refuges have taken to the sea in this area, a 34% increase compared to the 
first half of 2014. Over the past four years, some 2,000 people are estimated to have 
died at sea along this route, 370 in 2015.854 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia 
unilaterally resorted to 
airdropping supplies of water and 
food, but denied the aimlessly 
drifting boats landfall. No AMS 
allowed asylum. In fact, Malaysia 
escorted the boats out of its waters while Indonesia directed the refugee boats 
towards Malaysia. Thailand responded the same way, even fixing some of the rickety 
boats’ engines before sending them towards Malaysian waters – although there 
have been reports that Thai authorities apparently offered some Rohingya to come 
ashore. Those Rohingya who managed undetected landing, mostly in Malaysia, were 
put into detention camps once safe aground. The Malaysian government for instance 
announced it had detained over 1,000 Rohingya who had made landfall on Langkawi 
 
 
 
852 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Thailand (29 May, 2015): Summary special meeting on irregular 
migration in the Indian Ocean, available: www.mfa.go.th, accessed: 22/10/2016. 
853 
Financial Times (22 May, 2015): The unwanted Rohingya refugees dumped at sea. 
854 
UNHCR (2016): Southeast Asia. Mixed Maritime Movements in Southeast Asia 2015, UNHCR 
Regional Office for Southeast Asia, available: www.unhcr.org, accessed: 01/06/2016. 
304 
 
 
on May 10.855 Other ailing refugees were left adrift at sea, heading from one AMS’ 
shores to the next and back in what one observer not without a degree of morbid 
irony called ‘a three-way game of human ping-pong.’856 The numbers have since 
gone down, but the problem persists and to this day, Rohingya attempt to flee via 
land- and sea-based routes at the hand of traffickers and due to desperate prospects 
at home. Neither the UN, nor ASEAN have invoked Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
yet. 
 
ASEAN to the Rescue? 
 
Some may argue that ASEAN cannot be expected to lead, or even coordinate an 
effective response. Not to mention action on a R2P mandate. After all, it remains 
intergovernmental in nature and ASEAN Members States (AMS) remain rather wary 
of interference in internal affairs. It may simply not be the role of an 
intergovernmental organisation to address this particular issue. For a number of 
reasons such assertions do not withstand scrutiny. The crisis is evidently a 
transnational Southeast Asian issue. At least four AMS along the Andaman coast are 
directly affected and whether they like it or not, this crisis is not going to abate 
anytime soon unless  the root  cause of  the problem does.  Hence, Rohingya  will 
continue to pose a NTS threat to countries other than Myanmar alone and while the 
cause may be domestic, the impact is not. Secondly, we saw above that ASEAN 
leaders themselves have for years declared that their peoples shall enjoy human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in a safe, harmonious and secure environment 
within a rules-based, people-oriented ASEAN Community. This rules-based, inclusive, 
and responsive community would uphold common values and address challenges 
effectively and in a timely manner. Therefore, the Rohingya refugee crisis would not 
only morally compel ASEAN to take action and deliver on its human rights promises, 
by ASEAN’s own accounts it can and must address this issue. Lastly, in particular due 
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to the substantial global attention paid to the Rohingya refugee crisis of 2015,857 this 
presents a unique chance for ASEAN to prove its relevance, something it tends to be 
generally keen on; to prove that it can be more than an ineffective talk-shop. Yet, 
thus far, the association has not taken that chance. 
ASEAN and Myanmar 
 
It would do other ASEAN leaders injustice to allege ignorance, obliviousness or even 
complacency as to Myanmar’s human rights record. Until recent very positive 
changes for the better, the country had long been an embarrassment to ASEAN and 
ever since Myanmar joined, ASEAN leaders have cautiously tried to navigate 
between the principle of non-interference on the one and morality as well as 
increasing international pressure on the other hand. In 1997, the time for external 
recognition had come for Myanmar’s generals. Despite significant international 
opposition, ASEAN admitted Myanmar into their ranks and the military regime 
assured ASEAN it would keep its house in order.858 This decision by ASEAN to admit 
the country was partly due to recommendations by then Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir. By his own confessions, Mahathir was certain that the best way to 
improve the deplorable Burmese situation and mitigate the worst impacts of the 
military junta was to engage the country. He hoped that ending Burmese isolation 
could facilitate permanent change through a process of economic and social 
development as well as increasing elite-contacts.859 Other influential ASEAN elites, 
such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew expressed similar convictions.860 Without referring 
to the concept of course, ASEAN leaders implicitly advocated ASEAN’s role as norm- 
entrepreneur, believing in the practical effect of intramural norm diffusion. As time 
went on however, ASEAN realised that with Myanmar it had admitted a troublesome 
state. The authoritarian, often ruthless generals would expose ASEAN’s weaknesses 
as an organisation and force it to apply a certain degree of flexibility to its major 
principles of non-interference and absolute sovereignty. An often cited example is 
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the pressure ASEAN exerted on Myanmar following the devastating Cyclone Nargis in 
2008, when the junta appeared to be more concerned with blocking international 
humanitarian assistance than with responding to the humanitarian crisis in their 
country.861 
It is certainly no coincidence that immediately following Myanmar’s admission, Thai 
Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan proposed the idea of “flexible engagement” which 
would allow for a more adaptable, case-dependent interpretation of ASEAN’s non- 
interference norm. Other ASEAN leaders rejected flexible engagement, in particular 
Vietnam and Myanmar, but also ASEAN-wide at the 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMM) in 1998. Then Singaporean Foreign Minister Jayakumar defended non- 
interference staunchly. 
The surest and quickest way to ruin is for ASEAN countries to begin 
commenting on how each of us deals with these sensitive issues. Each 
of us deals with them in our own way, in our common effort to achieve 
harmony and stability in our societies. ASEAN countries’ consistent 
adherence to this principle of non-interference is the key reason why 
no military conflict has broken out between any two ASEAN countries 
since the founding of ASEAN.862 
Nonetheless, Surin’s proposal suggested that in particular the generals’ handling of 
political opposition and of Aung San Suu Kyi caused great annoyance to ASEAN. 
Following the 2003 Depayin Incident when members of the political opposition were 
massacred, in a by ASEAN standards very unusual outburst Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir called on Myanmar to either end oppressive polices or face expulsion from 
ASEAN – although this would have been procedurally difficult as there is no 
mechanism to expel an AMS once admitted.863 There was also some substantial 
pressure on AMS governments from local pressure groups across civil society in 
particular in Indonesia, but also in the Philippines and Thailand in the light of 
frequent violence against and oppression of opposition by the Myanmar junta. Non- 
state  actors  as  well  as  some  members  of  the  Indonesian  parliament  have  also 
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asserted pressure on their government to publically and more forcefully condemn 
Myanmar’s lack of democratic reforms. 864 In the same vein, local civil society 
organisations and NGOs, some of which of transnational character, such as the 
Bangkok based Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development worked hard to 
publically ostracise Myanmar for its abysmal human rights record.865 
Despite those rare instances of public criticism by ASEAN elites and limited but 
indeed vocal activity of local pressure groups, ASEAN did not do much to end the 
junta’s oppressive policies and remained loyal to its non-interference principle. Until 
Myanmar’s 2006 rotational chairmanship became subject of discussion in 2005, 
ASEAN remained officially out of domestic Burmese affairs. Although initially ASEAN 
wanted to go ahead with Myanmar assuming its scheduled chairmanship duties, due 
to international as well as some internal (Indonesia and Malaysia) pressure, ASEAN 
decided that it was inappropriate for Myanmar to assume the role of ASEAN Chair, 
fearing for its international credibility. Reluctantly, Myanmar renounced its right.866 
 
The 2012 incidents of communal violence alarmed ASEAN anew, in particular in the 
light of the Myanmar chairmanship scheduled for 2014. The human rights situation 
in Myanmar yet again elicited to some untypically vocal responses by some ASEAN 
officials calling on Naypyidaw to address the living conditions of the Rohingya. 
Indonesian Foreign Minister at the time, Marty Natalegawa spoke of ‘crimes against 
humanity’ and that the ‘government’s treatment of Rohingya Muslims is not in line 
with its recent efforts towards democracy. Any act of discrimination on the basis of 
religion or ethnicity is unacceptable.’ By that time ASG Surin Pitsuwan declared that 
‘ASEAN cannot be perceived to be standing by without taking any action on such a 
big scale of humanitarian difficulty.’867 Naypyidaw’s utter repudiation of any ASEAN 
involvement came as no surprise given that it even refuses to acknowledge  or 
discuss the matter in general. Notwithstanding some vocal individuals among ASEAN 
elites,  the  association  largely  adhered  to  its  overall  guiding  principle  of  non- 
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interference despite the junta’s oppression of political opposition over the years, 
including events in 2012. 
Since the 2015 refugee crisis became public knowledge, several regular and irregular 
ASEAN meetings were held that would be well placed to address the issue. Primarily 
the AMM but also ADMM meetings and corresponding retreats as well as more 
specialised conventions, none of which produced or even proposed a plan as to how 
to deal with the Rohingya crisis. In fact, not once was this specific case even 
mentioned, at least not publically. Foreign ministers at 48th AMM in August 2015 in 
Kuala Lumpur for instance reaffirmed commitment to address NTS issues and in 
particular transboundary challenges. As close as they came to this particular NTS 
issue, though was referring in general terms to ‘irregular movement of persons’. The 
end of meeting joint communiqué stated that root causes of this irregular movement 
should be identified and addressed by the parties concerned868 – read, not by ASEAN 
and there is no crisis. Earlier in July, ASEAN had already called a special, ad-hoc 
meeting within the framework of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational 
Crime (AMMTC); the awkwardly named Emergency ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime Concerning Irregular Movement of Persons in Southeast Asia 
Region (EAMMTC). At this irregular emergency meeting only some two months past 
the crisis and most likely in all but name called in direct response to the Rohingya, 
ministers remained at the most superficial of levels. Not once was the Rohingya 
situation directly identified or addressed, nor were any immediate relief measures 
agreed upon,  although  it  was  known that  many  were  still  trapped  at sea  or  in 
improvised detention camps. A trust fund was set up, to be administered by the 
ASEC, but contributions were on voluntary basis and funds would be used to support 
Southeast Asian humanitarian relief efforts in general. No conclusive strategies could 
be agreed upon and the matter of irregular movement was referred to the Senior 
Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) for further discussion. General 
commitments to fight human traffickers – mentioned in all ASEAN documents 
nowadays – aside, the only reference point that this author could identify as having 
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any relevance to a potentially increasing ASEAN agency in such matters was the 
rather vague recommendation ‘to explore the possibility of setting up a task force to 
respond to crisis and emergency situations arising from irregular movements of 
persons in Southeast Asia’.869 The following SOMTC organised at least the first joint 
workshop Human Rights-based Approach to Combat Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children. During this workshop, ideas were exchanged 
between the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and 
SOMTC and others relevant ASEAN bodies on how human right perspectives could 
be applied across Southeast Asia, but no concrete measures were articulated. 
The 10th AMMTC meeting in 2015 was even less precise. Only after reference points 
had identified issues such as illicit trafficking of wildlife and timber as areas of 
concern, the AMMTC endorsed all those pledges already articulated in previous 
ASEAN documents, such as Vision 2025, to create a secure community and respond 
to transboundary NTS challenges.870 The most important intramural security forum, 
the ADMM convened its first post-Rohingya crisis meeting in May 2016 in Laos. It is 
telling that the most significant NTS crisis occurring in between the 9th and the 10th 
ADMM was not even mentioned at the meeting – at least not officially. The joint 
statement did however, as usual reaffirm commitment to respond to existing and 
future NTS challenges, particularly of transnational nature, in an ‘effective and timely 
manner’.871 Even  the  most  passionate  defenders  of  ASEAN agency  would  find it 
tough to argue against the noteworthy contrast between the strong language in 
general commitments to human rights in all ASEAN documents and the language, 
not to mention tangible measures at actual meetings. 
 
AMS Acting, But Acting Outside ASEAN 
 
Unfortunately, crises do not tend to simply disappear. Under intense international 
pressure, on May 20, 2015 Thai, Indonesian, and Malaysian foreign ministers held a 
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tripartite meeting in Malaysia to discuss the ‘irregular movement of people into 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.’ Although referring to ASEAN, this meeting was 
undoubtedly extra-ASEAN, involving only the three foreign ministers. They tried 
‘finding a solution to the crisis of influx of irregular migrants and its serious impact on 
the national security of the affected countries.’ The joint statement specifically 
emphasised that ‘necessary measures have been taken by the three (3) countries on 
humanitarian grounds, beyond their international obligations’ and underlined that 
the issue ‘cannot be addressed solely by the three (3) countries.’872 While Thailand 
refused, Malaysia and Indonesia abandoned their turning-away policy and offered 
temporary refuge to 7,000 Rohingya boat people under the precondition that the 
international community would compensate all financial expenses. Moreover, the 
Indonesian  and  Malaysian  offer  included  temporary  shelter  only,  insisting  that 
resettlement and repatriation must take place within one year. They also called on 
other regional countries to join their efforts.873 
Since then, alarming media reports have increased not only highlighting that several 
thousands are believed to have been left at sea. But also describing very 
questionable conditions under which Rohingya are detained in Indonesian and 
Malaysian camps, pending resettlement in a third country.874 It is also unclear to 
exactly where those detained could be resettled and over a year on at the time of 
writing, only the U.S. has offered to accept a small number (52). No ASEAN country 
has thus far offered permanent refuge. Since Myanmar refuses to acknowledge 
Rohingya citizenship, effectively creating stateless migrants, repatriation is no option 
either. As poorly maintained the detention camps in Indonesia and Malaysia may be, 
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur acted as valve for ASEAN and took some pressure off the 
tense situation, and off their own governments. 
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Although Thailand was less accommodating at first, the government convened an 
international meeting in Bangkok on May 29. The Special Meeting on Irregular 
Migration in the Indian Ocean involved 17 Asian states, including Myanmar and 
seven further AMS (Brunei and Singapore did not attend according to the official 
list). Also present were representatives of non-Asian governments as well as 
international organisations and NGOs, including UNHCR, but interestingly not 
ASEAN. Results were less than enchanting. The post-conference statement released 
by the Thai Foreign Ministry 875 reveals that participants agreed on very little 
substantive measures beyond some emergency funding, vague expressions of 
solidarity and general proposals. Recommended actions included for instances the 
promotion of respect for human rights, providing development assistance and 
enhancing a sense of security and belonging. Jakarta and KL reaffirmed their earlier 
commitments but refrained from making further offers. Several urgent crisis relief 
efforts were initiated and in particular the U.S. and the Australian government 
pledged several million US$  to fund  humanitarian action  via internationally 
recognised NGOs. No mention of ASEAN. Remarkably, under the specific reference 
point Regional Response, the meeting noted the tripartite efforts of Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Thailand, but again did not mention ASEAN.876 
One delegate claimed that the Myanmar representative Htein Lin had pushed for 
other participants not to use the term Rohingya, a typical Burmese request that the 
others largely obliged by. Htein Lin himself told Reuters that no one at the meeting 
had raised ‘the Rohingya question’.877 Indeed, the meeting’s press release does not 
mention the Myanmar government, nor does it refer to the Rohingya. Instead, talk is 
of ‘migrants’ and their ‘areas of origin’.878 International participants were more 
upfront. According to press reports, UN Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees 
Volker  Turk  was  said  to  have  addressed  Myanmar  directly.  There  could  be  no 
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solution if root causes were not addressed he said, which ‘will require full 
assumption of responsibility by Myanmar toward all its people. Granting citizenship is 
the ultimate goal.’ Without using the term Rohingya, Turk was also to have said that 
Myanmar must allow ‘access to identity documents and the removal of restrictions 
on  basic  freedoms.’  To  which  Htien  Lin  replied  that  Mr  Turk  ‘should  be  more 
informed’ and doubted whether ‘the spirit of cooperation is prevailing in the 
room.’879 Evidently, Mr Turk did not seem to care much about the ASEAN way of 
approaching sensitive issues. Singapore’s then Foreign Minister Shanmugam said 
irregular migration needed to be addressed on the ground. He went as far as stating 
that such issues ought to be addressed in the refugee’s country of origin, but 
stopped short of calling this country by name. Instead, the government pledged to 
contribute US$200,000 to the trust fund set up by the EAMMTC that should be used 
to support the efforts of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand in providing temporary 
shelter. Singapore also offered to consider further assistance, but only if specifically 
requested.880 Subsequently, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said ‘Asean 
is not one country, and it's not possible for Asean to say, you do that, and you put a 
stop to this.’ In response to a journalist who had asked Lee to comment on criticism 
of ASEAN as toothless over this humanitarian crisis the PM said countries ‘have to 
tackle these problems themselves’.881 
In sum, ASEAN remained at the margins. In accordance with Charter requirements, 
the unambiguous identification of NTS as pivotal to ASEAN security and the defined 
action requirements in the Blueprints, there is a clear obligation with a definite legal 
basis to problem solving in the specific case of the Rohingya migration crisis of 2015. 
However, as laid out, ASEAN did not take meaningful action, a few vague references 
notwithstanding. If meaningful action was taken, it was initiated by individual AMS 
not  ASEAN.  But  even  then  measures  were  inadequate  and  at  best  temporary 
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problem management. Not that ASEAN is only language. It does not have HRMs in 
place. Closer inspection of the ASEAN human rights mechanism (HRM) and 
corresponding provisions illuminates the calamities of ASEAN in such matters and 
sheds some light on its institutional idleness. 
The ASEAN HRM 
 
In particular on track-2 level, 
a HRM for ASEAN had been 
discussed since the early 
1990s. As has been 
introduced above, prior to 
ASEAN enlargement and 
following the Vienna 
Declaration, ASEAN foreign 
ministers first stressed the 
importance of human rights. 
The 26th AMM’s joint 
communiqué proposed that 
ASEAN ‘should also consider 
the establishment of an 
appropriate regional 
mechanism on human 
rights’. 882 As a result, a 
working group on human 
rights (HRWG) was instituted 
and tasked with drawing up 
proposals for an appropriate 
mechanism, resulting in the first draft agreement on an ASEAN Human Rights 
Commission in 2000. In close cooperation with the ASEAN-ISIS, the HRWG made 
 
 
 
 
882 
Joint Communiqué of the 26
th 
AMM Singapore (1993): 18, available: asean.org, accessed: 
18/05/2016. 
Table 4.3.1: Regional HRM AICHR (estbl. African Commission on Inter-American 
2009) Human and People’s Rights Commission on Human 
(estbl. 1987) Rights (estbl. 1960) 
Power 
Independent Monitoring No Yes Yes 
Independent Investigation No Yes Yes 
Own Court No Yes Yes 
Mandate from binding 
treaty 
No Yes Yes 
May receive complaints 
(state, civil society) 
No Yes Yes 
Negotiation between 
parties 
No Yes Yes 
Can make 
recommendations and 
proposals to members 
Yes Yes Yes 
Power to report publically 
on human rights situations 
of parties 
No Yes Yes 
Can request information Yes Yes Yes 
Power to visit member 
states 
No Yes Yes 
Urgent action mechanism No Yes Yes 
Parties required to submit 
reports on treaty/ 
declaration obligations 
No Yes Yes 
Own premises, housing 
bureaucratic body (e.g. 
secretariat) 
No Yes Yes 
Commissioners 
democratically elected 
No Yes Yes 
Institutionalised civil 
society engagement 
No Yes Yes 
Sessions/Decisions public No Yes Yes 
Source: African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, www.achpr.org; Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, www.oas.org/en/iachr; Similar information in William (2015); Human Rights in ASEAN; humanrightsinasean.info. 
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several proposals, including a human rights scorecard intended to monitor progress 
on national level in terms of the overall human rights situation as well as respective 
legislation. 883 Among many other more feasible proposals, the scorecard is 
particularly noteworthy. Although the details had never been worked out, a 
scorecard would certainly have come very close to issue specific benchmarking by a 
transnational body with at least some degree of independent monitoring power, de 
facto introducing first supranational elements into the ASEAN process. Yet, such a 
scorecard never materialised in the eventual AICHR. 
 
Nonetheless, with the ratification of the Charter, as of 2008 human rights in general 
and in institutional form became legality. 
In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter 
relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights 
body.884 
In accordance with Charter Article 14, it was at the 2008 AMM retreat in Singapore 
where ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to set up a High Level Panel (HLP) to draft the 
Terms of Reference (ToR) for an ASEAN HRM. This was subsequently endorsed at the 
42nd AMM in Thailand in 2009. Following belatedly into the footsteps of other 
regions, the ASEAN HRM, the AICHR was progress as far as Asian human rights are 
concerned, being the first Asian human rights body. In one of its first acts, the AICHR 
drafted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), officially authorised at the 21st 
Summit in 2012. According to the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) 
The establishment of the AICHR demonstrates ASEAN’s commitment 
to pursue forward-looking strategies to strengthen regional 
cooperation on human rights.885 
Immediately after the AICHR inauguration two years after the Charter first provided 
for  it,  plenty  of  commentators  called  it  “toothless”886 and  table  4.3.1.  gives  an 
 
 
 
 
883  
Caballero-Anthony (2009): 210f. 
884 
ASEAN Charter (2007): Art. 14. 
885 
AICHR (2014): What you need to know, 10; available: www.aichr.org, accessed 19/05/2016. 
886 
The Wall Street Journal (22 Jul, 2009): Asean’s toothless council; also U.S. Department of State (20 
Nov, 2012): ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights; United Nations, UN News Centre (19 Nov, 2012): 
UN official welcomes ASEAN commitment to human rights, but concerned over declaration wording; 
Bangkok Post (25 Sep, 2012): Civil liberty groups reject ‘flawed’ human rights declaration draft. 
315 
 
 
indication as to the reasons for such pessimism. How could a HRM be effective if it 
may act on consensus only, without court or non-compliance provisions, no 
independent oversight power, not even a mechanism for immediate relief action? 
The list of shortcomings goes on. What those international observers do not 
appreciate are the inner workings of ASEAN. Just like the Charter itself, as outlined in 
chapter 2, the AICHR is a manifestation of the ASEAN way, a perpetuation of the core 
constitutive principles under which ASEAN operates. Especially in matters of such, in 
ASEAN eyes profound sensitivity. 
The contentious nature of human rights in ASEAN in general and even more as 
relating to a potentially regulative HRM was apparent from the outset. Although 
some AMS favoured a stronger mandate for an ASEAN HRM, there were significant 
intra-ASEAN disagreements. The Malaysian representative to the HLTF drafting the 
Charter, Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi remembers the establishment of an ASEAN HRM as the 
single most sensitive issue faced by the HLTF, for human rights were a ‘taboo’ within 
ASEAN.887 Mostly the CLMV states (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) opposed an 
ASEAN endorsement of human rights in general, or at least preferred a potential 
human rights body with the narrowest conceivable mandate. On the other side of 
the aisle, o-AMS such as Indonesia and the Philippines were more supportive. 
Unsurprisingly, particularly those two became proactive intra-ASEAN promoters of 
human rights following their own internal democratisation. 888 The Singaporean 
delegate to the HLTF, its chair Ambassador Tommy Koh, recalls that on the topic of 
human rights the HLFT was effectively split three-ways. According to Koh, the CLMV 
states were utterly opposed to creation of an ASEAN human rights commission per 
se, while Indonesia and Thailand were in favour. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Singapore occupied the middle ground. At the eighth HLTF meeting the three 
camps tried to agree on several formulations as to how committed the Charter ought 
to be to the establishment of a HRM for ASEAN. Since all formulations, no matter 
how vague were rejected, the HLTF referred the matter up the hierarchy to the 
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ASEAN foreign ministers for guidance. 889 As is common practice in ASEAN, if issues 
get tricky under the condition of unanimity, matters tend to be promoted to the 
AMM. To everyone’s surprise, the foreign minister’s decision was in favour of the 
establishment of a HRM and thus, the intention to establish a HRM found its way 
into the Charter. 
Some regional experts have argued that the inclusion of human rights in the Charter 
and the subsequent establishment of an ASEAN HRM was not the dividend of a 
normative consensus, but part of a bargain between the pushers and the CLMV 
states. If the Charter would guarantee a continuation of the consensus-based 
decision making process, they would agree to the inclusion of human rights.890 
Evidently, the  CLMV states saw  the prospect of  a permanent change to  ASEAN 
process as the greater evil. But Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi alludes to a further, perhaps even 
more decisive factor. Although human rights were a taboo, the HLTF faced significant 
external pressure by advocacy groups as well as some more open-minded AMS, 
themselves pressured by internal civil society actors. He claims pressure became so 
intense that human rights became a measure of the very relevance of the entire 
Charter itself.891 The Vietnamese representative even suggested external pressure 
was the main reason why human rights needed to be referenced in the Charter. 
Nguyen Trung Thanh recalls that the purpose of ASEAN’s regional consolidation in 
line with the community building endeavour through the Charter necessitated 
human rights references. Remarkably, in the light of international criticism of the 
Myanmar regime and its human rights record, Nguyen remembers fear among 
ASEAN leaders that human rights could become ‘an excuse for outsiders to intervene 
into ASEAN’s own affairs’.892 Indeed, until as late as 2008, Myanmar in particular did 
not discount a possible U.S. intervention.893 A study by Avery Poole also shows that 
ASEAN officials directly connected the reference to human rights in the Charter to 
the international condemnation of the domestic human rights situation in Myanmar. 
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The U.S. Senate had exerted extensive pressure on ASEAN to pay attention to the 
unacceptable Burmese situation 894 and influential international NGOs directly 
appealed to ASEAN in the drafting process. HRW for instance wrote an open letter to 
then ASG Ong urging him to ‘implement[ing] a binding human rights mechanism as 
part of the new Charter.’ HRW argued that the situation in Myanmar showed the 
need for a binding human rights mechanism with enforcing abilities mandated by the 
Charter.895 
It is most striking that human rights had been of such profound significance at the 
drafting process given that the document in question, the Charter, was the first and 
primary legal framework for the entire institution that is ASEAN; its very 
constitution.896 More important even is the impression that external and also some 
internal pressure may have been the primary reason for the inclusion of human 
rights. This corresponds well with Kerstin Radtke’s aforementioned “window of 
opportunity” following the enlargement of ASEAN. Only in the eyes of participants, 
this “opportunity” was much rather compulsion. Unlike Radtke implies, inclusion was 
not so much a normative chance but strategic necessity. This is indicative of the 
substance of intrinsic commitment within ASEAN to human rights in general. This 
low intrinsic commitment is certainly reflected in the weak mandate the eventual 
AICHR was endowed with. By and large, it must have been obvious to anyone 
involved that this context would not favour an eventual strong AICHR mandate. 
Revealingly, at the ceremony held around the inaugural session of the AICHR in 
2009, certain ASEAN governments rejected participation of civil society 
representatives from their respective country. Also, the leaders of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines did not attend at all, citing domestic obligations.897 
Nonetheless, given that ASEAN never had a human rights body, Asia-constructivists 
such as Clarke or Radtke are correct and this was a monumental step for human 
rights in Asia; or was it? 
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The clue to AICHR’s limited value is already in the name. The Terms of Reference 
(ToR) require the AICHR to be strictly ‘inter-governmental’, functioning as a 
‘consultative body’,898 also maintaining that ‘the primary responsibility to promote 
and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms rests with each Member 
State.’899 The body’s utmost principle shall be guided by ‘[r]espect for principles of 
ASEAN as embodied in Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter’, such as ‘respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all 
ASEAN Member States’, and ‘respect for the right of every Member State to lead its 
national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion.’900 With 
those reference terms, the AICHR is effectively regulated by the traditional 
constraints on suprantationalism of the ASEAN way and consequentially lacks any 
independent agency quality. Indeed, as illustrated in table 4.3.1, the AICHR’s limited 
mandate provides for not much more than a consultative function, just as the ToR 
had demanded. It has no independent monitoring power, may not even point out 
human rights issues without unanimous consent by all AMS governments. It has no 
permanent bureaucracy, not to mention a court or penal system. No non-compliance 
mechanism is provided for, nor does the AICHR have any means to initiate or even 
coordinate immediate crisis relief. Amazingly, at the inaugural session of the AICHR 
Thai Prime Minister Abhisit triumphantly announced that ASEAN was to endow the 
AICHR with a total sum of US$200,000 for its first year of operations; $US20,000 
each. 
The perhaps two most striking and symptomatic flaws are the AICHR’s composition 
and the cultural relativism applied to human rights. Apart from its very name of 
course, the AICHR’s intergovernmental nature is most obviously reflected in its 
personnel. The ToR unambiguously created a government dependent body by 
requiring each individual ASEAN government to ‘appoint a Representative to the 
AICHR who shall be accountable to the appointing Government.’901 Accordingly, the 
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AICHR is composed of ten representatives, one delegate from each AMS on a three- 
year renewable term. Under conditionality of the overall guiding consensus 
principle, this directive ensures that individual governments retain absolute control 
over the human rights regulation process. Each representative is endowed with de 
facto veto power and simultaneously chosen and seconded by and only accountable 
to the respective government. Any degree of independent oversight is impossible for 
the commission to attain. In particular the first AICHR was indicative of what the 
aforementioned intra-ASEAN cleavage regarding the validity and importance of 
human rights means in practice. Indonesia for example posted Rafendi Djamin to the 
AICHR. He holds a Masters Degree in Development Studies and has significant 
human rights expertise having been a member of the earlier HRWG that had 
proposed the scorecard. He had also been a long-time human rights activist in 
Indonesia. 902 While the appointment of Djamin signalled Jakarta’s intention to 
provide  the  AICHR  with  some  degree  of  autonomous  agency,  Myanmar  and 
Cambodia seconded direct government delegates with posts in their respective 
administrations.903 
An additional matter for concern is the degree of socio-cultural relativism in 
Southeast Asia in general and applied to human rights in particular. ASEAN leaders 
had ostensibly embraced the universality of human rights by way of accepting the 
Vienna Declaration and somewhat reinforced this in the Charter and the ToR that 
refer to a ‘respect for international human rights principles, including universality.’904 
However, the same document specifies that the AICHR should only 
promote human rights within the regional context, bearing in mind 
regional particularities and mutual respect for different historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds, and taking into account the 
balance between rights and responsibilities.905 
 
 
 
 
 
 
902 
Rafendi Djamin now serves as the head of Amnesty International’s South East Asia and the Pacific 
Regional Office in Bangkok. 
903 
Past and current composition of the AICHR, available: www.humanrightsinasean.info, accessed: 
21/05/2016. 
904 
AICHR Terms of References (2009): 2.2. 
905 
AICHR Terms of References (2009): 1.4. 
320 
 
 
ASEAN’s view on human rights as relative to the cultural context is repeated in the 
subsequent AHRD. In what could certainly be called an oxymoron, Article 7 reads 
[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated. All human rights and fundamental freedoms in this 
Declaration must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same 
footing and with the same emphasis. At the same time, the realisation 
of human rights must be considered in the regional and national 
context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, 
cultural, historical and religious backgrounds. 
Even more inauspicious, Article 6 declares that 
 
[t]he enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be 
balanced with the performance of corresponding duties as every 
person has responsibilities to all other individuals, the community and 
the society where one lives. 
Article 8 then puts the final nail into the coffin of human rights sovereignty de facto 
subjecting them to individual and sovereign national legislation in order to 
meet the just requirements of national security, public order, public 
health, public safety, public morality, as well as the general welfare of 
the peoples in a democratic society.906 
Similarly, Article 16 accepts and reaffirms the earlier provision of the Vienna 
Declaration that ‘[e]very person has the right to seek and receive asylum in another 
State’ the ASEAN version of a human rights declaration adds that this must be ‘in 
accordance with the laws of such State’907 and allows AMS to ‘determine the extent 
to which they would guarantee the economic and social rights found in this 
Declaration to non-nationals.’908 
This reflects the early emphasis on the relativism of human rights in the in the 
context of the so-called “Asian value” debate, advocated most notably by Lee Kuan 
Yew and Mahathir Mohamad. The 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights 
stressed that human rights must be considered in the context of ‘national and 
regional particularities and historical, cultural and religious backgrounds’ and must 
not  interfere  with  ‘the  principles  of  respect  for  national  sovereignty,  territorial 
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integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States’ promoted only ‘by 
cooperation and consensus, and not through confrontation and the imposition of 
incompatible values.’909 Even at the Vienna Conference on human rights itself, the 
Singaporean delegation emphasised that a universal recognition of the human rights 
ideal must not be used by universalist to deny the reality of diversity.910 
Hence, in spite of all the optimism and excitement, all ASEAN provisions for 
promotion and protection of human rights relativise their application and 
implementation of respective laws. Although there were some champions within 
ASEAN, the final result privileges sovereignty and autonomy of the individual AMS 
governments over sovereignty of inalienable human rights. Interference by a HRM is 
anathema  in  ASEAN,  no  matter  the  extent  of  abuse.  National  resilience  as  the 
principal constitutive element of regional resilience is reinforced.911 Unfortunately, 
this negates one of the main principles of recent interpretations of international law, 
R2P. And if any AMS in opposition to a robust human rights defence in Southeast 
Asia was still worried outsiders may interfere in their domestic politics on such 
grounds as human rights, they only need to read the closing Article 40 of the AHRD. 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group 
or person any right to perform any act aimed at undermining the purposes and 
principles of ASEAN.912 
 
Supply Meeting Demand? 
 
The APSC is built on the desire to create a harmonious and safe community for all 
peoples of ASEAN. A community in which human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are respected and threats and challenges to this harmonious environment are 
effectively addressed. It has been shown that ASEAN included human rights issues 
and the effective handling of related issues into a comprehensive perspective on 
security  within  the  APSC.  Asia-constructivists  added  the  normative  theoretical 
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dimension, seeing ASEAN as a workable forum within which norm-entrepreneurs can 
infuse and cascade positive norms, facilitating a process towards greater human 
rights protection in Southeast Asia. Against the background of Asia-constructivist 
optimism and ASEAN’s rhetorical endorsement of humanitarian principles, this case 
study designed two benchmarks and corresponding KPIs in order to assess the 
degree of ASEAN’s institutional effectiveness, measured in terms of being able to 
take action and as a forum of ideational exchange where positive norms successfully 
diffuse. Both are deemed indicative of ASEAN’s overall security actorness. A 
comprehensive overview of one of the most severe man-made humanitarian crises 
in Southeast Asia, the regional response, and an institutional investigation in the 
ASEAN HRM in place exemplified ASEAN’s tangible impact. We are now able to 
conduct the final case specific appraisal of ASEAN’s actorness by assessing the 
degree to which the association has met said benchmarks. Has ASEAN functioned as 
a forum for ideational exchange?; and has this translated into a robust enough 
mandate in order to engage in meaningful action? 
Internal Norm Diffusion – Partially Met 
 
Asia-constructivists saw the development from ASEAN’s early days towards a 
community where fundamental humanitarian principles are addressed and cascaded 
as a normative evolution across ASEAN. To thus inclined observers, a still on-going 
diffusion of positive norms is apparent in the developing discourse and subsequent 
constitutive change and institutionalisation. In order to assess whether the norm 
diffusion benchmark has been met, we devised several KPIs. We asked for example 
for tangible evidence that a change in the ASEAN discourse occurred; if it was 
possible to identify norm-entrepreneurs; and an institutional evolution? Have norms 
even been internalised and provided ASEAN with an effective mandate? Following 
the above analysis, this case study concludes that the benchmark of internal norm 
diffusion has been partially met. On the one hand, human rights norms have found 
their way into the ASEAN discourse. Some norm-entrepreneurs have been identified 
and bargains could be struck which led to an institutionalisation of the norm of 
promotion and protection of human rights. On the other hand, the bargains are not 
conclusive as the intrinsic quality of cascaded norms and the cascade has arguably 
323 
 
 
not led to internalisation and not facilitated a meaningful mandate for an ASEAN 
HRM. 
Let us look at the changed discourse first. It appears that the Asia-constructivist 
explanation is plausible and can account for the development of a general ASEAN- 
wide discourse on human rights that clearly has taken place to a noteworthy extent. 
Ever since the Vienna Declaration human rights entered the ASEAN discourse and 
almost all documents suggest as much. It has been shown in detail how the 
discourse developed from initial feeble references all the way towards Charter 
codification. Human rights also firmly entered the APSC. Not only have human rights 
increasingly been discussed, they have also become a de facto legality in the form of 
the ASEAN Charter. On basis of the above analysis, this is arguably the greatest credit 
one can give to norm diffusion; human rights have undoubtedly penetrated the 
ASEAN discourse and institutional framework. Overcoming this taboo is in itself an 
achievement and codification of the principle fulfils two functions. First, it can serve 
as a moral compass for ASEAN elites.913 Second, even if not adhered to in practice, 
legal codification of human rights principles provides agents, both officials and civil 
society pressure groups, with a foot to stand on when making their case for more 
effective human rights governance across Southeast Asia. Words are not 
meaningless even if they are not implemented. 
This doubtless evolution of the ASEAN discourse is a result of successful initial 
penetration by norm-entrepreneurs. We could identify several norm-entrepreneurs 
in the form of both AMS as well as local and international civil society actors who 
have used ASEAN as a forum for interactive ideational exchange. The above case 
study showed how Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok as well as local civil society, 
particularly in Indonesia, and international pressure groups such as HRW worked 
towards the inclusion of human rights into ASEAN’s constitutive documents.914 It is a 
logical consequence that the two most democratic states in Southeast Asia at that 
time  (Philippines  and  Indonesia)  should  have  been  critical  driving  forces  behind 
 
 
 
913 
The following chapter will elaborate in more detail on the critical function of ASEAN as a moral 
compass. 
914 
Radtke (2014); Clarke (2012); Collins (2014); Dosch (2008); (2009); Poole (2012). 
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greater regional commitment to human rights.915 Evidence for this has been found 
for instance  in the  accounts of HLTF  members. Indicative is  also the posting  of 
Indonesia’s Rafendi Djamin to the AICHR. At least as noteworthy and laudable is the 
domestic pressure asserted by local civil society groups and NGOs in particular in 
Indonesia, targeting both general democratisation in Myanmar and oppression of 
opposition by the junta as well as specific human rights abuses. Unfortunately, the 
tangible impact on ASEAN has hitherto been limited. Moreover, the track-2 
literature, in particular Caballero-Anthony 916 made a convincing case as to the 
positive involvement of the ASEAN-ISIS network and the related HRWG. Track-2 and 
-3 have had a significant impact on the HLTF and the eventual inclusion of human 
rights in the Charter. Interestingly, Joern Dosch found that even this track-2 
involvement reflected the diverging interests of AMS as far as a formal HRM is 
concerned. While the ASEAN-ISIS institutes in Manila and Jakarta pushed hard to get 
this issue into the Charter and in favour of a strong HRM, others were less keen.917 
Overall evidence substantiates both a change in discourse and the agency of norm- 
entrepreneurs and thus, somewhat vindicates Asia-constructivists. 
However, I argue that the norm-entrepreneurship was not sufficiently indigenous to 
ASEAN elites. Although there was intra-ASEAN pressure to endorse human rights, 
ever since human rights found their way into the ASEAN discourse, it was an external 
push rather than internal pull felt by critical decision makers. For making my case 
here, it is worth recalling Acharya’s norm-localisation concept again. As shown in 
chapter 3, Acharya argues that key to norm diffusion is the ability of local agents to 
reconstruct external  norms  to match locally pre-existing  identities  and cognitive 
priors. If congruent with the pre-existing normative order, local agents can become 
active norm takers by modelling foreign norms as to make them fit with local 
conditions. In the same vein, local norms are rejected if they contradict locally held 
beliefs and identities and are thus regarded as either illegitimate or even inadequate 
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Dosch (2009): 84; related Zhang (2010): 263ff; Hao (2009): 387; Clarke (2012): 15f. 
916  
Caballero-Anthony (2009); (2005). 
917 
Dosch (2009): 84. 
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in addressing the particular local challenges.918 In other words, if foreign norms can 
be adjusted to locally pre-existing belief systems, they are more likely to be adopted 
then norms contradicting those belief systems. However, while not contradicting 
Acharya’s norm-localisation concept per se, this case study suggests the concept is 
not sufficient in itself. Firstly, it was not the agency of local norm-entrepreneurs 
alone that facilitated norm diffusion within ASEAN, but also external pressure. 
Secondly, localisation has taken place, but harmonisation of foreign norms at the 
hand of ASEAN elites in the context of the ASEAN way’s unanimity rendered those 
initially positive foreign norms almost meaningless. Yes, discourse has changed, but 
norm-entrepreneurship was extrinsic to ASEAN elites and even internal local ASEAN 
efforts were either motivated by external factors or too weak as to have a 
meaningful impact beyond laudable discourse development. As shown above, the 
26th AMM in 1993 where foreign minsters’ kick-started the discourse and the 
inauguration of track-2 workshops directly followed the UN Vienna Declaration to 
which AMS had agreed. In this context of international recognition of human rights 
and impending ASEAN expansion to include countries with well known human rights 
problems, there was an increasing awareness of the importance of inclusion of 
human security in general. In other words, the inclusion of human rights norms was 
a partly obligatory import of foreign norms, not sufficiently indigenous to ASEAN, 
some local norm-entrepreneurship by civil society actors aside. Representatives to 
the HLTF agreed that this formerly out of ASEAN bounds taboo found its way into the 
constitutive DNA of ASEAN was mostly due to external pressure.919 There was also a 
strong connection to ASEAN’s “Myanmar problem”, i.e. external pressure concerning 
an AMS’ domestic situation that necessitated a strong reference to human rights in 
the light of possible external intervention. Pressure became so intense that human 
rights became a measure of the very relevance of the entire Charter. 
This argument allows us to explain why norm-entrepreneurs have managed to 
induce human rights into the discourse, but the quality of the norm remained low. 
The ASEAN HRM is weak and internal support for ASEAN to take action on that 
 
 
 
918  
Acharaya (2009). 
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Koh (2009); Tan Sri Ahamad Fuzi (2009); Nguyen Trung Thanh (2009). 
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normative basis post infusion is still very low. Although studies show that to some 
extent individual countries such as Vietnam have accepted the regional discourse 
and allowed it to trickle down nationally,920 there is an absence of genuine norm 
internalisation across ASEAN elites. This is manifest in a weak mandate for AICHR as 
well as application of cultural relativism. 
This is the signal word for the second point. Localisation has taken place and foreign 
norms became accustomed to what are ostensibly local belief systems. But norms 
were harmonised at the hands of elites to an extent as to render them almost 
meaningless in practice. Corresponding with the earlier “Asian value” debate, human 
rights related norms were interpreted by elites under the precondition of cultural 
relativity, not universality. This is reflected in the institutional regulative outcomes of 
the norm cascade in ASEAN, the ADHR and the ToR drafted for the AICHR. All this is 
not to say that ASEAN leaders are hostile to human rights per se. Again, internal 
norm-entrepreneurs, including elites in some AMS had a significant influence and 
localisation of norms is important. It does however reflect the general first instinct 
across ASEAN to prioritise institutional stability over protection of the individual. Not 
least due to the heterogeneity of individual AMS in terms of normative and liberal 
development. This allows us to explain why norm-entrepreneurs have managed to 
induce human rights into the discourse, but the quality of the norm remained low; 
quantity over quality in other words. Legitimacy of human rights is low and 
accordingly, have neither been sufficiently internalised nor institutionalised. Can 
internalisation be accepted as a variable if it is not translated into a practical 
mandate? How can norm diffusion be meaningful if norms are adopted without 
sufficient depth or for the wrong reasons, i.e. for image’s sake, and are subsequently 
weakened as to render them meaningless? The simple essence of the ASEAN human 
rights commitment is that it never universally existed in the first place. Low intrinsic 
legitimacy is indicative of the low substance of ASEAN commitment to human rights 
in practice. This leads us to the second benchmark inquiring about the capacity of 
ASEAN to take meaningful action. 
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Dosch (2016): APSC – Just a side-show?; Panel Presentation at the LSE Southeast Asia Forum, May 
13 2016, London, available: www.lse.ac.uk/SEAC, accessed: 29/05/2016. 
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Governance Capacity – Not Met. 
 
Thus far, we looked at human rights promotion and protection largely  in 
conjunction. But the critical benchmark of governance capacity requires a 
differentiation. Norm diffusion is not a simple matter of acceptance or rejection, but 
corresponding rules need to be implemented in order to reach a plateau beyond 
political lip-service or “ivory-tower” academia. In other words, principles are one 
thing and implementation quite another. Mely Caballero-Anthony claimed that 
human rights found their way into the ASEAN discourse was a milestone norm 
building exercise that will eventually lead to an enhanced, effective model of human 
rights governance.921 The above suggests that this may be too naïve a perspective. In 
order to assess this benchmark, we set out to measure ASEAN performance by 
applying specific KPIs that allow measuring the observable empirical effect of 
successful norm adaptation. ASEAN’s promulgated willingness and ability to address 
transboundary NTS challenges effectively and in a timely manner for the benefit of 
the peoples of ASEAN within a rules-based ASEAN Community should be expected to 
be observable on the Southeast Asian ground. We can expect a degree of voluntary 
compliance with the new standards of acceptable behaviour domestically, but more 
critical here, regionally. This includes enabling, or at least not inhibiting, ASEAN 
action. Is ASEAN empowered to take meaningful action on issues concerning human 
rights?; to initiate immediate crisis response, find long-term solutions, or support 
individual member efforts? 
The above analysis of ASEAN activity leads to the inevitable conclusion that ASEAN 
has not met the benchmark of governance capacity. It has failed some of the most 
vulnerable of the “peoples of ASEAN” according to all critical KPIs. The prediction of 
some Asia-constructivists that the APSC would contribute not only to a normative 
shift in discourse, but also facilitate the construction of a regional framework with 
some degree of governance capacity to tackle NTS issues has not materialised, yet. 
Thus far, ASEAN does not live up to its human rights rhetoric. The first benchmarking 
effort argued that norm diffusion has taken place to a certain degree. Although 
 
 
 
921  
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legitimacy is low, inhibiting a robust mandate for an eventual mechanism, human 
rights norms were nonetheless “promoted” across ASEAN. Yet, ASEAN failure to 
prevent, or even meaningfully respond to the Rohingya refugee crisis of 2015 
evidences that it has failed to live up to the “protection” element of the norm. This I 
argue is intentional since the norm itself is not considered legitimate. To  date, 
ASEAN has shown itself either unwilling or incapable of addressing the still 
continuing crisis. Albeit general importance of human rights was acknowledged and 
the need for transboundary cooperation in NTS accepted, if cooperation occurs it 
takes place outside ASEAN on ad hoc minilateral basis, reflecting diverging levels of 
commitment across the heterogeneous ASEAN membership. Even if agreement 
could be reached on that basis, AMS at best manage, not solve crises, producing 
suboptimal temporarily mitigating results. As seen with Indonesia and Malaysia 
setting up temporary camps, provided the UN would arrange speedy resettlement as 
well as financial compensation. Initial state based effort on May 20 was the 
decisively tripartite, not multilaterally institutionalised meeting of Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia to discuss relief efforts. That it should be exactly those three 
is only natural being the directly affected Andaman rim countries. Although we saw 
that foreign ministers warned this issue ‘cannot be addressed solely by the three (3) 
countries’,922 they agreed on and initiated urgent response measures on minilateral, 
not ASEAN basis. 
 
Far from igniting an ASEAN-based strategy, as close as the association itself came 
was the irregular emergency meeting EAMMTC where, the small but commendable 
voluntary trust fund aside, no consequential relief efforts were initiated. Several 
further regular ASEAN meetings were held subsequently that ex officio could have, 
but failed to address the Rohingya crisis. Some humanitarian relief materialised at 
the crucial Bangkok meeting on May 29. Fortunately, a number of local and 
international NGOs and several non-ASEAN governments contributed laudably. They 
did so without as much as even mentioning ASEAN, nor was ASEAN officially 
represented. Although eight of the ASEAN10 sent representatives, it would be overly 
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Ministerial Meeting on Irregular Movement of People in Southeast Asia, Joint Statement (20 May, 
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naïve, even simply inaccurate to credit ASEAN with this effort. The meeting took 
place by invitation of the hosting the Thai government and a number of Asian states, 
both ASEAN and non-ASEAN, as well as non-Asian states and local and international 
organisations participated. ASEAN was absent. Thus far, notwithstanding some non- 
ASEAN immediate crisis responses, no medium- to long-term answers, not to 
mention possible solutions, have been found. ASEAN has not shown any governance 
ability, nor has it exercised any leadership whatsoever. 
If one accepts the argument made above that human rights have not been 
sufficiently internalised across ASEAN elite circles and that the human rights 
provisions there are, are deemed illegitimate and thus, intentionally kept non- 
functional, the low governance capacity of ASEAN is of course unsurprising. Despite 
attempts to take ASEAN to task over this transboundary Southeast Asian crisis by 
launching workshops, special meetings, and a trust fund, procedural barriers 
constrain ASEAN involvement. The permanent institutional outcome of the 
illegitimate norm cascade is the AICHR. Due to normatively unaffected ASEAN 
procedural principles the AICHR is institutionally weak and must inevitably submit to 
absolute state sovereignty. The association has been unwilling to be flexible or break 
with its traditional procedures, even in the face of a severe humanitarian crisis 
originating from maltreatment of a minority local to the ASEAN region and clearly 
within APSC jurisdiction. The AICHR mandate does not provide for authority over the 
nation state or to commit or discipline it, or even inquire as to the human rights 
situation in AMS. Worse, it cannot even address specific cases of abuse. Like all 
ASEAN processes, the AICHR works according to the unanimity principle and the 
composition of this body with seconded representatives provides each individual 
government with a de facto veto on the transnationalisation of human rights. 
Ironically, the ASEAN HRM relies on the goodwill of mainly authoritarian 
governments to uphold human rights principles. 
The rhetoric-action gap is staggering. In spite of what ASEAN rhetorically assembled 
in the documents leading to the AICHR, the actual institutional result is significantly 
less than the language promised. Strong rhetorical commitments to human rights are 
negated by procedural principles and neither the AHRD nor the AICHR provide any 
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robust mechanism to “protect” those human  rights it “promotes”. In particular, 
though not exclusively, precisely those AMS with the most dubious domestic human 
rights record have ensured an institutionally weak human rights mandate. Including 
rhetorical references to human rights is an easy concession to make if veto 
constraints on an eventual HRM are upheld. Opposing governments could at later 
stages prevent non-compliance sanctions and thus, pay lip-service to human rights 
while eschewing implementation on the national or regional level. In this case, this 
allows Myanmar to frustrate immediate and long-term humanitarian efforts by 
ASEAN regarding the Rohingya. Indeed, the Myanmar government even to this day 
succeeds to not discuss or mention the issue in any ASEAN meeting and statement. 
ASEAN and AMS thus implicitly reject R2P if a member is concerned. Governance 
effectiveness succumbed to the ASEAN way and ASEAN has been ineffective in 
solving a transboundary NTS issue originating in Myanmar. Therefore, ASEAN has 
been unable to assume a role that would warrant any claim of autonomous 
governance capacity. Cascading the norm of promotion has not led to protection and 
ASEAN failed a part of its peoples it pledged to protect. A norm was introduced and 
diffused. But because it was not internalised, ASEAN stopped short of applying 
corresponding rules. In other words, Southeast Asia is characterised by the absence 
of human rights protection despite the presence of human rights promotion and 
mechanisms. 
 
A Preliminary Conclusion 
 
Arguably, in no other case study has the failure to meet benchmarks been as 
disconcerting as in this one, for nowhere is the immediate human impact as obvious. 
The answer to this last case specific research question is therefore a “no”. Although 
there is some evidence of norm diffusion, human rights norms have not been 
diffused and internalised across ASEAN sufficiently as to translate into a capacity for 
ASEAN to meaningfully protect its peoples in cases of human rights crises. Despite 
ASEAN’s flamboyant, promising rhetoric of being a community guided by normative 
principles, it has been shown to play a minimal role when it comes to 
implementation.  In  the  case  of  human  rights  in  ASEAN,  rhetoric  is  long  but 
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implementation is short. Thus, ASEAN supply has failed to meet demand. Although 
the norm diffusion benchmark has been met to some extent, human rights have not 
been internalised and thus, this case study had to conclude that the ability of ASEAN 
to contribute to a meaningful application of superficially diffused norms is non- 
existent. The Rohingya refugee crisis has demonstrated that ASEAN’s national 
governments have not succeeded in putting in place effective systems of governance 
despite commitments to the contrary. 
Beginning with norm diffusion, we saw that norms have found their way into ASEAN 
discourse and Asia-constructivist have been vindicated to some extent. Promotion 
and protection of human rights were introduced by identifiable norm-entrepreneurs 
and are now frequently referenced in all critical documents. Indeed, those even 
became constitutive principles and facilitated official HRMs in form of the AICHR and 
the subsequent AHRD. Yet, it has also been shown that norm diffusion remained 
superficial because internalisation has been insufficient. For anyone it would be hard 
to explain why such high standards were set rhetorically, while maintaining regional 
interaction procedures that directly contradict an efficient human rights body. 
Sufficient evidence has been assembled to legitimately argue that the reason human 
rights were officially endorsed were not norm internalisation. They were chiefly 
strategic reasons in addition to some internal pressure and procedural bargains. The 
evident rejection of universalism, the weak mandate, and the continuous 
reinforcement and perpetuation of the ASEAN way is evidence for the low substance 
of the rhetorical normative commitment. The doubtless diffusion of human rights 
norms into the regional and national discourse at the hand of norm-entrepreneurs 
did not lead to implementation of corresponding rules and practices that logically 
ought to have followed in order to make norms functional, i.e. give practical 
meaning to norms that positively impact people’s lives. Hence, ASEAN’s  human 
rights commitments are first and foremost lip service to an audience. 
If this is the case, we asked the question whether this newly introduced norm was 
doomed to be a paper-tiger. And indeed, when analysing the AICHR and the 
response ASEAN gave to the immediate Rohingya refugee crisis, it became evident 
that the governance capacity of ASEAN is inevitably inadequate; in fact non-existing 
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in this case. ASEAN prioritises sovereignty, non-interference, and 
intergovernmentalism over those humanist principles written on banners. It is left 
to individual AMS to decide whether or not to apply those human rights standards 
individually to which they have signed up as a collective. Individual AMS either 
protect the human rights of their people or they choose not to. Either or, ASEAN has 
no oversight or authority. 
The best optimists could point to is the laudable pressure local agents have and 
continue to assert. They could also argue that ASEAN human rights norm diffusion 
may be at a nascent stage, only slowly gaining a foothold in a region characterised by 
mostly illiberal governments lacking traditions of liberal values, remembering Wendt 
who warned ideational change can be incremental and slow. Like all ASEAN security 
cooperation, Asia-constructivists could highlight, NTS cooperation is still in the 
development stage and one must be patient and anticipate development. ASEAN 
HRMs are a stage in a journey, as Clarke has suggested. Yet, unlike the first, the latter 
argument is unconvincing. APSC is in force as of now and it is justifiable to ask at 
what point one can make a judgement. The AICHR remains a toothless paper-tiger, 
currently regarded as both appropriate and sufficient by relevant elites. It is 
therefore likely to endure. At least to some AMS human rights supply and demand in 
is perfectly acceptable and serving their purposes. Eventually, Asia-constructivists 
must face the question of what value norm diffusion and discourse expansion is if 
implementation and accountability is lacking. 
Often, the CLMV states have been blamed for impeding ASEAN’s normative turn 
towards liberalism, allegedly obstructing institutional development. This is to falsely 
assume that the old AMS were ready to accept supranational monitoring and even 
compliance authority. Inactivity by Singapore or recent developments in Thailand 
and Malaysia suggest that this is a simplified perspective. Ultimately, all AMS, even 
the allegedly more liberal ones, are acquiescent in upholding the ASEAN principles 
even in the face of human rights abuses. I stated above that principles are one thing 
and living up to them quite another. 2015 indicates that norm diffusion is not 
meaningful without implementation. This case study brings home the potential 
human consequences of the informal, non-intrusive ASEAN way, the absence of non- 
333 
 
 
compliance mechanisms, and most of all, the lack of ASEAN’s ability to effectively 
govern intramural affairs in NTS. The ASEAN way prevents ASEAN from taking 
ownership of sensitive issues. ASEAN must stand trial for failing its own devices and 
cannot realise the principles and goals of the Charter and AC15 without addressing 
serious humanitarian crises in Southeast Asia. If it fails the Rohingya, it fails 
significant parts of its community claims. The Rohingya are currently in the 
unfortunate position to be either living disenfranchised and marginalised under 
control of an empowered majority who detest them, or being forced to flee their 
home towards a capricious future. Hope comes in the form of still feeble but positive 
developments in Myanmar. I shall conclude this case study by yet again reciting 
ASEAN’s own words ‘ASEAN’s problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas, and action 
plans. The problem is one of ensuring compliance and effective implementation of 
decisions.’923 
 
 
5. Final Assessment 
 
 
 
The main subject of this thesis has been Southeast Asian security as institutionalised 
within the framework of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the first 
ASEAN Community (AC15) pillar. Ultimately, it inquired as to the degree of ASEAN’s 
relevance in meeting security requirements of the APSC, the “supply”, against the 
backdrop of optimistic, indeed ambitious “demand”. The ultimate study variable (SV) 
has been determined as ASEAN’s security actorness. Thus far, this thesis’ attempt 
has been twofold. It tried to provide a detailed, critical, but also necessarily selective 
overview of discourse dominating literature in the International Relations of 
Southeast Asia. With this it hoped to draw attention to two essential characteristics. 
Firstly, I alleged a heavy reliance on variables and concepts of traditional 
constructivist in dominant analyses of ASEAN security. I claimed the interrelation to 
be strong enough as to warrant devising a new sub-theory of Asia-constructivism. 
Constructivist  bias  aside,  I  also  claimed  that  Asia-constructivist  analyses  and 
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conclusion strikingly correlate with ASEAN’s self-perception. In particular chapter 3 
hoped to show that both perspectives are characterised by remarkable optimism as 
to ASEAN’s actorness capability in regional security. I hypothesised that this 
characteristic optimism innate  to Asia-constructivist perspectives could be  a 
consequence of an ideological predisposition and ultimately responsible for a 
substantial bias as to an empirically unwarranted optimism regarding ASEAN 
actorness in regional security. I suggested conducting a critical appraisal of ASEAN 
actorness in regional security multilateralism, measured against the demand put on 
ASEAN as a logical result from those perspectives. Naturally, the second challenge 
proved to be uncovering empirical evidence for my hypotheses. Within a three case 
studies framework,  this thesis  hoped to uncover  sufficient evidence in  order to 
conduct a critical appraisal of ASEAN actorness in regional security and answer the 
principal overall guiding research question 
How great is ASEAN’s role in arbitrating, mitigating, and managing matters of 
regional security in the light of the high expectations that it is subjected to? 
As for the structural and analytical design, I approached the appraisal within a 
“demand vs. supply” scaffolding. Each case study summed up some case relevant 
perspectives and conclusions of selected Asia-constructivists and ASEAN’s own 
ambitions. Under the umbrella of this overall guiding structure I proposed to apply 
benchmarking whereby each case study would be subject to a set of case specific 
benchmarks derived from such optimistic perspectives. I also devised corresponding 
KPIs in order to assess whether or not the ASEAN supply met the said benchmarks 
and thus, managed to satisfy the demand. 
The purpose of this chapter is now to bring it all together. It will briefly recap a few 
essential case study results in order to answer the research question and allude to 
ASEAN’s limited actorness. The specific question as to ASEAN security actorness 
within the APSC pillar will be addressed and answered with the help of case study 
results. This chapter subsequently draws conclusions as to the implications of this 
study’s research result for its two critical constituents; Asia-constructivism and 
ASEAN.  It  will  end  by  suggesting  to  lower  the  demand  side  and  to  settle  for 
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1. Centrality 
unfulfilled 
2. Security Community 
missed 
3. Norm Diffusion&Effectivity 
unfulfilled 
 
appreciating ASEAN for what it is good at. In other words, it puts a degree of realism 
back in ASEAN studies. 
 
5.1. What Did We Learn from the Case Studies? 
 
 
 
 
 
Cohesiveness Convening Competence Dependable Identity Conflict Intramural Governance 
 Power Power expectations  mediation norm capacity 
   of peaceful 
change 
  diffusion  
 
Largely failed Met Not met Not met Not met Partially Partially Not met 
     met met  
The first case study inquired as to ASEAN’s role in extramural regional security. It 
attempted to assess the degree of ASEAN’s actorness within the realm of the APSC 
pillar within the ASEAN centrality concept. After analysing a number of individual, 
yet interconnected maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) over both 
territory and resources the answer to the case specific research question Can the 
notion of ASEAN centrality in the wider regional security architecture be 
substantiated in practice, had been a qualified no. While the benchmark of 
convening power was definitively met, the two critical benchmarks of cohesiveness 
and competence power had been largely failed and not been met respectively. It was 
concluded that ASEAN could not transcend the innate Sino-ASEAN power 
asymmetries. Chinese ambitions are checked not by a cohesive and coherent ASEAN, 
central to a rules-based order, but by “hard” internal, but mostly U.S.-led and - 
facilitated external balancing. The APSC is built on the presumption that its members 
constitute a community. The way this case study interpreted community related to 
ASEAN’s internal unity, its cohesiveness. There were some positives in this respect. 
Those positives were however entirely depended on a strong ASEAN Chair, under 
whose guidance ASEAN could find unity in the face of adversity and severe external 
pressure by China. A strong Chair can take the initiative and facilitate a united ASEAN 
position resulting in an ability to project a unified and coherent security policy stance 
and some robust language into the wider Asia-Pacific, in this case addressing China. 
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Yet, this dependence was also found to have the potential to have the polar opposite 
effect should the Chair be weak. We also found that ASEAN’s heterogeneity in 
combination with informal and consensus oriented processes allow more powerful 
outsiders with malign intentions to effortlessly divide and rule ASEAN. In this case 
study, this tactic had mostly been used to impede progress towards ASEAN’s goal of 
creating a rules-based order. 
Asia-constructivists’ main argument in favour of ASEAN centrality produced the 
arguably most critical and contentious benchmark, ASEAN’s competence power. 
Here, case study results proved beyond reasonable doubt that it has been 
spectacularly missed. Unfortunately for ASEAN, its ability to socialise China into a 
rules-based maritime security order, based on ASEAN-conceived norms and 
transmitted via ASEAN-initiated and -led institutions and regimes, has failed. Plenty 
of factual evidence could be assembled and exemplified that while China indeed 
signs up to numerous ASEAN security norms and initiatives, this remains entirely 
theoretical. Not only is the materially more powerful actor resisting socialisation 
attempts by a collective of weaker states and not only does China not follow up on 
norms, rules, and principles it has committed to on paper. Beijing has been shown to 
even work in the opposite direction and directly contradicts its rhetorical 
commitment. It has even been suggested that China may use multilateral 
engagement as a strategic, tactical check to its “hard power” approach in the region. 
Nonetheless, although we found balance of power dynamics not institutionalised 
norms governing security in ASEAN-China relations in the SCS, Asia-constructivists 
have made some great contributions in particular by clarifying ASEAN’s convening 
power. This allows the association to retain some relevance in that it contributes 
significantly to regional security by providing a useful reference and meeting point 
for non-ASEAN regional great powers to engage, talk, and build confidence. In 
particular the political investment of the Obama administration into ASEAN is 
evidence for that, but also China’s continuing participation. This at least suggests 
that ASEAN is seen and acts as a viable forum for security dialogue. This thesis has 
however criticised those forums for their notorious failure to deliver results, i.e. to 
reach the goals they have been set up for. Not only are they often talk shops as 
337 
 
 
opposed to conflict resolution mechanisms, but they also allow countries such as 
China to play a geostrategic game and more or less effectively restrict the security 
agenda. As a result, all security related forums are at best reduced to conflict 
management. At the same time, they have shown to be quite robust and enduring 
platforms for regular meetings and exchange, which has been declared a merit in 
itself. 
Subsequently, we turned inside and inquired as to the “S” and the “C” in APSC. More 
precisely, the case study set out to analyse just how much security and how much 
community there is in the ASEAN Political-Security Community. The Thai – Cambodia 
conflict 2008 – 2011 demonstrated that ASEAN is lacking in both. Yet, ASEAN was 
found not to be redundant in intramural conflict mitigation. Although the case 
specific research question, Does the APSC sufficiently satisfy the demands of the 
security community concept to warrant its name? had to be refuted, I argued that a 
Southeast Asia without ASEAN would be less secure than it is now and it partially 
fulfils the “S”. The reason for that positive note rested in the benchmark of conflict 
mediation. It could be demonstrated that under certain conditions, ASEAN does have 
the ability to meaningfully contribute to conflict mitigation by facilitating dialogue 
and offering its good offices. With ASEAN’s large number of both regular and ad-hoc 
meetings ASEAN facilitates important inter-elite contact and confidence building. 
The doubtless ability to convene stakeholders as well as in this particular case the 
Indonesian shuttle diplomacy, contributed to conflict management in a very 
heterogeneous region and a context of increasing hostility. Although some critical 
efforts eventually failed, there even were auspicious signs of peace monitoring and 
conflict resolution. The positive conclusion was somewhat tainted when we found 
that ASEAN leaders showed themselves reluctant to validate their commitment to 
regional peace and stability when asked to step in. Nonetheless, undoubtedly, 
despite its many shortcomings, ASEAN offers its members institutionalised as well as 
ad-hoc and informal, “face-saving” conflict management facilities. 
Despite ASEAN’s very significant potential for conflict mitigation, the research 
question had to be negated, for it missed the two remaining benchmarks. Empirical 
results suggested that in spite of its significant contributions, ASEAN does not have 
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sufficient security, nor is it a resilient community in an Asia-constructivist sense. The 
perhaps easiest argument to make was the absence of dependable expectations of 
peaceful change. Events along the Thai-Cambodian border between 2008 and 2011 
led to the unambiguous conclusion that ASEAN is not a security community in a 
Deutschian, or indeed Asia-constructivist sense. Both ASEAN itself as well as Asia- 
constructivist and the security community literature they draw on have emphasised 
the utmost necessity that political disagreement must under no circumstance occur 
under the condition of violence. ASEAN has even codified this principle as a legal 
requirement and no intra-ASEAN relations may involve the use or threat of force. 
The fact that military engagement occurred frequently, including heavy weaponry 
and leading to dozens of casualties and tens of thousands displaced civilians, ruled 
out any positive conclusion as far as this benchmark is concerned. 
It was also concluded that ASEAN lacks the basic constituent of the “C”, identity, 
identified as a critical variable in Asia-constructivist literature. The “real glue” 
binding ASEAN Member States (AMS) together was found to be rather fragile since it 
could be shown that two members of the ostensible community did not display any 
realisation of a we-feeling. On both sides, narrow self-interests, in this case domestic 
power politics, easily trumped even the most basic consideration for either the 
direct neighbour or regional integration as a whole. Bellicose military action and 
hateful rhetoric was readily employed in order to further domestic political ends. 
Moreover, regional processes were held hostage to further such narrowly defined, 
definitively anti-regional interests. The identity assessment could for such reasons 
not come to any other conclusion than that ASEAN has not succeeded in facilitating 
identity building on its road to AC15. In sum, while ASEAN has not been very 
effective in dealing with a serious military conflict and has even completely missed 
the remaining benchmarks, it would be unmerited to declare ASEAN redundant and 
pathetic, for it could be credited with a critical mediation role. 
Finally, the Rohingya refugee crisis of 2015 served as an assessment of ASEAN’s 
ability to diffuse positive norms within its area of jurisdiction and act accordingly. 
The case specific research question asked Have human rights norms been diffused 
and internalised across ASEAN and translated into sufficient governance capacity for 
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ASEAN to act meaningfully in events of human rights crises? In this final case study 
two benchmarks had sufficed to answer this question with a “no”. The major 
takeaway from that case study had perhaps been best summed up in ASEAN’s own 
words ‘ASEAN’s problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas, and action plans. The 
problem is one of ensuring compliance and effective implementation of decisions.’924 
The case study had to arrive at this unfortunate conclusion because the benchmark 
of intramural norm diffusion was only partially met; governance capacity was not 
met at all. Although some evidence of norm diffusion was found, human rights 
norms were found as not having been diffused and internalised sufficiently in order 
to translate the high demand into appropriate supply. Despite strong commitments 
to NTS threats in general and human rights promotion and protection in particular, 
ASEAN was found unable to meaningfully protect its peoples in cases of human 
rights crises. ASEAN partially met the first benchmark, for it could be shown that 
human rights norms had found their way into the ASEAN, even national AMS 
discourse. Certain identifiable norm-entrepreneurs managed to introduce promotion 
and protection of human rights, norms that henceforth frequently featured in all 
critical documents as well wider discussions. Human rights even became constitutive 
principles and led to the creation of official human rights mechanisms (HRM) in form 
of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the 
subsequent ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). To some extent, Asia- 
constructivist had been vindicated. Nonetheless, we also found that norm diffusion 
unfortunately remained superficial, for albeit opening  up for the discourse, 
internalisation did not occur. The argument was mostly based on the apparent 
rejection of universal applicability of human rights and the weak mandate the AICHR 
is endowed with. Here, the continuous reinforcement and perpetuation of the 
ASEAN way led to maintenance of regional interaction processes that directly 
contradict an efficient human rights mechanism. This served as evidence for a low 
substance of a strong rhetorical commitment. Even in the case of gross human rights 
violations and a resulting serious non-traditional security threat affecting at least 
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four AMS directly, ASEAN was immobilised and incapacitated to act upon 
commitments – if anyone had ever wanted to act. It was argued that mostly for 
strategic reasons human rights had been officially endorsed, resulting in an absence 
of norm internalisation. Hence, the unquestionable diffusion of human rights norms 
into the regional and national discourse at the hand of norm-entrepreneurs was not 
accompanied by implementation. In other words, while promotion of human rights 
was evident, the protection thereof was deficient and normative commitments were 
not given practical meaning. ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms are paper-tigers and 
first and foremost lip service to a variety of audiences. 
 
5.1.2. ASEAN Actorness – Walking the Talk? 
 
The task at hand now is to assess the implications of such results for ASEAN 
actorness comprised of the three defined constituents of this concept. Over the 
course of the three case studies, it could be shown that supply has largely failed the 
demand side and both the benchmark assessments and case specific preliminary 
conclusions have alluded to the principal overall result. Drawing on what we have 
learnt from the case studies, we can suspect ASEAN actorness to be low, for the 
individual qualities required for a strong collective security role for ASEAN are either 
entirely absent or fragile and ineffective – convening power being the only 
noteworthy exception. Hence, despite a number of positive takeaways, the empirical 
part of this thesis concluded that most benchmarks and thus, critical constituents of 
ASEAN’s overall security actorness have been missed. On the supply side, the 
preceding case studies have shed light on ASEAN’s role in the three of the most 
pressing security issues facing the region today. This thesis arrives at the conclusion 
that ASEAN does have a role to play and is visible in each of the analysed issues – if 
to a varying degree – but the extent of this visibility is significantly lower than the 
association aspires to and Asia-constructivist presume. It is therefore consequential, 
coherent, and appropriate to claim that the SV, ASEAN’s actorness supply does not 
meet Asia-constructivists’ and indeed ASEAN’s own demand. Therefore, the answer 
to the principal research question How great is ASEAN’s role in arbitrating, 
mitigating,  and  managing  matters  of  regional  security  in  the  light  of  the  high 
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expectations that it is subjected to? must be negative. Having gathered sufficient 
evidence and performed detailed analyses, I claim legitimacy for my conclusion that 
ASEAN’s security actorness is, while not insignificant, insubstantial in the light of the 
high demand it is subjected to. 
When analysing the demand side, I argued that Asia-constructivists, corresponding 
with ASEAN’s own image, often presuppose the presence of shared norms  and 
values as their independent variable (IV), facilitating emergence of a shared identity 
and unity, a strong sense of belonging together, a we-feeling. This ostensibly results 
in a number of dependent variables such as a high degree of ASEAN agency, 
autonomy, and community. As a result, I claimed that both Asia-constructivists and 
ASEAN itself presume a high degree of what I have frequently referred to ASEAN’s 
actorness, based on robust nature of those individual constituents, Asia- 
constructivist dependent variables (DV). In chapter 1 in particular I attempted to 
explain actorness by highlighting its most important qualities. Applied to ASEAN 
security, actorness becomes tangible in the association’s role in regional security. 
Case studies have set benchmarks to analyse such critical elements as ASEAN’s 
vertical policy coherence, i.e. a transnationalisation and synchronisation of 
preferences and processes, its degree of reliable cohesiveness, or its unity. It was 
also assessed whether or not ASEAN is able to operate in its own right, relatively 
independent from capricious sub-actors or interfering outsiders. On the basis of 
internal cohesiveness, ASEAN should be capable of formulating and articulating 
coherent goals and policies and substantiate those in practice by implementing and 
regulating regional interaction in order to meet thus articulated security ends. ASEAN 
must therefore be more than the sum of its members and evince a common purpose 
and autonomous ability to formulate, articulate, and operationalise common 
security goals. It needs a degree of cohesiveness, a community quality in Asia- 
constructivist words, that aids autonomous agency, a capacity to act collectively and 
affect change in a meaningful manner on the basis of shared interests, purpose, and 
shared concerns. To be a credible security actor ASEAN needs the sum of individual 
actorness constituents such as community, autonomy, and agency. 
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In the context of both this approach to actorness and the summary of what we have 
learnt from the case studies, ASEAN does not possess strong enough constituent 
qualities as to conclude that it has actorness. Looking at centrality first, I have argued 
that by and large ASEAN centrality is illusive. Asia-constructivist and ASEAN’s own 
claims as to the association’s relevance and actorness are based on the presumption 
that ASEAN is in the driver’s seat of regional security multilateralism. Yet, it was 
demonstrated that despite some laudable efforts, ASEAN is marginalised by either its 
own members or by external actors who either interfere with ASEAN processes or 
manipulate those to their own ends. As for ASEAN’s agency, the picture is mixed. 
ASEAN has been shown capable of utilising its indeed significant convening power. It 
has been explained in length why this is value added to regional security in its own 
right and therefore partly fulfils actorness requirements. But is convening the 
powers alone sufficient to claim extramural security agency? Probably not if one 
considers another critical element of genuine agency. The most critical goal ASEAN 
has been able to articulate in terms of its centrality in extramural security within the 
APSC pillar is the creation of a reliable rules-based regional order. Chapter 4.1. has 
explained that the maritime domain is East Asia’s most critical security ground. It is 
therefore legitimate to draw wider conclusions from ASEAN’s unequivocal failure to 
achieve such reliable rules-based order in the South China Sea. ASEAN has been 
unsuccessful in meaningfully affecting change in pursuit of this policy goal. Related 
to this, Asia-constructivists have raised the demand significantly by crediting with 
what some had termed ASEAN’s competence, or socialising power. Certainly, if 
ASEAN could have been found to meaningfully affect change in regional security by 
altering the preferences of extramural, perhaps materially more powerful actors, it 
would have a significant degree of agency. Unfortunately for both ASEAN and Asia- 
constructivists, it could convincingly be argued that ASEAN has tried but failed. China 
has not let itself be socialised into ASEAN’s rules-based order arranged around 
ASEAN norms, values, and procedural principles. 
In terms of autonomy in extramural security, ASEAN has also failed. ASEAN is not 
able to reliably act independently to realise vertically coherent approaches. Not 
much  progress  is  being  made  in  multilateral  forums  and  regimes  where  ASEAN 
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centrality supposedly plays out. To a great extent the ASEAN way in general and non- 
claimants/non-interested AMS in particular are to blame. The former allowed some 
AMS to spoil any chance of an effective and concerted ASEAN response. Meanwhile, 
some ASEAN claimants have tried to galvanise others behind their cause in order to 
realise a more robust autonomously acting ASEAN, but have met great resistance. 
The degree of ASEAN actorness was found to depend to some extent on the 
leadership of the rotating Chair, not on institutional substance. Not autonomous, 
concerted ASEAN action, but capricious individual leadership decides whether 
ASEAN is side-lined or not. Lastly, this reason for ASEAN mostly remaining at the 
side-lines also suggests that the community constituent is of low quality. Analysing 
centrality demonstrated that the unity, or cohesiveness required for actorness is 
low. In particular because AMS do not seem to have realised sufficiently that they 
share common security concerns and ought to be united in order to address those 
concerns. ASEAN has been easily divided by China, suggesting that the community 
feeling required for genuine security actorness is at least feeble. Overall, ASEAN 
centrality is not a redundant concept. But in the light of the high demand on 
centrality, it is of too little quality as to warrant anything but at best a moderate role 
for ASEAN in wider East Asian security. Instead of ASEAN centrality, we found various 
national balancing strategies as well as external forces at work in the SCS. The 
consequentially limited degree of actorness ASEAN has acquired in extramural Asian 
security over recent decades largely reflects its material capabilities in relation to 
other powers, existent but low. Or in Bilahari Kausikan’s way, ASEAN may well be in 
the driver’s seat, but the occupant of that seat is sometimes only the chauffeur.925 
The appraisal of ASEAN as a security community led us to conclude that the name 
APSC is unwarranted since it is not characterised by dependable expectations of 
peaceful change. ASEAN does however have some agency to show for in terms of 
conflict mediation. It could be demonstrated that under certain conditions, ASEAN 
does have the ability to meaningfully contribute to conflict mitigation by facilitating 
dialogue and offering mediation and good offices. With ASEAN’s large number of 
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both regular and ad-hoc meetings ASEAN facilitates important inter-elite contact and 
confidence building. The problem was therefore not so much agency as such, but the 
realisation in practice, i.e. its effectiveness. Autonomy was absent because individual 
AMS and local elites managed to block any ASEAN involvement whenever doing so 
advanced their own narrow interests. On the one hand, AMS feared for the survival 
of critical principles of the ASEAN way, in this case non-interference, and inhibited 
direct ASEAN involvement on that ground. On the other hand, local elites, such as 
Thai Prime Minister Abhisit or General Prayuth could easily prevent ASEAN action 
such as inhibiting peace monitoring as arranged for by a proactive Indonesian ASEAN 
Chair. Realisation of autonomous ASEAN action was therefore procedurally 
impossible and despite a strong proactive Chair, ASEAN could not affect change 
meaningfully. Again, this is due to the particularities of the ASEAN way, but also to 
the absence of a community feeling. Beyond security and ever closer economic and 
socio-cultural links, building a strong regional identity to pave the way for deeper 
community integration has been an AC15 priority. The “C” in APSC was found to be 
of low quality, though precisely due to a lack of such identity. ASEAN itself, but more 
importantly Asia-constructivists had claimed a shared Southeast Asian identity as a 
critical part of the APSC. Unfortunately, in the security community case the set 
identity benchmark concluded that individual members of this ostensible community 
have not realised that they had ‘something more important in common - namely 
being a member of ASEAN’, as Asia-constructivists had argued. 926 The “real glue” 
binding AMS was found to be hollow. An initially minor  dispute, certainly 
manageable if ASEAN would fulfil community requirements, was escalated to 
military conflict and strongly bellicose rhetoric among two APSC members’ national 
elites who definitively privileged their “I” over the “we”. Nor was there any visible 
vertical synchronisation of interests and it was demonstrated how corresponding 
foreign- and security policy decisions were guided by national self-interest instead of 
regional value orientation guided by intrinsic orientation on what is collectively 
appropriate. Two APSC members have also unhesitatingly held the entire regional 
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integration and identity building process hostage to domestic posturing and 
nationalism; even within ASEAN forums and Summits. They grossly violated 
community principles under complete disregard of regional integration dynamics. 
ASEAN is not a “community of caring societies”. 
As was the case with centrality, individual constituents of actorness have been 
exposed as too low as to legitimately warrant genuine security actorness. Hence, 
while ASEAN does have some agency and limitedly contributes to, but not manages 
to establish a reliable “S” in the APSC, the “C” is entirely absent here. ASEAN’s role in 
the intramural security community is reduced to the ability to mediate between 
stakeholders with both ad-hoc shuttle diplomacy but also in regular and ad-hoc 
intramural institutions. However, not only is this little in terms of the demands 
placed on ASEAN as a security community with shared identity. It could also be 
demonstrated how easily even this limited agency can be rendered ineffective by 
individual, often very capricious actors. 
A final appraisal of ASEAN’s overall security actorness related to its intramural norm 
diffusion capability and its governance effectiveness. Chapter 3 demonstrated the 
former as an integral part of Asia-constructivism, while the latter is essential to give 
practical meaning to norms, once those should have been diffused. We found a 
partial role for ASEAN in terms of norm diffusion, but saw that ASEAN was unable to 
substantiate those norms in practice. More precisely, we found human rights 
“promotion” without “protection”. ASEAN has declared non-traditional security 
(NTS) in general and human rights in particular a regional priority and anchored such 
matters firmly within the ASEAN Political-Security Community. But I was left to argue 
that while ASEAN had virtually no role whatsoever in enforcing human rights 
protection, even its diffusion role was limited to infusing human rights norms into 
the political arena, because stakeholders resisted internalisation of such norms once 
those had entered the discourse. This however would have been a necessary second 
step in order to increase ASEAN’s governance capacity sufficiently as to provide it 
with the degree of agency required to support overall actorness. ASEAN has been 
shown to be both an active agent of norm diffusion across ASEAN, even igniting 
normative  trickle  down  processes  to  the  national  level,  and  a  forum  where 
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identifiable norm-entrepreneurs could go about their business of spreading positive 
norms. ASEAN was thus integral to coherent identification, prioritisation, 
articulation, and even codification of preferences. With the help of this significant 
agency, human rights norms found their way first into the regional and national 
discourse and subsequently became a legal reality and institutionalised in the form 
of an official HRM, the AICHR. However, at the same time, an analysis of the 
unfortunate situation of the Rohingya minority that spurred a severe refugee crisis in 
2015 demonstrated that this agency did not extend from promotion towards 
protection of human rights. Hence, in spite of meaningfully affecting discourse and 
indeed legal change, ASEAN has not been able to facilitate a problem solution, not to 
mention to protect the Rohingya refugees or even alleviate their hardship. This 
limited ability to affect positive change is explained by a shortage of institutional 
autonomy. ASEAN’s shortcomings in this constituent of security actorness became 
most obvious in the weak mandate the AICHR is endowed with. The case study 
found that the AICHR was deliberately highly circumscribed, unable to participate in 
immediate and long-term problem solving in a matter clearly within its raison d’être. 
It lacks any independent authority such as enforcement of human rights protection, 
crisis alleviation powers, or judicial oversight. The AICHR does not even possess 
monitoring power independent from the nation state in question. This lack of 
institutional independence I argued was related to the wider principles of the ASEAN 
way. This is for instance reflected in the fact that all personnel is seconded from 
national governments and bound by unanimity. Therefore, the institutional 
independence of this ASEAN HRM is non-existent and by extension, the autonomy 
constituent remains unfulfilled. I argued that the AICHR had been kept weak as a lip 
service to various audiences, because the promoted norm of human rights had not 
been internalised across ASEAN but only by some individual actors. This casts doubts 
as to the third constituent, the community. It was mostly left to directly affected 
individual AMS as well as the international community to find solutions and alleviate 
a crisis that would have been in both theory and practice a definitive matter for the 
APSC. There was a critical split not exclusively, but most obviously between the 
ASEAN latecomer CLMV states states and the older ASEAN members (o-AMS) over 
the question whether or not human rights protection ought to be prioritised and 
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how much independent oversight an ASEAN human rights mechanism ought to be 
endowed with. Even among the o-AMS divisions were obvious with some more 
progressive states such as Indonesia and more cautious non-universalists such as 
Singapore and Malaysia. A common position on such critical norms and values was 
impossible among AMS and while norms were endorsed, the absence of commonly 
shared perspective led to a deliberately ineffective mechanism. Overall, ASEAN has 
demonstrated only a limited amount of agency, while the autonomy and community 
constituents were absent. Therefore it would be unjustified to prescribe any more 
than a very limited degree of actorness in terms of norm-diffusion and governance 
capacity in critical intramural NTS issues. 
In sum, one must conclude that ASEAN’s actorness is, though not entirely absent, 
low. This result in particular confirms the fourth hypothesis that was articulated in 
chapter 1. The optimistic demand cannot be met and Asia-constructivist claims as 
well as ASEAN’s self-appraisal have been exposed as inadequate and excessively 
optimistic. ASEAN’s limited supply does not come close to meeting the demand side. 
It also qualifies the third hypothesis in that contrary to my pre-analytical 
presumption, ASEAN is indeed a security actor and does make contributions to both 
intra- and extramural Asian security. Yet its contributions are limited and ASEAN 
remains, although not redundant, a security actor with restricted and incomplete 
means to affect change meaningfully. The principal research question is thus 
answered. 
Two final pivotal questions remain at this stage. First, what does this research and all 
analyses above mean for the two critical subjects of this thesis, ASEAN and Asia- 
constructivists. While making genuinely useful contributions to the study of ASEAN, 
Asia-constructivist will have to go back to the drawing board and revise their 
variables and way of evidencing. ASEAN meanwhile is an incomplete and very 
restricted and circumscribed security actor. This is however exactly what its founders 
and their successor, i.e. all critical stakeholders want it to be. Under current 
circumstances, ASEAN cannot rise beyond that restricted role if it was to survive and 
continue to make some limited contributions to Asian security and stability. The final 
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question is, if ASEAN is neither irrelevant nor the promised institutional beacon of 
East- and Southeast Asian regional security multilateralism, what is it then? 
 
5.2. Implications for Asia-constructivists – Sound Academia? 
 
ASEAN and the empirical case studies aside, the second critical subject of this thesis 
has been theoretical, i.e. the one sub-theory that has come to dominate the field of 
Southeast Asian studies, Asia-constructivism as I have termed and categorised it. 
Chapter 3 introduced all aspects of this theory in great detail. Asia-constructivists do 
sound reasonably convincing if ASEAN’s own rhetoric is taken at face value. On the 
surface, the ASEAN Community (AC15) project looms large and the integration 
process based on the ASEAN way has apparently induced a shared identity and might 
even appeal to non-ASEAN regional actors. Now the case studies have attempted to 
reconcile reality on the ground and Asia-constructivists theory, presumption, and 
concepts and has clarified ASEAN’s actorness, this part of the final assessment 
intends to summarise some of the most critical implications of final results for this 
school of thought. Although Asia-constructivist fall short in many of their main 
assumptions, research variables, and analytical approach, neither the foregoing nor 
the following criticism denies the valuable contribution of constructivism to 
International Relations (IR) in general and Asia-constructivism in East and Southeast 
Asian IR in particular. They have for example greatly aided our understanding of 
ASEAN by showing that norm-diffusion does take place or that mutual perception 
matters. 
Having said this, the case studies have strongly suggested severe shortcomings and 
some of the most critical concepts of Asia-constructivism have collapsed on the 
ground of day-to-day regional practice. Therefore, the following intends to highlight 
some of the most conspicuous problems with Asia-constructivism and comes to the 
conclusion that thus inclined scholars ought to go back to the drawing board and 
adjust their research approach, design, and presumptions. 
Before this final assessment of the implications for the theory of Asia-constructivism, 
I  remind  the  reader  of  this  thesis’  principle  theoretical  hypothesis  that  Asia- 
349 
 
 
constructivism’s inherent normative bias obscures empiricism in favour of thick 
phenomena description and makes assessments overly optimistic as to ASEAN’s 
actorness. Let us see whether or not this can be confirmed or must be discarded. 
Thick Description 
 
I have accused Asia-constructivists of “thick” phenomena description. I have 
borrowed this from Jones and Smith who themselves once accused constructivist 
scholarship in general of relying on it.927 In contrast to thin description, a neutral 
description of ASEAN on which all scholars can agree and assessment is not 
fraudulently influenced by hindering predispositions, the thick description of Asia- 
constructivists is a causal analysis based on a norm-endorsing ideological 
predisposition that favours constructivists concepts at the expense of objectivity, 
which would be characterised by such agreeable and intersubjectively appreciable 
measures as empirical hypotheses testing.928 Even Finnemore and Sikkink, identified 
as constructivists, have admitted that this approach at times fails to produce specific 
predictions about concrete outcomes, obscuring tests.929 Thus, the question arises 
how constructivism, and by extension Asia-constructivism, could ever be validated or 
falsified beyond their fundamental dogmata. It also begs the question of the value- 
added of thus inclined analysis to the academic study of ASEAN. I accuse thus 
informed analyses of being victims of an ideological predisposition, rather than being 
analytically objective. Without discarding constructivism per se, the case studies 
have sufficiently evidenced that Southeast Asian regionalism is at odds with Asia- 
constructivist claims and approaches. Additionally, in particular in the cases of 
Acharya’s, Ba’s and to some extent even Evelyn Goh’s theoretical frameworks in 
combination with unsatisfactory ambiguity and often all but non-falsifiable 
hypotheses make for an over-complicated reading and one wonders whether such 
undertakings serve academic vanity more than genuine political analysis. Words are 
not deeds and while some arguments are stronger than others, scholarly debate in 
 
 
 
 
927  
Jones/Smith (2007). 
928 
Emmerson (2005) for a great analysis of the problem of thick descriptions in constructivist 
methodology. 
929  
Finnemore/Sikkink (2001): 393. 
350 
 
 
political science should not be an intellectual end in itself, but should advance 
sincere academia and have clear policy implications. Of course I must and shall 
substantiate such accusations with the help of a few selected examples. 930 
Chapter 3 has attempted to categorise and critically evaluate this school of thought. 
Thereafter, this thesis has at various stages pointed to the manifold problems with 
Asia-constructivist perspectives of both theoretical and empirical nature. Essentially, 
those can be categorised into three key issues; theoretical; empirical; and 
concreteness. Each of those problems raised doubts as to the validity of Asia- 
constructivist claims at various points over the course of this thesis. 
 
   
 
 
The Problem of Selective Evidence 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have drawn attention to the parallels, even echoes between 
ASEAN self-appraisal and Asia-constructivists notions of ASEAN’s abilities. Internally, 
research for example looked at whether AMS had indeed reconciled their regional 
and national interests in ways conducive to security community building, or whether 
norms could be diffused sufficiently across ASEAN to realise idealistic targets. 
Externally, it was checked if ASEAN really is the fulcrum of East Asian 
institutionalised security multilateralism, or what it even means to be the fulcrum. 
Simply hosting or perhaps even socialising China; can the tail really wag the dog? 
Given the importance of empirical validation of academic work in political science in 
general as well as the unusually broad academic consensus about ASEAN actorness 
in Asia-constructivism and the often far-reaching claims such scholars make, it is 
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surprising just how little systematic empirical tests, such as case studies, have been 
devoted to ASEAN by Asia-constructivists. Asia-constructivists have assembled a set 
of resounding narratives that are mistaken for evidence. Instead, they engage in 
cross-referencing within a close-knit and likeminded academic circle and 
substantiate claims with often dubious, sometimes even meaningless support. Even 
if one was well inclined to constructivist preferences and concepts, one would find 
many arguments unconvincing due to a lack of substantial support. 
For example, Estrella Solidum has exclusively relied on ASEAN statements in support 
of her indeed sweeping conclusions regarding ASEAN’s ostensible like-mindedness, 
cohesion and unity. In the light of case study 1 and 2 though, one suspects she has 
taken ASEAN’s political rhetoric at face value and relies on the association’s self- 
proclamations in lieu of evidence. If this is true or not, it is justifiable to inquire as to 
her evidence and primary sources. In this particular case, Emmerson has already 
outdone the best criticism I could possibly level against her. 
What Solidum means by primary is official. Had she interviewed government 
officials for their possibly authoritative accounts, consulted knowledgeable 
critics of ASEAN (including ex-officials) for their alternative views, and then 
made up her own mind, she would have illustrated the value of obtaining 
original evidence. But her endnotes credit no interviews at all. Her book relies 
instead on a selection of secondary writings about ASEAN and, above all, on 
official ASEAN statements. Her single most frequently cited source is the 
Association’s 1998-99 annual report. The uncritical nature of her conclusions 
surely reflects her method.931 
 
 
Other Asia-constructivists such Hiro Katsumata, Mely Caballero-Anthony, and Alice 
Ba are guilty of a similar offense. In his analysis of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
Katsumata concludes that the ARF is East Asia’s a security norm-brewery. Katsumata 
declares that he seeks to explain events in the real world, just like rationalist schools 
do. The sources he consults for this optimistic conclusion are official documents. He 
reasons that since all participants had agreed on those, the here codified norms 
provided a legitimate research base. Below, I will highlight the problem with relying 
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on ASEAN consensuses for evidence. As for now though, I remain sceptical regarding 
codification of normative principles without practical adherence. Katsumata backs 
his research up with interviews conducted with mostly Southeast Asian participants 
who turn out to be all stakeholders in the ARF process. Despite this obvious bias, he 
derives a set of apparently commonly shared ideas that serve as evidence. Lastly, he 
cites his intensive studies of literature on institutions in the Asia-Pacific, referring 
exclusively to authors who could with some legitimacy be themselves included in the 
Asia-constructivist category; or even are included in the case of Amitav Acharya, 
whom Katsumata also frequently references. Mely Caballero-Anthony and Alice Ba 
both acknowledge in their respective assessments of ASEAN’s engagement with 
China that ASEAN-led forums have not yet solved any conflict. But both conclude 
that those forums are successful in their objective to be an ASEAN-led norm-building 
mechanisms. By way of evidence, Caballero-Anthony emphasises for example 
Chinese participation in confidence building measures (CBM) while Ba relies on 
China’s signature underneath the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as well as 
some multilateral participation for evidence. Both unfortunately fail to produce any 
convincing explanation as to why those “achievements” matter, to what extent 
ASEAN can be at all credited, and in what way this affects Chinese policy and 
behaviour beyond rhetoric. 
Asia-constructivists fail to convincingly answer to what extent ASEAN plays a 
significant role or meaningfully affects regional relations; ultimately, how ASEAN can 
be relevant. All they offer are ASEAN-initiated regimes and institutions and major 
power participation. This final assessment as well as the case studies have tried to 
rectify the lack of evidence partly responsible for the implausibility of Asia- 
constructivism. Results however do not support their optimism and are indicative of 
the argument made here that oftentimes Asia-constructivists mistake rhetoric and 
political manoeuvring for evidence, indicative of their normative predisposition. 
The Problem of Ambiguous Research Variables 
 
In the tradition of traditional constructivism, plenty of ASEAN studies rely on such 
research variables as norms, identity, we-feeling, shared perceptions, and value 
intersubjectivity. The problem often appears to be the lack of precision as to their 
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centre stage concepts as well as their usage. This is arguably the greatest problem 
with Asia-constructivism. I intend to highlight two essential problems arising from 
this, though the list is easily extended. First, Asia-constructivism cannot be a 
predictive theory since the causal impact of their independent variables (IV) and 
intervening variables (IntV) on outcomes and events is hard to explain and evaluate 
if all variables are used at will as dependent variable (DV), IV or both and often 
tautological. Secondly, those variables lack clear definition and are too vague as to 
be intersubjectively understandable by all and thus, testable. This is academically 
unsound. The question arises how can we account for the validity of Asia- 
constructivist arguments? And how can one assess ASEAN’s relevance if analyses are 
based on variables that can explain everything and nothing, are unable to make 
predictions, deliver at best partial explanations, and are too insubstantial as to be 
appreciated across the academic world, including non-constructivists? But this is 
precisely what Asia-constructivist endeavour. Adler and Barnett for instance 
assessed ASEAN’s contribution to a security community in Southeast Asia and argued 
that a shared identity facilitated community building and standard of appropriate 
behaviour in form of norm acceptance. Jetly on the other hand regards the 
normative basis of the ASEAN way as the cause of regional stability. Those two 
weaknesses challenge Asia-constructivism’s worth. 
It is in particular Amitav Acharya whose pervasive reliance on norms and identity 
obscures appreciation of his indeed highly sophisticated and stimulating arguments. 
Chapter 3 introduced his work extensively. In most of Acharya’s research, the IV is a 
vague understanding of norms unfolding in  a state of a diffuse pre-norm  social 
environment, the local “belief system”. Local agents become the intervening variable 
initiating localisation of norms that subsequently become appropriately adjusted, 
localised versions of formerly alien norms, leading to DVs such as new shared, but 
homemade identities and communities. Given the utmost significance of norms in 
such arguments, Acharya remains ambivalent as to their origin and what was before 
localisation as well as to the function of norms. Which norms are constitutive, which 
regulative. He does clarify the origin of certain selected ASEAN way specific norms, 
some  of  which  are  apparently  adopted  from  the  international  community  and 
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localised in Southeast Asian agents. But the ambivalence remains because he fails to 
accounts for critical questions such as what came first, socialisation or norms, and 
the reasons behind norm adoption in the first place. For instance, if norms are the 
IV, localisation the IntV, and localised norms one of the DVs in analyses of ASEAN 
regionalism, then norms both drive and result from integration, suggesting 
tautology.932 We can readily accept Achraya’s introduced claim that legal-rational 
norms and socio-cultural norms in combination make up the ASEAN way. His 
localisation concept argues that the ASEAN way itself is the result of a local 
adjustment of foreign norms. If so, then logically norms are both IV and DV. 
The question where they originally came from also remains unclear. If norms are 
foreign and adjusted in accordance with local belief systems, then I suggest that not 
only are norms both IV and DV, but the same applies to identity, for what is a local 
belief system if not an identity? Acharya argues that specific ASEAN norms derived 
from localisation of foreign norms, modified by local agency in accordance with pre- 
existing local beliefs. ASEAN elites in this case become active norm-takers by 
adjusting foreign norms to fit the indigenous cultural and ideological background. 
The outcome is the ASEAN way that facilitates a burgeoning ASEAN identity and 
eventually a community. Acharya argued that regions are first imagined and then 
constructed. He analyses how AMS institutionalised regional socialisation within 
ASEAN and ASEAN-based institutions and how that process allows ASEAN leaders to 
imagine  themselves  as  part  of  the  distinct  region,  leading  to  the  DV  of  deeper 
institutionalisation. The imagined community is defined as ‘an existing set of ideas, 
belief systems, and norms’ of which sources include ‘integrated systems of beliefs.’933 
This cognitive prior has then led to an institutionalisation of regionalism within which 
regional identity gradually developed.934 Identity is therefore not pre-existing but a 
phenomenon evolving from the interaction among Southeast Asian states on the 
basis  of  a  shared  belief  system.  His  logic  therefore  assumes  the  existence  of 
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intersubjectivity from which identity subsequently developed. ASEAN regionalism 
began, he argues, ‘without a discernible and preexisting sense of collective identity’ 
but ASEAN founders ‘clearly hoped to develop one’. At the same time, the founding 
of ASEAN ‘drew upon indigenous social, cultural, and political traditions which would 
all find their way into ASEAN norms’. 935 In other words, a system of beliefs underpins 
the imagined community as ASEAN’s cognitive prior. Again, how does a shared 
system of beliefs differ from identity? 
Again, the use of IV and DV is unclear. What is more, the ASEAN way is therefore the 
result of an incremental socialisation process, norm localisation, and produces 
regulatory and constitutive effects, norm adherence in Southeast Asia. But the 
question as to exact constitution of the pre-localisation state remains. After all, 
socialisation processes do not occur in a vacuum but in a context of local belief 
systems. Yet, what are those belief systems if not norm adherence? Acharya could 
theoretically now  explain that a  belief  system is  something other than identity. 
Chapter 3 however showed how Ted Hopf and other constructivists argued that 
identity is the relation of oneself to its surroundings; the appreciation of who one is 
and who others are and what unites and what separates one actor from another. 
This definition of identity is congenial to Acharya’s shared beliefs. Those may indeed 
be precisely what constructivists would call identity. I would do Acharya injustice and 
he could claim that this definition is not what he understands identity to be, had he 
not himself referred to Hopf and precisely this definition in his work.936 
 
The problem of tautology and causality has been highlighted, but critical positivist 
observers could also point out one further crucial weakness of such variables, their 
measurement. How can one ever account for identity and how can identity and 
identity formation be measured and verified? Related to this, how can one account 
for identity change/evolution? Although, Acharya has provided a yardstick for 
identity measurement, Nicholas Khoo has, in possibly the most scientifically sound 
criticism  of  Acharya’s  research  design,  pointed  out  that  all  three  of  Acharya’s 
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indicators (commitment to multilateralism; development of security cooperation; 
boundaries of membership) are flawed.937 Although Khoo’s critical evaluation of the 
third of Acharya’s measurement tools is weak, his critique of the former two is a 
blow to one of Acharya’s most critical variable and by extension his entire research 
design. Chapter 2 of this thesis has shown that Article 6 of the Charter offers 
clarification of who may be included or excluded from the community; who 
constitutes an outsider and who an insider. Thus, ASEAN offers as precise a 
definition of it boundaries as Acharya expects. However, Khoo convincingly argues 
that the first two criteria are precisely measures not of identity but of threat 
perceptions, reminding analysts more of Walt than Wendt.938 Hence, in what is a 
chiefly constructivist research design, Acharya’s theoretical rational is beset with 
irregular theoretical eclecticism, occasionally resorting to rather rationalist- 
materialist reasoning. 
In sum, Acharya is ambiguous in his use of research variables and this is reflective of 
a general weakness in Asia-constructivism, indeed all constructivism. IV - DV 
relations are unclear. As is what norms emerged when, why, and whether they are 
cause or effect or both. All this is at best imprecise, at worst too diffuse to accept. 
But given that norms and identity are often the two critical variables, it is justified to 
ask for clarification. Things become even more tricky for Asia-constructivist literature 
when we ask for empirical evidence. Collective norms are said to have a constituting 
effect on the actual behaviour of AMS. Thus, we should be able to detect a 
cooperative behaviour in Southeast Asia. Thinking back to this thesis’ case study 
results, we find that even if norms exist, they rarely have a meaningful impact 
beyond the paper they are written on. But this has been sufficiently argued above. 
Frankly, Asia-constructivists are guilty of basing their analyses, hypotheses and 
sweeping claims on unclear foundations. This also, like the other criticism in this 
chapter, suggests intrinsic ideological predisposition, a constructivist bias. Instead of 
starting from a critical vantage point, questioning ASEAN’s cohesion, institutional 
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robustness, and tangible impact, Asia-constructivist begin by accepting constructivist 
variables and eschew evidencing. At the very least, Asia-constructivist ought to 
attempt clarification so that their claims become academically sound and 
intersubjective. 
The Problem of Community 
 
A further problem in Asia-constructivism is the significant community overload. The 
idea of community has been extended to account for an ostensible Southeast Asian 
identity, communal spirit, and the bonding of nation states in order to overcome the 
adverse condition of realpolitik, of anarchy and national self-interest. Echoing ASEAN 
rhetoric, virtually each Asia-constructivist approaches ASEAN in community terms, 
defined by a subjective, imagined, and reciprocal sense of belonging together; a 
common identity and we-feeling by which members intrinsically act according to a 
shared value orientation. Asia-constructivists have accepted the traditional 
constructivist notion that interests and by extension community derive from shared 
identities. Identity is therefore the main constituent of community, as explained in 
chapter 3. 
The true test for ASEAN’s community quality arises whenever national interests 
collide with regional commitments. The more ready AMS are to sacrifice the latter in 
order to service national interests, the less substantial the regional identity and with 
it the community. Yet, we know that Asia-constructivists tend to avoid such tests. 
But case study 2 in particular suggested ASEAN may still have a long way to go to 
reach the Asia-constructivist community. Case study 1 and 2 both showed that not 
even the necessary IntV of identity merger has taken place in ASEAN, not to mention 
the DV of community. Elites in AMS have not engaged in a process of self-reflection 
in order to redefine the self and the other and in ASEAN, identity is not regional we- 
feeling but more often than not national I-feeling. In particular the notion of the 
security community is misleading. Certainly, intramural relationships have 
significantly improved since the founding of ASEAN and the end of Konfrontasi. 
There is also a stronger sense of the need of more cooperation across policy issues 
to the benefit of regional stability. But fundamental, often instinctive barriers remain 
as the Thai-Cambodia conflict has shown. In this light, it is hard to argue that AMS 
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are united by a common Southeast Asian identity and have come to realise that they 
have deeper values in common and share a common destiny. 
Community proponents therefore see the ASEAN10 as more than the sum of ten 
AMS. But it is not; and, as this thesis argues, it does not need to be. National and 
regional resilience are the defining principles of the political ideology across 
Southeast Asia. National resilience and the continuing obsession with domestic 
stability and political autonomy remains the primary goal across the region. Regional 
resilience takes account of the perceived fragility of ASEAN as the organisation of 
diverse and comparatively weak post-colonial nation states. The strong emphasis on 
the ASEAN way and the deliberately resulting institutional weakness accounts 
precisely for that. The apprehensive perception of fragility vis-à-vis outsiders is 
deeply rooted in the political DNA of all ASEAN Member States. Transnational 
identity and inter-governmental norms are an oxymoron. Community is therefore to 
be found in the realisation of a more or less sound modus operandi. In ASEAN, 
community is simplistic and minimalist, not a mature Gemeinschaft of value-rational 
action and the redefinition of self. If there is any sense of ASEAN identity, then it has 
at best been an inter-elite understanding of what ASEAN ought to be used for in 
terms of the wider regional economic and security architecture, i.e. maintain ASEAN 
as an inter-governmental avenue for regional interaction to ensure a basic degree of 
stability and civility while paying lip-service to normative principles to further 
secondary goals. ASEAN’s essential task then is to manage relationships in order to 
preserve a level of order and civility in a region where order and civility cannot be 
taken for granted. Indeed, viewing ASEAN as more than a heterogeneous coalition of 
purpose is to buy into an Asia-constructivist utopia. 
Asia-constructivists have frequently argued that ASEAN is still young and needs time 
to develop into a sound community as they see it. As we recall, traditional 
constructivists had warned that identity formation would be incremental and slow. 
Outside of the academic ivory tower though, this risks eternal deferral of a serious 
appraisal of ASEAN’s qualities. All barriers and counterexamples to shared ASEAN 
identity formation, such as the Thai-Cambodian conflict, can be dismissed as short- 
term  disruption  of  an  inevitable  positive  long-term  trend.  This  leads  to  non- 
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falsifiability of Asia-constructivists claims. Such as Amitav Acharya’s claim in 2001 
that ASEAN was a normative community, making good progress towards 
constructing a Deutschian security community. A story he retells in precisely the 
same words 13 years later.939 
As is so often the case in ASEAN, it is a Singaporean leader who finds the most 
rational words. Following the 27th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Lee Hsien Loong 
noted that 
[o]ne of the constraints on governments - and one of the reasons Asean finds it 
difficult to make progress together - is [that] there is not a very strong sense of 
Asean identity: it's really a Singaporean identity, a Malaysian or Indonesian 
identity. People don't think of themselves as being Asean, except when you 
have an Asean meeting and you have sing-songs together and you see what 
the ideal is. But to go from that ideal to a reality, I think there is some distance 
yet.940 
If even ASEAN leaders are sceptical of something called an ASEAN identity how can 
external pro-identity pundits be that certain? 
The Problem of Centrality 
 
The final problem I intend to highlight is that Asia-constructivists have 
misunderstood both the meaning and the value of centrality. ASEAN’s centrality is a 
concept as frequently used as it is misunderstood. ASEAN talks of its centrality as the 
central lifeline for its continued relevance amidst great powers in East Asia. ASEAN’s 
claim to centrality rests on the claim to be both neutral and the only actor capable of 
facilitating viable dialogue. After all, China would be less willing to participate in U.S.- 
led forums and vice versa. Bilahari Kausikan’s already referred to driver-chauffeur 
analogy helps to understand centrality. Centrality is not accepted by the great 
powers, but convenient to them. Most in ASEAN have understood that being the 
driver of regional multilateralism means not much more than being the chauffeur. 
Asia-constructivists on the other hand have been led to believe that ASEAN’s 
position of being the convener is equal to power. By signing up to ASEAN-based 
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multilateralism, Asia-constructivists expect that eventually the interests of the great 
powers would shift, giving rise to an identification along ASEAN norms to which they 
have been inspired in ASEAN-led multilateral forums. 
A great example is the Chinese security strategy vis-à-vis ASEAN. Asia-constructivists 
continuously refer to participation of major powers in ASEAN-led regional security 
forums and cite this fact as evidence for ASEAN being in the driver’s seat of regional 
security by setting the agenda and determine the process of such forums. China’s 
increasing interest in ASEAN initiated and -based regional institutions and regimes, in 
particular the ARF, TAC, and ASEAN+3 is seen as evidence for the transformative 
power of norms and processes because Beijing apparently demonstrated that it has 
moved from norm-avoidance to norm-acceptance. Both state interests and regional 
identity had undergone a process of transformation. Indeed, on paper, China has 
become increasingly content with ASEAN processes. But in case study 1 we found 
that in reality there is no effort or interest by any of the participants, individual AMS 
and external powers alike, to cooperate meaningfully beyond the pursuit of the own 
national interest. Beijing’s actions on the ground are in striking contrast, almost 
polar-opposite to the principles it has signed up to. ASEAN’s state centric, consensus 
oriented and conflict avoiding norms play into Chinese hands. China intentionally 
maintains an atmosphere of ambiguity by joining institutions and regimes while 
labouring hard to keep all substantial security issues and conflicts off the regional 
agenda and simultaneously changes the status quo on the ground. ASEAN has not 
been able to determine and spread regional norms as Asia-constructivists imply. The 
great powers have rather seen the usefulness of ASEAN-led extramural  forums 
useful to their own end. 
True, AMS do gain significance by hosting high-level forums, just as the chauffeur has 
a certain degree of agency in the car. However, as is the case with internal ASEAN 
processes, there is no dispute settlement procedures or any other form of 
compliance mechanisms. The entire process is more CBM than anything else. In 
particular case study 1 has shown that centrality reflects not ASEAN’s competence 
power but lack of strategic clout. Bizarrely, precisely because ASEAN is weak and 
engagement with ASEAN is essentially free of consequences, major powers accept 
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ASEAN. There are no political costs involved. If this was any different, great powers 
would decide not to participate. However, ASEAN cannot determine or even alter 
the great power’s key interests. ASEAN’s role is rather limited to that of being the 
host, or the chauffeur, not the boss giving directions. 
In this light, ASEAN centrality is, albeit a factor, marginal and thus, in itself 
hyperbolic. This is not to say that centrality is a security basket-case. Case study 1 
found that entertaining cooperation and negotiations when no one else would but 
everyone should, is a valuable contribution. Just like the chauffeur contributes to the 
boss’ work. But in the light of expectations of competence power, this analysis has 
therefore severely disappointed Asia-constructivist notions of ASEAN’s centrality. 
Asia-constructivism refuses to acknowledge the basic fact that whatever institutional 
development ASEAN undertakes, the reality persists that an association of weak 
states can perhaps guide the course of action of stronger ones, but it cannot by itself 
determine their preferences and behaviour. They can contribute to the policy 
considerations of more powerful states, but they cannot determine the nature of 
their interests. Asia-constructivists have simply misunderstood the idea of centrality. 
Back to the Drawing Board 
 
In a context of post-Cold war erosion of the pre-eminence of state centric order, 
constructivism emphasised the important role of norms and their transformative 
power, the role of institutions in overcoming realpolitik and nation state identities. 
Asia-constructivists see ASEAN and its AC15 rhetoric as the practical confirmation of 
the substance of their ideas. An epistemological bias towards normative frameworks 
of analysis and ideational concepts predated both critical considerations and 
empirical observations. As a consequence, Asia-constructivists have begun to analyse 
ASEAN in a state of ideological predisposition, fed by a strong sense of anti-realism, 
post-materialism, and over-accentuation of sociological concepts that are misplaced 
in IR. In other words, Asia-constructivism is normatively biased academia. 
Only the practice on the ground has been shown to look rather different. Given 
Wendt’s warning that transformation processes are incremental and slow, Asia- 
constructivists  can  and  do  dismiss  inauspicious  events  and  trends  as  temporary 
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obstacles on a long-term path headed towards a normative fantasyland. Those 
visionary analyses are useful academic thought experiments, but they do not 
withstand empirical analysis. Such analysis has been performed here, though and 
shown to be dominated by intergovernmental practice, a distinctive lack of 
transnational identity, the absence of a security community, and ultimately 
demonstrated the limited impact of norms and ideas. In sum, the principle 
hypothesis can be confirmed. Though contributing to a holistic understanding of 
regional security, as they stand, Asia-constructivist concepts are not workable, are 
too confuse and diffuse as to be intersubjectively plausible, and cannot be 
substantiated in practice. The academic horizon has been broadened, but essentially, 
Asia-constructivists ought to go back to the drawing board. 
 
5.3. Implications for ASEAN – An Organisation in Peril? 
 
The implications for ASEAN are a lot less severe. The empirical part of this thesis has 
drawn attention to two parallel phenomena. The region displays both a significant 
proliferation of ASEAN-based institutions, declarations, and goals and at the same 
time continued regional insecurity. This suggest that ASEAN actorness in matters of 
regional security has been instrumental but less effective than both Asia- 
constructivists and ASEAN itself expected, or at least claim to be expecting. However, 
unlike Asia-constructivists, ASEAN cannot go back to the drawing board. Although 
the value-added of ASEAN multilateralism and its institutions to regional security is 
significantly lower than what the association has promulgated, ASEAN plays a critical, 
arguably irreplaceable role in regional security and would perish if extensively 
reformed. Before highlighting why this is the case and what this means in ultimate 
conclusion, it is worthwhile to briefly recap two of ASEAN’s most pivotal assets that 
contribute to regional stability. 
ASEAN’s Strengths – The Merits of Process. 
 
This thesis has thus far concluded that ASEAN security actorness remains unfulfilled 
and the case studies have consistently pointed to the many weaknesses of ASEAN. 
Those are largely due the relative material weakness of AMS, their complex history, 
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the association’s heterogeneity and most of all, ASEAN processes under the guidance 
of the ASEAN way. All of this has been rightly criticised, especially when weighed 
against aspirations. Yet, ASEAN is not an “illusion” as some observers maintain.941 
Under the current circumstances of complex strategic relations in a potentially 
conflict-prone, heterogeneous region, ASEAN’s security role is, albeit severely 
constraint, without conceivable alternative. What ASEAN does in the field of security 
at  least  contributed  to  establishment  and  maintenance  of  stability,  order,  and 
civility. This research had promised to deliver a critical but fair appraisal of ASEAN. 
Hence, the final paragraphs of this assessment chapter shall emphasise and 
acknowledge ASEAN’s value-added to regional security and to that end recap two of 
ASEAN’s greatest strengths that became implicitly apparent over the course of this 
study, ASEAN’s intra- and extramural convening power as well as its role as the 
region’s procedural and moral guide, a compass through complex regional relations. 
Both are valuable process oriented means to work towards precisely this stability 
ASEAN has initially set out to deliver. 
Convening Power - External and Internal Networking 
 
Asia-constructivists – and implicitly ASEAN itself – have credited the ASEAN specific 
process, i.e. the ASEAN way as the firm foundation for AC15 and ASEAN’s ever closer 
engagement of extramural powers. Given that the process in question specifically 
reaffirms state-centrism and privileges sovereignty over supranationality, this is 
somewhat paradoxical. We are by now well aware that the ASEAN way intentionally 
creates a framework of low institutional substance; a regionalism light. Meanwhile 
though, despite or arguably precisely because of the non-committing nature of the 
ASEAN way, the association has managed to establish and maintain a dense 
framework of meetings, summits, workshops, and many other exchange forums for 
policy dialogues and CBMs spanning all avenues of diplomacy from track 1 – 3 from 
which peer-to-peer networks emerge and deepen. In plenty of books written on the 
institutional culture of ASEAN, the list of acronyms tends to be several pages long. 
This reflects the fact that ASEAN regularly hosts a staggering amount of meetings 
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and may have taken institutionalised dialogue to the extreme. While this thesis has 
justifiably criticised many such dialogues for their lack of concrete results, it has also 
found them to be surprisingly valuable beyond meaningful policy outcomes. ASEAN 
hosts both issue specific and general conventions of relevant stakeholders in various 
civilised settings and thus created an impressive network for frequent contact and 
even policy exchange that may not have materialised otherwise. Avenues of 
cooperation and dialogue must take place within a procedural framework within 
which all participants feel confident and comfortable with each other; not an easy 
feat in a region as heterogeneous as Southeast Asia and even more complicated in 
the wider Asia-Pacific region. The ASEAN way has proven to be a useful tool in this 
respect since it allows cooperation without significant investment. In other words, 
there is merit in process. 
Internally, the biannual ASEAN Summits are at the centre, but forums such as the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and 
many others are increasingly important. A number of former and current regional 
policymakers and other elites have suggested to this author that they most certainly 
appreciate ASEAN as a distinctively Southeast Asian networking opportunity. Long 
time Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad for instance believes it to be one 
of ASEAN’s greatest assets that it always made contact that much easier. ASEAN 
elites he said, could talk in their own quiet way and he himself had always relied on 
ASEAN to provide him and other ASEAN stakeholders with a channel to establish and 
maintain contact. He highlighted two specific examples. For one, cooperation within 
ASEAN frameworks expedited and simplified necessary collaboration with 
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew in a context of personal aloofness. Mahathir also recalled 
how ASEAN in the typically unobtrusive ASEAN way aided engagement of Myanmar’s 
top  generals.  Despite  significant  international  opposition,  ASEAN  had  admitted 
Myanmar into their ranks.942 This decision was partly due to recommendations by 
Mahathir and by his own confessions, he believed admission was the best way to 
mitigate  the  worst  impacts  of  the  military  junta  within  regular  ASEAN  based 
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interaction, perhaps even leading to auspicious permanent change.943 Singapore’s 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew expressed similar convictions.944 Without exposing or 
publically criticising the generals, both Mahathir and Lee thought it possible to exert 
covert, quiet influence on the junta, in particular with regards to the human rights 
situation and the treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi and political opposition in 
general.945 Topics the generals were very reluctant to discuss and may not have done 
so without the informal characteristics and discreetness of the ASEAN way. 
The various ASEAN retreats for example are highly conducive to such regional 
cooperation.946 Matters of regional security in general tend to be of similar such 
sensitivity and are, as we saw in all three case studies, rarely openly discussed at 
formal meetings. With the inauguration of the first retreat in 1999, a critical format 
for frank, informal, and face-saving discussions had been established and retreats 
are now a permanent feature of ASEAN security diplomacy during which to exchange 
views without commitment and direct public awareness. 947 Such creations are 
testimony to both ASEAN’s will and ability to enhance security by institutionalising 
confidential elite communication. Although elites do sometimes choose to cooperate 
outside the ASEAN framework, as seen for instance with the Malay, Thai, and 
Indonesian Ministerial Meeting on Irregular Movement of People in Southeast Asia, 
ASEAN certainly aids and accelerates such contact in general and at times of crisis. 
Case study 2 has also suggested that ASEAN can bring even directly warring parties 
together and enable mediation in both official and unofficial forums, such as the 
Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN (IMAMM) in Jakarta. As also 
witnessed in case study 2, communication by itself may not always resolve the 
underlying security problem. Indeed, the fact that ASEAN involvement in this case 
was minimal is unfortunate testimony to its enduring ineffectiveness in terms of 
affecting meaningful change. What ASEAN does however, is contributing to tension 
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Personal Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 2015. 
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Lee (2011): 324. 
945 
Personal Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 2015. 
946 
Haacke (2003) and chapter 2 of this thesis for more on retreats. 
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management and de-escalation and reduces the risk of misunderstanding and 
miscalculation by promoting inter-elite understanding. 
A final point, with China growing ever more assertive and in particular Indonesia 
inadvertently becoming ever deeper embroiled in the SCS disputes, intramural 
networking on this subject is likely to increase. In particular should Indonesia decide 
to assume a leadership role in ASEAN once again. In that sense, Chinese 
encroachment on the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone around the Natunas may 
turn out to be a blessing for ASEAN. If Indonesia were to begin to link its own China 
problem with those of other AMS, it might facilitate further intra-ASEAN 
coordination conducive to more concerted diplomatic, legal, and military defence of 
territorial integrity. For now though, this remains speculation. 
Externally, ASEAN performs a similar laudable, albeit less influential feat. Although 
not safeguarding stability and security in the Asia-Pacific by itself, this research has 
alluded to ASEAN’s role as the convener of great powers; i.e. its role as the provider 
of East Asian avenues for security cooperation. This role is primarily to continue to 
provide a platform for inter-great power relations in general as well as for the 
management of specific and immediate conflicts of regional concern that could spiral 
out of control due to a lack of communication or simple misunderstanding. Although 
ASEAN does not have the power to change or meaningfully influence perception and 
interests of more powerful actors and in the end those will do as they see fit, the 
association does an important job by hosting talks. Convening regional security 
stakeholders such as China and the U.S. who do have the power to either maintain 
or reverse the status quo is a worthwhile objective in itself. Case study 1 has 
provided useful insights in this regard. It was found that what matters for tangible 
security outcomes in the East Asian security architecture is all but unrelated to 
ASEAN and materialises in the form of Chinese or U.S. led initiatives and hard power 
instruments such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, One Belt One Road, land-reclamations and bullying, freedom of navigation 
operations, bilateral alliances and defence agreements, and many more such factors. 
Meanwhile though, ASEAN was found to fill a gap inevitably left by regional and 
global great power competition that prevents any one major power to establish 
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credible avenues for exchange. This is where ASEAN enters the game and this is also 
the real merit of ASEAN centrality. 
Calling the ADMM+ the most important regional security forum or being the 
namesake of the ARF is not simple vanity on ASEAN’s part. The great powers have 
been found to invest substantial political capital into ASEAN based processes and are 
thus willingly on the receiving end of convening power. Even if ASEAN is not 
necessarily the honest, neutral broker Asia-constructivists would like to believe, in 
the context of the geostrategic status quo in the Asia-Pacific where great power 
relations unfold, ASEAN remains relevant because it is the most viable provider of 
communication and point of reference. Granted, this thesis has strongly criticised 
ASEAN-based forums, mostly for their notorious failure to reach the set goals or to 
take binding decisions with tangible outcomes. Such forums are justifiably called talk 
shops where no one even expects conflict resolution, but precisely this also incites 
countries such as China to remain in constant dialogue. 
Take for instance the ARF. While it has virtually no role in conflict resolution, it is by 
no means obsolete. Its value-added has shown to be such indirect measures as 
dialogues, CBMs, and facilitation of military-to-military contacts and more. Although 
direct security concerns tend to remain unaddressed, the value of the ARF and other 
such forums is maintaining a point of diplomatic contact with the limited objective to 
improve the regional climate in good faith that bi- and multilateral problems may be 
easier to manage; just as Michael Leifer had always pointed out.948 Similar applies to 
processes and security regimes. Ian Storey is incorrect when he calls the Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) and Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea (CoC) talks increasingly irrelevant.949 True, I have also argued above 
that a CoC is not going to materialise anytime soon and even if, there is not much 
that would change as result. And yet, the process of negotiating it is laudable and in 
fact ASEAN should push for even more multilateral dialogue channels, no matter 
how superficial. As Tang Siew Mun rightly pointed out while ‘negotiations have not 
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Leifer (2005c): 161; Leifer (1996). 
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yielded the desired results, the process is an important line of communication 
between ASEAN and China to manage expectations and exchange views on the 
SCS.’950 
Critics also rightly argue that the reason ASEAN takes centre stage here is not 
testimony to the association’s relevance but consequence of a coincidental strategic 
environment.951 Although this is true, it misses the point. For one, ASEAN’s limelight 
is only superficial for it does not provide it with any significant actorness. Secondly, 
coincidental or not does not matter. What matters is that regional stability requires 
institutionalisation of mutual great power reassurance and efficient information 
transmission. In particular the maritime domain in East Asia needs more, not less 
security cooperation and CBMs for better management of risks in regional seas that 
could easily escalate. Aside from keeping all parties talking, one further implicit by- 
product is that this plethora of multilateral contact maintains the notion that a rules- 
based order would indeed be the best and most desired outcome. 
Although not sufficient for credible security actorness, convening power is arguably 
ASEAN’s greatest contribution to regional security. Convening power, enabled by the 
peculiar ASEAN specific process provides an enduring role for the association in 
intra- and extramural regional security by reducing the  likelihood or severity of 
conflict and instability in a region where neither can be taken for granted. 
Compass 
 
A second noteworthy ASEAN asset relates to one of this thesis’ specific aims of 
pointing to the gap between goals and achievements. There is a logical contradiction 
between simultaneous goals of realising a regional value community while 
maintaining absolute national sovereignty by intentionally creating weak institutions 
entrusted with safeguarding such values. Markus Hund hints at this paradox when he 
argues that ASEAN looks like ‘an organization trying to integrate without actually 
integrating,  of  nation  states  trying  to  coordinate  without  being  coordinated.’952 
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Notwithstanding ASEAN’s claims, Southeast Asian interstate relations are governed 
by national interest and relative power, manifest in ASEAN’s incapacity to move to a 
politically integrative level above non-interference and absolute domestic 
sovereignty.953 This suggests that perhaps present-day ASEAN does not aspire to 
actually achieve the goals it sets in an operative sense. As far as ASEAN is concerned, 
missing those goals is not the one critical point and ASEAN is often misunderstood. In 
ASEAN, goals do not exclusively fulfil the function of an achievable target within a 
specific timeframe, but are set as grand aspirational, but unachievable objectives; as 
an at least in the medium-term unachievable telos. 
This is not to say that goals are inoperable. On the contrary, but is one of the 
peculiar, but fundamental realisms of Southeast Asian regionalism and serves two 
purposes. First, this paradox reflects ASEAN’s quality as facilitating regional 
understanding in general. This understanding in general is reached by ASEAN elites 
comfortably agreeing on goals and thus, cooperate in a non-contentious atmosphere 
bettering intramural relations in general. Lee Kuan Yew argued that ASEAN does not 
focus on what divides them but on what unites them, pushing divisions aside for the 
greater good of mutual understanding.954 In this light, consensus may not only be an 
integral principle of the ASEAN way but ought to be understood as a CBM and 
becomes an end in itself. Reaching a positive and decisive consensus among ASEAN 
leaders facilitates cordial relations and reduces apprehension. In other words, 
consensus is reached for the sake of reaching a consensus. As a consequence, ASEAN 
agrees on easy to agree upon measures, while “shelving” the ones they “agree to 
disagree” on. Focusing on “low hanging fruits” at the expense of contentious issues 
is detrimental, or at least not conducive to ASEAN actorness. But it is also the reason 
why Southeast Asian states as well as extramural powers can continue to cooperate 
within civilised, orderly, and institutionalised regional security architecture. The 
guide through potentially antagonistic relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
953  
Weatherbee (2005): 120. 
954 
Lee (2011): 330. 
370 
 
 
Second, in particular case study 3 suggested that the association’s agreements can 
sometimes play a role as the moral compass of ASEAN elites; an umbrella of guiding 
values building bridges in a region of great religious, cultural, and especially political 
diversity. While realising that the status quo differs significantly from stated 
ambitions, those can be understood as an appreciation of moral and normative 
perfection by ASEAN elites. A yet unachieved condition on which agreement can be 
established as long as it remains rhetoric and is not immediately backed up with 
mechanisms sufficient to turn rhetoric into practice. On the one hand, this allows 
ASEAN elites to cooperate and find agreement with ease. Should circumstance 
change at some point, those agreements can be realised or simply left as mere 
rhetorical principles. Even then, perhaps not even wanting to achieve those goals, 
elites can use those principles for overall guidance in day-to-day regional relations as 
a general moral compass and for specific policy guidance. In particular case study 2 
and 3 suggest as much. Commitments made to human rights and ASEAN’s security 
community quality are not distortions of reality by elites who have lost touch. They 
are an acknowledgement of the deficiency of the under current circumstance 
unchangeable actual condition, via formulation of a desired condition; a codification 
of regional perfection, providing guidance in a messy security environment. All can 
agree on perfect peace, knowing they are unlikely to achieve it in reality. Agreeing 
on peace is not much and certainly not sufficient to be a security community, but it is 
better than not achieving agreement at all. 
Or consider human rights norms. Those have appeared on ASEAN’s agenda ever 
since the 1993 United Nations Vienna Declaration and found their way into the 
regional discourse. However, as demonstrated, there are no mechanisms in place 
that could ever safeguard adherence to such norms. And yet, norms could be 
diffused by local norm-entrepreneurs and have been rhetorically accepted by all 
critical stakeholders. Although not practically implemented, overcoming the human 
rights taboo in Southeast Asia and codify such norms as a legal principle is an 
achievement in itself. ASEAN has enshrined such laudable aspirations in ASEAN’s 
moral compass which would have certainly been impossible to agree on had this 
been accompanied by a strong human rights mechanism. Even if some countries may 
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resist implementation of corresponding rules and no one else imposes, all have 
nonetheless signed up to human rights in theory and the hard bargaining and 
deliberation in the Charter drawing process as documented by members of the 
ASEAN Charter High Level Task Force,955 testifies that every single ASEAN Member 
State (AMS) had contemplated the meaning of human dignity. Recent research by 
Joern Dosch is indicative of the medium-term merit of such dynamics. He found that 
the evolution of the regional human rights discourse has penetrated contemporary 
Vietnam and meaningfully affected domestic Vietnamese politics. Unlike a few years 
ago, human rights are now increasingly discussed across Vietnam to an extent that 
Hanoi even amended the constitution in order to account for such discourse 
evolution. Dosch is adamant that a change in the regional discourse has increased 
peer-pressure and encouraged individual AMS to be responsive to human rights 
requirements.956 This also reminds of a further, only implicit, yet positive utility of 
the moral compass. Also highlighted in case study 2, the codification of normative 
perfection, in this case theoretical commitments to protection of high human rights 
standards, provides civil society actors with an argument. There can be no doubt 
that non-state norm-entrepreneurs, such as human rights non-governmental 
organisations have a more solid foot to stand on when making their laudable human 
rights case if such norms are in fact firmly and de jure anchored in ASEAN’s legal 
framework. 
Institutional Reform? 
 
Those strengths may not sound much in the light of the extensively introduced 
demand. This is the reason why plenty of analysts continuously suggest ASEAN ought 
to modify its rules and procedures in order to enhance its effectiveness and 
actorness and thus, its relevance. A great many, including this author, have rightly 
criticised ASEAN and pointed to its many shortcoming, mostly on the basis of ASEAN 
way  principles  such  as  strict  unanimous  decision  making  and  non-interference 
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inhibiting effectiveness. At first sight, this thesis’ analysis makes for a compelling 
case in support of such criticism. All case studies have exposed ASEAN’s weaknesses 
as security threats unfolded within an institutional structure not well equipped to 
provide the necessary guardianship to meaningfully tackle those and thus, fulfil 
ASEAN’s actorness demands. It would require great leadership to adjust ASEAN 
processes and structure and to coordinate AMS’ policy priorities in a way conducive 
to a greater role for ASEAN in regional security. AMS would have to be convinced to 
accept limits on their sovereignty and at times accept individual disadvantages in 
favour of a greater common regional good. Two questions arise immediately. Should 
ASEAN undertake severe institutional reform to increase its ability to live up to its 
laudable goals; and what is the greater regional good? I suggest that institutional 
reforms, though auspicious in theory, may seriously threaten ASEAN and while it 
may not vanish, it may become even less effective as a result of well-intended 
reforms. Hence, the greater regional good may well be to keep ASEAN exactly as it is. 
If ASEAN wants to remain in the driver’s seat of the wider regional security 
architecture, if it wants to be a rules-based security community in which war is 
absent and all peoples enjoy human rights, ASEAN, one could be tempted to say, 
must urgently reform. Susan Shirk for instance argued ASEAN will have to find a way 
around its procedural roadblocks by reforming decision making processes in order to 
prevent individual spoiler countries from corrupting the association’s effectiveness 
and resilience in dealing with China.957 Similarly, case study 2 brought this point 
home and demonstrated how Thailand as well as other AMS could easily prevent 
ASEAN from taking a proactive role in living up to its security community aspirations. 
Case study 3 on the other hand showed that while human rights gained great 
attention in the newest APSC blueprint, including 15 action lines, operationally the 
AICHR focuses on promoting the norm without a trace of active protection of it. 
True enough, ASEAN’s near obsession with conflict avoidance and the consensus 
principle exposes it to outside and inside interference. Coupled with the extreme 
 
 
 
957 
Shirk (2016): The significance of ASEAN for U.S. strategy toward China and the Asia-Pacific, Panel 
Presentation at the Regional Outlook Forum 2016, 12 January, Singapore, available: 
www.iseas.edu.sg. 
373 
 
 
heterogeneity ASEAN lends itself easily to hostage taking. Yet, it is precisely the non- 
binding character and lack of non-compliance mechanisms of ASEAN-based 
procedures that keep countries participating. Signing the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) or joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) allowed relevant 
actors to engage and to demonstrate good will at relatively low costs, knowing that 
formal agreements are not binding and the ASEAN way would always allow everyone 
to prevent any measure not in their interest. Similar applies for instance to the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. Case study 3 shed light on 
the process leading to the establishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism 
(HRM) and highlighted the intense debates surrounding the process. Of course, it 
would be preferable to  have a  HRM with at least  some autonomous  oversight, 
perhaps even some compliance enforcement authority. But in particular the CLMV 
states are unlikely to have ever given their consent had a HRM be endowed with a 
mandate providing ASEAN with greater actorness. 
In the light of the case study results that vividly displayed the practical, tangible 
implications of ASEAN’s low actorness, one could be tempted to argue that ASEAN 
elites ought to further strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat, perhaps even appoint 
autonomous ministers and review fundamental principles in order to devise 
mechanisms for monitoring and non-compliance sanctioning. While the ASEAN way 
may have prevented problems from arising between AMS, the same doctrine 
impedes solving them should they ever arise. Should certain principles be reformed 
or abolished ASEAN’s actorness would doubtlessly improve. Even some AMS, or 
rather individual ASEAN elites suggested reform in order to more effectively address 
security problems with regional ramifications. This is for instance behind Foreign 
Minister Surin Pitsuwan’s proposal for “flexible engagement”. As we know, he did 
meet strong resistance. Equally, one could be tempted to propose a reform to 
decision making by for instance introducing various forms of majority voting 
mechanisms in order to prevent process hogging. Yet, under current circumstances, 
ASEAN would not withstand substantial institutional reform and advice to that end is 
based on either frustration with, or a fundamental misunderstanding of ASEAN. 
Reforms are both unlikely and detrimental. This thesis numerous interviews with 
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current and former ASEAN and AMS’ officials have overwhelmingly shown that 
stakeholder are content with the way ASEAN works and that substantial reforms 
were likely to spell the end of ASEAN for it goes against the regional instinct. 
Although its rhetoric suggests otherwise and it may perhaps be desirable, ASEAN has 
no intention of becoming more effective. 
This is indicative of ASEAN’s main dilemma. Its very principles, its constitutive norms 
prevent ASEAN from fulfilling its ambitions. But at the same time, they are the only 
reason ASEAN can exist. ASEAN can only work by informal debate and consensus 
decision making. Chapter 2 has introduced the extreme heterogeneity across ASEAN 
as well as the strong sense of post-colonial nationalism and all case studies have at 
some point related to these two decisive realities of Southeast Asia. Several 
influential ASEAN elites with a great wealth of ASEAN experience stressed to this 
author  that  that  by  and  large  all  AMS  insist  and  require  the  ASEAN  way  to  be 
upheld.958 Not only has the ASEAN way always been the most important procedural 
basis for AMS to engage, it also continues to minimise suspicion in a heterogeneous 
region where conflict remains a reality. Changes to ASEAN’s cherished modus 
operandi may indeed initiate deeper institutionalisation conducive to ASEAN’s 
actorness, but will cause serious damage to its internal and external relevance as it 
jettisons ASEAN’s strengths as an informal, non-committing forum for desperately 
needed interaction, confidence, and guidance. By abolishing its institutional 
weaknesses, ASEAN reformist would abolish ASEAN. Like Ambassador Bilahari 
Kausikan said, ASEAN only works if it does not work too well.959 
Hence, unlike most other critical observers, I do not suggest a reform of ASEAN in 
order to enable ASEAN to meet its ambitions. I propose temporarily reducing the 
demand side to allow the supply side to catch up. Lower the expectations and ASEAN 
will do just fine for now. 
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5.4. Lowering the Demand 
 
As a final proposition of this chapter, I put forward the argument that the problem 
may also rest with the demand, not only the lacking ASEAN supply. Why not lowering 
the demand side in order to allow the supply side to catch up and become confident 
in achievement? This would allow ASEAN to rid itself of the constant air of 
underachievement and be congenial to the above made argument about ASEAN 
consensuses for confidence and the ASEAN way. In such atmosphere ASEAN can 
function well and if elites decide on it, even develop. If desired, supply may 
eventually increase. 
While language is certainly strong, the actual behaviour of Southeast Asian countries 
on the regional security canvas more often than not advances national, often 
mutually antagonistic agendas, not the regional good. This is as true extramurally as 
it is intramurally. The low degree of ASEAN actorness is particularly obvious under 
the limelight of  self-imposed standards and  academic expectations. If  measured 
against this demand, we saw that ASEAN is hopelessly overstretched. It expanded 
significantly in both form and function with the inclusion of the CLMV states as well 
as the AC15 project. Extended membership led to ever greater heterogeneity in 
societal, economic, and political make-up as well as national interest. This only 
exacerbated divisions and increased the frequency of “agree to disagree” and 
shelving of issues. Too ambitious political, economic, and social targets 
inauspiciously accompanied membership expansion. AC15 brought with it a whole 
new set of demands by expanding and articulating new and ever more aspiring tasks 
and goals. At the same time, though we saw over the course of the case studies that 
its members only poorly support the association. Adding to this is the absence of a 
natural leader. Best placed to fulfil this role would arguably be Indonesia, the 
intellectual parent of the APSC. However, as things stand the Jokowi government 
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seems to have downgraded the ASEAN component in its foreign policy strategy from 
being the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy to being a cornerstone.960 
All this creates manifold political dilemmas for ASEAN. For example, while the 
inclusion of Vietnam led to an even greater urgency and prominence of the SCS 
conflicts in ASEAN’s extramural affairs, the Cambodian inclusion limited ASEAN’s 
capacity to address effectively those conflicts. Myanmar’s maltreatment of the 
Rohingya minority highlighted a similar effect, causing great embarrassment to the 
association and rightly raised doubts as to ASEAN’s efficacy and ultimately its 
relevance. In sum, the demand side is beyond reach as expectations and capacity are 
hopelessly out of sync. This has created a constant atmosphere of 
underachievement. More than just detecting plenty of room for improvement, 
ASEAN could be seen as total failure. 
But since we also saw that firstly, not all is wrong in Southeast Asia at all and ASEAN 
has shown itself to play an irreplaceable role, and secondly, that substantial reforms 
are unlikely, one could suggest that ASEAN would be better served if one was to 
lower the demand side and allow ASEAN to redeem itself in a low-pressure 
atmosphere. In a more or less comfortable-for-all multilateral regionalism, ASEAN 
has managed to keep internal and external dialogue and cooperation going in a 
region where neither can be taken for granted. 
Would the region be any less secure if ASEAN and its numerous extensions would 
not exist? The answer is yes. The preceding analysis has led to the conclusion that it 
is delusional to interpret ASEAN as a viable autonomous actor that has more than a 
marginal role in the regional security order. Yet, the region would be less secure 
because it would lack consensus, dialogue, confidence, a normative value 
commitment, and in total it would lack a constantly reinforced cooperational spirit, 
no matter how superficial. Take for instance centrality. All of the above suggests that 
ASEAN centrality has been misunderstood by many. Its extramural convening power 
gives  credit  to  ASEAN’s  relevance  and  to  some  extent  to  its  centrality.  But  if 
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measured against ASEANS’s own and Asia-constructivist demands on centrality, 
including the power to socialise and change preferences of outsiders, the relevance I 
credit ASEAN with here, appears a rather limited appreciation. But why should we 
for instance see the ARF as the region’s “norm brewery” or the TAC to be behind the 
ostensible “long East Asia peace” if there is no evidence to support this? The ARF 
was never designed to solve regional problems but nonetheless, it is a crucial cog in 
the larger regional security wheel. There is a case to be made that ASEAN-led forums 
have to some extent allowed AMS a greater role in regional security than otherwise 
possible, but why claiming that East Asia has been “ASEAN-ised”? Or take consensus. 
It can be interpreted as an integral principle designed to achieve and maintain 
confidence among elites, as an end in itself. It is one of the reasons why Southeast 
Asian states cooperate at all. Why making such principles the basis for DVs of a 
shared identity in which nationalism becomes secondary to regionalism? 
If one buys this thesis’s arguments, one would be well advised to induce a bit of 
realism back into the debate and appreciate ASEAN for what it is, a heavily 
institutionalised, but intergovernmental facilitation of elite cooperation where 
otherwise there may be none. ASEAN and ASEAN-based institutions are neither 
norm-entrepreneurs nor the one reason for relative Asian stability. ASEAN is no 
security community, especially not one in which its peoples enjoy democracy, 
freedom, human rights, and harmony. It is a useful adjunct to a stable balance of 
power, which is what had always been on Michael Leifer’s mind. No need to reinvent 
the wheel. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter concluded with the call to appreciate ASEAN simply for what it 
is. The remarkable optimism in ASEAN and among Asia-constructivists is at least 
incomplete but also naïve for it ignores the realities of nation state behaviour that is 
only in theory subordinate to ASEAN’s normative framework. Three case studies 
have strongly suggested that this is the case. Since the literature, the empirical case 
378 
 
 
studies, all arguments, and the general research framework and conclusion have 
been explained well and summarised in different context, this completed 
appreciation of ASEAN is the best conclusion this thesis could now come to. Before I 
suggest some potential further research, it shall very briefly attempt to account for 
ASEAN in the light of what this research has found out. 
 
6.1. What is ASEAN? 
 
This thesis began setting out very sceptical presumptions and the appraisal remained 
critical all the way through. However, in particular the foregoing pages have 
demonstrated that its author is not an ASEAN abolitionist. Quite to the contrary. 
Over the course of this research ASEAN and academic assessments surrounding it 
have been subjected to the hardest possible tests and assessments. More often than 
not ASEAN was found lacking; so were Asia-constructivists. Despite, or perhaps 
precisely because of case study results, this thesis intends to conclude on a sober, 
realistic, but also positive note. Appreciating ASEAN for what it is means essentially 
three things. Accepting ASEAN’s limitations; acknowledge its strengths; and 
consequentially, rationally adjust the demand. There is no value in either 
condemning ASEAN as a useless talk shop or rejoicing in an illusive performance. 
Realists have ignored the value of institutions in general and ASEAN’s valuable 
contributions to regional security in particular. Asia-constructivists on the other end 
have been overly and unduly optimistic, oblivious to ASEAN’s shortcomings. They 
have raised the demand to unattainable levels and by doing so contributed to a 
constant atmosphere of underachievement. While realists are overly pessimistic and 
unwisely and prematurely dismiss ASEAN, Asia-constructivists failed to convincingly 
argue what ASEAN is good for and why it matters since they ignored rationality and 
evidence. 
Drawing on its comprehensive and conscientious analyses and conclusions, this 
thesis has come to appreciate ASEAN despite some gloomy pre-analytical 
hypotheses. I arrive at the conclusion that in terms of International Relations (IR) 
theory, most, though not ultimate explanatory power rests with institutional realist 
approaches.  IR  is  arguably  still  best  explained  in  terms  of  power  politics  and 
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balancing, but with growing interdependence those explanatory parameters must be 
interpreted differently and must be expanded to account for IR’s greater complexity, 
latest since the end of the Cold War. Institutional realists highlight the value of 
institutions under the pretext of a general acceptance of some basic neo-realist 
assumptions, such as anarchy and threat balancing. Institutions can be used by 
sovereign nation states to shape rough edged balance of power theory. While 
institutions do not have a life of their own and are in absolute dependence vis-à-vis 
sovereign nation states, weaker states may use them in order to limitedly participate 
in great power politics. States can for instance supplement military means with 
formal and informal institutional arrangements in order to balance geopolitical 
forces for the sake of increasing their security. To that end, they may instrumentalise 
institutions of great power contact to influence policy or to form ad-hoc, short-term 
and issue-specific coalitions. Institutional balancing therefore provides an 
opportunity to individual small states to take part in regional and global politics; a 
voice to be heard that would be marginalised otherwise. 
Institutional realism would therefore regard ASEAN’s institutions as an intervening 
variable impacting regional security by influencing contact between hegemonic 
competitors and  the  rules  and agendas  of  regional  cooperation.  Institutions are 
therefore important, but insufficient foreign- and security policy tools. In that view, 
ASEAN Member States (AMS) utilise their association to maintain stability by using 
institutions to balance against external threats or to maintain sound, rationalist 
working relationships among AMS themselves.961 
This view corresponds to a large extent with the conclusions drawn on ASEAN above. 
Those however also suggest that while institutional balancing is important, it does 
not exhaust the merit of ASEAN. Institutional realists rightly argue that institutions 
have helped to create, maintain, and manage a balance of power, internally and 
externally. But it is equally important to stress that while the institutions in question 
have indeed been used for balancing for security, they are not exhausted by it but 
also  facilitate  pivotal  cooperation  and  consensus  for  confidence.  This  thesis’ 
 
 
 
961 
He (2006); Khoo (2004) for an application of institutional realism in Asia. 
380 
 
 
conclusions as to what ASEAN is and can be differs from institutional realist 
perspective in that it sees the perhaps greatest attribute of ASEAN in its ability to 
convene all stakeholders and to increase confidence among them. 
It has been shown that ASEAN avenues of engagement are not more and not less 
than useful additives to hard internal and external balancing components in a holistic 
overall security strategy. AMS rely mainly on bilateral cooperation with the U.S., 
Japan and others to counter growing extramural threats. Yet, ASEAN’s “+extensions” 
shape this hard strategy with dialogue and confidence building measures in order to 
avoid a Cold War-esque atmosphere of unpredictable non-contact. In intramural 
relations, ASEAN is of greater value. Initially, as institutional realists would argue, 
ASEAN served as a tool for intramural balancing, in particular in the complex, 
uncertain, and dangerous Singaporean-Malay-Indonesian relations. However, the 
utility of ASEAN has evolved and moved on in order to account for new threats and 
opportunities. ASEAN has failed to effectively address traditional and non- 
traditional, state- and non-state-centric security threats largely because of the 
principles of the ASEAN way. Yet, this for now irreversible hindrance has 
simultaneously allowed ASEAN to manage facilitation of contact, officially and 
otherwise. It has also done a good job in establishing confidence via superficial 
consensus and by providing idealistic guidance to constantly remind the region of a 
desirable telos in an imperfect reality. All of this, while not sufficient, contributes to 
a relative stability in a region where the spectre of conflict and turmoil looms large. 
 
6.3. Further research 
 
This thesis claims to have contributed a wide range of new arguments about ASEAN 
studies and ASEAN as an institution. It has also introduced a unique model to 
approach the ASEAN question. However, a number of areas have been touched but 
not sufficiently elaborated on and there is certainly no shortage of further research 
opportunities in the field. I shall suggest four areas out of a long list where I hope 
productive future research will provide the interested world with significantly more 
insight than I have been able to. 
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First, ASEAN studies would benefit greatly from more research as to the origin of 
ASEAN rhetoric. An entire Ph.D. project could be conducted as to the exact 
motivation of ASEAN elites to agree on such flamboyant, ambitious rhetoric, 
knowing articulated goals will never be achieved. Throughout this thesis, some 
suggestions have been made as to why this could be the case. However, as the origin 
of language has not been the primary research focus, I have not made many 
meaningful contributions to this question. Secondly, the similarities between ASEAN 
and European Union (EU) terminology are striking. For instance, ASEAN inadvertently 
opened itself up for EU comparisons by adopting a three-pillar community structure 
as the basic framework for the ASEAN Community, reminiscent of the EU structure 
as stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty. Some great researchers have already done 
valuable work on this.962 But there is plenty of room for more and it would be 
fascinating to learn more about possible reasons for such similarities, in particular in 
the light of ASEAN’s aversion to EU supranationalism. Thirdly, keen researchers could 
inquire about the impact of significant domestic regime change on regional 
integration in ASEAN Community. This could perhaps even be done in an Asia- 
constructivist framework accounting for identity, not regime change. For example, 
the  recent  significant  transformation  in  Thailand  from  an  elected  government 
towards a military junta or the other way around in Myanmar would offer great new 
case studies. As of yet, not much work has been done on this and it would be 
interesting to learn how ASEAN processes, meetings and Summits cope with this 
substantial and rapid change. Lastly, and to this author of specific interest is the 
application of my research model to other cases. On the one hand, future 
researchers could be interested in the benchmarks  I have derived from a 
combination of various ASEAN and Asia-constructivists sources and apply those to 
different case studies in ASEAN. Chapter 1 has already made some  suggestions 
where individual  benchmarks  could  be applied,  but  there  are  plenty more 
possibilities. On the other hand, at least as interesting would be an application of the 
here devised supply versus demand model within a case study framework including 
 
 
 
 
962  
Jetschke (2009); Jetschke/Murray (2015). 
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qualitative benchmarking and KPIs to other global, regional, and national 
organisations and institutions. For instance, the EU or the United Nations, even 
specific regimes such as the United Nations Human Rights Declaration and others 
offer a great wealth of potential applicability. 
This list is by no means exhaustive, but includes some of the most interesting areas 
for future research. I shall leave this for competent researchers, bold enough to 
attempt it and I wish them well. 
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